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1 Introduction
1.1 THESIS OF THE STUDY
This study defends the thesis that when European states endeavour to control
the movement of asylum-seekers outside their territories, they remain respons-
ible under international law for possible wrongdoings ensuing from their
sphere of activity. To substantiate this thesis, the study first conceptualises
the relevant international legal framework governing external activity of states
and the status of individuals who seek protection from a state but are outside
that state’s ordinary legal order. The study next examines how this legal
framework governs and constrains current and unfolding European practices
of external migration control.
1.2 GENESIS OF THE STUDY
The study was sparked by a proposal presented by the United Kingdom
government to its European partners in 2003 to fundamentally change the
system of asylum protection in Europe. In order to deter those who enter the
European Union illegally and make unfounded asylum applications, the UK
government proposed to establish protected zones in third, non-EU, countries,
both in regions of the refugees’ origin and along the transit routes into the
EU, to which asylum-seekers, including those who had already arrived in the
European Union, could be transferred to have their applications processed.
Only those determined as refugee would be eligible for resettlement within
the EU, while failed claimants were to be returned to their countries of origin
or integrated locally.1 The proposal aimed, amongst other things, to break
the link between illegal immigration and asylum seeking, to reduce the burden
on European states of rapidly fluctuating and unmanaged intakes of asylum-
seekers, to scale down the numbers of failed asylum-seekers residing illegally
1 The United Kingdom proposal was forwarded by Prime Minister Blair in March 2003 as
a concept paper to his European Council colleagues: Letter of 10 March 2003 by Prime
Minister Tony Blair to His Excellency Costas Simitis, with attached document ‘New Inter-
national Approaches to Asylum Processing and Protection’, reprinted in: House of Lords
European Union Committee – Eleventh Report, ‘Handling EU asylum claims: new ap-
proaches examined’, 30 April 2004, Appendix 5.
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in Europe, and to provide more equitable protection for genuine refugees. In
an internal document, the British Home Office summarised the proposals as
reflecting a ‘pro-refugee but anti-asylum seeking strategy’.2
The British ‘New Vision for Refugees’ was widely reflected upon in political
arenas across Europe and legal academia. Not only did the plans constitute
a fundamental shift to traditional thinking about the reception of asylum-
seekers in Europe (and were as such perceived as ‘a serious challenge to the
institution of asylum as we know it’3), they also raised a variety of legal and
theoretical issues relating to the responsibilities of states under international
law to protect refugees and other displaced persons. These concerned, in
particular, the question whether obligations stemming from refugee law, and
most notably the prohibition of return (or refoulement), would also apply to
asylum-seekers not being within the territory of the European Union; the legal
regime which would apply to the reception and processing in third countries;
the extent to which European states could be held responsible for violations
of international law taking place in those regional processing and reception
centres; what the quality of protection in such centres should be; and under
what circumstances responsibilities for the treatment of asylum-seekers could
be transferred to international organizations or third countries.4 A lack of
clarity on those issues, it was submitted, would risk leaving the asylum-seekers
in a legal vacuum.5
It soon became clear that the British proposal was too ambitious to enjoy
the political support of a majority of the Member States of the European Union.
Although the idea of processing all applications of asylum-seekers outside
the EU’s external borders has occasionally resurfaced in policy debates across
Europe,6 it has never featured as such in any of the policy agendas of the
2 This internal document, containing a more detailed version of the proposals, came into
informal circulation in the beginning of March 2003: United Kingdom Home Office, ‘A
New Vision for Refugees’, draft Final report, on file with the author. This document and
the concept paper forwarded to the European Council are hereafter referred to as ‘A New
Vision for Refugees’ or ‘UK’s New Vision’.
3 G. Noll, ‘Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit Pro-
cessing Centres and Protection Zones’, 5 European Journal of Migration and Law, (2003),
p. 304.
4 Ibid; K. Wouters, ‘EU Asylum Protection in the Region: questions of legal responsibility
for the protection against refoulement’, in: Bruin, R. (Ed.), Niemandsland, opvang van vluchtelin-
gen in de regio, Amnesty International Nederland, Amsterdam, 2003, p. 55-83; Amnesty
International, ‘Unlawful and unworkable – Amnesty International’s views on proposals
for extra-territorial processing of asylum claims’, IOR 61/004/2003, April 2003; Human
Rights Watch, ‘An Unjust ‘Vision’ for Europe’s Refugees’, 17 June 2003; House of Lords
(2004), esp. paras. 75-101.
5 House of Lords (2004), para. 98.
6 In October 2004, on proposal of German Interior Minister Otto Schily, the EU Justice and
Home Affairs Ministers discussed the idea of setting up EU transit centres in North African
countries. Several Member States, including France, Belgium and Sweden, voiced strong
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European Commission or the Council of the European Union which set forth
the future strategic aims of the common policy in the field of asylum. In
directly responding to the UK’s New Vision, the European Commission under-
lined that any new approaches to the question of asylum ‘should be built upon
a genuine burden-sharing system both within the EU and with host third
countries, rather than shifting the burden to them’.7 The Commission further
noted that ‘[a]ny new approach should be complementary rather than sub-
stituting the Common European Asylum System, called for at Tampere.’8 This
complementary nature was later endorsed by the European Council in the
Hague Programme.9
But the UK’s New Vision was not simply another radical proposal to
address the asylum issue. The proposal is perhaps best characterized as the
ultimate consequence of a policy rationale which has taken root in Western
immigration countries over the last decades and which embodies the idea that
burdens posed by illegal entries and false asylum claims can only be addressed
effectively if policies are developed which manage or control the movement
of migrants before they present themselves at the border of the state. Instead
of following the traditional model of deciding upon rights of entry and resid-
ence of migrants in the course of spontaneous arrivals, European and other
immigration countries have in recent years developed policies which give
expression to this strategy of establishing a system of global migration and
asylum management. The UK proposal thus fitted into a general trend under
which Western states have increasingly sought to enforce their migration
policies outside their borders.
In academic literature, various terms are used to describe this trend of pre-
border migration enforcement: the outsourcing, externalisation, offshoring or
extraterritorialisation of migration management, external migration governance,
remote migration policing and others.10 Typologies of the different policy
opposition to the plans. Die Welt 4 October 2004, ‘Außenminister distanzieren sich von
Schilys Asyl-Plänen’; Euractiv 5 October 2004, ‘EU divided over African asylum camps’.
7 COM(2003) 315 final, p. 12.
8 Ibid. This view was shared by the Select Committee on European Union of the House of
Lords: ‘Rather than developing proposals for processing centres or regional protection areas,
it would be preferable to devote resources to strengthening and accelerating asylum
procedures in Member States and to ensuring high minimum standards at EU level.
Furthermore, greater resources must be invested to strengthen the processing systems in
countries of first asylum and to promote resettlement programmes. However, these efforts
must not prejudice the capacity of EU Member States to consider fully asylum claims that
are submitted in their territory’, House of Lords (2004), para. 101.
9 Presidency Conclusions 4/5 November 2004, Annex I, ‘The Hague Programme: Strengthen-
ing Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union’, para. 1.3.
10 V. Guiraudon, ‘Before the EU Border: Remote Control of the “Huddled Masses”’, in:
K. Groenendijk, E. Guild and P. Minderhoud (eds), In Search of Europe’s Borders, The Hague:
Kluwer (2002); D. Bigo, and E. Guild, ‘Policing at Distance: Schengen Visa Policies’, in: D.
Bigo and E. Guild, Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe, London:
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instruments include the instalment of visa requirements, the posting of im-
migration officials at foreign airports, the imposition of sanctions on com-
mercial carriers transporting improperly documented migrants, the interception
of migrant vessels at sea and various forms of pre-inspection regimes.11 Other
measures which may be rubricated under this trend are capacity building
programmes for migration management and refugee protection in countries
of origin or transit, which may include the reception and processing of
migrants and asylum-seekers in third countries.
A common feature of this type of measures is that migrants may encounter
the state they wish to migrate to long before they arrive at that state’s territorial
border. The migrant may be required to first obtain a visa at a consular post
of that state within his country of origin; he may be subjected to pre-boarding
checks by immigration officers of a foreign state while at the airport in his
country of origin; or he may be subjected to various types of enforcement
measures while crossing the open seas. It is also possible that the migrant,
while en route, does not encounter the foreign state directly through its agents
posted abroad, but that he is indirectly confronted by immigration measures
emanating from that state. He may, for example, be redirected to a reception
centre staffed or funded by that state; he may be subjected to stringent checks
by private carriers which perform enforcement activity normally appertainable
to the state; or he may be subjected to border controls in his country of origin
or countries of transit which are carried out by local agents who have been
trained, funded or supplied with special equipment by the foreign state.
This process of relocating migration management and shifting responsibil-
ities for controlling the border is drastically changing the nature of the border.
It has been aptly posited that borders are no longer ‘stable and ‘univocal’, but
instead, ‘multiple’, shifting in meaning and function from group to group’.12
Migration control no longer focuses exclusively on the geographical border
as the ultimate threshold for a foreigner to be allowed entry into a state’s
sovereign legal order, but is exported to other countries so that persons may
experience a foreign border while still within their country of origin.
Ashgate (2005); B. Ryan, ‘Extraterritorial Immigration Control: What Role for Legal Guar-
antees?’, in: B. Ryan and V. Mitsilegas (eds), Extraterritorial Immigration Control, Leiden/
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff (2010), p. 3; J.J. Rijpma, Building Borders: The Regulatory Framework
for the Management of the External Borders of the European Union, dissertation Florence (2009),
p. 307 et seq; S. Lavanex, ‘EU external governance in “Wider Europe”’, 11 Journal of European
Public Policy (2004), p. 683.
11 Guiraudon, in: Groenendijk, Guild and Minderhoud (2004), p. 195; A. Ataner, ‘Refugee
Interdiction and the Outer Limits of Sovereignty’, 3 Journal of Law and Equality (2004), p. 12-
14; M.J. Gibney and R. Hansen, ‘Asylum Policy in the West: Past Trends, Future Possibil-
ities’, United Nations University Discussion Paper No. 2003/68, World Institute for Develop-
ment Economics Research (2003), p. 5-7.
12 A. Kesby, ‘The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law’, 27 Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies (2007), p. 101.
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After ample consideration, it was decided that this general trend of
externalising migration policies, and the impact it has on the legal position
of persons seeking access to protection in the Member States of the European
Union, should be the focus of the present study.
1.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The rationale for the proliferation of pre-border migration policies can be
appreciated in different ways. The European Union and Western states com-
monly perceive pre-border enforcement as a necessary instrument to protect
the border and control the entry of foreigners, in accordance with the right
of states, as inherent in their sovereignty, to exclude aliens from their territory.
As such, pre-border enforcement is seen to foster migration through ‘regular’
channels and to prevent the inflow of ‘unauthorised’ arrivals.13 By intervening
before a migrant can effectuate an irregular entry, legal and logistical burdens
can be avoided, especially in respect of those migrants whose return may be
difficult to enforce. It is further said that to regulate migration movements
away from the border is conducive for the security and safety of the migrants
themselves, for it may prevent, amongst other things, migrants from embarking
upon perilous journeys on unseaworthy ships or as stowaways and it avoids
the exploitation of migrants by human smugglers and traffickers.14 Further,
by obtaining prior permission, bona fide travellers may obtain legal certainty
concerning their entry and/or residence status and may benefit from expedited
controls once they present themselves at the border.
Others have considered practices of external migration control less favour-
ably, in noting that states may employ such measures to the detriment of
refugees seeking access to protection.15 These authors point to the fact that
states have an incentive to prevent asylum-seekers, be they genuine refugees
or not, from reaching their borders, because it relieves them of financial and
societal burdens incurred by the processing and granting of protection to
asylum-seekers. The United Kingdom for example, has in the past decided
to introduce visa requirements for particular countries coupled with pre-
inspection regimes at airports in those countries precisely in response to an
increase of asylum-seekers originating from those countries.16 It has also been
observed that states may deliberately seek to take measures outside their
territorial jurisdictions so as to create a nebulous legal zone in which the state
13 On the use of terminology, see section 1.9 below.
14 European Parliament resolution of 18 December 2008 on the evaluation and future develop-
ment of the FRONTEX Agency and of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)
(2008/2157(INI)), recital (E, F, T); COM(2006) 26 final, para. 3.2.4.
15 M. Garlick, ‘The EU Discussions on Extraterritorial Processing: Solution or Conundrum?’,
18 IJRL (2006), p. 612-613; Gibney and Hansen (2003), p. 5.
16 Ryan, in: Ryan and Mitsilegas (2010), p. 9, 20-21.
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can avoid its responsibilities under international law for the protection of
refugees.17
Regardless of the underlying aims of external migration policies, it is
scarcely disputed that refugees often travel by irregular means and that they
are therefore prone to be affected by measures which aim to prevent
unauthorised migrants from arriving at the state’s border.18 That external
migration measures, be they specifically targeted at asylum-seekers or at
irregular migrants in general, affect, as a matter of empirical reality, the free
movement of persons seeking asylum, is acknowledged not only in legal and
social studies, but also by the states employing these policies, the European
Union and UNHCR.19
This study is not as such interested in the rationales behind the various
pre-border strategies. Rather, it proceeds from the assumption that these
strategies may in one way or the other impact upon the possibility of refugees
to gain access to Europe. The key legal question which then rises is how these
policies correspond to the specific rights of refugees to seek, claim and be
granted international protection. In the ordinary situation of ‘territorial asylum’,
where a person presents himself at the border or within the territory of a state
and claims asylum, that state is obliged to grant protection, in accordance with
international refugee and human rights law, to those who can either be defined
as refugees or who can be brought within the ambit of complementary pro-
tection regimes which have developed around the prohibition of refoulement
as established under general human rights law. This protective duty is not
self-evident in the absence of a territorial linkage between the individual and
the state. By operating outside its territorial boundaries, the state also steps
out of its territorial sovereignty and its domestic legal order. This gives rise
to issues of defining state competences, of defining the applicable law and
of identifying the actor who can be held responsible for upholding individual
rights. In examining the legal framework governing the relationship between
the person seeking protection and the state employing such policies, the present
study submits that, although questions of ‘territorial asylum’ differ in several
17 Guiraudon, in: Groenendijk, Guild and Minderhoud (2004), p. 195; Ryan, in: Ryan and
Mitsilegas (2010), p. 35; R.A. Davidson, ‘Spaces of Immigration “Prevention”: Interdiction
and the Nonplace’, 33 Diacretics (2003), p. 6.
18 Ataner (2004), p. 10.
19 UNHCR has estimated that the proportion of asylum-seekers in mixed migratory flows
arriving in Italy by sea was 50% in 2007 and 75% in 2008. The percentage of asylum
applicants who were granted either refugee status or subsidiary or humanitarian protection
was around 50%: UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Refugee protection
and international migration: a review of UNHCR’s operational role in southern Italy, PDES/
2009/05 September 2009, paras. 39-40. See, further: UNHCR EXCOM, ‘Interception of
Asylum-Seekers and Refugees’, EC/50/SC/CRP.17 (9 June 2000), paras. 3-17; COM(2006)
733 final, para. 10; COM(2008) 67 final, para. 15. The various efforts of the EU, EU Member
States and other Western states to incorporate refugee concerns in external instruments
of migration control are extensively discussed in chapters 5-7.
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respects from questions of ‘extraterritorial asylum’, international law continues
to constrain the liberty of states in their dealings with internationally protected
categories of migrants.
The subject matter of the present study is the general trend whereby
European states engage in forms of external migration control and the legal
implications of this trend in terms of obligations of European states towards
persons seeking international protection. This trend may one the one hand
consist of measures specifically targeted at and affecting persons who seek
asylum; and on the other hand of measures of external immigration control
which affect the more general category of irregular migrants, potentially
including persons who seek asylum.
1.4 GOAL OF THE STUDY
The goal of the study is twofold. Firstly, and in its most concrete terms, the
study aims to provide a legal response to a new empirical reality which may
significantly impact upon rights of refugees and other forced migrants. The
immediate goal of this study, therefore, is to provide a better understanding
of the manner in which human rights and refugee law govern and constrain
the discretions of states which employ various types of pre-border migration
enforcement. There is, unfortunately, a marked discrepancy between the pace
in which European states are implementing their external migration policy
agendas and the speed with which the law catches up with that development.
Many of the legal questions raised by the UK’s new vision are of equal rel-
evance for other forms of pre-border migration enforcement but have not, or
only partially, been subjected to thorough scrutiny. The European Member
States and the institutions of the European Union have on multiple occasions
acknowledged that the legal framework applicable to the various external
migration policies is insufficiently clear. In 2006, the European Commission
communicated that an analysis should be made of the circumstances under
which states must assume responsibilities under international refugee law when
engaged in operations of sea border control and that practical guidelines
should be developed in order to bring more clarity and a certain degree of
predictability regarding the fulfilment by Member States of their obligations
under international law.20 In 2009, the European Commission reemphasised
the need for a clarification of the international rules applicable to maritime
controls, while also underscoring the necessity of conducting a study into the
feasibility and legal and practical implications of joint processing of asylum
applications both inside and outside the Union.21 The multi-annual Stockholm
Programme (2010-2014) repeated these concerns and further called for an
20 COM(2006) 733 final, esp. paras. 31-35.
21 COM(2009) 262 final, paras. 4.2.3.1 and 5.2.2.
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exploration into possible avenues concerning access to asylum procedures
targeting main transit countries.22
One of the most profound consequences of the contested nature of the
applicable law to extraterritorial migration measures is that it may foster a
development by which states simply refuse to acknowledge any international
responsibility for the effects of their extraterritorial activities. In the context
of interception and rescue activities carried out on the seas between Africa
and Europe, various European governments have not only questioned but
explicitly denied any responsibilities towards refugees subjected to those
activities.23 Although the present study does not purport to provide a detailed
set of guidelines for each and every manner in which European states engage
with asylum-seekers outside their territories, it does aim at formulating a
general set of parameters which can provide the guidance that a rule of law
must provide to enable states to understand and fulfil their obligations.
The goal of the study is, secondly, to identify how human rights law
responds to a phenomenon whereby states, through a variety of avenues,
engage in external activity and seek cooperation with other actors in pursuit
of particular political objectives in the course of which the enjoyment of
fundamental rights may be negatively affected. The increased European
involvement in the regulation of migration movements around the world can
well be perceived as a specimen of the wider international development, often
explained from the notions of globalisation and interdependency, where
governmental activity takes place across legal orders and involves a plurality
of actors.24 This interaction between jurisdictions and international actors
complicates attempts to define the applicable law, to determine the responsible
actor and, ultimately, to identify the consequences for individuals in terms
of the scope and justiciability of their rights vis-à-vis the exercise of power.
Apart from providing the normative framework for examining the extent to
which unfolding European practices give rise to responsibilities under human
rights and refugee law, the chapters discussing the ability of human rights
law to respond to these atypical forms of state conduct aim at contributing
22 The Stockholm Programme, An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens,
OJ 2010 C115/01, paras. 5.1, 6.2.3.
23 See, amongst others the observations of the Spanish government in the Marine I case,
discussed in chapter 6, in which the government maintained that it did not bear responsibil-
ity under the Convention Against Torture for the alleged maltreatment of migrants in the
course of a rescue operation at sea, because the incident took place outside its jurisdiction:
ComAT 21 November 2008, J.H.A. v Spain (Marine I), no. 323/2007, paras. 6.1-6.2. The Italian
government has similarly submitted that its obligations under international and human
rights law are not engaged in the context of border controls undertaken outside Italian
territory: Human Rights Watch News Release 12 May 2009, ‘Italy: Berlusconi Misstates
Refugee Obligations’.
24 There is a wealth of legal literature on this development. For some perspectives see G.
Palombella, ‘The rule of law beyond the state: Failures, promises and theory’, 7 International
Journal of Constitutional Law (2009), p. 442-467.
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to existing international legal theory on extraterritorial state activity, the
protection of human rights and the allocation of responsibilities in situations
of joint conduct.
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
Several steps are in order to identify the manner in which international law
governs the relationship between European practices of external migration
control and persons who seek international protection.
It is necessary, first, to set out the international law regime on the delimita-
tion of international obligations and the allocation of responsibilities for viola-
tions of human rights in circumstances where states become active, possibly
through intermediary actors, in legal systems other than their own.
Chapter 2 of the study explores the general theory, case law and legal
doctrine on the extraterritorial applicability of human rights. By focusing on
the manner how the notions of ‘territory’ and ‘jurisdiction’ have been incor-
porated and applied in human rights law, the chapter presents a general
outline for delineating the scope of a state’s extraterritorial human rights
obligations.
Chapter 3 explores those parts of the international law regime on the
allocation of international responsibilities for wrongful conduct which are of
relevance for situations where there is either a plurality of international actors
or where there is another principal actor involved in the conduct. This regime
of law mainly derives from the Law on State Responsibility and includes the
doctrines of attribution of conduct to the state and derived responsibility of
a state for wrongful conduct of another state. The chapter explores how these
doctrines have been established under the Law on State Responsibility, how
they are employed under human rights law and what their relationship is with
substantive human rights obligations and especially the doctrine of positive
obligations.
The research questions addressed in chapters 2 and 3 may be summarised
as follows:
1. How does international law, and in particular human rights law, respond to state
activity affecting the enjoyment of rights of persons outside the state’s territory?
2. How does international law, and in particular human rights law, allocate re-
sponsibilities for international wrongful conduct in which a plurality of actors
is involved?
It is necessary, subsequently, to identify those norms of international and
European law which specifically address the status of asylum-seekers who
are outside but subject to immigration measures employed by EU Member
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States. This analysis focuses on the substantive obligations of states normally
associated with the status and entitlements of persons requesting asylum.
Chapter 4 conceptualises the notion of ‘extraterritorial asylum’ under
international law. Although the term ‘asylum’ is rarely defined in international
law, it has traditionally been understood as encompassing both the situation
of ‘territorial asylum’ – referring to asylum accorded by a state in its territory
to nationals of another state – and ‘extraterritorial asylum’ – referring to
asylum accorded in some other place, normally the territory of the state from
which refuge is sought.25 Because the international system of protection of
refugees is organised in accordance with the notion that states should grant
protection to those refugees who have presented themselves on their soil,
contemporary refugee law discourse is predominantly occupied with defining
the rights and duties of states and refugees in situations of territorial asylum.
Although states may contribute to solutions to the refugee problem on a global
scale, for example through the instrument of resettlement or general pro-
grammes of humanitarian relief, these efforts are not normally grounded in
legally binding international arrangements. Traditionally, the matter of legal
duties of states in situations of extraterritorial asylum has mainly received
attention in the context of practices of so-called ‘diplomatic asylum’, a term
which refers to a state granting protection to an individual within its embassy
or consulate in a host state.26 Current policies of relocating migration manage-
ment do seem to warrant a legal restatement of the concept of extraterritorial
asylum, which should respond not only to the traditional question of how
grants of extraterritorial asylum should be accommodated with the sovereign
rights of the host state, but also to the question to what extent and under what
circumstances norms sprouting from general human rights and refugee law
25 In one of the few attempts to define the term ‘asylum’ in international law, the Institut du
Droit International adopted a provision stipulating that asylum can refer both to protection
inside and outside the granting state’s territory: ‘Dans les presented Résolutions, le terme
“asile” désigne la protection qu’un Etat accorde sur son territoire ou dans un autre endroit
relevant de certains de ses organes à un individu qui est venu la rechercher’. Institut de
Droit International, Session de Bath 1950, ‘L’asile en droit international public (à l’exclusion
de l’asile neutre)’, Article 1. On the dichotomy between ‘territorial’ and ‘extraterritorial’
asylum, see A. Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Leiden: Sijthoff
(1972), Vol. ii, p. 5-6; A. Grahl-Madsen, Territorial Asylum, Stockholm/London/New York:
Almqvist & Wiksell International (1980), p. 1; F. Morgenstern, ‘‘Extra-Territorial’ Asylum’,
25 British Yearbook of International Law (1948), p. 236. The use of the ‘territorial’-‘extraterri-
torial’ dichotomy is not always consistent. Noll, taking the location of the individual as
starting point, denotes all forms of protection outside the individual’s country of origin
as ‘extraterritorial protection’: G. Noll, Negotiating Asylum. The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial
Protection and the Common Market of Deflection, The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff
(2000), p. 18.
26 Morgenstern (1948); F. Morgenstern, ‘Diplomatic Asylum’, 67 The Law Quarterly Review
(1951); Grahl-Madsen (1972), p. 45-56; S.P. Sinha, Asylum and International Law, The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff (1971), p. 203-271.
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as applicable to situations of territorial asylum can be extrapolated to situations
of extraterritorial asylum.
Chapter 5 then turns to the European dimension. It explores in what manner
the European Union both stimulates and sets limits to Member State activity
in the sphere of external migration control, it identifies how the relevant norms
of refugee and general human rights law as identified in chapter 4 have been
incorporated into the relevant EU instruments forming part of the ‘external
dimension of asylum and migration’, and it seeks to determine the consistency
and interrelation between these external EU instruments and the Union’s
internal rules on border control and asylum.
The research questions to be addressed in chapters 4 and 5 may be summarized
as follows:
3. How does international law regulate the rights of individuals requesting protection
in situations of ‘extraterritorial asylum’?
4. How does European Union law regulate the rights of individuals requesting
protection in situations of ‘extraterritorial asylum’?
The final exercise of the study, undertaken in chapters 6 and 7, consists of
a description and legal appreciation of current practices of external migration
control. These two chapters may also be regarded as case studies which
examine the conformity of contemporary policies of remote migration control
with the legal standards as formulated in the previous chapters. Instead of
exploring the entire range of external measures of migration control employed
by EU Member States, it was decided to restrict this part of the study to the
two arguably most topical and legally contested forms of external migration
control: migrant interdiction at sea and the external processing of asylum
applications.
Chapter 6 describes the various forms in which European states, sometimes
in conjunction with third states, intercept, deter or ‘push-back’ migrants at
sea and appreciates these practices in terms of international maritime law and
norms of refugee and human rights law as identified in the previous chapters.
Chapter 7 discusses the phenomenon of external processing of asylum
applications. In the absence of presently functioning European policies which
involve the transfer of migrants to a foreign location and the subsequent
processing of claims to protection, the chapter takes as its background the two
most prominent non-European precedents of external processing: the pro-
grammes of external processing developed by the governments of Australia
and the United States. These non-European practices are then transposed into
the European legal framework, by assessing to what extent those programmes
correspond with the human rights norms binding the EU Member States. From
this assessment, conclusions are drawn as to the legal feasibility of the possible
future creation of programmes of external processing in the European context.
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The research questions to be addressed in chapters 6 and 7 may be summarized
as follows:
5. How does international law, and in particular human rights law, constrain the
liberty of EU Member States to engage in migrant interdiction at sea?
6. How does international law, and in particular human rights law, constrain the
liberty of EU Member States to relocate the reception and processing of asylum
applicants to third countries?
1.6 DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Delimitation 1: International refugee and human rights law
The law at issue in this study comprises those norms of international law
which are of specific relevance for persons who seek, but who may be barred
from receiving, international protection. The rights typically associated with
the international protection of persons who flee their country are those set
out in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967
Protocol. Complementary to the Refugee Convention, binding human rights
instruments also protect persons seeking asylum against expulsion or return,
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT) and, within the European
legal order, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The
cornerstone of the protection of asylum claimants under these treaties is formed
by the prohibition of refoulement, which prohibits, in general terms, the forced
removal of an individual to a territory where he runs a risk of being subjected
to (flagrant) human rights violations.27 The prohibition of refoulement is either
explicitly provided for in these treaties (Article 33(1) Refugee Convention,
Article 3 CAT), or implicitly derives from substantive human rights norms,
in particular the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment
(Article 7 ICCPR, Article 3 ECHR).28 Under European Union law, the term
‘international protection’ is used to collectively indicate protection which ought
27 K. Wouters, International Legal Standards for the Protection from Refoulement, Antwerp: Inter-
sentia (2009), p. 25.
28 Other human rights than the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment
may also be construed as prohibiting refoulement. See, for a general discussion M. den Heijer,
‘Whose Rights and Which Rights? The continuing Story of Non-Refoulement under the
European Convention on Human Rights’, 10 EJML (2008), p. 277-314; H. Battjes, ‘The Soering
Threshold: Why Only Fundamental Values Prohibit Refoulement in the ECHR Case Law’,
11 EJML (2009), p. 205-219.
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to be accorded to refugees and to those who can be qualified as ‘subsidiary
protection beneficiaries’ under general human rights instruments.29
International refugee and human rights law not only protects against
forcible removal or return, but also sets wider standards for the treatment of
persons who (successfully) seek asylum. Articles 2-34 of the Refugee Conven-
tion set forth the rights (and duties) of those who can be defined as a refugee
in accordance with Article 1 of the Refugee Convention. This collection of
rights, which includes protection from refoulement, does not automatically
accrue to any refugee, but distinguishes in applicability in accordance with
specific levels of attachments of a refugee with a state. Further, the regime
of refugee rights operates concurrently with the general system of human
rights, which by its nature and purpose grants fundamental rights to everyone.
Pronouncements made in this study on the circumstances giving rise to inter-
national protection obligations of European states are hence not only relevant
for identifying whether a person may successfully claim protection from
refoulement, but also warrant a further assessment of how and where the state
should secure the fulfillment of its wider protection obligations.
Although the study focuses on the obligations of states under international
refugee and human rights law, this body of law does not operate in a vacuum.
A key aim of the study is to identify how international refugee and human
rights law finds application in contexts other than the ordinary situation of
‘territorial asylum’. This requires an appraisal not only of the scope and
contents of relevant norms of international refugee and human rights law,
but also of the interaction of these norms with specific other norms or regimes
of law. Firstly, the study aims to identify how the relevant human rights norms
find expression in the legal instruments adopted by the European Union, in
so far as these instruments affect the legal status of persons who are outside
the territory of the Union (chapter 5). Further, the study addresses the relation-
ship between, on the one hand, international refugee and human rights law
and, on the other hand: the law on state responsibility (chapter 3), the duty
of states to respect the territorial sovereignty of other states (chapter 4) and
international maritime law (chapter 6).
Delimitation 2: Persons seeking international protection
The persons in focus of this study are individuals who 1) are physically not
present in the territory of one of the EU Member States and 2) seek international
protection. It follows that the study does not deal with measures which are
often categorised under the rubric of external migration policies but are
29 Council Directive 2004/83/EC, Article 2(a). Note that the personal scope of ‘subsidiary
protection’ under EU law may be wider than protection which derives from human rights
law.
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enforced in respect of persons who are within the state of refuge, such as
readmission or return agreements concluded with third countries.
Legal textbooks on refugee law ordinarily focus not on the legal status of
asylum-seekers but on that of refugees or other persons who are entitled to
international protection. This is because asylum-seekers, as opposed to
refugees, do not have a special status under international law as such.30 But
because asylum-seekers may be refugees, and because formal recognition is
not constitutive for having the quality of refugee, it is commonly accepted
that persons claiming to be refugees must be treated on the assumption that
they may be refugees.31 In the ordinary situation, where an asylum-seeker
presents himself in or at the border of the state, this implies that, at least until
the claim to be a Convention refugee has been formally denied, an asylum
claimant should be granted those entitlements of the Refugee Convention
which do not depend on some form of legal attachment with the state, which
includes protection from refoulement.32 The European Court of Human Rights
has, under a similar rationale, considered that any claim for protection under
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights necessarily requires
a meaningful assessment before any action as regards possible deportation
is undertaken.33
The notion that asylum-seekers should, at least during an initial period,
be treated as refugees forms an important premise of this study. A key question
surrounding the external migration policies is whether and how these policies
should be arranged in order to meaningfully distinguish between persons who
are entitled to international protection and other migrants. The search for
appropriate solutions in this respect involves not only a determination of the
circumstances under which a state is bound to grant protection to a person
who claims asylum, but also involves the question of whether and how the
state should arrange its policies so as to separate asylum-seekers from other
categories of migrants. Especially in respect of measures of immigration control
of collective nature, which impact upon ‘mixed flows’ of asylum-seekers and
other irregular migrants, the proposition could be defended that the treatment
of migrants should accord not only with the assumption that asylum-seekers
may be refugees, but also with the assumption that migrants may be asylum-
seekers. To accept this proposition may have serious repercussions for the
manner in which coercive measures must be carried out.
30 This is different under European Union Law, where asylum applicants are accorded special
status. See esp. Article 3(1) Council Directive 2003/9/EC.
31 UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion No. 6 (XXVIII) (1977), para. (c); UNHCR, ‘Note on Inter-
national Protection’, A/AC.96/815 (31 August 1993), para. 11; G.S. Goodwin-Gill and
J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press (2007), p. 232-233;
J.C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge University Press
(2005), p. 158-159.
32 Hathaway (2005), p. 158-159.
33 ECtHR 11 July 2000, Jabari v Turkey, no. 40035/98, paras. 39-40.
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Delimitation 3: The member states of the European Union
Although this study is concerned with policies and practices which have to
a considerable extent become the subject of the competence of the European
Union, the study will not deal with the question of the division of responsibil-
ities between the European Member States and the European Union as an
international organization, nor with the question whether and to what extent
the European Union may be held internationally responsible for the manner
in which it pursues its external asylum and migration agenda. The rationale
behind this delimitation is that even though the competences of the European
Union in the areas of asylum and migration control have substantially
widened, in the vast majority of fields explored in this study – and this is
extensively explained in chapter 5 – its present role consists primarily of
facilitating intra-European cooperation and cooperation between European
and third states. Within the EU’s external dimension of asylum and migration,
the Member States continue to enjoy a decisive amount of sovereign discretion
in devising and enforcing the various immigration policies.
This does not mean that the present study disregards the expanding role
and competences of the European Union within this policy area. Especially
in the final chapters of the study, systematic attention is paid to the questions
how the various European practices find their basis in European law, to what
extent the relevant aspects of European law are in conformity with inter-
national standards and how European law may foster or channel the proper
observance of international law. But in so far as conclusions are drawn in terms
of human rights obligations and responsibilities for violations of those obliga-
tions, the Member States are the subjects of the study.
1.7 SOURCES OF THE STUDY
In conceptualising the international legal framework regulating the relationship
between EU Member States and asylum-seekers in an extraterritorial context,
the study has recourse to the generally accepted sources of international law
as enumerated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice:
1) international conventions (in this study the Refugee Convention and human
rights conventions and other treaties in so far as they interact with those
conventions); 2) international custom (which in this study includes several
norms laid down in the Articles on State Responsibility and possibly the right
to grant ‘diplomatic (or extraterritorial) asylum’); and 3) the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations. These three sources are also termed
the principal, formal or ‘actual’ sources of international law.34 Article 38 of
34 M. Shaw, International Law, Cambridge University Press, 6th Ed. (2008), p. 114; R. Jennings
and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th Ed. (1992), Vol. i, p. 24.
16 Chapter 1
the Statute mentions as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law: 4) judicial decisions and 5) the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations. These subsidiary means do not necessarily
articulate the law itself, but determine and elucidate the principal sources of
international law, although they may also contribute to the further develop-
ment of international law.35 In respect of the European Convention on Human
Rights, the judgments and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights,
although formally only binding upon the State party to the dispute, fulfil a
similar function as both identifying and contributing to the further develop-
ment of, the rights set forth in the Convention.
Apart from the sources of international law listed in Article 38 of the ICJ
Statute, which are all to a greater or lesser extent capable of instituting new
norms of international law (or of developing the law), a great variety of sources
contribute to the identification of existing international law. This study refers
to judgments, decisions and advisory opinions of international and European
courts (and, less frequently, domestic courts and arbitral tribunals); views and
conclusions of human rights treaty monitoring bodies; scholarly writings;
reports and other relevant materials. Resolutions, declarations or other texts
setting forth codes of conduct which are not binding upon states but which
may be referred to as ‘soft law’, are relevant only in so far as they inform the
meaning or development of binding rules of international law.
In so far as the study identifies norms of international refugee and human
rights law, judgments of the ECtHR, views of United Nations treaty monitoring
bodies and pronouncements of UNHCR are accorded special importance.
Although the views of UNHCR and treaty monitoring bodies are not formally
binding, they are generally seen as authoritative interpretations of the law
and often assented to by a large majority of states. Where relevant however,
the study also has recourse to (divergent) state practices in identifying whether
a particular development or interpretation of the law can be said to have
achieved binding character.
1.8 SCIENTIFIC CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
This study is not the first which explores the legal implications of practices
of external migration control. This is hardly surprising, in view of the wide
variety of measures which are being employed, their impact on the legal status
of individuals and their legally and politically contested nature. In particular,
legal academia have provided often timely responses to fresh attempts of
35 Jennings and Watts (1992), p. 41. Shaw emphasises that it is not always possible to make
a strict distinction between primary and secondary sources of international law by pointing
amongst others to the law-creating character of many judgments of the International Court
of Justice: Shaw (2008), p. 71.
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immigration countries to enforce migration policies away from their borders:
such as in the context of the US and Australian schemes of migrant interdiction
at sea and the external processing of asylum applications;36 the broadening
of visa regimes and the enactment of carriers’ liability for the transport of
improperly documented passengers in Europe and North America in the 1980s
and 1990s;37 and the more recent developments within the EU’s external
dimension on migration and asylum.38
Although existing legal research addresses many topics which are also at
focus in the present study, there is as of yet no monograph which brings
together in one context i) the general doctrines of international and human
rights law applicable to external and multiple state activity, ii) the legal con-
tents of the notion of ‘extraterritorial asylum’ and iii) selected European
practices of external migration control. It is hoped that the compilation in one
study of the different legal regimes governing European practices of external
migration control allows for the drawing of conclusions which see to the
interaction between the relevant legal regimes and surpass statements about
the limits set by one particular legal norm or regime. At the outset, it is
possible to identify three particular legal interactions which have as of yet
not, or only scarcely been addressed in existing research. The first concerns
the relationship between extraterritorial human rights and refugee law obliga-
tions and the duty of states to respect the territorial sovereignty of the other
state (discussed in chapter 4). The second concerns the relationship between
extraterritorial human rights and refugee law obligations and the (possible)
extraterritorial applicability of EU law on border controls and asylum (chapter
5). The third concerns the relationship between rights of states to interdict
migrant vessels at sea as set forth by the Law of the Sea and concomitant
human rights obligations vis-à-vis the migrants found on board the interdicted
vessel (chapter 6). In line with the goals of the study formulated in section
36 Eg S. Ignatius, ‘Haitian Asylum-Seekers: Their Treatment as a Measure of the INS Asylum
Officer Corps’, 7 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal (1993), p. 119-148; H.H. Koh, ‘America’s
Offshore Refugee Camps’, 29 University of Richmond Law Review (1994), p. 139-174; M.E.
Sartori, ‘The Cuban Migration Dilemma: an Examination of the United States’ Policy of
Temporary Protection in Offshore Safe Havens’, 15 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal
(2001), p. 319-356; B. Frelick, ‘“Abundantly Clear: Refoulement”’, 19 Georgetown Immigration
Law Journal (2004), p. 245-276; C.M.J. Bostock, ‘The International Legal Obligations owed
to the Asylum-seekers on the MV Tampa’, 14 IJRL (2002), p. 279-301; E. Willheim, ‘MV
Tampa: The Australian Response’, 15 IJRL (2003), p. 159-191; A. Francis, ‘Bringing Protection
Home: Healing the Schism Between International Obligations and National Safeguards
Created by Extraterritorial Processing’, 20 IJRL (2008), p. 273-313; S. Legomsky, ‘The USA
and the Caribbean Interdiction Program’, 18 IJRL (2006), p. 677-695.
37 E. Feller, ‘Carrier Sanctions and International Law’, 1 IJRL (1989), p. 48-66; F. Nicholson,
‘Implementation of the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1987: Privatising Immigration
Functions at the Expense of International Obligations?’, 46 ICLQ (1997), p. 586-634.
38 See inter alia the various contributions in special issue 3-4 of Volume 18 of the International
Journal of Refugee Law (2006); and the contributions in Ryan and Mitsilegas (2010).
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1.4, the effort undertaken in this work is not merely to enumerate the relevant
obligations stemming from one legal regime or another. Rather, the study aims
to identify how the relevant regimes of law interact and how they jointly
inform the manner in which European states should treat persons in search
for international protection in the course of external migration controls.
1.9 TERMINOLOGY
Migration law, including asylum law, is fraught with terminological issues.
In the public domain, the terms foreigners, aliens, migrants, refugees and
asylum-seekers are often used interchangeably and although migration law
defines and demarcates the legal statuses of the various categories of migrants,
questions of terminology remain apparent in legal literature and, indeed, in
the law itself. In the above, reference was made to the legal distinction between
asylum-seekers, refugees and other persons entitled to ‘international protection
(from refoulement)’. On occasion, this study uses the term refugee as a short-
hand for all persons who are entitled to international protection, but will
specifically refer to the relevant grounds and contents of protection where
deemed necessary.
The study has not chosen to systematically distinguish between the terms
‘irregular’, ‘unauthorised’ or ‘undocumented’ migrants in denoting the more
general category of migrants who seek entry into a state which has not express-
ly sanctioned their entry or stay. All these terms are commonly employed to
refer to those migrants who depart without the admission documents required
by the country of destination.39 The study does however avoid using the term
‘illegal (or clandestine) migrant’ as far as possible. The term illegal migrant
is often perceived as contributing to a negative social perception of the person
in question and further as legally imprecise, because i) the law does not
normally qualify persons, but particular activity as illegal (i.e. an act, but not
a person can be illegal), because ii) ‘illegality’ is normally associated with
criminal activity, while the violation of rules of entry or residence is not
normally subject to penal sanctions, and because iii) a lack of possession of
39 Also see International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Migration Law: Glossary
on Migration, Geneva: IOM (2004).
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valid admission documents not necessarily precludes a migrant (and this is
especially so in the case of refugees) from obtaining legal residence.40
40 For these and other criticisms of the term ‘illegal’ in connection to migrants, see M. Paspa-
lanova, ‘Undocumented vs. Illegal Migrant: Towards Terminological Coherence’, 4 Migra-
ciones Internacionales (2008), p. 82-83. The United Nations General Assembly recommended
in 1975 that all UN bodies use the term ‘non-documented or irregular migrant workers’
as a standard to define those migrants workers that illegally and/or surreptitiously enter
another country: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3449 (XXX) of 9 December
1975, ‘Measure to ensure the Human Rights and Dignity of All Migrant Workers’. In policy
documents, the institutions of the European Union continue to employ the term ‘illegal
migration’ in referring to persons wishing to enter the Member States without the required
admission documents. For an overview and critique, see S. Carrera and M. Merlino,
‘Undocumented Immigrants and Rights in the EU Addressing the Gap between Social
Science Research and Policy-making in the Stockholm Programme?’, Centre for European
Policy Studies (CEPS) (2009).

2 The extraterritorial applicability of human
rights
The question of the territorial, and therewith the personal, scope of a state’s
obligations under human rights treaties is central to discussions on external
measures of immigration control. Because human rights are commonly pres-
ented as the foremost constraint to the state’s liberty to control the entry of
foreigners, any discussion on the legal framework governing external migration
policies requires understanding of the conditions giving rise to the extraterri-
torial applicability of human rights. The current chapter explores the general
theory on the (extra)territorial applicability of human rights. Chapter 4 more
specifically addresses issues of personal and material scope of the prohibition
of refoulement and the right to leave any country, including his own.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In the year 1906, the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company Limited
of Canada bought a zinc and lead smelter located along the Columbia river
in the city of Trail, Canada, which is close to the international border with
the State of Washington. In the following decades, the capacity of the plant
expanded rapidly and so did the amount of sulphur released from the plant.
The harmful effects of the emissions were noticed in the State of Washington,
where the land and trees of the Columbia River Valley, used for logging and
farming purposes, were affected. After the government of the United States
had filed complaints with the government of Canada, both countries agreed
to put the dispute before a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. In its final decision,
reported on March 11, 1941, the Tribunal considered that
‘under the principles of international law, as well as the law of the United States,
no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or
persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence.’1
1 Ad Hoc International Arbitral Tribunal 11 March 1941, Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States
v Canada), United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. III (United Nations
publication, Sales No. 1949.V.2), p. 1965; re-printed in 35 American Journal of International
Law (1941), p. 684-736. The history and legal legacy of the Trail Smelter Arbitration was
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On this basis, the Tribunal considered Canada to be responsible for paying
damages for harm in the United States from future smelter emissions. It is
on the basis of the same ‘principles of international law’ that the International
Law Commission (ILC) has now drafted the Articles on Prevention of Trans-
boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, obliging states to take all necessary
measures to prevent or minimize the risk of harm from activities on its own
territory to the territory of another state, also with regard to activities which
are not as such prohibited by international law.2
In 2006, the European Court of Human Rights was faced with, on face value
at least, quite a similar question of law. Mr Mohammed Ben El Mahi com-
plained before the European Court of Human Rights that, as a Muslim, he
had been discriminated against by Denmark, which had permitted the publica-
tion of a series of cartoons in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. Mr Ben
El Mahi was joined in his complaint by the Moroccan National Consumer
Protection League and the Moroccan Child Protection and Family Support
Association – all of them based in Morocco. The applicants considered these
cartoons to be offensive caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad, in particular
the one showing him as a terrorist with a bomb in his turban. Like the Arbitral
Tribunal in Trail Smelter, the European Court referred to ‘relevant principles
of international law’ in deciding whether Denmark could be held accountable
for the harmful effects these cartoons produced outside its territory. The
European Court unanimously found that the application was inadmissible:
‘The Court considers that there is no jurisdictional link between any of the ap-
plicants and the relevant member State, namely Denmark, or that they can come
within the jurisdiction of Denmark on account of any extra-territorial act. According-
ly, the Court has no competence to examine the applicants’ substantive complaints
under the Articles of the Convention relied upon.’3
Offensive cartoons are not to be equated with toxic fumes, but the outcome
of the two cases is strikingly different. It illustrates how, apparently, divergent
‘principles of international law’ govern questions of territorial scope of the
state’s obligations under human rights law. The special nature of human rights,
and in particular the requirement that an individual must be ‘within the
jurisdiction’ of the state, sets limits to the duty of states to secure human rights
outside their own territory.
recently explored in R.M. Bratspies and R.A. Miller, Transboundary Harm, Lessons from the
Trail Smelter Arbitration, Cambridge University Press (2006).
2 Articles 1 and 3 Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities 2001, text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session
in 2001 (A/56/10).
3 ECtHR 11 December 2006, Ben El Mahi a.o. v Denmark, no. 5853/06.
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Under the general regime of international law – primarily dealing with
horizontal interstate relations – the question whether a state has committed
an internationally wrongful act is normally answered on the basis of two
elements: (a) whether specific conduct may be attributed to the state concerned,
and (b) whether that conduct was in conformity with the obligations binding
that state.4 There is no rule of general character stipulating that these obliga-
tions can only be situated within the state’s territory. This corresponds to the
very purpose of international law to regulate interstate contacts and relations.
Substantial material parts of international law, such as international human-
itarian law, international maritime law and the law on diplomatic relations
are premised on the understanding that states do act outside their territorial
sovereignty and that when they do so, their activity should be subjected to
common agreement. In accordance with this rationale, the International Law
Commission has affirmed that ‘the acts or omissions of organs of the State
are attributable to the State as a possible source of responsibility regardless
of whether they have been perpetrated in national or in foreign territory’.5
And in its commentary on Article 29 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which holds that ‘[u]nless a different intention appears from the treaty
or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of
its entire territory’, the ILC has underlined that this provision does not exclude
the ‘obvious’ possibility of extraterritorial application of treaties.6 In so far
4 Article 2 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, text
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session in 2001 (A/56/10),
annexed to UN General Assembly Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001.
5 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-seventh session,
Yearbook of the ILC 1975, Vol. II, p. 84.
6 Article 29 VCLT is primarily designed to prevent states, in the absence of specific territorial
provisions or declarations such as federal-, metropolitan- or colonial clauses, from restricting
the territorial application of a treaty to only a part of its territory. It transpires from the
drafting history of the Vienna Convention that several governments had indeed feared
that Article 29 VCLT could be read as excluding the possibility of extraterritorial application
of treaties. But the ILC clarified that the provision does not ‘cover the whole topic of the
application of treaties from the point of view of space’ and felt it unnecessary to insert a
further paragraph stipulating the ‘obvious fact’ that treaties may apply outside the territories
of the parties; see Summary records of the eighteenth session, Yearbook of the ILC 1966, Vol.
I (Part Two), p. 46-47, 50; Reports of the International Law Commission on the second part
of its seventeenth session and on its eighteenth session, Yearbook of the ILC 1966, Vol. II,
p. 213-214; Sir H. Waldock, Third report on the Law of Treaties, Yearbook of the ILC 1964,
Vol. II, p. 12. On occasion, the rule laid down in Article 29 VCLT and, in conjunction with
that rule, the system of territorial reservations or declarations made under a human rights
treaty, is nonetheless advanced as argument against the possible extraterritorial application
of human rights treaties: C. Rozakis, ‘The Territorial Scope of Human Rights Obligations:
the Case of the European Convention on Human Rights’, Report Venice Commission,
Strasbourg 30 Sept. 2005, No. CDL-UD(2005)022rep, p. 5; S. Kavaldjieva, ‘Jurisdiction of
the European Court of Human Rights: Exorbitance in Reverse?’, 37 Georgetown Journal of
International Law (2006), p. 534-537. The European Commission of Human Rights and the
House of Lords have affirmed however that territorial declarations or provisions allowing
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as international law does localize the enjoyment of the rights and obligations
of a treaty in a specific area, such restrictions must follow from the particular
wording or object of a treaty.
In the context of human rights law – primarily dealing with the vertical
relationship between the state and the individual – the prevailing paradigm
is however that human rights treaties only govern the relationship between
a state and its subjects and the circle of a state’s subjects is traditionally defined
either with reference to nationality or the territory in which a person is present.
It follows that, while under the law governing interstate relationships the
determination of state responsibility for international wrongful conduct
depends on an assessment of state activity in relation to the state’s international
obligations, under human rights law a further assessment is introduced: that
of the relationship between the state and the individual. In many human rights
treaties, this relationship has found expression in the requirement that victims
of human rights violations must be within the ‘jurisdiction’ of a state.
Although the notion is currently widely accepted that a state which
ventures abroad and affects the human rights of an individual situated outside
its territorial borders may be held responsible under human rights treaties,
the circumstances giving rise to such responsibility remain subject to contro-
versy. This chapter aims to identify the key principles of international law
governing the field of extraterritorial human rights obligations. In particular,
the chapter focuses on the meaning of the notion of ‘jurisdiction’, which
appears the crucial requirement for engaging a state’s responsibility for extra-
territorial human rights violations.
The chapter first sets out, in sections 2.2-2.4, the different purport of the
concept of ‘jurisdiction’ in general international public law and human rights
law. It is argued that the ordinary function of ‘jurisdiction’ within international
law – which is primarily to allocate competences between states – is not to
be equated with the specific delimiting function of the concept of ‘jurisdiction’
in human rights law. In section 2.5, a comparative analysis is made of the
methods and criteria applied by international courts and human rights bodies
in interpreting the term jurisdiction and in defining the extraterritorial reach
of human rights treaties. In section 2.6, the analysis is broadened to human
rights treaties which do not contain a general clause as to their personal or
territorial application, with a view to determining whether a general doctrine
on the extraterritorial application of all human rights treaties can be identified.
for territorial restrictions should not be interpreted as limiting the scope of the term ‘juris-
diction’ in Article 1 of the European Convention but merely as indicating the governmental
entities which are bound by the Convention: House of Lords 13 June 2007, Al-Skeini and
Others v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 26, para. 86 (‘In particular, there is an
important difference between the legal system to which any Act of Parliament extends and
the people and conduct to which it applies’, emphasis in original); EComHR 26 May 1975,
Cyprus v Turkey, nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, p. 136-137 at para. 9.
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The chapter submits that, although not always consistent and operating
on sometimes contradictory premises, international case law has moved
towards the acceptance that human rights obligations serve as a code of
conduct for all activity of a state, regardless of territorial considerations, and
that exercises (or omissions) of factual power by the state which directly affect
a person in the enjoyment of human rights are sufficient for considering that
person to be under the jurisdiction of the state. Although it has been argued
that this reasoning may overstretch the meaning of the term jurisdiction in
international law, the chapter emphasises that the term jurisdiction fulfils
different functions in general international law and human rights law, allowing
for a different construction of that term within the human rights context.
2.2 THE CONCEPT OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
In public international law, the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ is often understood
as closely connected to the notion of sovereignty. Jurisdiction is described as
an ingredient or an aspect of sovereignty: laws extend so far as, but no further
than the sovereignty of the state which puts them into force.7 Whereas ‘sover-
eignty’ is referred to as the general legal competence of states (or as the legal
personality of statehood), ‘jurisdiction’ refers to particular exercises of sover-
eignty (or particular exercises by states of their legal personality). In this
connection, ‘jurisdiction’ is essentially a right of states to regulate conduct,
international law setting the limits to this right and domestic laws prescribing
the extent to which states make use of this right.8 A state may exercise ‘juris-
diction’ within the limits of its sovereignty, and is not entitled to encroach
upon the sovereignty of other states.
The ordinary and essentially territorial notion of ‘jurisdiction’ may also
be explained from its quality as an attribute of state sovereignty.9 Since sover-
eignty is in the present world organized along territorial demarcations, the
starting point of assessing ‘jurisdiction’ is also territorial. States are, as a rule,
exclusively competent in respect of their territories and may not intervene in
7 F.A. Mann, ‘The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty Years’, 186
Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (1984), p. 20; I. Brownlie, Principles of
Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 6th Ed. (2003), p. 105-106; M. Shaw,
International Law, Cambridge University Press, 5th Ed. (2003), p. 572; R. Jennings and A.
Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, London: Longman, 9th Ed. (1992), Vol. I, p. 457.
8 Jennings and Watts (1992), p. 456-7. Mann (1984), p. 20. In his earlier treatise, Mann em-
phasized the function of jurisdiction as delimiting the right of states to exercise powers:
F.A. Mann, ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law’, 111 Recueil des Cours de
l’Académie de Droit International (1964), p. 9-15.
9 The terminology is taken from ECtHR 12 December 2001, Banković and others v Belgium and
others, no. 52207/99, para. 61.
26 Chapter 2
the territories of other sovereign powers.10 In the Lotus case, the Permanent
Court of International Justice stated this rule as follows:
‘[F]ailing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – [a state] may not
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense juris-
diction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory
except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from
a convention.’11
Thus, when states would act within the territory of another state they will
normally breach the rule of non-intervention and act beyond their jurisdiction.
This may also be seen as an ‘excess’ or ‘overstepping’ of jurisdiction.
Two types of ‘jurisdiction’ are generally discerned. Legislative (or prescript-
ive) jurisdiction refers to the capacity to make decisions or rules. Enforcement
(or executive) jurisdiction refers to the capacity to ensure compliance with those
rules. One of the differences between the two manifestations of jurisdiction
is that it is well-established in international law that legislative ‘jurisdiction’
may be based on other grounds than territorial considerations.12 A state has
– to a certain extent – the capacity to make laws concerning its own nationals
living abroad, for example regarding the levy of taxes, the supply of state
benefits or the recruitment of military conscripts.13 Legislative ‘jurisdiction’
over nationals living abroad is not unfettered but remains subject to the rule
of non-intervention. This implies that it will generally not be allowed for a
state to impose upon its nationals, or other persons for that matter, who are
resident in another country, obligations which run counter to the local laws
of that country. If France were to prohibit its citizens living abroad to work
on Quatorze Juillet this would most likely collide with the sovereignties of other
states and be an unlawful exercise of ‘jurisdiction’.14
But nationality is not the only legal title for exercising legislative ‘juris-
diction’ over foreign territories. Many states assert criminal ‘jurisdiction’ over
non-nationals committing offences against their nationals living abroad, over
offences against vital state interests, or over offences of serious concern to the
international community as a whole.15 Other examples of extraterritorial
10 Brownlie (2003), p. 297; Shaw (2003), p. 572; Mann (1984), p. 20.
11 PCIJ 7 September 1927, S.S. ‘Lotus’ (France v Turkey), PCIJ Series A. No. 10, p. 18-19.
12 See in particular M. Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’, 46 British Yearbook of
International Law (1972-1973), p. 179.
13 According to Lowe: ‘States have an undisputed right to extend the application of their laws
to their citizens, wherever they may be. This type of jurisdiction has a longer history than
jurisdiction based upon the territorial principle.’ V. Lowe, ‘Jurisdiction’, in: Evans (2003),
p. 339.
14 For a more comprehensive analysis of limits to legislative jurisdiction over foreign territories,
see Akehurst (1972-1973), p. 188-190.
15 Also known as the passive personality principle, the protective principle and the universal
principle.
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legislative ‘jurisdiction’ concern anti-trust or bankruptcy laws regarding foreign
economic activities producing effects within the legislating state. In the Lotus
case the Permanent Court of International Justice held the competence of states
to enact legislation on acts outside their territories not to be subject to a general
prohibitive rule:
‘Far from lying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend
the application of their laws and the ‘jurisdiction’ of their courts to persons,
property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide
measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules
(…). [A]ll that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits
which international law places upon its ‘jurisdiction’; within these limits, its title
to exercise ‘jurisdiction’ rests in its sovereignty.’16
While states may have the ‘jurisdiction’ to levy taxes on its own nationals living
abroad or to try non-national criminals who have committed offences abroad,
a state will normally not have ‘jurisdiction’ to enforce these legislative or
judiciary measures without the consent of the other state.17 A state may not
simply enter into another state in order to collect taxes, recruit military con-
scripts or arrest criminals. This is what the PCIJ referred to when holding that
failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary, a state may not
exercise its power in the territory of another state.18 Thus, enforcement ‘juris-
diction’ must be grounded in international custom or international agreement.
There are, of course, many examples of states permitting other states to act
within their territories. Under international custom and through bilateral and
multilateral treaties, consular officers stationed abroad may perform a wide
variety of functions such as the issue of passports, travel documents, and visa,
or act as notary and civil registrar.19 Under treaties concluded within the
framework of the Council of Europe, European states are entitled to service
writs, records of judicial verdicts or rogatory letters in other Member States
and may Members States be obliged to comply with criminal judgments and
16 S.S. ‘Lotus’, p. 19. See also the separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice in ICJ 5 February 1970,
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970,
p. 104 at para. 70: ‘It is true that, under present conditions, international law does not
impose hard and fast rules on States delimiting spheres of national jurisdiction in such
matters (...), but leaves to States a wide discretion in the matter. It does however (a) postu-
late the existence of limits-though in any given case it may be for the tribunal to indicate
what these are for the purposes of that case; and (b) involve for every State an obligation
to exercise moderation and restraint as to the extent of the jurisdiction assumed by its courts
in cases having a foreign element, and to avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more
properly appertaining to, or more appropriately exercisable by, another State’. For a
comment: Mann (1984), p. 26-31.
17 Lowe, in: Evans (2003), p. 351; Mann (1984), p. 47.
18 Supra n. 11.
19 Various consular practices are now codified in the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, 596 UNTS 261, see in particular Article 5.
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orders of seizure and confiscation served in another Member State.20 Under
bilateral treaties, the Spanish Guardia Civil is allowed to patrol the territorial
waters of Senegal for the purpose of intercepting illegal migrants, the Dutch
police is allowed to continue the hot pursuit of drug traffickers crossing the
Belgian border, and the United States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and
control’ in the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base under a lease established by the
1903 Cuban-American Treaty.21 In all these examples, states enforce, either
directly or indirectly, their domestic laws in the territory of another state. State
intervention in the territory of another state is sanctioned by the competent
authority: the other state. Extraterritorial enforcement ‘jurisdiction’ comes into
being as a result of agreement.
In general international law therefore, the primary function of ‘jurisdiction’
is to allocate state competences and to determine whether a state is entitled
to act. ‘Jurisdiction’ presupposes the existence of a legal title.
2.3 THE CONCEPT OF JURISDICTION IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Although human rights treaties undoubtedly form an integral part of inter-
national public law, they operate somewhat differently than treaties governing
inter-state relationships.22 Whereas treaties entered into under the general
regime of international law give rise to reciprocal rights and duties between
states, human rights treaties do not only create interstate obligations, but, more
importantly, give rise to a collection of one-way obligations a state owes to
a particular set of individuals.23 Whereas the addressee of an obligation under
20 See eg European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, ETS 30 (1959);
European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, ETS 70 (1970);
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime,
ETS 141 (1990).
21 Agreement between Spain and Senegal to launch joint military police patrols, concluded
on 21 August 2006 (see extensively chapter 6.2); Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium,
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg on cross-border law
enforcement, 8 June 2004; Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease
of Lands for Coaling and Naval stations, 23 February 1903.
22 B. Simma, ‘How Distinctive Are Treaties Representing Collective Interest? The Case of
Human Rights Treaties’, in: V. Gowlland-Debbas (ed.), Multilateral Treaty-Making, The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2000), p. 87.
23 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated it as follows: ‘modern human rights
treaties (…) are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish
the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their object
and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings irrespective
of their nationality, both against the State of their nationality and all other contracting States.
In concluding these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to submit themselves
to a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various obligations, not
in relation to other States, but towards all individuals within their jurisdiction.’ Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. 24 September 1982, The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the
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general international law will normally be another Contracting State, the
addressee of human rights obligations is a group of individuals the member-
ship of which is variable and to some extent indeterminate. The legal bond
of the individual with the Contracting State does not consist of an act of
signature or ratification, but is subject to less tangible criteria reflecting a
degree of attachment of the individual with the Contracting State. This legal
bond may come into existence or come to an end as a result of circumstances
relating to the individual, such as the fact of birth, death, immigration or
emigration. It may also be the result of actions emanating from the state. By
invading Kuwait in 1991 for example, Iraq was considered to have extended
its human rights obligations under the ICCPR to the populace of Kuwait.24
Although there is no uniformity in methods whereby various human rights
instruments try to capture, or legally define, the group of individuals to which
states owe the human rights obligations set out in the treaty, the notions of
‘jurisdiction’ and ‘territory’ have an obvious appeal. The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights speaks of ‘all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction’ (Article 2(1)); the European Convention on Human
Rights speaks of ‘everyone within their jurisdiction’ (Article 1); the Convention
on the Rights of the Child speaks of ‘each child within their jurisdiction’
(Article 2(1)); and the American Convention on Human Rights speaks of ‘all
persons subject to their jurisdiction’ (Article 1(1)). But other treaties, such as
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
do not contain a general provision limiting the scope of obligations either
ratione personae or ratione loci, although some of the material provisions con-
tained in these treaties do embody language from which a particular scope
can be inferred. The Refugee Convention, for example, divides the various
rights contained therein to refugees ‘present in the State party’s territory’,
refugees ‘lawfully staying in the country of refuge’, and refugees ‘who have
their habitual place of residence in the State party’s territory’.25
It appears from the drafting histories of the various human rights conven-
tions that the choice for the term ‘jurisdiction’ in delimiting their scope was
not self-evident. While the Drafting Committee of the ICCPR had originally
confined the scope of obligations of a state Party to ‘persons under its juris-
diction’, this requirement was subject to ongoing discussions during the
preparatory stages. A US draft had substituted the words ‘under its jurisdiction’
for ‘within its territory’, but in 1949 a French proposal to replace the word
American Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82,
para. 29. In a similar vein: ECtHR 18 January 1978, Ireland v United Kingdom, no. 5310/71,
para. 239.
24 HRC 10 October 1991, Fifteenth annual report, UN doc. A/46/40, para. 652.
25 Almost all substantive rights in the Refugee Convention specify to which category of
refugees the protection applies. See in particular Articles 12-34 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150 (Geneva, 28 July 1951).
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territory for jurisdiction was provisionally adopted.26 France had submitted
that a state should not be relieved of its obligations to persons who remained
within its jurisdiction merely because they were not within its territory.27
At a practical level it was further argued that nationals residing abroad wishing
to join associations within a Contracting State’s territory should be able to rely
on the ICCPR, as should nationals wishing to have access to the courts of their
state and nationals invoking a right to enter their mother country as laid down
in Article 12 (4) ICCPR.28 On the other hand it was contended, in particular
by the US, that a reference to ‘jurisdiction’ alone would neither suffice, since
a state would normally not be able to protect (or enforce) the rights of persons
living outside its territory who might be subject to its (legislative) ‘jurisdiction’;
in such cases action would be possible only through diplomatic channels.29
In the final stages of the negotiations it was eventually decided to refer both
to territory and jurisdiction – resulting in what later has been termed ‘this
awkwardly formulated provision’.30
During the preparatory stages of the European Convention, the first draft
(which limited its applicability ‘to all persons residing within the territories’31
of the Member States) triggered a proposal to replace the words ‘residing in’
by ‘living in’, so as to expand the reach of the future Convention. This proposal
led to a second one:
‘Since the aim of [the first,] amendment is to widen as far as possible the categories
of persons who are to benefit by the guarantees contained in the Convention, and since
the words ’living in’ might give rise to a certain ambiguity, the ... Committee should
adopt the text contained in the draft Covenant of the United Nations Commission:
that is, to replace the words “residing within” by “within its jurisdiction” [...].’32
The choice for insertion of the term jurisdiction apears to have been inspired
by the drafting process of the UN Covenants, the early stages of which took
place at the same time, and where at that moment a reference to jurisdiction
had been provisionally agreed upon. The proposal was approved by the
Committee of Experts; later changes of Article 1 ECRH only related to other
26 See M.J. Bossuyt, Guide to the ’Travaux Préparatoires’ of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff (1987), p. 53-54.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. Also see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Session,
Annexes, A/2929, Part II, Chap. V, 1955, para. 4. For a commentary, see M. Nowak, U.N.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary, Kehl am Rhein: Engel, 2nd Ed. (2005),
p. 30-31, 43-45.
29 Bossuyt (1987), p. 54.
30 Nowak (2005), p. 43.
31 See Collected Edition of the ’Travaux préparatoires’ of the European Convention on Human Rights
(hereafter: TP) part II, p. 276 (8 Sept. 1949); emphasis added.
32 Ibid., p. 200 (5 Feb. 1950), emphasis added.
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elements of this provision.33 Although the word ‘territory’ was reintroduced
into the draft text of the ICCPR one year later, the corresponding provision in
the ECRH remained unchanged.
Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the wordings chosen
in the ECRH were eventually preferred above those of the ICCPR. The original
draft of Article 2 of the CRC had delimited the scope of obligations of Contract-
ing States to children ‘in their territories’. In considering to opt for the
wordings chosen in the ICCPR, it was indicated that the dual requirement of
territory and jurisdiction could give rise to uncertainty, with as example
mentioned the legal status of children who are within a state’s territory but
outside its ‘jurisdiction’, such as diplomats’ children.34 The Finnish delegation
had subsequently proposed – ‘in order to cover every possible situation’ –
to delete the reference to territories and keep only the reference to jurisdiction –
‘such as in the European Convention’. The provision was, without further
comment, amended accordingly.35
In interpreting the territorial scope of human rights treaties, various authors
rely heavily on the travaux préparatoires, resulting in sometimes opposing
propositions as regards the scope of respective treaties.36 Although it is true
that in the legislative history of the ICCPR, CRC and the ECRH different argu-
ments were brought forward for inserting the notion of ‘jurisdiction’, one
should be hesitant to infer from these variances alone that the purport of the
word ‘jurisdiction’ differs among these treaties. The reasons submitted for
insertion of the word ‘jurisdiction’ were of rather footloose nature and it is
clear that the drafters shared similar concerns and did indeed pay close
attention to the wordings chosen in other human rights treaties. Perhaps the
main conclusion to be drawn from the preparatory works is not that they
signify the exact envisaged personal scope of application, but rather that they
reflect a common understanding that the notions of ‘territory’ and ‘jurisdiction’
do not necessarily coincide; and that states will sometimes encounter diffi-
33 TP part II, p. 236 and 260 (15 Feb. 1950); TP part IV, p. 218, for the text as adopted by the
Conference of Senior Officials (15 June 1950).
34 S. Detrick, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the “Travaux
Préparatoires”, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff (1992), p. 147.
35 Ibid.
36 It has sometimes been derived from the travaux preparatoires that neither the ECHR nor
the ICCPR should be interpreted as being extraterritorially applicable. Kavaldjieva concludes
from the legislative history of the ECHR that the drafting Committee was mainly concerned
with narrowing down the scope of territorial obligations from which she infers that juris-
diction should be interpreted as a territorial concept alone; Kavaldjieva (2006), p. 531-534.
A similar reading of the travaux is given by the ECtHR in Banković, para. 63. Noll concludes
that although the ECHR does have extraterritorial effect, the drafting history of the ICCPR
strongly suggests that Contracting Parties were not prepared to give the Covenant extraterri-
torial scope, G. Noll, ‘Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Entry under International
Law?’, 17 International Journal of Refugee Law (2005), p. 557-564.
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culties in ensuring human rights, in particular in situations of colliding state
sovereignties.37
2.4 ON THE DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS OF JURISDICTION IN GENERAL INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
While under general international law the concept of jurisdiction serves to
allocate state competences, in human rights law the term is used to define,
as appropriately as possible, the pool of persons to which a state ought to
secure human rights. These two different functions have also been described
as the ‘substantive’ notion of jurisdiction as opposed to the ‘remedial’ notion.38
It has transpired, in the time span of more than sixty years since the conclusion
of the ICCPR and ECRH, that the various treaty monitoring bodies – and the
European Court of Human Rights in particular – have encountered notorious
difficulties in reconciling these two notions. On a conceptual level, it appears
that these difficulties stem from two reasons in particular.
The first is that, in opting for the term ‘jurisdiction’, the drafters of the
human rights conventions appear not to have dwelled on situations in which
states would violate the sovereignties of other states, on situations in which
state sovereignties would overlap or situations where there is no clear demarca-
tion of competences at all.39 This has left the present-day human rights
practitioner, including the various monitoring bodies, with the rather peculiar
presumption reflected in human rights treaties that states only act within
clearly defined ‘jurisdictional’ bounds, and that it is only if states act in accord-
37 On this point, see also Mr. Tomuschat, former member of the Human Rights Committee:
‘The formula was intended to take care of objective difficulties which might impede the
implementation of the Covenant in specific situations. Thus, a State party is normally unable
to ensure the effective enjoyment of the rights under the Covenant to its citizens abroad,
having at its disposal only the tools of diplomatic protection with their limited potential.
Instances of occupation of foreign territory offer another example of situations which the
drafters of the Covenant had in mind when they confined the obligation of States parties
to their own territory. All these factual patterns have in common, however, that they provide
plausible grounds for denying the protection of the Covenant. It may be concluded, there-
fore, that it was the intention of the drafters, whose sovereign decision cannot be challenged,
’to restrict the territorial scope of the Covenant in view of such situations where enforcing
the Covenant would be likely to encounter exceptional obstacles. Never was it envisaged,
however, to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power to carry out wilful and
deliberate attacks against the freedom and personal integrity against their citizens living
abroad.’ Individual Opinion appended to HRC 29 July 1981, Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, no.
52/1979,
38 A. Orakhelashvili, ‘Restrictive Interpretation of the Human Rights Treaties in the Recent
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, 14 European Journal of International
Law (2003), p. 540.
39 Leaving aside emergency clauses, such as Art. 15 ECHR, which anticipate situations of
war.
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ance with those bounds, that individuals would fall under the scope of human
rights protection. The main difficulty with this presumption is that it would
risk denial of human rights protection in situations where states do act outside
of their jurisdiction. How should, for example, reliance be placed on the term
jurisdiction in the much commented upon case of Banković, where it could
be argued that the NATO Member States lacked a legal title to bomb the
television and radio station in Belgrade, but where the bombings nonetheless
had drastic repercussions on the persons working in that station? It would
of course greatly hamper the effective protection of human rights if the con-
dition of an individual falling under a state’s ‘jurisdiction’ in human rights
law is understood as requiring that a state has legitimately exercised power
for an individual to be able to benefit from human rights protection.
Although the Banković decision is not altogether illuminating in addressing
this point, the European Court of Human Rights has in several other cases
tacitly acknowledged that the remedial function of jurisdiction should prevail
over the substantive – or allocating – function.40 Other treaty monitoring
bodies and the International Court of Justice have taken a similar approach.
The fact that South Africa no longer had a legal title to administer the territory
of Namibia, did not release it from its obligations towards the people of
Namibia.41 And by invading Kuwait, Iraq clearly violated the territorial
sovereignty of Kuwait and overstepped its ‘jurisdiction’, but this did not
preclude the Human Rights Committee from establishing that this unlawful
exercise of ‘jurisdiction’ brought Kuwaiti citizens within the ‘jurisdiction’ of
Iraq for the purposes of the ICCPR.42 Accordingly, it is now commonly
accepted that in situations of an overstepping of jurisdiction, the personal scope
of human rights protection is not a question of legitimacy but of fact.43 It is
not relevant whether a state has a legal title to act, but it is relevant whether
40 See eg ECtHR 23 March 1995, Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections), no. 15318/89, para.
62: ‘[T]he responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of
military action – whether lawful or unlawful – it exercises effective control of an area outside
its national territory’; and ECtHR 16 November 2004, Issa a.o. v Turkey, no. 31821/96, paras.
69, 71. Also see EComHR 12 October 1989, Stocké v Germany (report), no. 11755/85, para.
167 (‘An arrest made by the authorities of one State on the territory of another State, without
the prior consent of the State concerned, does not […] only involve State responsibility
vis-à-vis the other State, but [it] also affects that person’s individual right to security under
Article 5(1) . The question whether or not the other State claims reparation for violation
of its rights under international law is not relevant for the individual right under the
Convention.’)
41 ICJ 21 June 1971, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports 1971, para. 118.
42 Supra n. 24.
43 This point is also stressed in Scheinin’s appraisal of the extraterritorial effect of the ICCPR,
who observes that ‘facticity creates normativity’. M. Scheinin, ‘Extraterritorial Effect of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, in: F. Coomans and M.T. Kamminga
(eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Antwerp: Intersentia (2004),
p. 73-81.
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the link between the individual affected and the state is sufficiently close as
to oblige the state to secure that individual’s rights. In Banković, the ECtHR was
thus right in its statement that extraterritorial exercises of ‘jurisdiction’ need
‘special justification’,44 but when it has been established that a state acts extra-
territorially, the question of justification becomes moot.
A second conceptual issue raised by the different functions of jurisdiction
under human rights and general international law is that under the latter, the
question whether a state is competent to enact legislation or to enforce its laws
abroad will normally depend on the subject matter at issue. Hence, a person
may well fall under the jurisdiction of state A in respect of subject matter X,
but under the jurisdiction of state B in respect of subject matter Y. But the
various human rights conventions have incorporated jurisdiction as a require-
ment that that an individual must fall ‘within’ – or, in the case of the American
Convention on Human rights, ‘be subject to’ – the jurisdiction of a contracting
state, which then enlivens a duty on the side of the state to ensure (all) the
rights and freedoms set forth in the respective treaties.45 This formulation
may be taken as reflecting the presumptions, firstly, that an individual falls
under the jurisdiction of either one state or another, and secondly, that the
state within which jurisdiction the person is placed, is obliged to secure the
full spectrum of human rights to that person.46 Such presumptions are
obviously problematic, as it may well be – and this will especially be so in
extraterritorial situations – that activities of a state only affect a person within
the sphere of one particular human right and not with regard to others and
it may moreover be so that a state is simply not legally entitled or factually
able to guarantee human rights across the full spectrum.
In Banković, the European Court of Human Rights adhered to a rather one-
dimensional approach to this matter where it considered that the obligation
to ensure persons within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms of the
Convention cannot ‘be divided and tailored in accordance with the particular
circumstances of the extra-territorial act in question’.47 But, adding to the
conceptual confusion, in Banković and several other cases the general formula
is also used that only extraterritorial acts which ‘constitute an exercise of
jurisdiction’ can engage the protection of the European Convention.48 This
gives rise to the question whether it is the nature of the act of the state or
rather the nature of the relationship between the state and the individual which
44 Banković, para. 61.
45 The ECHR, ICCPR and CRC merely require the contracting states to ensure (or secure)
‘the rights’; while the ACHR expressly speaks of the ‘free and full exercise’ of those rights.
46 The second presumption is upheld by M.J. Dennis, ‘Application of Human Rights Treaties
Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation’, 99 AJIL (2005), p. 130.
47 Banković, para. 75.
48 Ibid., para. 67; ECtHR 8 July 2004, Ilascu a.o. v Moldova and Russia, no. 48787/99, para. 314;
Ben El Mahi v Denmark; ECtHR 30 June 2009, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom
(admissibility), no. 61498/08, para. 85.
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should be decisive in the establishment of a ‘jurisdictional link’. Problematic,
further, is that by stating that it is only in exceptional cases that extraterritorial
acts of states can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction, the Court appears to
be caught up in some logical fallacy, as it is difficult to see – from the ordinary
meaning of the term jurisdiction – which acts of a state done out of public
authority, regardless of whether they are effectuated in- or outside the state’s
territory, do not constitute an assertion of its sovereignty and hence an exercise
of ‘jurisdiction’.
2.5 INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
It is now time to explore in more detail the relevant views and decisions of
international courts and monitoring bodies on the criteria to be applied in
giving extraterritorial effect to human rights. Regarding these criteria, inter-
national case law appears to distinguish between two types of situations. Under
the first type, control over foreign territory as a result of occupation or other-
wise, various international courts have accepted that by virtue of such control,
a state is bound to respect its obligations under human rights treaties in respect
of all activity it undertakes within that territory, rendering it unnecessary to
separately establish whether a specific act brings the affected individual within
the ‘jurisdiction’ of the occupying state (section 2.5.1). The second type, that
of control over persons, comprises a variety of situations through which indi-
viduals may be brought within the ‘jurisdiction’ of a state as a consequence
of a more or less incidental link between the individual and the state whose
acts produce effects outside its territory (section 2.5.2). This latter category
is particularly relevant for this study but, unfortunately, also subject to con-
siderable dispute. Section 2.5.3 deals with what may develop into a third
category, in which the state, also in the absence of an assertion of control or
authority over a person in a foreign territory, may nonetheless incur positive
duties vis-à-vis that individual.
2.5.1 Jurisdiction resulting from control over territory
Let us start our survey of this category of situations with what perhaps is a
platitude. A state has ‘jurisdiction’ over territory when it is the sovereign
power with regard to that territory. Amongst other things, this implies that
a state ought to secure a governmental structure capable of securing human
rights throughout its territory. In Ilascu a.o. v Moldova and Russia, in which the
European Court not only was faced with the question whether detainees in
the break-away region of Trandniestria, Moldova, were within the ‘jurisdiction’
of Russia by virtue of Russia’s support for the rebel forces, but also had to
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determine whether conversely, the detainees could still be considered to come
within the ‘jurisdiction’ of Moldova, the Court considered that ‘jurisdiction’
is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the state’s territory and that
this presumption may be limited in exceptional circumstances only, in
particular where a state is prevented from exercising authority in part of its
territory.49 The Court found that Moldova had lost effective control over the
separatist regime but it stressed that this did not discharge Moldova from its
positive obligation to take all diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures
that it is in its power to take to secure release of the applicants.50
In situations where a state, by invitation or force, assumes control over
a foreign territory, there would seem to be an inherent logic for extending
a state’s human rights obligations to the persons resident in the occupied
territory. This logic not only stems from the fact that activities of the controlling
state may have a notable impact on those resident there, but also from the
imperative that persons may otherwise be rendered void of meaningful human
rights protection.
The question of applicability of human rights to an occupied territory can
be considered from a multitude of perspectives. In the context of occupation
by force, a recurring theme concerns the relationship between human rights
law and international humanitarian law, whereby it has been suggested that
the former only applies in times of peace while the latter forms the lex specialis
in times of war.51 A more general question is whether, by encroaching upon
the territorial sovereignty of another country, a state should not simply assume
the international obligations of the territorial sovereign and therefore abide
by all rules, including international treaties, previously applicable to that
49 ECtHR 8 July 2004, Ilascu a.o. v Moldova and Russia, no. 48787/99, para. 312. Also see ECtHR
8 April 2004, Assanidze v Georgia, no. 71503/01, para. 139. A similar presumption was
proposed in R.A. Lawson, ‘Out of Control – State Responsibility and Human Rights: Will
the ILC’s Definition of the ‘Act of State’ meet the Challenges of the 21st Century?’, in
Castermans, Van Hoof & Smith (eds.), The Role of the Nation State in the 21st Century – Essays
in Honour of Peter Baehr (1998), p. 113.
50 Ibid., para. 331. Cf. Banković, where the ECtHR expressly rejected a ‘gradual approach’ to
the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ as was proposed by the applicants in that case.
51 The prevailing doctrine, however, is that human rights law also applies in times of war
and that, in situations of armed conflict, the protections under human rights and inter-
national humanitarian law complement one another. The applicable standard of human
rights protection may be influenced by international humanitarian law as the applicable
lex specialis. See inter alia ICJ 9 July 2004, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) (hereafter ‘Wall Opinion’), ICJ Reports
2004, para. 106; ICJ 8 July 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory
Opinion), ICJ Reports 1996, para. 25; ICJ 19 December 2005, Case Concerning Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (hereafter ‘Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo’), ICJ Reports 2005, para. 216; IACHR 29 September
1999, Coard et al. v the United States, Case 10.951, Report No. 109/99, para. 39-42. Contra
M.J. Dennis, ‘Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed
Conflict and Military Occupation’, 99 American Journal of International Law (2005), p. 119-141.
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territory.52 This proposition finds support in Article 43 of the Hague Regula-
tions of 1907, obliging occupying powers to, unless absolutely prevented,
respect the laws in force in the occupied country.53 In Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo, the ICJ considered this obligation to comprise the duty
to secure respect for the applicable rules of international human rights law
and international humanitarian law, to protect the inhabitants of the occupied
territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such violence by any third
party.54
But the question of applicability of human rights treaties to occupied
foreign territory is more often addressed from the perspective of the obligations
flowing from treaties ratified by the occupying state itself. The European Court
of Human Rights, UN treaty monitoring bodies and the International Court
of Justice have all unequivocally accepted that by invading a territory and
occupying it, a state becomes obliged to extend its human rights obligations
to activities it undertakes in that territory.55 Reference to specific human rights
obligations was explicitly made by the ICJ in its advisory opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
where it considered that, being the occupying power, Israel exercised territorial
‘jurisdiction’ over the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which was sufficient
to engage the responsibilities of Israel under the ICCPR, CRC and ICESR regarding
the human rights consequences of the construction of the Wall.56 The advisory
52 Meron, mainly discussing applicability of ILO Conventions to occupied Palestinian territory,
formulated the rules of thumb that 1) in case of prior application of a multilateral convention
of a treaty to the territory in question, a state must respect the norms of that treaty; and 2)
in case of the occupant but not the territorial sovereign having ratified a treaty, there is
a presumption against applicability of that convention, but adding that the needs of the
population must always be taken into account. T. Meron, ‘Applicability of Multilateral
Conventions to occupied Territories’, 72 American Journal of International Law (1978), p. 550-
551.
53 Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex to the Convention
(IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907.
54 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, para. 178.
55 Already before the explicit pronouncements of various international courts on the applic-
ability of a state’s human rights obligations to occupied territory, the ICJ had considered,
in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, that ‘certain
general conventions such as those of a humanitarian character’ to which the occupying
State is party, should apply to the persons resident in the occupied territory, see paras.
118-122.
56 Wall Opinion, para. 109. The ICJ brought forward three arguments in favor of extraterritorial
applicability of the ICCPR: (1) the object and purpose of the ICCPR implicates that it would
be natural that states exercising jurisdiction outside the national territory should be bound
to comply with its provisions; (2) the HRC has consistently found the ICCPR to be applicable
to states exercising jurisdiction on foreign territory; and (3) the travaux préparatoires of the
ICCPR indicates that the drafters ‘only intended to prevent persons residing abroad from
asserting, vis-à-vis their State of origin, rights that do not fall within the competence of
that State, but of that of the State of residence.’ In considering the ICESR applicable to
Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ reasoned that although the ICESR contains no
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opinion confirmed the position repeatedly taken up by the HRC and the CESCR
in respect of Israel’s human rights obligations in the occupied Palestinian
territories.57 In establishing whether Israel was an ‘Occupying Power’, the
ICJ merely referred to Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, which stipulates
that ‘Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army’.58 In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,
the ICJ further specified that the presence of military forces does not necessarily
signify that an intervening state has become an occupying power. It must also
be demonstrated that the intervening state has substituted its own authority
for that of the local authorities.59
What is not entirely clear is whether the fact of occupation enlivens a duty
to secure the full compliance with human rights treaty provisions throughout
that territory, including for example the setting up of legal arrangements
necessary for the fulfilment of all kinds of positive obligations; or that the state
should merely ensure that its own agents operating in that territory act in
accordance with human rights standards. In its advisory opinion on the Wall,
the ICJ confined Israel’s obligations arising from the ICCPR and ICESCR to activity
undertaken by Israeli state organs within the occupied territories and not to
activities of the Palestinian authorities. As regards the latter, the Court merely
noted that Israel was under the obligation ‘not to raise any obstacle to the
exercise of such rights in those fields where competence has been transferred
to Palestinian authorities.’60 These findings were in conformity – and indeed
based upon – the HRC’s concluding observations on Israel of 2003, where the
Committee had considered that ‘the provisions of the Covenant apply to the
benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories, for all conduct by the State
party’s authorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment of rights
enshrined in the Covenant and fall within the ambit of State responsibility
of Israel under the principles of public international law.’61
But in its first concluding observations on Israel in 1998, the Committee
had appeared to use broader language in noting that it was ‘deeply concerned
that Israel continues to deny responsibility to apply fully the Covenant in the
provision on its scope of application which may be explicable by the fact that the Covenant
guarantees rights which are ‘essentially territorial’, ‘it is not to be excluded that it applies
both to territories over which a State party has sovereignty and to those over which that
State exercises territorial jurisdiction.’ Ibid., para. 112.
57 CESCR 4 December 1998, Concluding observations on Israel, E/C.12/1/Add.27, para. 6;
CESCR 23 May 2003, Concluding observations on Israel, E/C.12/1/Add.90, para. 11; HRC
18 August 1998, Concluding observations on Israel, CCPR/C/79/Add.93, para. 10; HRC
21 August 2003, Concluding observations on Israel, CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para. 11.
58 Wall Opinion, para. 78.
59 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, paras. 173, 177.
60 Wall Opinion, paras. 111-112.
61 HRC 21 August 2003, Concluding observations on Israel, CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para. 11,
emphasis added.
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occupied territories’.62 This was despite Israel’s insistence that the over-
whelming majority of powers and responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza
had been transferred to the Palestinian authorities.63 In Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo, the ICJ also appeared to broaden the scope of obliga-
tions of Uganda beyond those concerning the own acts and omissions of its
armed forces. It derived from Article 43 of the Hague Regulations a duty to
‘restore and ensure’ public order and safety in the occupied territory. And
in respect of applicable human rights law, the responsibility of Uganda was
found to be engaged not only for the acts and omissions of its own military
forces, but also for ‘any lack of vigilance in preventing violations of human
rights (…) by other actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel
groups acting on their own account’.64 The rebel groups in question concerned
various Congolese factions which received active support from the Ugandese
army, but which functioned sufficiently autonomous as to preclude the possi-
bility of attributing their activity to Uganda.
The issue of the precise scope of human rights protection to be accorded in
a foreign territory has also been addressed under the European Convention
on Human Rights, especially in a long series of cases concerning the Turkish
occupation of northern Cyprus. In the ‘early’ Cyprus-cases, the former Euro-
pean Commission, in line with its decisions in cases concerning activities of
state agents abroad,65 considered that persons or property in Cyprus could
be brought within the jurisdiction of Turkey, but only to the extent that Turkish
armed forces, being agents of the Turkish state, ‘exercised control over such
persons or property’ and in so far they ‘by their acts and omissions, affect such
persons’ rights and freedoms under the Convention’.66 But the European
Court of Human Rights took the Turkish responsibilities in northern Cyprus
to be wider. In the case of Loizidou, the Court referred to the object and purpose
of the Convention and considered that having effective control over an area
outside its national territory enlivens the obligation ‘to secure, in such an area,
the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention’, while adding that it was
immaterial whether this control was exercised ‘directly, through its armed
62 HRC 18 August 1998, Concluding observations on Israel, CCPR/C/79/Add.93, para. 10
63 HRC 4 December 2001, Addendum to the Second Periodic Report, Israel, CCPR/C/ISR/
2001/2, para. 8.
64 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, para. 179.
65 See, infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
66 EComHR 26 May 1975, Cyprus v Turkey, nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, para. 10; EComHR
10 July 1978, Cyprus v Turkey, no. 8007/77, para. 21. In the case of Chrysostomos and others,
the Commission found the applicants’ arrest, detention and trial in northern Cyprus,
handled by the Turkish Cypriot authorities, acts which were not imputable to Turkey:
EComHR 8 July 1993, Chrystomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v Turkey, nos. 15299/89,
15300/89 and 15318/89.
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forces or through a subordinate local administration’.67 And more
pronouncedly, in Cyprus v Turkey, the Court held:
‘Having effective overall control over northern Cyprus, its responsibility cannot
be confined to the acts of its own soldiers or officials in northern Cyprus but must
also be engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration which survives
by virtue of Turkish military and other support. It follows that, in terms of Article 1
of the Convention, Turkey’s “jurisdiction” must be considered to extend to securing
the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional
Protocols which she has ratified, and that violations of those rights are imputable
to Turkey.’68
This reasoning has been upheld in all subsequent cases concerning the activities
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.69
A marked difference between the situation in northern Cyprus (and the
eastern Congo) on the one hand, and the occupied Palestinian territories on
the other is that the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (and
arguably, the various rebel Congolese factions) could indeed be labelled as
a subordinate administration, whereas the Palestinian Authority endeavours
precisely to function as autonomously as possible from the Israeli authorities.
Presumably, the reasoning of both the ICJ and the European Court must be
that in respect of situations where effective control is exercised over foreign
territory, a presumption is formed that the state is capable of ensuring the
full application of its human rights obligations there, also in respect of the
activities of a local entity. But this presumption may be considered not to apply
if a local entity, such as the Palestinian Authority, functions autonomously
from, and is inherently resistant to influence asserted by, the occupying state.70
67 Loizidou (preliminary objections), para. 62. Accordingly, in the merits phase the Court held
the question whether Turkish forces were directly involved in the impugned denial of Mrs
Loizidou’s access to her property in northern Cyprus was not to be decisive for a finding
concerning Turkey’s responsibility. Instead, it found that by virtue of the Turkish army
exercising effective overall control, Turkish responsibility was engaged also for the policies
and actions of the local ‘TRNC’ administration: ECtHR 18 December 1996, Loizidou v Turkey
(merits), no. 15318/89, para. 56.
68 ECtHR 10 May 2001, Cyprus v Turkey, no. 25781/94, para. 77.
69 Eg ECtHR 26 September 2002, Andreou Papi v Turkey, no. 16094/90; ECtHR 20 February
2003, Djavit An v Turkey, no. 20652/92, paras. 21-22; ECtHR 31 July 2003, Eugenia Michaelidou
Developments Ltd. a.o. v Turkey, no. 16163/90, para. 28; ECtHR 31 March 2005, Adali v Turkey,
no. 38187/97, paras. 186-187; ECtHR 3 June 2008, Andreou v Turkey, no. 45653/99; ECtHR
24 June 2008, Solomou a.o. v Turkey, no. 36832/97, paras. 50-51; ECtHR 24 June 2008, Isaak
v Turkey, no. 44587/98, paras. 76-77.
70 The ECtHR’s pronouncements on the question to what extent, and on what basis, Turkey
should assume responsibility for the activities of the ‘TRNC’ are not entirely clear. See
especially the Loizidou judgments, where the Court noted not only that effective control
over foreign territory may be exercised through a subordinate administration (merits at
para. 52, preliminary objections at para. 62), but also that this effective overall control would
consequently implicate that Turkey becomes responsible for the activities of the subordinate
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2.5.2 Jurisdiction resulting from control over persons
When a state is in control of a foreign territory, there are strong imperatives
for considering the state bound to ensure the human rights of persons in that
territory. Activities of the controlling state may obviously have a notable
impact on the persons residing there and the very fact that a state is ‘in control’
logically implies that the state has it, at least to some extent, within its abilities
to ensure the human rights of persons living there. Moreover, to consider the
state not bound to respect human rights in that territory could result in the
creation of a human rights vacuum, because the original sovereign will normal-
ly have become unable to fulfil its function as the human rights guarantor
in that territory. By contrast, in situations of ad hoc activities of a state in
foreign territory, or where activities of and within a state produce effects in
foreign territories, the existence of a ‘jurisdictional link’ between the acting
state and the affected individual may be less obvious.71 Not only may it be
less straightforward to establish that a state has impacted upon fundamental
rights of persons, the persons so affected will normally be able to continue
to rely on the protection of their own government, which is under a duty to
protect its inhabitants also from outside interference by other states.72
International human rights bodies have, however, considered human rights
conventions not to be without meaning in this context. In making some com-
parative observations on the manner in which the various international human
rights bodies have adjudicated the matter, this section submits that in essence,
two approaches are adhered to. Under the first approach, the requirement
of ‘jurisdiction’ is understood as embodying nothing more (and nothing less)
than just any exercise of state authority; while under the second approach the
concept of ‘jurisdiction’ is conceived as giving expression to some predefined
relationship between the state and the individual, other than the alleged human
rights violation itself, which must exist for the state’s human rights obligations
to become engaged.
The first approach is most evidently present in the case law of the former
European Commission of Human Rights and in that of the Human Rights
administration (merits at para. 56). This appears to be a circular form of argument and
moreover not one which distinguishes all too clearly between questions of attribution and
of jurisdiction. On this point extensively, M. Milanovic, ‘From Compromise to Principle:
Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties’, 8 Human Rights Law
Review (2008), p. 436-446.
71 The term ‘jurisdictional link’ was first introduced in Banković, para. 82, and repeated in
inter alia Ben El Mahi v Denmark; and ECtHR 14 December 2006, Markovic v Italy, no. 1398/03,
para. 50.
72 In the case of Alzery, in respect of activities of US agents on the territory of Sweden, the
Human Rights Committee noted that ‘at a minimum, a State party is responsible for acts
of foreign officials exercising acts of sovereign authority on its territory, if such acts are
performed with the consent or acquiescence of the State party’, HRC 10 November 2006,
Mohammed Alzery v Sweden, no. 1416/2005, para. 11.6.
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Committee. The formula consistently used by the European Commission in
various cases where state activity produced ‘incidental’ effects in foreign
territories was that ‘authorised agents of a State bring other persons or
property within the jurisdiction of that State, to the extent that they exercise
authority over such persons or property’; and that ‘[i]n so far as they affect
such persons or property by their acts or omissions, the responsibility of the
State is engaged.’73 Under this formula, affected individuals were deemed
to fall under the jurisdiction of the acting state in situations concerning inter
alia a prohibition imposed by the Swiss Federal Aliens’ Police on a German
citizen to enter Liechtenstein,74 a decision of the Danish ambassador to allow
the GDR police to recover a group of GDR nationals present in the Danish
embassy in Berlin,75 the arrest and recovery for prosecution purposes by law
enforcement personnel of persons present in another country,76 and the de-
cision of the Swedish government to cover with concrete the wreck of a cruise
ferry which had sunk in international waters while sailing under Estonian
flag and carrying a substantial number of Swedish nationals.77
On reflection, and this is also evident from the wide variety of circum-
stances under which it was deemed to be met, the test adopted by the Euro-
pean Commission does not entail much of a threshold at all. We may assume
that all acts of a state’s agents constitute an assertion of that state’s authority
(with as possible exception acts of commercial nature) and thereby, in so far
as persons are sufficiently affected by that act, bring persons within its juris-
diction. It did not matter for the Commission whether the exercise of authority
consisted of a legislative or executive measure or an assertion of physical
control, it did not matter whether the act was committed abroad or only
produced effects abroad, and it did not matter whether the exercise of authority
was duly sanctioned – or, an assertion of jurisdiction proper – under inter-
national law.78 Hence, the approach of the Commission may be summarized
as one in which States Parties must always act in conformity with the European
73 Infra notes 74-78. Also see, EcomHR 25 September 1965, X v Federal Republic of Germany,
no. 1611/62; EComHR 15 December 1977, X v United Kingdom, no. 7547/76; EComHR 12
October 1989, Stocké v Germany, no. 11755/85, para. 166; and EComHR 18 January 1989,
Vearncombe v United Kingdom and Germany, no 12816/87. For an extensive appraisal of the
approach of the European Commission of Human Rights, see R.A. Lawson, ‘Life after
Bankovic: On the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human
Rights’, in: Coomans and Kamminga (2004), p. 90-95.
74 EComHR 14 July 1977. X. and Y. v Switzerland, nos. 7289/75 and 7349/76.
75 EComHR 14 October 1992, W.M. v Denmark, no. 17392/90.
76 EComHR 24 June 1996, Ramirez v France, no. 28780/95; EComHR 2 October 1989, Reinette
v France, no. 14009/88; EComHR 7 October 1980, Freda v Italy, no. 8916/80.
77 EComHR 8 September 1997, Bendréus v Sweden, no. 31653/96.
78 As regards this last point, in Stocké the Commission explicitly found the question whether
Germany had illegitimately encroached upon the territorial sovereignty of France irrelevant
for establishing whether the person affected by this activity fell under its jurisdiction: Stocké
v Germany, para. 167. Also see Bendréus v Sweden.
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Convention, irrespective of territorial constraints.79 For individuals situated
abroad to be able to rely on the Convention, they would merely need to show
that they are sufficiently affected in their enjoyment of human rights – which
does not appear to be a different test than the establishment of their status
as ‘victims’ in the meaning of current Article 34 of the European Convention.
Accordingly, the Commission’s test may also be described as tantamount to,
as the ECtHR would later put it in its Banković decision, an approach under
which ‘anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a Contracting State,
wherever in the world that act may have been committed or its consequences
felt, is thereby brought within the jurisdiction of that State for the purpose
of Article 1 of the Convention’, a reasoning which the Court forcefully
rejected.80
The Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American system of human rights
protection have proceeded from a rationale similar to that of the European
Commission. The Human Rights Committee has repeatedly affirmed that ‘it
would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of
the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant
on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on
its own territory’.81 Under this rationale, the Committee considered the appre-
hension and detention of Uruguayan nationals by Uruguayan security forces
in the territory of Brazil and Argentine, with the connivance or acquiescence
of local authorities, to bring the victims within the ‘jurisdiction’ of Uruguay.82
This conclusion was based on the consideration that the term ‘jurisdiction’
in Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR refers not to the place where
the violation occurred, but rather to the relationship between the individual
and the state in relation to a violation of any of the rights set forth in the
Covenant, wherever they occurred.83 The Committee further affirmed that,
for the question of enlivening a state’s duties under the ICCPR in such a situ-
ation, it was immaterial whether the state was internationally competent to
undertake the activity in the territory of another state.84 In several other views,
the Committee considered that the refusal by Uruguayan authorities to renew
the passports of Uruguayan citizens living abroad ‘is clearly a matter within
79 This is also the conclusion drawn by judge Rozakis from the Commission’s case law:
Rozakis, in: Venice Commission (2006), p. 61.
80 Banković, para. 75.
81 HRC 29 July 1981, Celiberti de Caseriego v Uruguay, no. 56/1979, para. 10; and HRC 29 July
1981, Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, no. 52/1979, para. 12.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Celiberti de Casariego v Uruguay, para. 10.3.
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the ‘jurisdiction’ of the Uruguayan authorities’ and that the authors were
‘subject to the ‘jurisdiction’ of Uruguay’ for the purpose of the ICCPR.85
The Human Rights Committee has not departed from this line of reasoning
in later views. Worth mentioning is the case of Ibrahima Gueye, on the question
whether retired Senegalese soldiers of the French Army residing in Senegal
should be treated equally with French nationals in the enjoyment of their
pension rights. The Committee considered that the authors were ‘not generally
subject to French ‘jurisdiction’, except that they rely on French legislation in
relation to the amount of pension rights’. This was sufficient to bring the
authors within the purview of the Covenant.86 In General Comment 31, the
Committee has now formulated as a general rule that ‘a State party must
respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within
the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within
the territory of the State Party.’87 Although the comment speaks of ‘power
or effective control’ as a general condition for engaging the protection of the
Covenant, these terms did not feature in the Committee’s views on the
passport- and apprehension cases, nor in the view in Ibrahima Gueye.88
Under the Inter-American system of human rights protection, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights have both considered that the obligation to uphold the rights
of any person subject to the jurisdiction of each American state may refer to
conduct with an extraterritorial locus, and that ‘[i]n principle, the inquiry turns
not on the presumed victim’s nationality or presence within a particular
geographic area, but on whether, under the specific circumstances, the State
observed the rights of a person subject to its authority and control’.89 In
85 HRC 23 March 1982, Vidal Martins v Uruguay, no. 57/1979, para. 7; HRC 31 March 1983,
Lichtensztejn v Uruguay, no. 77/1980, para. 6.1; HRC 31 March 1983, Montero v Uruguay,
no. 106/1981, para. 5; HRC 22 July 1983, Nunez v Uruguay, no. 108/1981, para. 6.1.
86 HRC 3 April 1989, Ibrahima Gueye et al. v France, no. 196/1983, para. 9.4. For other more
recent pronouncements see: HRC 15 November 2004, Loubna El Ghar v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
no. 1107/2002 (concerning the refusal of the Libyan consular authorities in Morocco to issue
a passport to a Libyan citizen residing in Morocco); and HRC 30 July 2009, Munaf v Romania,
no. 1539/2006 (concerning the transfer of an Iraqi-American national from the Romanian
embassy in Baghdad to the multinational forces in Iraq).
87 HRC 26 May 2004, General Comment 31, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 10.
88 The ramifications of the wording chosen in the general comment may be considerable, as
illustrated by the dissenting opinion of Kälin in the case of Munaf v Romania: ‘Thus, the
test is not, as argued by the State party, whether it had “custody of” or “authority over”
the author, or whether it relinquished custody of him to the MNF-I [the multinational forces
in Iraq – author], but whether it had “power or effective control” over him for the purposes
of respecting and ensuring his Covenant rights’: Dissenting opinion on the Admissibility
Decision of Committee member Mr. Walter Kälin appended to HRC 21 August 2009,
Mohammad Munaf v Romania, no. 1539/2006.
89 Coard et al. v the United States, para. 37 (concerning the deprivation of liberty of citizens
in and from Granada by invading United States armed forces); IACHR 29 September 1999,
Alejandre et al. v Cuba (hereafter ‘Brothers to the Rescue’), case no. 11.589, report no. 86/99,
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Brothers to the Rescue, the shooting down by the Cuban air force of two civilian
aircraft in international space was sufficient to consider the aircrafts’
unfortunate passengers to have been subjected to the ‘authority’ of Cuba,
without there being any further special relationship between Cuba and the
victims.90
But the proposition that human rights must always govern the extraterritorial
conduct of states was challenged by the European Court of Human Rights
in its Banković decision – rendered by the Court’s Grand Chamber and un-
animously. The ECtHR found the Convention not to apply to air-strikes by NATO
member states which were also party to the Convention, on the television and
radio facilities in Belgrade, because it was not persuaded that there was any
‘jurisdictional link’ between the victims of the air-strikes and the respondent
states and that therefore the applicants and their deceased relatives were not
‘capable of coming within the jurisdiction of the respondent States’.91
The Banković decision has been much commented upon elsewhere and need
not be in full explored here.92 It suffices to point to what was perhaps the
most crucial consideration propounded by the Court in restricting the extra-
territorial potential of the ECRH, namely that the rights and freedoms defined
in the Convention cannot be ‘divided and tailored in accordance with the
particular circumstances of the extra-territorial act in question’.93 The Court
reasoned that such an approach would render the words ‘within their juris-
diction’ in Article 1 ‘superfluous and devoid of any purpose’ because it would
equate the jurisdiction requirement with the question whether a person can
para. 23 (concerning the shooting of two civilian aircraft by a Cuban jet fighter outside
of Cuban airspace). Also see IACHR 13 March 1997, The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et
al. v. United States, case no. 10.675, report no. 51/96, paras. 164-178 (in which several
violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man were found on
account of the US interception of Haitian refugees on the high seas); and IACHR 11 March
1999, Victor Saldano v Argentina, report no. 38/99, para. 17.
90 Brothers to the Rescue, para. 25.
91 Banković, para. 82.
92 See eg Lawson, in: Coomans and Kamminga (2004), p. 83-123; M. O’Boyle, ‘The European
Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Comment on ‘Life After
Bankovic’, in: Coomans and Kamminga (2004), p. 125-139; Orakhelashvili (2003); M.
Happold, ‘Bankovic v Belgium and the Territorial Scope of the European Convention on
Human Rights’, 3 Human Rights Law Review (2003), p. 77–90; Milanovic (2008); M. Gondek,
‘Extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights: Territorial Focus
in the Age of Globalization?’, 52 Netherlands International Law Review (2005), p. 349-387; M.
Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial Application of Human
Rights Treaties, Antwerp: Intersentia (2009), p. 169-178; Kavaldjieva (2006), p. 520-522; E.
Roxstrom, M. Gibney and T. Einarsen, ‘The NATO Bombing Case (Bankovic et al. v. Belgium
et al.) and the Limits of Western Human Rights Protection’, 23 Boston University International
Law Journal (2005), p. 55-136; A. Ruth and M. Trilsch, ‘International Decisions: Bankovic
v Belgium (Admissibility)’, 97 American Journal of International Law (2003), p. 168-172.
93 Banković, para. 75.
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be considered to be a victim of a violation of rights guaranteed by the Conven-
tion.94 Accordingly, the Court appeared to suggest that the notion of ‘effective
control’ as established in its case law on Northern-Cyprus requires something
more than a determination that (i) a state has asserted authority over a person
present in a foreign territory; and that (ii) the person can be considered a
victim of a violation of a Convention right. Although the Court did not ela-
borate on the contents of this required additional threshold, one may safely
deduce that the Court did not deem every exercise of authority affecting a
person’s enjoyment of human rights sufficient to bring that person under its
‘jurisdiction’. Some further relationship between the individual and the state
is required which can be said to amount to a ‘jurisdictional link’ and which
is made operational through the notion of ‘effective control’. Several authors
have concluded from this part of the Banković decision that the Court would
at the least require that the exercise of state authority takes place over a certain
duration and/or has overall repercussions on the person concerned.95
It appears however that the Court, without expressly recognising so, is
slowly distancing itself from that doctrine, with several more recent decisions
and judgments pointing towards a more generous understanding of ‘juris-
diction’. In one of the first post-Banković judgments, in the case of Issa, the
Court adopted the formula earlier used by the Human Rights Committee in
referring to the ‘fact’ (sic) ‘that Article 1 of the Convention cannot be inter-
preted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention
on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own
territory’.96
This ‘fact’ (or rather principle) does appear to have been accorded decisive
weight in more recent Strasbourg case law. What is particularly notable about
the post-Banković case law of the ECtHR is that the ‘effective control’-criterion
has been applied rather arbitrarily. On the one hand, one could say that in
several post-Banković decisions in which the ECtHR concluded that applicants
were brought within the jurisdiction of a State Party, the power exerted by
the state over the individual was of such an intrusive and all-encompassing
nature that it indisputably amounted to an exercise of ‘effective control’. Thus,
in the cases of Öcalan, Medvedyev and Al-Saadoon, which all concerned the
extraterritorial arrest and continuing deprivation of liberty, the Court en-
94 Ibid.
95 Rozakis, in: Venice Commission (2006), p. 64; Happold (2003), p. 87.
96 Issa a.o. v Turkey, para. 71; the formula was repeated in ECtHR 28 September 2006, Isaak
v Turkey (admissibility), no. 44587/98; ECtHR 3 June 2008, Andreou v. Turkey (admissibility),
no. 45653/99; and Solomou a.o. v Turkey, para. 45.
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countered no difficulties in accepting that the applicants were within the state’s
jurisdiction.97
But in several cases concerning the use of force in foreign territories of
a rather incidental nature, some of which display striking factual similarities
with the case of Banković, the Court also accepted that the targeted persons
were within the jurisdiction of a State Party. Notable are the cases of Pad,
concerning fire discharged from Turkish helicopters just over the border with
Iran, and Solomou and Andreou, where the Court reasoned that fatal gunfire
discharged by Turkish-Cypriot forces in the neutral UN buffer zone in Cyprus
had brought the victims within the ‘authority and/or effective control’ of
Turkey.98 Similar to Brothers to the Rescue but seemingly contradictory to
Banković, the mere use of incidental force sufficed to bring the victims within
the jurisdiction of the State Party.
There are, further, several cases in which the ECtHR accepted that the
Convention applied to executive or adjudicative measures which were specific-
ally directed at persons resident abroad – much in line with the passport-cases
brought before the Human Rights Committee. In the case of Haydarie, concern-
ing the Dutch government’s refusal to issue a provisional residence visa to
a person living in Pakistan, the Court expressly discarded the argument that
the Convention could not apply because the applicant was outside the juris-
diction of the state refusing to issue the visa.99 In Minasyan and Semerjyan
97 In the Chamber judgment in Öcalan, the Court noted that the material difference with
Banković was that Mr. Öcalan was arrested and then had been physically forced to return
to Turkey by Turkish officials; as a result he was ‘subject to their authority and control’.
In its Grand Chamber judgment, the Court confirmed this proposition and found it ‘common
ground’ that arrest, followed by a physically enforced return, brought Öcalan within the
jurisdiction of Turkey, ECtHR 12 March 2003, Öcalan v Turkey (Chamber), no. 46221/99,
para. 93; ECtHR 12 May 2005, Öcalan v Turkey (Grand Chamber), no. 46221/99, para. 91.
ECtHR 10 July 2008, Medvedyev and Others v France (Chamber), no. 3394/03, paras. 50-51;
ECtHR 29 March 2010, Medvedyev and Others v France (Grand Chamber), no. 3394/03, para.
67 (referring to ‘the full and exclusive control’ exercised over the ship and its crew); ECtHR
30 June 2009, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom, no. 61498/08, para. 88 (referring
to the ‘the total and exclusive de facto, and subsequently also de jure, control exercised over
the premises where the individuals were detained’).
98 In Pad, the ECtHR simply reasoned that since Turkey had already admitted that the fire
discharged from its helicopters just over the border with Iran had caused the killing of
the applicants’ relatives, the alleged victims were within the jurisdiction of Turkey, ECtHR
28 June 2007, Pad a.o. v Turkey, no. 60167/00, paras. 54-55. See also Solomou a.o. v Turkey,
paras. 50-51 and Andreou v Turkey. On the extraterritorial use of force and the question
of jurisdiction, see further Isaak v Turkey (where the Court found that Turkey had violated
Article 2 ECHR on account of the involvement of Turkish-Cypriot soldiers in the killing
of Mr. Isaak in the neutral UNFICYP buffer zone); Issa v Turkey, paras. 74-77 (concerning
the alleged killing by Turkish forces operating in northern Iraq of seven shepherds); and
ECtHR 11 January 2001, Xhavara a.o. v Italy and Albania, no. 39473/98 (concerning the
ramming by the Italian navy of a vessel carrying Albanian migrants).
99 ECtHR 20 October 2005, Haydarie a.o. v the Netherlands, no. 8876/04). Also see ECtHR 1
December 2005, Tuquabo-Tekle v the Netherlands, no. 60665/00, para. 26.
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v Armenia, the Court found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECRH on
account of the Armenian authorities having expropriated and demolished a
flat in Yerevan, in respect of the owners who were at that time living in the
United States.100 Likewise, in Zouboulidis v Greece, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
ECRH was considered to have been violated due to the Greek authorities
refusing to pay supplements to the expatriation allowance of a Greek diplomat
living in Prague.101 A final case worth mentioning in this connection is Kovaèiè
and others v Slovenia, where the Court did expressly address the jurisdiction
issue in respect of the impossibility of several Croatian citizens to withdraw
currency from a Slovenian bank, which had partially been caused by legislative
amendments adopted by the Slovenian National Assembly. The Court observed
that:
‘[t]he applicants’ position as regards their foreign-currency savings deposited with
the Zagreb Main Branch was and continues to be affected by that legislative
measure. This being so, the Court finds that the acts of the Slovenian authorities
continue to produce effects, albeit outside Slovenian territory, such that Slovenia’s
responsibility under the Convention could be engaged.’102
The reasoning is noteworthy, as it indicates that the Court finds the Convention
applicable also in respect of a legislative measure of generally applicable nature
which directly affects a person resident abroad, and without employing the
notion of ‘(effective) control’ as delimiting criterion.
There are, in fact, many more decisions rendered by the ECtHR wherein
violations (or interferences) of Convention rights are found in respect of
persons resident abroad but where the issue of jurisdiction is not addressed
at all.103 A majority of these cases concern measures taken by a Contracting
State within its own territory but which produce effects in respects of persons
100 ECtHR 23 June 2009, Minasyan and Semerjyan v Armenia, no. 27651/05.
101 ECtHR 25 June 2009, Zouboulidis v Greece (No. 2), no. 36963/06.
102 ECtHR 9 October 2003, Kovaèiè a.o. v Slovenia, nos. 44574/98, 45133/98, 48316/99.
103 See inter alia ECtHR 25 October 2006, Martin v the United Kingdom, no. 40426/98 (where
a British court-martial in Germany under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement was found
to have been conducted in violation of Article 6 (1) ECHR); ECtHR 4 November 2008, Carson
a.o. v the United Kingdom, no. 42184/05 (concerning the pension rights of British nationals
who had emigrated and were formerly working in the UK); ECtHR 9 July 2009, Tarnopolskaya
a.o. v Russia, no. 11093/07 (concerning pension rights of former USSR citizens who had
emigrated to Israel); ECtHR 22 September 2009, Stochlak v Poland, no. 38273/02 (where
violation of Article 8 ECHR was found in respect of a father resident in Canada on account
of the Polish authorities’ insufficient action to secure the return of his child who was
abducted by the mother to Poland); ECtHR 12 October 2006, Mayeka and Mitunga v Belgium,
no. 13178/03 (where the Court not only found a violation of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR on
account of the Belgian authorities having failed to make proper arrangements for the arrival
of a deported child in the Congo, but also in respect of the mother who was residing in
Canada and who was not appropriately informed and consulted in respect of the decisions
taken regarding her daughter).
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who are at the material time resident abroad. Although it may seem self-
evident that the Court holds the state as a matter of principle accountable for
all executive or adjudicative measures taken within its ordinary territorial
jurisdiction which directly interfere with a person’s human rights (thus also
in respect of a person who just happens to be (temporarily) resident abroad),
these decisions do signify that the Court not always conditions the personal
scope of human rights protection on an individual being within the state’s
physical or effective control. This having said, the Court’s case law remains
inconsistent. In the decision in Ben El Mahi, on the Danish cartoons, the Court
found the refusal of the Danish public prosecutor to initiate criminal proceed-
ings against the publishing newspaper not to engender a ‘jurisdictional link’
with the Muslim complainants, even though the complaint concerned state
activity executed within its own territory which arguably directly affected the
complainants residing in a foreign territory.104 Although the Court’s reluct-
ance to accept that Mr Ben El Mahi could invoke the Convention may well
have been influenced by a fear of opening the floodgates, it is unfortunate
that the Court does not explain why the matter of banning a publication
affecting Muslims living abroad is fundamentally different from the issuing
of legislation which affects bank account holders in a foreign country. A
relevant difference may be that in the cartoons case the publication was not
directly targeted at the complainants, rendering the group of potential victims
indeterminate. But this is a matter which is normally examined under the
victim-requirement laid down in Article 34 ECRH, which already imposes the
threshold that there must be a sufficiently direct link between the applicant
and the damage allegedly sustained.105
Certainly, to accept that human rights are a guide to all the conduct of
a state having an impact outside its borders can create all sorts of practical
and legal issues. Although the precise motives underlying the Banković decision
remain rather obscure, the Court’s reluctance to simply accept that all forms
of international activity remain covered by human rights standards may well
104 For a similar factual constellation see Weber and Saravia v Germany, where the Court even-
tually declined to pronounce itself on the question whether the legislative extension of
powers of the German Bundesnachrichtendienst regarding the monitoring of telecommunica-
tions all around the world could bring the persons whose conversations had been recorded
within the jurisdiction of Germany and thereby within the ambit of Convention protection.
Instead of addressing the ‘Bankovic-argument’ brought forward by the German government,
the Court found the complaints inadmissible because ‘even assuming that the applications
are compatible ratione personae with the Convention’ the legislative amendments constituted
a justified interference with their right to private life; ECtHR 29 June 2006, Weber and Saravia
v Germany, no. 54934/00, para. 72.
105 Cf. ECtHR 27 July 2010, Aksu v. Turkey, nos. 4149/04 and 41029/04, paras. 32-34, concern-
ing the publication of a book allegedly containing offensive statements in respect of persons
of Roma origin. In considering the applicant to be a victim, the Court accorded decisive
weight to the factor that the applicant was entitled to initiate compensation proceedings
before domestic courts.
50 Chapter 2
have been influenced by an understanding that states may find themselves
ill-equipped to live up to each and every human rights standard when they
engage themselves in activities in foreign countries. Difficulties may arise, for
example, from an overlap or conflict with other standards, such as the laws
in force in the other country; a lack of practical capabilities a state may have
in guaranteeing human rights protection; or a perceived lack of willingness
on the part of states to submit themselves to human rights standards when
engaging in, for instance, peace keeping operations.106
But what also transpires from the post-Banković case law is that the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has shown itself both able and willing to accom-
modate this type of concerns with the imperative of effective human rights
protection. A prominent case, in this respect, is Medvedyev v France, where the
Court first accepted that a ship and its crew sailing under the Cambodian flag
in international waters which was boarded by a team of French armed com-
mandos on account of suspicions of drug trafficking, was being brought under
the control of France and therefore its jurisdiction in accordance with Article
1 ECRH. But the Court also acknowledged, subsequently, that the operation
took place under ‘wholly exceptional circumstances’ and considered these
circumstances to justify the time it inevitably took for the French authorities
to bring the persons placed under arrest before a judge.107 A similar approach
was adhered to by the Court in the admissibility decision in the case of Al-
Saadoon and Mufdhi, concerning a potential conflict between the human rights
obligations incumbent on the United Kingdom and the local laws in Iraq. As
regards the question whether the United Kingdom’s obligations under the ECRH
in respect of the activities of its armed forces in Iraq could be modified or
displaced by obligations it owed to Iraq, the Court considered this not to be
a question ‘material to the preliminary issue of jurisdiction’, but one which
needed to be addressed under the merits of the complaints.108 In both these
106 As regards this latter argument, see for example the anxieties voiced by the governments
of France and Norway in the case of Behrami. The Norwegian government submitted that
extension of the European Convention to peacekeeping mission could deter states from
participating in such missions. Jointly, the French and Norwegian governments contended
that establishing separate liability under human rights law for states contributing to
peacekeeping missions could jeopardize the necessary integrity, effectiveness and centrality
of the mission. ECtHR 2 May 2007, Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France,
Germany and Norway, nos. 71412/01 and 78166/01, paras. 90-91.
107 Medvedyev v France (Grand Chamber), paras. 130-131.
108 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi (Chamber), paras. 88-89. But see ECtHR 14 May 2002, Gentilhomme
a.o. v France, nos. 48205/99, 48207/99 and 48209/99, para. 20, where the Court, in expressly
noting that ‘a State may not actually exercise jurisdiction on the territory of another without
the latter’s consent, invitation or acquiescence’, considered that the French refusal to allow
certain children to enrol in French state schools in Algeria constituted an implementation
of a decision imputable to Algeria, taken by the sovereign on its own territory and therefore
beyond the control (and therewith the ‘jurisdiction’) of France. See, on a possible conflict
between human rights protection in a foreign country and respect for the territorial sover-
eignty of that country more extensively, chapter 4.5.
The extraterritorial applicability of human rights 51
cases, the ECtHR departed from a presumption of applicability of the ECRH to
the situation on account of the factual involvement of the respondent state
(i.e. the condition of jurisdiction was considered satisfied), and accommodated
the special circumstances into its interpretation of the scope of the substantive
norm at issue. This approach may serve to underscore that human rights law
is sufficiently flexible to cope with various exceptional issues which may arise
when human rights obligations are considered to be extraterritorially applic-
able, without it being necessary to simply deprive human rights treaties of
meaning in those contexts.
It is now time to make two preliminary conclusions. The first is that, in virtual-
ly all cases concerning incidental foreign activity of the state, the term ‘juris-
diction’ has been perceived as a criterion giving expression to factual assertions
of state sovereignty. Although there are various cases – such as the passport-
cases before the Human Rights Committee or those concerning restitution
proceedings in respect of property of foreigners before the ECtHR – in which
state activity could be labelled as recognised assertions of ‘jurisdiction’ with
extraterritorial implications under international law, it does not appear that
the question whether a state has legitimately exercised jurisdiction is as such
material for delimiting the personal scope of application of a human rights
treaty. Rather, the various monitoring bodies have all confirmed that human
rights protection should be based on the tenet that de facto activity gives rise
to de jure responsibilities.109
Secondly, it is increasingly accepted by human rights bodies, either in fact
or as a principle of law, that a state must always be guided by the human
rights obligations it has entered into, thus regardless of territorial considera-
tions. In propounding the much discussed ‘effective control’ threshold in its
Banković decision, the European Court of Human Rights may have been guided
by a fear of opening up an arena of indeterminacy, but in its later judgments
and decisions the Court does appear to have taken a more practicable
approach, in which it has not only (tacitly) acknowledged that the criterion
of effective control is rather unworkable in its application to all the various
forms in which states may more or less incidentally impact upon the funda-
mental rights of persons in other territories; but also that human rights law
is sufficiently flexible to cope with various issues which are likely to come
to the fore if states are considered bound by human rights in undertaking
extraterritorial activity.
109 This is more or less how the ECtHR put it in the case of Al-Saadoon.
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2.5.3 Jurisdiction and positive obligations
Extraterritorial migration controls not necessarily involve an easily identifiable
act on the part of the state which may bring an individual within the state’s
‘jurisdiction’. As is extensively explored in chapters 5-7 of this study, a state
may be involved in a less direct manner in the treatment of migrants in a
foreign territory, for example through it having delegated powers to a private
air carrier, through it having concluded border control arrangements with
another state, or through the setting up of reception facilities which are
managed by other actors. In the context of human rights protection, the ques-
tion which may arise in such situations is whether the state should not, on
account of its indirect involvement in the treatment of an individual, incur
positive obligations towards that individual. Problematic however, is that the
nature of duties to protect and to fulfill (or: positive obligations ‘not to omit’)
may make it difficult to identify what specific conduct of the state would
engender a ‘jurisdictional link’ between the state and the individual.
If one would approach this matter from the doctrine that states can only
incur responsibilities under human rights treaties if victims can demonstrate
that they have been placed under the effective control (or under the authority)
of the state, this would most likely minimize the meaning of human rights
in such scenarios. But, dwelling upon the concept of positive obligations in
respect of foreign activity in its General Comments, the Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights maintains, as a general formula, that it is
incumbent upon states ‘to prevent third parties from violating the right[s] in
other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal
or political means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
applicable international law’.110 Hereunder, it is shown that the ECtHR and
ICJ have in their case law also been willing to accept that the notion of juris-
diction need not necessarily preclude a conclusion that positive obligations
not accompanied with exercises of ‘effective control’ over persons abroad can
nonetheless bring those persons within the jurisdiction of the state.
In the case of Isaak the ECtHR dealt with an incident that took place in the
United Nations buffer zone on Cyprus, during which a Greek Cypriot man
was kicked and beaten to death. Although the facts of the case were disputed,
the Court accepted that both private citizens and at least four uniformed
soldiers belonging to the Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot forces were involved in
the incident. The Court held that Turkey had been under an obligation to
actively protect Mr Isaaks’ life:
110 CESCR 12 May 1999, General Comment No. 12 (The right to adequate food), para. 36;
CESCR 11 August 2000, General Comment No. 14 (The right to the highest attainable
standard of health), para. 39; CESCR 20 January 2003, General Comment No. 15 (The right
to water), para. 35.
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‘the Court cannot ignore the fact that the Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot soldiers
actively participated in the beating without making any attempt to apprehend
Anastasios Isaak or to prevent the counter-demonstrators from continuing their
violent behaviour. Thus, they manifestly failed to take preventive measures to
protect the victim’s life.’111
Presumably, the active presence of Turkish (or the subordinate Turkish-
Cypriot) forces and therewith the immediate involvement of the Turkish
authorities in the incident rendered it materially easier for the Court to con-
clude that Mr Isaak was indeed within the ‘jurisdiction’ of Turkey – even
though he was not within Turkish ‘effective control’. But there are other cases
in which the ECtHR has also acknowledged the existence of positive obligations
in respect of individuals present in a foreign country, without there being a
direct presence or involvement of agents of the state.
In the case of Ilascu, concerning the continuing detention of Moldovan
nationals who had been arrested by Russian soldiers and who were
subsequently handed over into the charge of the Transdniestrian police, the
ECtHR considered that there was ‘a continuous and uninterrupted link of
responsibility on the part of the Russian Federation for the applicants’ fate’,
also in view of ‘the effective authority, or at the very least the decisive in-
fluence’ asserted by the Russian Federation over the separatist regime Trans-
dniestria. The Court considered it of little consequence that the agents of the
Russian Federation had not participated directly in the events complained of
but observed that it had not made (positive) attempts to put an end to the
applicants’ situation throughout their period of detention. The Court concluded
that the applicants came within the ‘jurisdiction’ of the Russian Federation
for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.112 The Court’s acknowledge-
ment of the existence of a jurisdictional link thus appears to be grounded in
the dual elements of (1) the initial arrest and handover of the applicants and
(2) the subsequent influence (and therewith the power to undertake positive
action) asserted by Russia over the separatist regime. By analogy, this reason-
ing could also inform the duties of states in the context of external processing
of asylum claimants – where persons requesting asylum are intercepted or
otherwise apprehended and subsequently handed over to other actors with
whom arrangements are concluded for status determination, repatriation and/
or resettlement.113
The case of Treska concerned two Albanian men who claimed that the
Albanian authorities had illegally taken possession of their family’s villa in
1950. To make matters worse the Albanian authorities had sold the house in
111 Isaak v Turkey, para. 119. Also see the admissibility decision: ECtHR 28 September 2006,
Isaak v Turkey, no. 44587/98.
112 Ilascu a.o. v Moldova and Russia, paras. 392-394.
113 See chapter 7.
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1991 to the Italian government, which had vested its embassy in it. The Treska
brothers brought a complaint against both Albania and Italy. As regards the
claim directed against Italy, which had only entered into written contact with
the applicants in respect of the restitution procedure, the European Court of
Human Rights concluded that the brothers were not within Italian jurisdiction.
But, on a general note, the Court did pronounce that:
‘Even in the absence of effective control of a territory outside its borders, the State
still has a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplom-
atic, economic, judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are
in accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights
guaranteed by the Convention (see Ilascu and Others …).’114
If taken at face value, the quote has quite striking consequences. Leaving aside
all the subtleties and controversial line-drawing exercises of the past, the Court
is simply saying that states should always do their best to secure the rights
guaranteed by the Convention. An identical formula was used by the ECtHR
in the case of Manoilescu and Dubrescu v Romania and Russia, also concerning
restitution proceedings in respect of a building transferred into the possession
of a foreign state.115 In inquiring whether the responsibility of the foreign
state, Russia, could be engaged under Article 1 of the Convention by any
failure to comply with its positive obligation to secure the Convention rights
to the complainants, the Court eventually concluded that this was not the case,
but not because such a positive obligation did not exist, but rather because
to require the Russian Federation to take positive action would run counter
to the Russian State’s entitlement to foreign sovereign immunity.116
That the concept of jurisdiction should not be taken as an obstacle in the
consideration of positive extraterritorial obligations finds further confirmation
in the Order indicating provisional measures of the ICJ in the Case Concerning
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. In that case, the ICJ was asked to address the extraterritorial
114 ECtHR 29 June 2006, Treska v Albania and Italy, no. 26937/04. Note that the reference to
Ilascu is not entirely correct: the particular quote concerned Moldova’s obligations in respect
of events taking place within its territory.
115 ECtHR 3 March 2005, Manoilescu and Dobrescu v Romania and Russia, no. 60861/00, para.
101. Also see ECtHR 11 December 2008, Stephens v Cyprus, Turkey and the UN, no. 45267/06,
concerning the inability of Mr. Stephens, living in Canada, to enter his house located in
the UN buffer zone in Cyprus, because the Cypriot national guard had erected a defence
post in the garden of his house. The Court firstly observed that in so far as the complaint
was directed against Cyprus and Turkey, these states did not have effective control over
the buffer zone in which the applicant’s house was located. But the Court subsequently
noted that the applicant had neither challenged ‘a particular action or inaction by these
States or otherwise substantiated any breach by the said States of their duty to take all the
appropriate measures with regard to the applicant’s rights which are still within their power
to take’.
116 Ibid., para. 107.
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scope of the CERD in respect of alleged racial discrimination practiced and
incited by the Russian authorities in several regions of Georgia, both before
and in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian conflict. The complaint related
not only to the activities of Russian state agents operating within South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, but also to possible duties of due diligence of Russia in respect
of the separatist forces in those regions. The ICJ not only found the CERD to
apply to Russia’s actions within the territory of Georgia, but also held the
obligations of Russia to include various duties of a positive nature, by ordering
it inter alia ‘to do all in [its] power to ensure that public authorities and public
institutions under [its] control or influence do not engage in acts of racial
discrimination’.117
It transpires from the judgments and decisions above that international
courts are at the least receptive for claims relating to positive obligations in
an extraterritorial setting. The state’s responsibility to ensure and protect a
person’s human rights was in the above mentioned cases derived not from
the oversimplified shorthand of effective factual control over the individual,
but rather from the power, or capability of the state to positively influence
a person’s human rights situation. Although scant and hardly accompanied
by a well-elaborated doctrine for addressing this type of situations, the avail-
able case law leaves room for an understanding that it is not the fact of the
affected person having been directly affected or placed under the effective
control of a state, but rather the relationship of the state with a particular set
of circumstances being of such special nature, which is decisive in enlivening
a state’s positive obligations.
2.6 HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES NOT CONTAINING A JURISDICTIONAL CLAUSE
Not all human rights treaties contain a restriction of a general nature relating
to their personal or territorial scope. This may, on the one hand, be taken to
reflect the idea that these treaties guarantee rights which are essentially terri-
torial or, conversely, be taken to support the notion that the rights contained
therein govern a state’s conduct wherever it acts.118 In more recent years,
117 ICJ 15 October 2008, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) (Order), ICJ Reports 2008, p. 353 at
para. 149.
118 See, in this respect, the different starting points taken by the International Court of Justice
in the Wall Opinion, para. 112 (‘This may be explicable by the fact that this Covenant
guarantees rights which are essentially territorial’) and in the Order in the Case Concerning
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of racial Discrimination,
para. 109 (‘the Court consequently finds that these provisions of CERD generally appear
to apply (…) to the actions of a State party when it acts beyond its territory’). The outcome
of the ICJ’s analysis of the territorial scope of the ICESCR and CERD in the respective cases
is however similar, as further explained below.
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the International Court of Justice, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission have
impliedly or expressly addressed the issue of the extraterritorial applicability
of several human rights treaties not containing a jurisdictional or other general
delimiting clause, in particular the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man.119 This section summarizes the relevant
jurisprudence and subsequently explores how this jurisprudence relates to
the doctrines developed under human rights treaties which do contain a
general clause as to their personal or territorial scope.
The question of applicability of the ICESCR to extraterritorial state conduct
was addressed by the CESCR in its concluding observations on Israel of 1998
and 2003.120 In noting the failure of Israel to report on the situation of the
Palestine people in the Occupied Territories, the Committee expressed the view
that ‘the Covenant applies to all areas where Israel maintains geographical,
functional or personal jurisdiction’, and that ‘the State’s obligations under the
Covenant apply to all territories and populations under its effective con-
trol’.121 In the Wall Opinion, the ICJ used fairly similar terms by holding the
ICESCR to apply to territories over which a State party ‘exercises territorial
jurisdiction’.122 It saw this position confirmed, amongst others, by Article
14 ICESCR, which speaks of parties to the Covenant which have ‘not been able
to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction
compulsory primary education (…)’.123
In its judgment in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo the ICJ
approached the question whether international human rights law would apply
to the conduct of Uganda on the territory of the Congo more generally. It
recalled its findings in the Wall Opinion and considered that ‘international
human rights instruments are applicable ‘in respect of acts done by a State
in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory’, particularly in
119 Although the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man is not a legally binding
treaty, the jurisprudence of both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights holds the Declaration to be a source of binding
international obligations for the OAS’ member states. While largely superseded in the
current practice of the inter-American human rights system by the more elaborate provisions
of the American Convention on Human Rights, which does contain a jurisdictional clause,
the terms of the Declaration are still enforced with respect to those members of the OAS
that have not ratified the Convention, most notably Cuba and the United States.
120 Supra n. 57.
121 Ibid. (1998), paras. 6, 8; Ibid. (2003), para. 31. Also see CESCR 12 May 1999, General Comment
No. 12 (The right to adequate food), E/C.12/1999/5, para. 14: ‘Every State is obliged to
ensure for everyone under its jurisdiction access to the minimum essential food (…).’
122 Wall Opinion, para. 180
123 Ibid., para. 112. The ICJ also found it relevant that Israel had for more than 37 years been
the occupying power.
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occupied territories’.124 On this basis, it found several provisions of the ICCPR,
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (which does not refer to
the concept of ‘jurisdiction’) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
to have been violated.125
In its Order indicating provisional measures in the Case Concerning Applica-
tion of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, mentioned above, the ICJ had occasion to address the extraterritorial
scope of the CERD, which, similar to the ICESCR, does not contain a general
jurisdictional clause. In concluding the CERD to govern Russia’s acts and
omissions in the contested regions, the ICJ did not find it necessary to first
establish that the Russian authorities asserted jurisdiction or some form of
authority or control over the persons resident there:
‘Whereas the Court observes that there is no restriction of a general nature in CERD
relating to its territorial application; whereas it further notes that, in particular,
neither Article 2 nor Article 5 of CERD, alleged violations of which are invoked by
Georgia, contain a specific territorial limitation; and whereas the Court consequently
finds that these provisions of CERD generally appear to apply, like other provisions
of instruments of that nature, to the actions of a State party when it acts beyond
its territory.’126
Three observations can be made: (1) the ICJ focussed exclusively on the ‘actions’
of state parties, and left issues of jurisdiction, control, and authority aside;
(2) the ICJ seemed to operate a presumption that human rights treaties apply
to extraterritorial acts of the state unless treaty provisions contain a specific
territorial limitation; (3) the broad language suggests that, in the eyes of the
ICJ at least, this approach is not limited to CERD, but applies to human rights
treaties in general.
In the American regional context, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has on several occasions considered the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man to apply to conduct of OAS member states
in foreign territories.127 In Disabled Peoples’ International v the United States
(1987) and Salas and others v the United States (1993), without specifically
addressing the question of extraterritorial applicability of the Declaration, the
Commission declared complaints concerning violations of several rights
protected by the Declaration admissible in respect of the human rights conse-
quences of US military operations in Grenada and Panama. In the Haitian
Interdiction case (1997), more extensively discussed in chapter 4, again without
124 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, para. 216.
125 Ibid., para. 219.
126 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Order), p. 353 at para. 109.
127 IACHR 22 September 1987, Disabled Peoples’ International et al. v the United States, no. 9213;
IACHR 14 October 1993, Salas and others v United States, no. 10.573.
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addressing the question of potential extraterritorial applicability issue as such,
the Commission found violations of rights protected under Articles I, II, XVIII
and XXVII of the American Declaration on account of the US interdiction of
Haitian refugees at the high seas and their treatment in and repatriation from
the US naval base in Guantanamo, Cuba.128 It also concluded that the United
States had breached its treaty obligations in respect of Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention. In Coard (1999), also concerning the US military operations in
Grenada in 1983, the Inter-American Commission explicitly confirmed the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man to have extraterritorial
application. The Commission held that ‘each American State is obliged to
uphold the protected rights of any person subject to its jurisdiction’ and that
this may also refer to ‘conduct with an extraterritorial locus where the person
concerned is present in the territory of one state, but subject to the control
of another state – usually through the acts of the latter’s agents abroad’.129
In using an almost identical formulation in Brothers to the Rescue, the Commis-
sion found Cuba to have violated the right to life enshrined in Article I of the
American Declaration, on account of the shooting down by the Cuban Air
Force of two civilian aircraft in international airspace.130
Several observations are in order in respect of the case law presented above.
In the first place, criteria and terminology used under human rights treaties
which do refer to the term jurisdiction, have also been adopted by the various
international bodies in determining the extent of a state’s extraterritorial
obligations under treaties not containing such a clause. Secondly, in respect
of the exact standard to be applied in delimiting the territorial scope of treaties,
a similar contrast in views, or at least a similar contrast in terminology, as
apparent in respect of the human rights treaties discussed in the previous
sections, comes to the fore: on the one hand, reference is made to the require-
ment of persons being subject to the ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘(effective) control’ of the
state, but on the other hand, the ICJ in particular appears to focus primarily
on the ‘actions’ (or ‘exercises of jurisdiction’) of State Parties without referring
to some further threshold. What also transpires from the ICJ’s pronouncements,
thirdly, is that it advocates a harmonised approach in considering the extra-
territorial application of human rights treaties, whereby the nature (or object
and purpose) of those treaties would in principle demand that State Parties
must always comply with the provisions contained therein.131 It follows from
the available case law, in sum, that the issue of extraterritorial application of
treaties not containing a jurisdictional clause has been treated in a similar vein
128 IACHR 13 March 1997, The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. United States, no. 10.675.
129 Coard et al. v the United States, para. 37.
130 Brothers to the Rescue, para. 23.
131 Reference to the object and purpose of human rights treaties was made in the Wall Opinion,
para. 109.
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as under other human rights treaties and that the issue does not appear to
be governed by fundamentally different considerations.
There is, in itself, nothing wrong with such a harmonised approach. It
resonates with the increasingly accepted notion that an integrated approach
within human rights law should be adhered to and that there are no intrinsic
differences between, for example, the categories of economic and social rights
and civil and political rights.132 Obviously, apart from textual differences,
it is difficult to identify a rationale for treating the matter of extraterritorial
application of one human rights treaty differently than that of another.
This having said, two reservations are in order. A first is that some human
rights treaties do contain specific territorial limitations in respect of certain
substantive rights.133 This would most probably imply that although there
may be a presumption that human rights treaties do apply to extraterritorial
activity, this is different in respect of treaty provisions which are expressly
(or impliedly) restricted in territorial scope. This was confirmed in the ICJ’s
order indicating provisional measures warranted under the CERD, where the
Court found it relevant to note that the provisions invoked by Georgia did
not contain a specific territorial limitation.134 A second reservation is that
there may, on the other hand, also be provisions in human rights treaties which
contain an inherent international outlook.135 The most prominent example
is the ICESCR, which imposes the general obligation upon states to engage in
international assistance and cooperation to realize the rights recognised in the
Covenant.136 This obligation is reiterated in several substantive provisions
of the Covenant.137 Whereas the matter of extraterritorial obligations under
treaties safeguarding civil and political rights is generally confined to the
question whether a state should incur, on account of its own acts and
omissions, specific obligations vis-à-vis persons situated in another state, these
‘international’ obligations primarily refer to the duty to assist and cooperate
with other states in the fulfilment of human rights, regardless of the establish-
ment of some specific ‘jurisdictional link’ between the state and an individual
132 P. Alston and G. Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 9 Human Rights Quarterly
(1987), p. 156-222; and G.J.H. van Hoof, ‘The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: a Rebuttal of Some Traditional Views’, in: P. Alston and K. Tomasevski (eds.), The
Right to Food, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff (1984), p. 97-110.
133 See, for examples and a further discussion, chapter 4.3.
134 Supra n. 126.
135 F. Coomans, ‘Some Remarks on the Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights’, in: Coomans and Kamminga (2004), p. 185-186;
R. Künnemann, ‘Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights’, in: Coomans and Kamminga (2004), p. 203-204.
136 This general obligation is laid down in Article 2(1) ICESCR. For an extensive discussion
S.I. Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International Coopera-
tion, Antwerpen/Oxford: Intersentia, 2006, p. 83-98, 144-153.
137 See in particular Articles 11, 15(4) and 23 ICESCR.
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situated in another state.138 This implies on the one hand, that these obliga-
tions are much wider in scope and not as such dependant upon specific activity
undertaken by a state. But on the other hand, because these obligations refer
primarily to interstate cooperation, it may be difficult to construe these duties
as regulating the conduct between a state and a particular individual situated
in another country.
2.7 FINAL REMARKS
Discussions on the extraterritorial application of human rights have been
burdened with a substantial amount of conceptual confusion, in particular
in respect of the relationship between the meaning and functions of the notions
of territory, jurisdiction and sovereignty within the body of human rights law.
One of the aims of this chapter has laid with clarifying some of this conceptual
confusion, by disconnecting, first and foremost, the meaning of ‘jurisdiction’
within human rights law from its ordinary meaning in public international
law. This detachment allows for rethinking the concept of jurisdiction under
human rights treaties.
To a considerable extent, two divergent approaches fight for supremacy
in defining the term jurisdiction as a tool for delimiting the extraterritorial
scope of human rights treaties. Under the first approach, which is most
evidently present in the case law of the former European Commission and
the Human Rights Committee, but also in some judgments and decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights, human rights obligations serve as a
code of conduct for all activity of a state, regardless of territorial considerations,
in which the condition of jurisdiction is satisfied if an act or omission of a state
affects a person to such an extent that he or she can be considered a victim
of a human rights violation. The rationale behind this approach is as simple
as it is appealing from the perspective of effective human rights protection:
a state must always be guided by the human rights obligations it has entered
into, which can only implicate that it may not do towards a person in another
country what it may not do to persons in its own territory. But under the
second approach, the condition of jurisdiction is translated into the criterion
of ‘effective control’, which (presumably) embodies the notion that there must
be a predefined relationship between the state and the individual, other than
138 M. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective
on its Development, Oxford: Clarendon, 1998, p. 144. According to the CESCR it is ‘in
accordance with the provisions of the Covenant that international cooperation for develop-
ment and thus for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation
of all States. It is particularly incumbent upon those States which are in a position to assist
others in this regard.’ CESCR 14 December 1990, General Comment No. 3 (The nature of
States parties obligations), para. 14.
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the act affecting the individual’s rights itself, for a state’s extraterritorial human
rights obligations to become engaged.
The chapter has submitted that the second approach is not necessarily in
‘better’ conformity with the international law notion of ‘jurisdiction’. If under-
stood as giving expression to factual exercises of the state’s sovereignty,
regardless of whether they trespass into another state’s sovereign prerogatives,
the term ‘jurisdiction’ may well apply to any conduct of the state, whereby
that conduct can in itself be sufficient to bring an affected individual ‘within’
the state’s jurisdiction.
Apart from conceptual confusion as to the appropriate meaning of the term
jurisdiction in human rights law, a further problem identified in this chapter
in regard of the second approach concerns the use of the criterion of (effective)
control as a threshold, or mitigating mechanism, for engaging the state’s
extraterritorial human rights obligations. It does appear that the requirement
of ‘(effective) control’ is ill-equipped to adequately respond to the large variety
of manners in which states may impact on fundamental rights of persons who
remain outside their territory. A first complication is that it is not always clear
what the object of control should be: territory, persons, property, factual
circumstances, or any of the above?139 A second question concerns the defi-
nition of control, or: when can a state be said to be in control of an object or
a person? Must it be established that the state ‘possesses’ the person or object?
Must it be established that the state has the ability to manage or direct the
actions of the person or the object? Does one control a person by refusing him
a visa or passport? Is someone within the cross-hairs of a military aircraft
within the control of a state? Obviously, it is much easier to establish that a
state controls an inert object such as a strip of land, than to find that the state
effectively controls a human being – which has the tendency to engage in all
sorts of activity of its own accord. To put it otherwise, the criterion of control
over persons is a rather impracticable requirement and moreover one which
is likely to discriminate in the sorts of human rights which it brings within
the ambit of extraterritorial human rights protection.
This is not deny that to accept that human rights must always bind the
state when it engages in foreign activity raises issues which merit serious
consideration. Although the chapter has indicated that human rights law is
sufficiently flexible to cope with a variety of challenges which may arise in
the context of securing human rights in foreign jurisdictions, there are some
issues which have as of yet not, or only scarcely, received attention in inter-
national case law.
Perhaps the most salient one concerns the liaison between the law on
fundamental rights and the principle of state sovereignty. When states enforce
their authority outside their borders, that enforcement, including the guar-
139 Also see Scheinin, in: Coomans and Kamminga (2004), p. 76.
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anteeing of human rights, may conflict with sovereign interests of other states.
This raises the question whether, on the one hand, the paradigm should prevail
that states may simply not do abroad what they are not allowed to do at home
and that therefore, all extraterritorial activity remains covered by the sending
state’s obligations incurred under human rights treaties; or that, on the other
hand, the paradigm should prevail that when operating in foreign territories
– and in the absence of any specific agreements on the matter – states should
first and foremost respect the applicable law of the host state, including the
relevant human rights standards, also if they differ from those incumbent on
the sending state. To adhere to the first approach would correspond to the
idea that human rights are universal and form a harmonized standard for the
conduct of all states, while the second resonates with the principles of com-
munal autonomy and self-determination and is most pertinently reflected in
the doctrine of cultural relativism.140 If one takes the case of Al-Saadoon for
example, regarding the handover of an Iraqi criminal suspect who might face
the death sentence, the opposing arguments would be that to prevent the Iraqi
criminal justice system from having its course would amount to some form
of moral imperialism, while to allow the death sentence to be carried out
would constitute an affront to the universal aspirations of the right to life.141
One could maintain, on the basis of the drafting history on the place and
function of the term ‘jurisdiction’ within human rights treaties, that the term
might serve precisely to prevent situations from arising where states would
become obliged under human rights treaties to interfere in matters which
essentially belong to the sovereignty of the other state. The present study will
elaborate on this theme more extensively in chapter 4.5, in the specific context
of grants of extraterritorial asylum, where the case of Al-Saadoon is put in
comparative perspective with several other judgments on the reconciliation
between human rights obligations and the territorial sovereignty of the host
state.
Despite these doctrinal issues and the continuing controversy over the
extraterritorial scope of human rights, this chapter has identified an emerging
consensus among international courts and supervisory bodies that human
rights constitute a paramount code of conduct for all state activity. In the vast
majority of cases discussed in this chapter, the rationale was upheld, in fact
or in principle, that the creation of so-called legal black holes in the system
of human rights protection must be prevented and that this is most effectively
done by bringing state activity, wherever it takes place, under the ambit of
the state’s human rights obligations – and without adherence to the rather
rigid criterion of ‘effective control’. This is an important conclusion in the
140 For a general discussion see, J. Donnelly, ‘Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights’,
6 Human Rights Quarterly (1984), p. 400-419.
141 On this debate J.H. Wyman, ‘Vengeance Is Whose: The Death Penalty and Cultural Relativ-
ism in International Law’, 6 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy (1997), p. 543-570.
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context of this study. It allows for the assumption that, when engaged in
practices of external migration control, human rights do govern and constrain
the external activity of European states. In chapters 5-7, it is examined in more
detail what the consequences of this conclusion are for the manner in which
European states should arrange the various external migration policies.

3 The responsible actor
3.1 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER
Under the assumption that the mere setting of conditions of entry and resid-
ence and the controlling of the territorial border are insufficiently effective
in achieving the political aims of immigration policies, European states increas-
ingly rely on other states and actors in controlling migration movements
towards their territories. The increased involvement of European states in the
control of migration outside Europe has not only been described as a process
of ‘extraterritorialisation’ or ‘externalisation’, but also in terms of ‘privatisation’,
‘cooperation’ and ‘outsourcing’. This process may involve the delegation of
powers to private parties, such as carriers, the transfer of powers to another
state, or the setting up of a variety of cooperation arrangements in the sphere
of migration control. The central purpose of this chapter is to lay down a
conceptual legal framework for determining the circumstances under which
states can be held internationally responsible for extraterritorial violations of
human rights, which have, partly or in whole, been committed in conjunction
with other actors.
The chapter explores three distinct but complementary mechanisms for
arriving at the international responsibility of a state for violations of inter-
national law involving a plurality of actors. The first is the notion of attri-
bution, which bridges acts of natural persons to the state and thereby serves
to identify what conduct should be regarded as an ‘act of state’. The rules on
attribution form part of the so-called secondary rules of international law, as
laid down in the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibil-
ity.1 The second concept to be discussed, also laid down in the ILC Articles
on State Responsibility, is that of derived responsibility, which holds that a
state can be held separately but dependently internationally responsible on
account of its involvement in the wrongful conduct of another state. A third
avenue for allocating international responsibility is the doctrine of positive
obligations, which articulates, amongst other things, that a state can incur a
1 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, text adopted
by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session in 2001 (A/56/10), annexed
to UN General Assembly Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, in which the Assembly
took note of the Articles and recommended them to the attention of Governments (hereafter
‘ILC Articles’ or ‘ILC Articles on State Responsibility’).
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duty to engage in preventive or protective conduct in respect of activity of
another actor. Positive obligations are commonly perceived as not forming
part of the law on state responsibility, but as duties inherent to a state’s
primary, or substantive, international obligations. The chapter will indicate
however, that the doctrine of positive obligations constitutes a necessary
complement to the secondary rules of state responsibility, as it signifies that,
even in the absence of a possibility of attributing conduct to a particular state
or of establishing its derivative responsibility, a state may still, on account
of its own involvement in a particular set of circumstances and the influence
it wields over another actor, incur a positive duty to prevent or remedy wrong-
ful conduct.
It is useful, for reasons of conceptual clarity, to set out that the question
of the applicability of human rights law to the foreign activity of states as
discussed in the previous chapter must be conceptually distinguished from
the allocation of responsibility for international wrongful acts, which forms
the topic of the present chapter. In the Tehran Hostages case, the ICJ held that
it had to look at the conduct of the Iranian hostage takers which had overrun
the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 from two points of view: ‘First, it must
determine how far, legally, the acts in question may be regarded as imputable
to the Iranian State. Secondly, it must consider their compatibility or incom-
patibility with the obligations of Iran under treaties in force or under any other
rules of international law that may be applicable.’2 This is the basic rule for
establishing the international responsibility of a state, now laid down in Article
2 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility: for a state to be held responsible
for an internationally wrongful act, (a) the act (or omission) must be attribut-
able to the state, and (b) the act (or omission) must constitute a breach of an
international obligation of that state. The extraterritorial application of human
rights treaties is essentially a matter falling under the second condition: if an
individual cannot be said to fall within a state’s jurisdiction, the state does
not have the obligation to secure that person’s human rights and there is
consequently no question of a breach of an international obligation of that
state.3 In other terms, where the doctrine of attribution serves to isolate those
acts and omissions which may be considered ‘acts of the state’ (and belongs
to the secondary rules of public international law), the concept of ‘jurisdiction’
isolates those individuals which come within the purview of human rights
obligations a state has entered into (and belongs to the field of a state’s primary
2 ICJ 24 May 1980, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1980 p. 3, para. 56.
3 Also see R.A. Lawson, ‘Life after Bankovic: On the Extraterritorial Application of the
European Convention on Human Rights’, in: F. Coomans and M.T. Kamminga (eds),
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Antwerp: Intersentia (2004), p. 86.
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obligations).4 The law on state responsibility, which includes rules on attribu-
tion and derivative responsibility, does not deal with the scope and contents
of a state’s international obligations, but with the circumstances under which
a state can be considered to act in breach of those international obligations
and with the question what the consequences of the violation should be.5
Yet, as will be explained throughout the chapter, especially in the context
of extraterritorial human rights violations involving a plurality of actors,
questions of primary and secondary international law tend to become blurred.
This is so because, firstly, the issues of determining whether a person falls
within the jurisdiction of one state or another and to which state particular
conduct should be attributed often require an assessment of the same factual
circumstances and the application of analogous legal criteria. Secondly, the
doctrine of positive obligations tends to trespass into the field of secondary
international law, because human rights courts have often derived duties in
respect of conduct of other international actors from the substantive scope
of the state’s human rights obligations, thereby not only complementing, but
also potentially displacing, relevant rules laid down in the Articles on State
Responsibility.
The chapter takes the following approach. It follows the structure of the
International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility, by
discussing, firstly, the rules of attribution which are most relevant for this
study (section 3.2): i) attributing conduct of individuals to the state; ii) attri-
buting conduct of one state to another state; iii) attributing conduct of joint
organs to a state. It will next discuss the notion of derivative responsibility
and in particular the international law concept of ‘aid and assistance’ (sec-
tion 3.3). In exploring the provisions of the ILC Articles, which have not
attained the status of treaty law, it is especially identified how they have been
applied in international case law (the ICJ and ECtHR), and how the mechanisms
of attribution and derived responsibility relate to the doctrine of positive
obligations.
Throughout the chapter, some preliminary conclusions are drawn on the
manner in which international law governs the allocation of international
responsibilities to states which engage in cooperation on or the outsourcing
of their migration policies. The conclusions of the chapter further serve as a
basis for delimiting the responsibilities of states in discussing state practices
of external migration control in chapters 6 and 7.
4 For a critical observation on the use of the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ language see: U.
Linderfalk, ‘ State Responsibility and the Primary-Secondary Rules Terminology – The Role
of Language for an Understanding of the International Legal System’, 78 Nordic Journal
of International Law (2009), p. 53-72.
5 See, extensively, J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility:
Introduction, Text and Commentaries, Cambridge University Press (2002), p. 14-16.
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Before embarking upon this exercise, several preliminary remarks are in
order. The first is that this chapter deals exclusively with state responsibility.
The subjects of the law on state responsibility are obviously states, but there
may be other international legal persons who are subjects of international law.
The better overarching term for the whole legal framework dealing with the
establishment and consequences of responsibility for international wrongful
acts is the law on ‘international responsibility’.6 Within this overarching frame-
work, attempts are undertaken to codify the law on responsibility of inter-
national organisations;7 and with regard to individuals, the adoption of the
Rome Statute of the ICC has provided an authoritative body of rules on
individual criminal responsibility. But because this study deals primarily with
the accountability of individual states active in regulating the movement of
migrants outside their borders, this chapter explores the law on state responsib-
ility only.
A second preliminary remark is that this chapter focuses on state responsib-
ility for human rights violations committed abroad or producing effects abroad.
In this connection, it is necessary to point out that the law on state responsibil-
ity does not distinguish between conduct occurring inside or outside a state’s
territory. As was also noted in the introduction of the previous chapter, the
International Law Commission has affirmed that ‘the acts or omissions of
organs of the State are attributable to the State as a possible source of re-
sponsibility regardless of whether they have been perpetrated in national or
in foreign territory’.8 This is in conformity with the observation above that
the question whether a state’s international obligations should entail its re-
sponsibility also as regards conduct outside its territory will ordinarily be
determined by the contents of the obligation, i.e. a question belonging to the
‘primary rules’ of international law. Nonetheless, it will be shown in this
chapter that the element of territory may influence the application of various
rules on state responsibility. One of this chapter’s aims is to identify the
circumstances under which that is so.
A third preliminary remark is that the chapter deals only with international
responsibility for violations of human rights. Again, the starting point must
be that the application of the law on state responsibility does not differentiate
between various fields of substantive international law. The International Law
Commission, legal doctrine and international case law confirm that the rules
on state responsibility apply to every internationally wrongful act, including
6 J. Crawford and S. Olleson, ‘The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility’, in:
M. Evans (ed), International Law, Oxford University Press (2003), p. 446-448.
7 For the text of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations adopted
by the ILC on first reading see, Report of the International Law Commission on the work
of its sixty-first session, UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Sup. No. 10, UN Doc. A/64/10 (2009), p. 19.
8 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-seventh session,
Yearbook of the ILC 1975, vol. II, p. 84.
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violations incurred under human rights treaties.9 The case law of the European
Court of Human Rights was in itself an important source of inspiration in the
course of the ILC’s drafting of the Articles on State Responsibility.10 But this
does not mean that human rights bodies are bound to apply the ILC Articles,11
and occasionally human rights bodies and in particular the Strasbourg courts
have embarked upon alternative paths of reasoning. This chapter expressly
aims – where relevant – to identify and to account for these divergences.
3.2 INDEPENDENT RESPONSIBILITY
3.2.1 Attribution and the act of state
Although often implied, rules of attribution are central to international law.
This is because states are legal persons and can only act through natural
persons. Without the concept of attribution, states would not only be incapable
of acting, they could neither be held accountable for wrongdoings resulting
from those acts.12 One may also formulate it as follows: because the state itself
is an abstraction, we need a legal construction to bridge acts of persons with
the state; and that construction is the concept of attribution. Attribution allows
us to think that a state, as if it were a natural person, is capable of acting.
Rules on attribution are central to international law, but subject to contro-
versy. Three things are clear from the outset: there is not one rule defining
the conditions for attribution; applying one rule or another depends on the
9 See note 155 infra. See further M.D. Evans, ‘State Responsibility and the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights: Role and Realm’, in: M. Fitzmaurice and D. Sarooshi (eds), Issues
of State Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions, Oxford: Hart Publishing (2004),
p. 140. B. Simma, ‘How Distinctive Are Treaties Representing Collective Interest? The Case
of Human Rights Treaties’, in V. Gowlland-Debbas, ed., Multilateral Treaty-Making: The
Current Status of Challenges to and Reforms Needed in the International Legislative Process, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (2000), p. 87. And, for a discussion: R.A. Lawson, Het EVRM en
de Europese Gemeenschappen. Bouwstenen voor een aansprakelijkheidsregime voor het optreden
van internationale organisaties, Deventer: Kluwer (1999), p. 217-222; R.A. Lawson, ‘Out of
Control. State Responsibility and Human Rights: Will the ILC’s Definition of the ‘Act of
State’ Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century?’, in: M. Castermans, F. van Hoof and J. Smith
(eds.), The Role of the Nation State in the 21st Century: Human Rights International Organisations
and Foreign Policy: Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr, The Hague: Kluwer Law International
(1998), p. 98-101.
10 This is very much apparent also from the final commentaries to the Articles, which frequent-
ly refer to Strasbourg case law.
11 Note however that several of the ILC Articles have been proclaimed to reflect – or to have
contributed to the establishment of – customary international law, see further infra section
3.3.2. at n. 133.
12 J. Griebel and M. Plücken, ‘New Developments Regarding the Rules of Attribution? The
International Court of Justice’s Decision in Bosnia v. Serbia’, 21 Leiden Journal of International
Law (2008), p. 602.
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specific circumstances of a situation; and the rules to be applied are often
contested in case law and legal doctrine.13 The ILC has drawn up altogether
8 different rules for attribution in its Articles on State Responsibility, and has
drafted additional rules for attributing acts to international organisations. Not
all these rules are discussed here. With a view to the particular topic of this
study, the three situations addressed in connection to the international law
on attribution are: situations in which acts of natural persons or groups of
persons should be attributed to a state (section 3.2.2); situations in which acts
of one state should be attributed to another state (section 3.2.3); and situations
where joint activity of states can be attributed separately to one or all of the
states involved (section 3.2.4).
3.2.2 Attribution of acts of natural persons and groups of persons to the state
The rules on attribution of conduct to a state are premised on the theory that
a state should not be held accountable for the conduct of all human beings
or entities connected to a state on account of, for example, having the national-
ity of that state or being within its territorial sovereignty, but that a state is
only internationally responsible for conduct in which the organisation of the
state is, in one way or another, itself involved.14
Based on the ILC articles and international case law, especially that of the
International Court of Justice, we may distinguish four core rules of attributing
conduct of persons or entities to a state. These concern: responsibility for acts
of de jure state organs, responsibility for acts of de facto state organs, responsibil-
ity for acts of private persons, and responsibility for conduct directed or
controlled by a state.
13 Ibid, p. 603.
14 See, for the underpinning of this theory, C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in Inter-
national Law, New York University Press (1928), p. 76-77; I. Brownlie, Systems of the Law
of Nations: State Responsibility, Part I, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1983), p. 132-166; and most
extensively R. Ago, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1972, Vol.
II, p. 95-126. In the Commentary to the ILC Articles this basic rule is stated as follows: ‘Thus
the general rule is that the only conduct attributed to the state at the international level
is that of its organs of government, or of others who have acted under the direction,
instigation or control of those organs, i.e. as agents of the State’, Text of the draft articles
with commentaries thereto, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
Its Fifty-third Session (hereafter ‘Commentary to the ILC Articles’, UN GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Sup. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001); Yearbook of the ILC 2001, vol. II (Part Two), p. 38.
Also see PCIJ 10 September 1923, Case of Certain questions relating to settlers of German origin
in the territory ceded by Germany to Poland, Advisory opinion, PCIJ Series B, No. 6, p. 22
(‘States can act only by and through their agents and representatives’). See further infra
section 3.2.2.4.
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3.2.2.1 Attribution of acts of de jure and de facto state organs to the state
The most basic – and hence, also the most latent – rule of attribution is that
a state is responsible for the acts of all its organs. According to Article 4 ILC
(‘Conduct of organs of a State’):
‘1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any
other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and
whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit
of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with
the internal law of the State.’
This basic rule reflects two notions. The first is the principle of unity of the
state, from which it follows that the conduct of all state organs, regardless
of their function or position in the state, is attributable to the state. The second
is that only if a person or entity acts in its capacity as a state organ, it can
engage the responsibility of the state.15 This latter notion is expressly laid
down in Article 7 of the ILC Articles, dealing with ultra vires acts, which holds
that all conduct of state organs or persons empowered to exercise elements
of governmental authority are acts of states, also if it concerns an abuse of
authority or an act in contravention of superior orders, provided that the organ
acts in a governmental capacity.
The key question under Article 4 ILC Articles is how to define a person
or entity as state organ. The second paragraph of Article 4 holds that a state
organ ‘includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with
the internal law of the State’. In the Genocide case, the ICJ referred to state organs
classified as such by the internal laws of the state as de jure state organs.16
This classification will ordinarily depend on the characterisation of an entity
as a state organ in domestic law, but may also follow from the legal embedding
of an organ in a state, by taking account of the legal powers conferred upon
the entity and the position it has in the constitutional structure of the state.17
Relevant indicators, on a more practical level, may be such matters as by whom
a person or body is appointed, to whom the person or body is subordinated,
15 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 42. The
requirement that the organ must act in its governmental capacity did feature expressly
in the draft articles proposed by Special Rapporteur Ago, but was later omitted. See R.
Ago, Third report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1971, vol. II (Part One), p. 243
(see Article 5: ‘… are acting in that capacity …’).
16 ICJ 26 February 2007, Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judg-
ment, paras. 386, 388; also see Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001,
vol. II (Part Two), p. 42.
17 Ibid.
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by whom its salaries are paid and, ultimately, whether the person or entity
is endowed by law with exercising public authority of the state.18
In its commentary, the ILC underlines that the internal laws of a state are
not solely decisive in classifying an entity as state organ, by noting that some-
times, ‘the status and functions of various entities are determined not only
by law but also by practice, and reference exclusively to internal law would
be misleading.’19 Examples of state organs falling outside the ordinary consti-
tutional framework of the state may be militias, religious authorities or political
parties functioning parallel to the state.20 The ILC refrains, in its articles and
commentary, from dwelling upon the appropriate test to establish whether
an entity is a de facto state organ, but the ICJ, most explicitly in the Genocide
case, affirmed that conduct of persons or entities de facto operating as an agent
of the state, is also to be attributed to the state:21
‘[P]ersons, groups of persons or entities may, for purposes of international re-
sponsibility, be equated with State organs even if that status does not follow from
internal law, provided that in fact the persons, groups or entities act in “complete
dependence” on the State, of which they are ultimately merely the instrument.’
As to the rationale of this rule, the ICJ considered that ‘it is appropriate to look
beyond the legal status alone, in order to grasp the reality of the relationship
between the person taking action and the state’ and that states should not be
allowed ‘to escape their international responsibility by choosing to act through
persons or entities whose supposed independence would be purely ficti-
tious’.22 The test of ‘complete dependence’ was drawn from its earlier judg-
ment in the Nicaragua case, in which the ICJ had found it necessary to deter-
mine whether or not the relationship between the contras in Nicaragua and
the United States government ‘was so much one of dependence on the one
side and control on the other that it would be right to equate the contras, for
legal purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or as acting
on behalf of that Govemment.’23 This was found not to be the case, because
‘the evidence available to the Court indicates that the various forms of assist-
ance provided to the contras by the United States have been crucial to the
pursuit of their activities, but is insufficient to demonstrate their complete
dependence on United States aid.’24 In the Genocide case, the requirement of
18 Ibid.
19 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, vol. II (Part Two), p. 42. Also
see Brownlie (1983), p. 136.
20 Ibid.
21 Genocide Case, paras. 391-392; ICJ 27 June 1986, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua. Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 at para. 109.
22 Genocide Case, para. 392.
23 Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua, para. 109.
24 Ibid, para. 110, emphasis added.
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complete dependence of the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) on the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia was neither met, because the VRS retained ‘some
qualified, but real, margin of independence’ and because notwithstanding the
strong political, military and logistical relations and the very important support
without which the VRS ‘could not have conducted its crucial or most significant
military and paramilitary activities’, did this not ‘signify a total dependence
of the Republika Srpska upon the Respondent’.25
It appears from the relevant passages in Nicaragua and the Genocide case
that the ICJ considers it inappropriate to classify an entity as a de facto state
organ if it remains able to function in certain respects autonomous from the
state. In Nicaragua, the Court attached particular relevance to the possibility
that the contras could still embark upon certain activities without the support
provided by the United States.26 In paragraph 111 of the judgment, the ICJ
held: ‘Nevertheless, adequate direct proof that all or the great majority of
contra activities during that period received this […] support has not been,
and indeed probably could not be, advanced in every respect.’ And shortly
before, in paragraph 108, the Court had considered that the evidence available
to it did not warrant a finding ‘that all contra operations reflected strategy
and tactics wholly devised by the United States.’ Equally, in the Genocide case,
the ICJ considered it decisive that the VRS was not deprived of ‘any real
autonomy’ and that it retained a ‘real margin of independence’. Accordingly,
it is required that the entity has no real autonomy and that the type and degree
of control is qualitatively the same as the control a state exercises over its own
organs.27
This rather high threshold must probably be explained from the far-stretch-
ing legal implications of equating an entity with state organs. The state
becomes responsible for all acts of the entity, regardless of whether the entity
acted contrary to state instructions and regardless of any consideration of
influence or control asserted by the highest state officials over the specific act
complained of.28 To apply a lower threshold would imply that the state could
become responsible also for acts which could have been initiated without its
involvement, running counter to the basic rule that a state should not be held
25 Genocide Case, para. 394.
26 It should be observed that the Court in Nicaragua did not make a very clear distinction
between its application of the ‘complete dependence’ test and the ‘effective control’ test.
This is also apparent from the Appeals judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Tadić, where the argument advanced by the Prosecution
that the ICJ in Nicaragua had applied both an ‘agency’ test and an ‘effective control’ test
was labeled as a ‘misreading of the judgement of the International Court of Justice’: ICTY
15 July 19, Prosecutor v. Tadić (Appeals chamber), no. IT-94-1-A, paras. 107 and 111-114.
27 Also see M. Milanović, ‘State Responsibility for Genocide’, 17 EJIL (2006), p. 577.
28 According to the ICJ: ‘so that all their actions performed in such capacity would be attribut-
able to the State for purposes of international responsibility’, Genocide Case, para. 397.
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responsible for persons or entities not acting on its behalf, or otherwise without
its involvement.
The ‘complete dependence’ test as applied in the Genocide case has been
criticised for dealing with relationships of the state with private persons or
entities which are meant to fall under one of the other attribution rules, namely
that of ‘effective control’ (Article 8 ILC Articles), to be discussed hereunder.29
Given the differences in threshold and legal implications of the attribution
rules of Articles 4 and 8 ILC Articles, this criticism is unpersuasive, although
it must be underlined that the boundaries between the two attribution rules
are not always clear. Moreover, both the Nicaragua and the Genocide-case
concerned the peculiar issue of activities of (para)military forces established
and active abroad. The test of ‘complete dependence’ and the criteria applied
by the Court for determining the existence of such dependence may therefore
be seen as setting precedence only for a particular set of circumstances.
3.2.2.2 Attribution of acts of private persons or entities
The second rule to be discussed here concerns the attribution of conduct of
private persons or entities to the state. According to Article 5 ILC (Conduct
of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority):
‘The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4
but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the govern-
mental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law,
provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.’
This provision is meant to take account of semi-public legal persons or para-
statal entities which cannot be considered de jure or de facto state organs but
which have been endowed with certain public functions. Examples of such
entities mentioned in the ILC Commentary are private security firms acting
as prison guards and, notably, private or state-owned airlines exercising
delegated powers in relation to immigration control or quarantine.30
29 Griebel and Plücken (2008), p. 613-614. This also appears to be the view taken by the ICTY
Appeals chamber in Tadić, which, in determining whether private persons can be regarded
as de facto state organs, referred only to the notion of ‘control’ and not that of dependence:
‘Consequently, it is necessary to examine the notion of control by a State over individuals,
laid down in general international law, for the purpose of establishing whether those
individuals may be regarded as acting as de facto State officials. This notion can be found
in those general international rules on State responsibility which set out the legal criteria
for attributing to a State acts performed by individuals not having the formal status of State
officials’, Tadić (Appeals chamber), paras. 98, 114.
30 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 43. Also
see EComHR 12 October 1989 , Stocké v Germany (Report), no. 11755/85, concerning a police
informer who was considered to have acted on behalf of the German authorities and where
the conduct was accordingly attributed to Germany (esp. para. 168).
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The essential difference between situations covered by Articles 4 and 5
is that under the former, all acts of a state organ are attributable to the state
– unless it concerns acts done in a personal as opposed to governmental
capacity – while under Article 5 it is recognised that an entity may only
partially exercise ‘elements of governmental authority’. Accordingly, under
Article 5 of the ILC Articles, responsibility of the state is engaged only in so
far as it concerns acts for which the entity has been empowered to exercise
governmental authority and not for private or commercial activity in which
the entity can engage of its own accord.31
Similar to the attribution of conduct of state organs to the state, Article 5
covers all conduct done in the exercise of governmental authority, implying
that it also covers conduct involving an independent discretion to act; and
that it is not necessary that the conduct complained of was carried out under
the control or under express instructions of the state.32
In the context of this study, Article 5 ILC Articles is especially relevant in
respect of carrier sanctions, where private carriers are prohibited from trans-
porting improperly documented aliens and obliged to return aliens who are
refused entry into the state.33 The rule of Article 5 ILC Articles signifies that
(i) the implementation of these obligations ought to be regarded as an exercise
of governmental authority, also when the carrier has discretion in the manner
of implementation, and that (ii) this implementing activity is attributable to
the state.
3.2.2.3 Attribution of conduct directed or controlled by a state
The two rules described above have an important element in common: the
state is responsible for all acts of the persons acting as an agent of the state,
provided that they do act in that capacity, regardless of whether the agent
acted within the limits of its competency and regardless of any consideration
of influence or control asserted by the highest state officials over the act
concerned. This is different with a third and the most controversial rule on
attribution of conduct of persons or entities to a state, the attribution of conduct
to a state on account of a state organ giving instructions or exercising control
over non-state organs resulting in the commission of acts in breach of its
international obligations. Under this rule, it is not the quality of being an
‘agent’ of the state which is decisive for establishing state responsibility, but
the factual relationship between the state and the conduct complained of.
According to Article 8 ILC Articles (Conduct directed or controlled by a State):
31 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 43.
32 Ibid.
33 See, extensively, chapter 5.2.2.2.
76 Chapter 3
‘The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the
conduct.’
Article 8 speaks of three disjunctive standards for this ‘incidental’ attribution
of private conduct to the state: acting under instructions, acting under the
direction, or acting under the control of the state. Especially the element of
control has given rise to divergent views on its proper application. The dis-
cussion essentially evolves around the question whether it should suffice for
attributing conduct of a private entity to the state that the state has asserted
‘overall’ or ‘decisive’ influence or control over a private entity or that it is
required that the state has specifically directed or controlled the conduct
complained of. The latter standard was adhered to by the ICJ in the Nicaragua
and Genocide cases, while in other cases the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and ECtHR have upheld the ‘overall control’
or ‘decisive influence’ standard. It is submitted hereunder that (i) the more
lenient standard of ‘overall control’ may risk attributing conduct to a state
in which it is not involved, potentially overstretching the international re-
sponsibility of the state; but that (ii) the wielding of overall influence or control
over an entity may nonetheless give rise to international responsibility by
virtue of the scope and contents of a state’s positive obligations. Although the
relevant case law mainly involves the responsibility of states for wrongful
activity of military factions which are active in another state and is therefore
not directly of relevance for this study, the discussion is of theoretical sign-
ificance, because it indicates how the rules on attribution and the doctrine of
positive obligations constitute separate but conjunctive avenues for delimiting
the international responsibility of the state.
In Nicaragua, after having discarded the possibility of equating the
Nicaraguan rebels (the so-called contras) with organs of the United States,
the next question was whether the United States, because of its financing,
organising, training, equipping and planning of the operations of the contras,
was nonetheless responsible for violations of international humanitarian law
committed by those rebels.34 The Court held that a high degree of ‘control’
was necessary for this to be the case:
‘United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing,
organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its
military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation,
is still insufficient in itself, on the basis of the evidence in the possession of the
Court, for the purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by
the contras in the course of their military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.
34 But see also Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, para. 58.
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(…) For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would
in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military
or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were
committed.’35
Accordingly, and in line with the text of current Article 8 of the ILC Articles
(‘in carrying out the conduct’), the ICJ required not only that a state has
directed, instructed or effectively controlled the operations of a military or
paramilitary group, but also that this involvement of the state had a direct
bearing on the specific conduct complained of. In his separate opinion, judge
Ago, the former special rapporteur of the ILC on State responsibility, subscribed
to the Court’s approach and stressed the exceptional nature of this attribution
rule:
‘Only in cases where certain members of those forces happened to have been
specifically charged by United States authorities to commit a particular act, or carry
out a particular task of some kind on behalf of the United States, would it be
possible so to regard them [as persons acting on behalf of the United States –
author]. Only in such instances does international law recognize, as a rare exception
to the rule, that the conduct of persons or groups which are neither agents nor
organs of a State, nor members of its apparatus even in the broadest acceptation
of that term, may be held to be acts of that State. The Judgment, accordingly, takes
a correct view when, referring in particular to the atrocities, acts of violence or
terrorism and other inhuman actions that Nicaragua alleges to have been committed
by the contras against the persons and property of civilian populations, it holds
that the perpetrators of these misdeeds may not be considered as having been
specifically charged by United States authorities to commit them unless, in certain
concrete cases, unchallengeable proof to the contrary has been supplied.’36
The Nicaragua-test37 was held to be unpersuasive by the ICTY in the Tadić
case.38 The ICTY advanced, in respect of acts committed by individuals forming
part of a hierarchically structured group, the more lenient standard of the state
wielding overall control over that group:
‘One should distinguish the situation of individuals acting on behalf of a State
without specific instructions, from that of individuals making up an organised and
hierarchically structured group, such as a military unit or, in case of war or civil
strife, armed bands of irregulars or rebels. Plainly, an organised group differs from
35 Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua, para. 115.
36 Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua, Separate opinion of Judge Ago, para. 16.
37 The Nicaragua-test is often referred to as the ‘effective control’-test. This designation is not
entirely appropriate, as effective control over the operations in the course of which the
alleged violations were committed was examined by the Court in close collaboration with
the other factors currently mentioned in Article 8 ILC Articles, i.e. the factors of ‘instructions’
and ‘direction’.
38 Tadić (Appeals chamber), para. 115.
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an individual in that the former normally has a structure, a chain of command
and a set of rules as well as the outward symbols of authority. Normally a member
of the group does not act on his own but conforms to the standards prevailing
in the group and is subject to the authority of the head of the group. Consequently,
for the attribution to a State of acts of these groups it is sufficient to require that
the group as a whole be under the overall control of the State.’39
The ICTY reasoned that having overall control over the group is sufficient to
engage the responsibility of that state for the group’s activities, and this is
regardless of whether or not each of these acts were specifically imposed,
requested or directed by the state.40 ‘Clearly’, the ICTY added, ‘the rationale
behind this legal regulation is that otherwise, States might easily shelter behind,
or use as a pretext, their internal legal system or the lack of any specific
instructions in order to disclaim international responsibility’.41 As to the
precise standard of this overall control-test, the ICTY considered as follows:
‘The control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State
(or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in
organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group,
in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support
to that group. Acts performed by the group or members thereof may be regarded
as acts of de facto State organs regardless of any specific instruction by the control-
ling State concerning the commission of each of those acts.’42
Several legal commentators welcomed the approach of the ICTY.43 Further,
as was also advanced in legal writings, the ECtHR, in its cases on the Turkish
involvement in Northern Cyprus and Russian activity in Moldova, appears
to have proceeded from a similar assumption that overall control suffices for
the attribution of conduct of a private group to a state.44
In the case of Loizidou v Turkey, concerning the Turkish occupation of
Northern Cyprus and the subsequent establishment of the ‘Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus’ (the TRNC), the Court was confronted with the dual
question whether the victims of human rights violations in Northern Cyprus
fell under the ‘jurisdiction’ of Turkey in the meaning of Article 1 ECRH and
whether the acts of the TRNC could be attributed to Turkey. After reiterating
39 Ibid, para. 120.
40 Ibid, para. 122.
41 Ibid, para. 123.
42 Ibid, para. 137.
43 A. Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on
Genocide in Bosnia’, 18 EJIL (2007), p. 649-668; Griebel and Plücken (2008), p. 601-622; M.
Spinedi, ’On the Non-Attribution of the Bosnian Serbs’ conduct to Serbia’, 5 Journal of
International Criminal Justice (2007), p. 829-838.
44 See especially Cassese (2007), p. 658-659, at n. 17 and 18.
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that a State Party’s obligations can also be incurred for acts and ommissions
producing effect outside that state’s territory, the Court considered:
‘It is not necessary to determine whether, as the applicant and the Government
of Cyprus have suggested, Turkey actually exercises detailed control over the
policies and actions of the authorities of the “TRNC”. It is obvious from the large
number of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus that her army
exercises effective overall control over that part of the island. Such control, accord-
ing to the relevant test and in the circumstances of the case, entails her responsibil-
ity for the policies and actions of the “TRNC”. Those affected by such policies or
actions therefore come within the “jurisdiction” of Turkey for the purposes of
Article 1 of the Convention. Her obligation to secure to the applicant the rights
and freedoms set out in the Convention therefore extends to the northern part of
Cyprus.’45
Although the Court does not distinguish all too clearly between the issues
of attribution and jurisdiction and refers to effective control over territory
instead of the TRNC, its reasoning appears to be that having effective control
over Northern Cyprus means not only that all persons living there are brought
within Turkish jurisdiction, but also that the TRNC can only be deemed to
function as a subordinate local administration, i.e. as a de facto state organ of
Turkey, implying that all the policies or actions of the TRNC are to be attributed
to Turkey. The Court in any regard makes clear that detailed control over the
particular acts of the TRNC was not required for acts of the latter to be
attributed to Turkey. This reasoning was upheld in Cyprus v Turkey.46
In the case of Ilascu a.o. v Moldova and Russia, the European Court examined
more closely the relationship between the state and the local administration,
thereby bringing the applied criteria more in line with those applied by the
ICJ in the Nicaragua case. The ECtHR held the Russian Federation to be fully
responsible for the continuing illegal detention of the applicants and the ill-
treatment they suffered at the hands of the separatists on the territory of
Moldova. The Court considered it of ‘little consequence’ that agents of the
Russian Federation had not participated directly in the events complained of;
and instead considered that because the separatist regime in Trandniestria
was set up with support of Russia and remained under the ‘effective authority,
45 ECtHR 18 December 1996 Loizidou v Turkey (merits), no. 15318/89, para. 56. Also see ECtHR
23 March 1995, Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections), no. 15318/89, paras. 52 and 62.
46 ECtHR 10 May 2001, Cyprus v Turkey, no. 25781/94, esp. para. 77: ‘Having effective overall
control over northern Cyprus, its responsibility cannot be confined to the acts of its own
soldiers or officials in northern Cyprus but must also be engaged by virtue of the acts of
the local administration which survives by virtue of Turkish military and other support.
It follows that, in terms of Article 1 of the Convention, Turkey’s “jurisdiction” must be
considered to extend to securing the entire range of substantive rights set out in the
Convention and those additional Protocols which she has ratified, and that violations of
those rights are imputable to Turkey’.
80 Chapter 3
or at the very least under the decisive influence, of the Russian Federation’,
and in any event because it ‘survives by virtue of the military, economic and
political support given to it by the Russian Federation’, there was a ‘continuous
and uninterrupted link of responsibility on the part of the Russian Federation
for the applicants’ fate’.47 The ECtHR did not however explicitly consider that
the acts of the separatists should be attributed to Russia but referred to the
positive obligation incumbent on it to put an end to the applicants’ situation.
The ICJ, however, upheld the Nicaragua-standard in the Genocide Case (2007),
and faulted the ICTY for engaging itself in matters pertaining to the law on
state responsibility ‘which do not lie within the specific purview of its juris-
diction’ and for applying a test which was seen as overly broadening the scope
of state responsibility.48 It underlined that the rule embodied in Article 8 ILC
Articles is substantially different from those enunciated in Articles 4 and 5:
should it be accepted that the instructions given to, or direction or control
asserted over the persons carrying out the conduct is sufficient to attract the
state’s responsibility, this does not mean that the perpetrators are to be
characterised as organs of the state – implying that all their acts are to be
attributed to the state – but merely that a state’s responsibility is engaged for
its own organs having issued instructions or asserted control resulting in other
persons committing an international wrong.49 Further, the Court explained
at length why the overall control test is unsuitable for establishing state re-
sponsibility for acts committed by persons who cannot be equated with state
organs:
‘It must next be noted that the “overall control” test has the major drawback of
broadening the scope of State responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle
governing the law of international responsibility: a State is responsible only for
its own conduct, that is to say the conduct of persons acting, on whatever basis,
on its behalf. (…) [A] State’s responsibility can be incurred for acts committed by
persons or groups of persons – neither State organs nor to be equated with such
organs – only if, assuming those acts to be internationally wrongful, they are
attributable to it under the rule of customary international law reflected in Article
47 ECtHR 8 july 2004, Ilascu a.o. v Moldova and Russia, no. 48787/99, paras. 382, 392-394.
48 Genocide Case, para. 403.
49 Ibid, para. 397. According to some authors, by emphasizing that responsibility is incurred
by reason of instruction or control asserted by its own organs, the ICJ apparently abolished
Article 8 as a rule of attribution proper; see Griebel and Plücken (2008), p. 605. Although
the Court’s wordings in paragraph 397 may be taken to allow for such a reading, it is
doubtful whether the Court intended to make that point. Its firm pronouncements on the
issue were primarily aimed at emphasising that if the conditions of Article 8 ILC Articles
are fulfilled, this does not transform the controlled or instructed persons into state organs,
without delving explicitly into the question whether the acts of the latter should in that
case be attributed to the State or not. Indeed, in paragraph 419, the ICJ explicitly considers
that, should it have been established that genocide would have been committed on the
instructions or direction of the State, ‘the necessary conclusion would be that the genocide
was attributable to the State’.
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8 cited above. This is so where an organ of the State gave the instructions or
provided the direction pursuant to which the perpetrators of the wrongful act acted
or where it exercised effective control over the action during which the wrong was
committed. In this regard the “overall control” test is unsuitable, for it stretches
too far, almost to breaking point, the connection which must exist between the
conduct of a State’s organs and its international responsibility.’50
Several observations are in order in respect of the case law above. It is firstly
notable that the ICTY (and the ECtHR in the Cyprus cases) not only favours a
different standard of control – at least in so as far as it concerns control over
organised (military) groups – but that it also submits that the fact of being
under such control brings with it that the group must be regarded as a de facto
state organ, implying that all the group’s acts are to be attributed to the state.
Given the more general nature of the control asserted by the state – not
necessarily related to a specific act – this is a logical conclusion, but it does
raise the question how this overall control-test relates to the existing rules
codified in Articles 4 and 5 of the ILC Articles, which lay down the specific
requirements for classifying natural persons as state organs. Rather than
refining (or expanding) the attrubition rule of Article 8 ILC Articles, the ICTY
appears to present an altogether new rule, which, in its legal implications at
least, bears more resemblance with Articles 4 and 5 of the ILC Articles, but
stretches substantially the circumstances for attribution mentioned under those
Articles, and in particular the ‘complete dependence’-test as formulated by
the ICJ.51
Secondly, although seemingly contradictory, the divergent approaches taken
by ICJ and ICTY do not appear to reflect a different perception on the nature
of the law on state responsibility. We may summarize the rationale of the ICJ
behind attributing acts of individuals to the state as one in which there indis-
putably must exist a connection between the state’s conduct and its inter-
national responsibility.52 An approach must be adhered to in which it is ruled
out that acts are attributed to the state which could well have been committed
without its involvement.53 This implies that persons, or groups of persons
50 Ibid, para. 406.
51 Indeed, some of the cases brought forward by the ICTY in support of its ‘overall control
test’, appear to have more resemblance with situations covered by Articles 4 and 5 – and
possibly Articles 9 and 11 – of the ILC Articles than Article 8. The ICTY referred, for
instance, to the Kenneth P. Yaeger case, in which the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
had concluded that the local revolutionary committees had acted as de facto State organs
of Iran because, amongst others, they had performed de facto official functions and that
Iran could not tolerate the exercise of governmental authority by actors and at the same
time deny responsibility for wrongful acts committed by them, Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal 2 November 1987, Kenneth P. Yeager v Islamic Republic of Iran, Partial Award No.
324-10199-1, reprinted in 17 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports (1987), p. 92.
52 Genocide Case, para. 145.
53 Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua, para. 115.
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retaining some element of autonomy should not be regarded as de facto agents
of the state and that their conduct can only engage the international re-
sponsibility of the state if there is some form of direct involvement of the state
(in the form of instructions, directions or effective control) in particular conduct
of that person or group. Cassese, on the other hand, giving voice to the reason-
ing behind the Tadic judgment, asserts that the latter test is inconsistent with
another ‘basic principle underpinning the whole body of rules and principles
on state responsibility’, namely that ‘states may not evade responsibility
towards other states when they, instead of acting through their own officials,
use groups of individuals to undertake actions that do damage to other states’.
Therefore, ‘states must answer for actions contrary to international law accom-
plished by individuals over which they systematically wield authority’.54 But,
this reasoning equally reflects an understanding that states should be held
responsible for acts committed on its behalf. The difference between the
approaches of the ICTY and ICJ is that the ICJ departs from an urge to prevent
the state being held responsible also for other acts; while the ICTY and the ECtHR
depart from an urge to ensure that a state is indeed so held responsible. Hence,
it is the test to arrive at the establishment of state responsibility which is
contested, rather than the nature of the law on state responsibility.
This brings us to the third and final observation, which is that both tests
may not be sufficiently apt to single out those acts for which the state should
be held responsible. The problem with the ‘overall control’ test is that it simply
accrues all acts of the controlled entity – also acts exercised in its own auton-
omy – to the state, whereas the problem with the test propounded by the ICJ
is that it does not seem to attach legal implications to all the intricate forms
in which a state may be involved in the activities of a private entity – through
wielding influence, asserting general control or the provision of all kinds of
support. It is in this connection that it should be observed that the attribution
rules laid down in the law on state responsibility are not solely decisive for
holding states accountable for their involvement in conduct of other actors.
The fact that activity of a particular entity cannot be attributed to a state does
not necessarily imply that the state cannot incur responsibility for its involve-
ment in that activity. It may well be that the primary, or substantive, inter-
national obligations incumbent on the state give rise, on account of its own
acts or omissions, to the state’s responsibility. This point is especially salient
within human rights law, where the doctrine of positive obligations may serve
to establish the concurrent, or derived, responsibility of the state in respect
of conduct of another actor. Hereunder, it is explained that the rules of attribu-
tion laid down in Part I of the ILC Articles and the doctrine of positive obliga-
tions serve as separate but conjunctive avenues for delimiting the international
54 Cassese (2007), p. 654, 661, emphasis in original.
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responsibility of the state when it is involved in the activities of a private
entity.
3.2.2.4 Positive obligations and due diligence
In order to better appreciate the divergent approaches of, let us say, the ICJ
upon the one hand, and the ICTY and the ECtHR on the other, regarding the
question of attributing conduct of private persons to the state, it is necessary
to examine the doctrine of positive obligations, and especially the relationship
of that doctrine with the law on state responsibility.
One can say that until fairly recently, the existence of duties of prevention
and due diligence in connection to acts of private persons were deemed to
form an integral part of the law on state responsibility, or at least, axioms
delineating the extent to which states could be held internationally responsible
for misconduct of private individuals. Somewhat simplified, two schools of
thought can be said to have persisted into modern thinking on state re-
sponsibility for acts of individuals.55
The first school is that of culpa, in which the presumption is that a state
can become responsible for the acts of individuals only through complicity.
Grotius, commonly associated with this school, discarded the medieval prin-
ciple of ‘collective responsibility’ according to which the state was regarded
as a collectivity, whose members were responsible for the acts of any one
member, implying that injury done by a member to a member of another state
would enliven the responsibility of the whole state.56 Instead, Grotius formu-
lated the principle that acts of private individuals can normally not be ascribed
to the state, unless a state can be held complicit for international wrongs of
individuals through the notions of patientia (toleration) and receptus (refuge).57
The term patientia refers to a state knowing that an individual has the intention
to commit a wrongful act against a foreign state, and where the state fails to
take action to prevent the act from being comitted while it possesses the power
to do so. The term receptus refers to the requirement of the state either to
punish or to extradite private persons who are known to have committed
crimes against foreign states. Failing to comply with the requirements of
55 This dictinction is drawn from R. Ago, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, Yearbook of
the ILC 1972, Vol. II, p. 120-124; and F. Przetacznik, Protection of officials of foreign states
according to International law, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff (1983), p. 197 et seq. For an
extensive overview of the doctrines of due diligence in relation to state responsibility,
including the many subdivisions within the various schools of thought, see J.A. Hess-
bruegge, ‘The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence
in International Law’, 36 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics (2004), p. 265-306.
56 On the origins and proponents of the theory of collective responsibility, see extensively
Hessbruege, note above, p. 276-281.
57 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), translated by A.C. Campbell, Kitchener: Batoche
Books (2001), Book II, Chapter 21, para. ii (p. 215-216).
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patientia and receptus would, in the Grotian theory of culpa, imply that a state
participates in the guilt of the individual – because ‘knowledge implies a
concurrence of will’58 – from which it, in modern terminology of state re-
sponsibility, would follow that the act is to be attributed to the state as a basis
for its international responsibility.
The theory of culpa was followed by many writers,59 but gradually gave
way to another line of thought in which the element of culpa, or fault, was
discarded as essential component of state responsibility. In this school of
thought, identified by Ago as the one to which the very large majority of
modern writings belong, state responsibility is derived directly from a duty
of the state to exercise due diligence over individuals who are subject to its
sovereignty. Triepel, for example, considered that the state, if it remains passive
towards an individual injuring another state, does not become an accomplice
of the individual, but is responsible only for its own failure to exercise due
diligence, implying that the responsibility of the state is enlivened for its own
omissions and not for the act of the individual.60 Another writer belonging
to this school is Eagleton, who stipulated that ‘the state is never responsible
for the act of an individual as such: the act of the individual merely occasions
the responsibility of the state by revealing the state in an illegality of its own
– an ommission to prevent or punish, or positive encouragement of, the act
of the individual.’61 Summarizing this school of thought, Ago held the basic
rule to be as follows: ‘the state is internationally responsible only for the action,
and more often for the omission, of its organs which are guilty of not having
done everything within their power to prevent the individual’s injurious action
or to punish it suitably in the event that it has nevertheless occurred.’62
The main difference between the two schools of thought lies in the question
of equation of the act of the individual with that of the state. What the theories
have in common, and what is important for our present purposes, is that they
both depart from an understanding that the state is not just bound to abstain
from committing internationally wrongful acts, but that it also has the duty,
inherent to its capacity of being the sovereign power and thereby to constrain
the actions of its subjects, to prevent them from committing international
wrongful acts. Having spent the vast part of his Fourth Report on State Re-
sponsibility on reviewing countless judicial decisions and legal writings
addressing the relationship between private acts and state responsibility, Ago
proposed, on the basis hereof, the following provision to be incorporated in
the Articles on State Responsibility:
58 Ibid.
59 Among whom Pufendorf and Vattel. For more extensive references see esp. R. Ago, Fourth
Report on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1972, Vol. II, p. 121-122 and Hessbruege
(2004), p. 281-292.
60 H. Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht, Leipzig: Siebeck (1899), p. 333-334.
61 Eagleton (1928), p. 77.
62 R. Ago, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1972, Vol. II, p. 122-123.
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‘Article 11. – Conduct of private individuals
1. The conduct of a private individual or group of individuals, acting in that
capacity, is not considered to be an act of the State in international law.
2. However, the rule enunciated in the preceding paragraph is without prejudice
to the attribution to the State of any omission on the part of its organs, where the
latter ought to have acted to prevent or punish the conduct of the individual or
group of individuals and failed to do so.’63
This provision was eventually not adopted by the International Law Commis-
sion, because it was felt that it could trespass into the field of ‘primary rules’,
i.e. the rules that place obligations on states, and did therefore not necessarily
belong to the rules determining whether those obligations have been violated
and what the consequences of such violations should be.64 This was, of course,
not to mean that the ILC denied the existence of a doctrine of positive obliga-
tions or due diligence, but rather that it perceived the scope of a state’s positive
duties to be intrinsically linked to the contents of the obligation at issue. Special
Rapporteur Crawford defended the ommittance of references to the nature
of various obligations in the Draft Articles, by noting, amongst other reasons:
‘[T]he most important point is that the extent or impact of the law on state re-
sponsibility depends on the content and development of the primary rules, especial-
ly in the field of the obligations of the state with respect to society as a whole. There
has been a transformation in the content of the primary rules since 1945, especially
through the development of human rights. But it is the case, overall, that the
classical rules of attribution have proved adequate to cope with this transformation.
This is so because of their flexibility and because of the development, as part of
the substantive body of human rights law, of the idea that in certain circumstances
the state is required to guarantee rights, and not simply to refrain from inter-
vening.’65
It is, of course, true that obligations of prevention and protection have gradual-
ly been incorporated into human rights law. It is also true that on the basis
of such obligations the ICJ in the Genocide case did consider the Former Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia to have violated the Genocide Convention, namely by doing
nothing to prevent the massacres occurring in Srebenica.66 But this violation
was not based on a general obligation on states to prevent the commission
by other persons or entities of acts contrary to certain norms of general inter-
national law, but on the explicit reference in Article 1 of the Genocide Conven-
63 Ibid, p. 126.
64 Summary records of the twenty-seventh session, Yearbook of the ILC 1975, Vol. I, p. 214;
also see J. Crawford, First report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1988, Vol. II,
p. 6-7, esp at para. 16.
65 J. Crawford, ‘Revising the Draft Articles on State Responsibility’, 10 EJIL (1999), p. 439.
66 Genocide Case, para. 438.
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tion to the substantive obligation incumbent on Contracting Parties to ‘under-
take to prevent and to punish’ genocide.67
This leaves us with two remaining questions to be addressed. The first
is to what extent, and on what basis, a general theory of due diligence in
relation to activities of individuals can be said to exist and in particular,
whether such duties also exist with regard to conduct outside a state’s territory.
The second is how this theory relates to the approaches of the ICJ, the ICTY
and the ECtHR in the cases mentioned in the previous section.
Regarding the first question, and limiting ourselves to human rights obliga-
tions, we may depart from two assumptions. The first is the one arrived at
in the previous chapter that a state’s human rights obligations are not necessar-
ily confined to a state’s own territory. The second is that many, if not all,
human rights are seen to bring with them duties of prevention and due
diligence.68 As to the question of a state’s positive obligations outside its
territory, it is useful to refer briefly to the approach of the ICJ regarding the
obligation to prevent genocide, as it provides insightful considerations regard-
ing the nature and basis of a state’s positive obligations outside its territory,
which may well apply to obligations other than the duty to prevent genocide
alone.
The substantive obligations, inter alia, not to commit and to prevent and
punish genocide enumerated in Articles I and III Genocide Convention were
considered by the ICJ as ‘not on their face limited by territory’, but to apply
‘to a State wherever it may be acting or may be able to act in ways appropriate
to meeting the obligations in question.’69 As to the extent of that ability in
law and fact, the Court set out to determine the specific scope of the duty to
prevent in the Genocide Convention. Regarding this duty, the ICJ found the
notion of ‘due diligence’ to be of critical importance and it defined the para-
meters of this notion as follows:
‘Various parameters operate when assessing whether a State has duly discharged
the obligation concerned. The first, which varies greatly from one State to another,
67 Ibid, para. 429, in which the ICJ made clear that it did not ‘purport to find whether, apart
from the texts applicable to specific fields, there is a general obligation on States to prevent
the commission by other persons or entities of acts contrary to certain norms of general
international law.’
68 For a general overview, see eg A. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under
the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights, Oxford:
Hart Publishing (2004); B. Conforti, ‘Exploring the Strasbourg case-Law: Reflections on State
Responsibility for the Breach of Positive Obligations’, in: M. Fitzmaurice and D. Sarooshi
(eds), Issues of State Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions, Oxford: Hart Publish-
ing (2004), p. 129-137; and, for a theoretical underpinning, H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence,
Affluence, and US Foreign Policy, Princeton University Press (1980), p. 52-53; and H. Shue,
‘The Interdependence of Duties’, in: P. Alston and K. Tomasevski (eds.), The Right to Food,
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff (1984), p. 83-85.
69 Genocide Case, para. 183, emphasis added.
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is clearly the capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit,
or already committing, genocide. This capacity itself depends, among other things,
on the geographical distance of the State concerned from the scene of the events,
and on the strength of the political links, as well as links of all other kinds, between
the authorities of that State and the main actors in the events. The State’s capacity
to influence must also be assessed by legal criteria, since it is clear that every State
may only act within the limits permitted by international law; seen thus, a State’s
capacity to influence may vary depending on its particular legal position vis-à-vis
the situations and persons facing the danger, or the reality, of genocide.’70
As to the moment on which the duty of due diligence comes into being, the
Court considered decisive ‘the instant that the State learns of, or should nor-
mally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be
committed.’71
Applying these parameters to the facts of the case, the Court attached
particular importance to the close links which existed between the FRY and
the VRS and the ability of the former to exert influence over the latter. Given
this position of ‘influence’ and the fact that the Belgrade authorities must have
been ‘aware’ of the serious risk that tragic events were to happen in Srebrenica,
the Court concluded:
‘In view of their undeniable influence and of the information, voicing serious
concern, in their possession, the Yugoslav federal authorities should, in the view
of the Court, have made the best efforts within their power to try and prevent the
tragic events then taking shape, whose scale, though it could not have been foreseen
with certainty, might at least have been surmised. (…) Yet the Respondent has not
shown that it took any initiative to prevent what happened, or any action on its
part to avert the atrocities which were committed. It must therefore be concluded
that the organs of the Respondent did nothing to prevent the Srebrenica massacres,
claiming that they were powerless to do so, which hardly tallies with their known
influence over the VRS.’72
It must be repeated that the Court expressly refrained from laying down a
general framework applicable to duties to prevent certain acts.73 The crime
of genocide is obviously of special nature and the duty of states to prevent
it is likely to require vigilance of the highest standard, which not necessarily
applies to all human rights obligations. Nonetheless, the parameters used by
the Court in defining the scope of the duty to prevent are worth noting. The
duty of prevention is not based on a territorial limitation, but on the ability,
70 Ibid, para. 430.
71 Ibid, para. 431. Cf. ICJ 9 April 1949, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland v. Albania), I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 18-22; and Military and Paramilitary
Activities in Nicaragua, para. 116.
72 Ibid, para. 438.
73 Ibid, para. 429.
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or capacity to act; this capacity is, on the one hand, measured in legal terms
(i.e. a state must always act within the limits of international law); and on the
other hand measured in terms of influence over, or links between, the state
and the acting individual(s).
This basic approach of the Court is in conformity with existing theories
on state responsibility in relation to acts of individuals. While it is obvious
that a state can be held responsible for its own acts, also if committed abroad
– whereby the territorial locus is relevant primarily with regard to determining
the substantive reach of a state’s obligations – with regard to omissions of the
state, or duties of due diligence, the notion of territory may be more pertinent,
as a state will not always be equally capable to act outside its territories as
it is within its territories. It is probably for this reason that reference to a state’s
territory is often made as a basis of a state’s responsibility for a failure of due
diligence.74 But, as various authors have stressed, this reference must be
understood from the presumption that the state ordinarily has the power to
regulate activity in its territory. Eventually, it is either the act of the state or
the power or capacity to act which gives rise to international responsibility,
with the notion of territory merely functioning as a presumption that the state
is able to act.75 Eagleton, in this regard, emphasised the importance of the
criterion of ‘control’ in explaining a state’s duties of due diligence within its
territory: ‘Since international law must prevail within each state, all states in
consequence thereof are burdened with the obligation of respecting the rights,
within their own territories, of other states or their members. The responsibility
of the state for the acts of individuals is therefore based upon the territorial
control which it enjoys, and which enables it, and it alone, to restrain and
punish individuals, whether nationals or not, within its limits’.76 The dis-
connection between territory and responsibility is perhaps most evidently
present in the work of Brownlie, who emphasises that responsibility may stem
both from harmful acts (or omissions) occurring outside state territory and
from acts (or omissions) within a state’s territory which produce harmful
74 See, amongst others, the references in Brownlie (1983), p. 165.
75 See eg Grotius, who based the responsibility of a State for a failure to prevent individuals
from doing harm to foreign states on ‘the power’ it has prevent it, n. 57 supra. Vattel
stipulated that a State ought not to permit ‘those who are under his command to violate
the precepts of the law of nature’; E. de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Loi
Naturelle (1758), translated by C.G. Fenwick, Washington: Carnegie Institution (1916), book
II, chapter VI, para. 72. Anzilotti based a State’s responsibility towards other States on a
State’s ‘sphere of activities’, D. Anzilotti, ‘La Responsabilité Internationale des États: A
Raison des Dommages Soufferts par des Étrangers’, 13 Revue Générale de Droit Public (1906),
p. 290. And Ago derived State responsibility for acts of individuals on a State’s organs being
guilty ‘of not having done everything within their power to prevent the individual’s injurious
action’, R. Ago, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1972, Vol. II, p.
123, emphasis added.
76 Eagleton (1928), p. 77-78.
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consequences outside state territory.77 Like Eagleton, Brownlie refers to the
notion of ‘control’ as a basis of state responsibility, whereby duties of the state
regarding activities within its territorial sovereignty are derived from ‘the
actual or presumed control the state has over its own territory.’78 Brownlie
saw this proposition confirmed by the ICJ advisory opinion regarding the
occupation by South Africa of Namibia, in which the Court had held South
Africa responsible for the consequences of this occupation, by reasoning that
‘physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is
the basis for state liability for acts affecting other states.’79
Based on the above, we may conclude that the question of private persons
being inside or outside a state’s territory is primarily relevant in terms of state
responsibility in so far as it has a bearing on the question whether it affects
the capability of the state to act. A state is presumed to wield influence – in
the broadest meaning of the term – over persons inside its territory, but this
is only a presumption, whereby a state may, on the one hand, lack control,
or power, to constrain the acts of individuals within its territory80 and, on
the other hand, assert a relevant degree of control (or power or influence),
over individuals outside its territory.
In the Genocide case the ICJ made a strict distinction between the question
of attributing conduct of the VRS to the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and
the duty of the FRY to prevent the VRS from committing genocide. In Nicaragua,
after having concluded that alleged violations of humanitarian law committed
by the contras could not be attributed to the United States, the ICJ nonetheless
found it relevant that the United States must have been aware of the allegations
of breaches of humanitarian law made against the contras, for this could have
an impact on the lawfulness of the actions of the United States in connection
to the contras. Eventually, the Court concluded that the United States had
‘encouraged’ the commission by the contras of acts contrary to humanitarian
law, by producing and disseminating a manual on guerilla warfare, which
amongst others justified the shooting of civilians, without however connecting
this finding to a breach of the United States’ obligations under international
humanitarian law.81
77 Brownlie (1983), p. 165, 180-188.
78 Ibid, p. 181.
79 ICJ 21 June 1971, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16 at para. 118.
80 Cf. Corfu channel, p. 18: ‘The State may, up to a certain point, be bound to supply particulars
of the use made by it of the means of information and inquiry at its disposal. But it cannot
be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its territory and
waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act
perpetrated therein, nor yet that it necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors.
This fact, by itself and apart from other circumstances, neither involves prima facie re-
sponsibility nor shifts the burden of proof.’
81 Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua, paras. 116-122.
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In the previous chapter, it was indicated that the European Court of Human
Rights has also applied the doctrine of positive obligations to several cases
concerning influence wielded over individuals in a foreign territory. The
formula used in the cases of Treska and Manoilescu that ‘Even in the absence
of effective control of a territory outside its borders, the state still has a positive
obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, economic,
judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are in accordance
with international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by
the Convention’ corresponds to the theoretical considerations made above and
the approach taken by the ICJ in the Genocide Case.82 It supports a conclusion
that the duty to take preventive or other positive action in respect of human
rights interferences taking place in a foreign territory derives primarily from
the influence a state wields over a particular situation and therewith the
‘power’, or capability, it has to prevent the occurrence of human rights viola-
tions. The establishment of the scope of this duty requires an inquiry, on the
one hand, of the substantive international obligations of the state and the duties
of due diligence inherent in them; and, on the other hand, an examination
of the legal and factual capabilities of the state to change the course of events.
This leads to the conclusion that any useful comparison of the manner in
which courts have established the international responsibility of the state on
the basis of certain links between the states and (groups of) individuals situated
in a foreign location, must not simply be based on an assessment of the manner
in which the courts have applied the various attribution rules. It must also
have regard to the question whether the courts have properly ascertained the
existence of potential positive duties inherent to a state’s international obliga-
tions and whether such duties were engaged as a result of the influence
wielded by the state over the individuals. In this regard, the ICJ’s more
stringent approach in Nicaragua and the Genocide Case regarding attribution
is well sustainable, so long as it does not neglect duties inherent in the
wielding of influence. But likewise is the overall control test propounded by
the ECtHR defendable, in the sense that it rightly attaches positive duties to
the finding that a state wields a certain degree of control or influence over
acts committed by individuals abroad.
3.2.3 ATTRIBUTION OF STATE CONDUCT TO ANOTHER STATE
The second category of situations falling under the rules of attribution which
are relevant for this study are those where a state places one of its organs at
the disposal of another state. Under operations of sea border control
coordinated by the EU external borders agency Frontex for example, guest
82 See chapter 2.5.3.
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officers of one EU Member State may be placed within the command structure
of another Member State. EU Member States have further concluded agreements
with third countries allowing for the conducting of joint sea patrols in the
territorial waters of third countries or the posting of immigration officers in
a third country, in order to assist in controlling the border.83 The question
raised by such arrangements is whether the activity of guest officers should
be attributed to the host or the sending state.
According to Article 6 ILC Articles (Conduct of organs placed at the disposal
of a State by another State):
‘The conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall
be considered an act of the former State under international law if the organ is
acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the State at
whose disposal it is placed.’
The ILC Commentary stresses that this rule applies to exceptional situations
and that, if the rule applies, the conduct is to be attributed only to the state
at whose disposal the organ is placed and not to the state whose organ it is.84
The latter rule was confirmed by the ICJ in the Genocide case.85
On its wording, Article 6 ILC appears to require, primarily, that the organ
is exercising ‘elements of the governmental authority’ of the other state. This
could be taken to mean that responsibility must be allocated to the receiving
state if the organ acts in the name of that state or at its behest. The ILC Com-
mentary however, notes that the words ‘placed at the disposal of’ are the
essential condition for attributing conduct of the organ to the other state,
whereby this condition is strictly interpreted as requiring not only that the
organ must act with the consent, under the authority of and for the purposes
of the receiving state, it must also act in conjunction with the machinery of
that state and under the latter’s ‘exclusive direction and control, rather than
on instructions from the sending state’.86 The conditions of actually being
under the authority of the receiving state and acting in accordance with the
receiving state’s instruction featured expressly in an earlier version of the Draft
83 See extensively chapters 5 and 6.
84 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 44. Also
see R. Ago, Seventh report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part
One), p. 53.
85 Genocide Case, para. 140 (‘Furthermore, the Court notes that in any event the act of an organ
placed by a State at the disposal of another public authority shall not be considered an
act of that State if the organ was acting on behalf of the public authority at whose disposal
it had been placed.’).
86 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 44. Also
see Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-sixth session,
Yearbook of the ILC 1974, Vol. II (Part One), p. 287; and Report of the International Law
Commission on the work of its twenty-seventh session, Yearbook of the ILC 1975, Vol. II,
p. 83.
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Articles.87 This strict standard is explained from the premise that states should
only be held responsible for their own acts and omissions and that therefore
the state organ must be under the genuine and exclusive authority of the
receiving state.88 Decisive, in other words, are the system within which the
activities of the organ are performed and the authority actually responsible
for the acts at the time they were performed.89
International jurisprudence confirms that the threshold for applying this
rule is high. In the case of X. and Y. v Switzerland – which is noteworthy in
the context of this study for it concerned the delegation of immigration control
functions to another state – entry bans imposed by the Swiss aliens police on
persons residing in Liechtenstein were held to be attributable to Switzerland.90
The agreements in force between the two countries provided that the ad-
ministration of matters concerning the entry, exit, residence and establishment
of foreigners was entrusted to the Swiss authorities and that Liechtenstein had
only the powers and functions corresponding to those Swiss cantons enjoyed
in these matters. The argument of the Swiss government that its aliens police
was merely exercising the public functions of Liechtenstein and that therefore
its conduct could not be attributed to Switzerland was dismissed, because the
aliens police functioned exclusively in conformity with Swiss law and there
was no distinction in competences between acts concerning Liechtenstein and
Switzerland. A similar conclusion was reached in the case of Xhavara v Italy,
where the ECtHR considered that the conduct of the Italian navy policing the
high seas and territorial waters between Albania and Italy pursuant to a treaty
concluded with Albania, could not engage the responsibility of Albania. The
treaty provided, amongst others, for the Italians to inspect migrant vessels
in Albanian territorial waters, to verify the identity of the passengers and to
order back the ships to Albanian ports.91 And in Vearncombe v the United
Kingdom and Germany, the European Commission concluded that the noise
nuisance emanating from the British shooting range in Berlin-Gatow could
only be attributed to the United Kingdom and not to the Federal Republic
of Germany, for the shooting range was constructed entirely under the control
of the British Military Government.92
By contrast, in the case of Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, the ECtHR
held that conduct of French and Spanish judges carrying out judicial functions
in Andorra, could not be attributed to France and Spain. The judges did not
function in their capacity as French or Spanish judges, and French or Spanish
87 R. Ago, Third report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1971, vol. II (Part One),
p. 274.
88 Ibid, p. 268.
89 Ibid, p. 269.
90 EComHR 14 July 1977, X. and Y. v Switzerland, nos. 7289/75 and 7349/76.
91 ECtHR 11 January 2001, Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania, no. 39473/98.
92 EComHR 18 January 1989, Vearncombe a.o. v the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of
Germany, no. 12816/87.
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courts had no power of supervision over judgments and decisions rendered
by the judges.93 Although the task of the ECtHR was confined to the question
of possible attribution to Spain or France and not to Andorra, we may assume
that the requirements for attributing the conduct of the organ of one state to
another as pronounced in Article 6 ILC were in this case fulfilled.
It follows from the above that the mere exercise of elements of the govern-
mental authority of the other state is not sufficient for attributing conduct to
the other state. Not only must the organ act ‘on behalf’ of the other state, it
must also form part of the machinery of that state and it must be subject to
that state’s instructions – and not to that of the lending state.
If conduct of a state organ taking place in the territory of another state
cannot be attributed to the latter state, the latter state is in principle not to
be held responsible. In a provisionally adopted version of the Draft Articles,
the ILC had considered it necessary to explicitly rule out any idea that the
territorial state is in some way responsible solely because the specified conduct
of organs of a foreign state took place in its territory:
‘Article 12. Conduct of organs of another State
1. The conduct of an organ of a State acting in that capacity, which takes place
in the territory of another State or in any other territory under its jurisdiction, shall
not be considered as an act of the latter State under international law.
- 2. Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the attribution to a State of any other
conduct which is related to that referred to in that paragraph and which is to be
considered as an act of that State by virtue of articles 5 to 10.’94
Thus, if the organ remains under the orders and exclusive authority of the
state to which it belongs, its acts and omissions cannot be attributed to the
state on whose territory the conduct takes place.95 Much in line with our
previous statements regarding obligations of due diligence in connection to
acts of private persons however, the ILC qualified this rule by underlining that
the territorial state always remains responsible for its own acts and omissions,
also those relating to the conduct of the other state:
‘[I]t is important to remember that, although the conduct of organs of a State acting
in the territory of another State can in no event be attributed as such to the territorial
State, the latter could nevertheless incur international responsibility for acts com-
mitted on the occasion of and in connexion with the conduct of such foreign organs.
Those would not, of course, be acts of the organs of the foreign State, but acts of
the organs of the territorial State, for example if they were unduly passive in their
conduct in the face of acts prejudicial to a third State committed within the frontiers
93 ECtHR 26 June 1992, Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, no. 12747/87, para. 96.
94 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-seventh session,
Yearbook of the ILC 1975, Vol. II, p. 83.
95 Ibid.
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of the territorial State by an organ of a foreign State. In other words, the actions
of foreign organs in the territory of a State, while not attributable to that State, may
in certain cases afford a material opportunity for the territorial State to engage in
conduct which might entail its international responsibility.’96
This approach was followed by the ECtHR in the case of Ilasçu, where it con-
sidered that even though the exercise of authority by Moldova was limited
in part of its territory, it was under a duty ‘to take all the appropriate measures
which it is still within its power to take’ to ensure respect for fundamental
rights and freedoms within its territory;97 and by the HRC in the case of
Alzery v Sweden, where Sweden was found to have failed to comply with its
duty not to consent to or acquiescence in ill-treatment performed by foreign
officials in its territory and therefore to have acted in violation of Article 7
ICCPR.98
The conclusion that attribution of conduct of an organ to the receiving state
requires the organ to have been placed in the receiving state’s command
structure is particularly relevant for the various forms in which EU Member
States have arranged joint missions of sea border control. In chapter 6 below,
it is explained that the cooperation with third countries does generally not
foresee in European ‘guest officers’ operating under the (exclusive) command
of third states. In operations coordinated by the EU’s border agency Frontex
however, guest officers may as a rule only perform tasks and exercise powers
under instructions of the host Member State, which constitutes an important
indicator for attributing their activities to the host state.99
3.2.4 Attribution of joint conduct to the state
3.2.4.1 Multiple state responsibility
Multiple states can be held responsible for a single event.100 Under the law
96 Ibid, p. 84.
97 Ilascu a.o. v Moldova and Russia, paras. 313, 331.
98 HRC 10 November 2006, Alzery v Sweden, no. 1416/2005, para. 11.6. Note that the Human
Rights Committee attributed the conduct of the American officials to Sweden, rather than
established the responsibility of Sweden on the basis of its own omissions, i.e. a failure
to prevent the maltreatment. Also see European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission), Opinion on the international legal obligations of Council of Europe
Member States in respect of secret detention facilities and inter-State transport of prisoners,
Opinion no. 363/2005, Strasbourg, 17 March 2006, doc. CDL-AD(2006)009, paras. 66, 116-120.
99 See, extensively, chapter 6.5.
100 This is confirmed in Article 47 ILC Articles, which articulates that where several states are
responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, ‘the responsibility of each state may
be invoked in relation to that act’. According to the ILC Commentary, in such cases ‘each
state is separately responsible for the conduct attributable to it’ and ‘responsibility is not
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of state responsibility, we may distinguish three categories of situations in
which the responsibility of two or more states may be engaged. The first is
where a plurality of states have acted independently in relation to an event,
consisting of an injury to a third party, and where the acts can be attributed
to the respective states under one of the attribution rules. Because the rules
on attribution are not mutually exclusive, it is perfectly conceivable that such
situations may arise.101 International jurisprudence provides abundant
examples of situations where two or more states were held internationally
responsible for a single incident.102
The second situation giving rise to a plurality of responsibility is where
one state participates in the internationally wrongful act of another state. These
have also been termed situations of derived responsibility, and are discussed
in section 3.3. of this chapter below.
The third situation, to be discussed in the present section, is where two
or more states truly act in concert, and where the joint act engages the respons-
ibility of all states contributing to the act. Typically, the existence of multiple
state responsibility in situations of concerted action has been addressed in the
context of states setting up common organs, such as joint administrations of
foreign territories, joint commercial ventures or intergovernmental executive
bodies not having the status of international organisations. But apart from
common organs, one can also imagine situations in which states engage in
joint activity or collaborative conduct of a more ad hoc character, such as in
the sea border patrols conducted by vessels with a mixed crew of Spain and
North African officials, the carrying out of joint expulsion flights by two or
more Member States of the European Union, or the joint management of
facilities for external processing of migrants.103 These latter situations must
diminished or reduced by the fact that one or more other states are also responsible for
the same act’; Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two),
p. 124.
101 Ibid; R. Ago, Seventh report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part
One), p. 53.
102 See eg the cases of Ilascu a.o. v Moldova and Russia and Alzery v Sweden referred to in the
previous section. In Corfu Channel, Albania was held responsible for damages caused to
United Kingdom vessels by mines in Albanian waters, even though the mines had not been
laid by Albania (but, in all probability, by Yugoslavia). In Celiberti de Caseriego v Uruguay,
the Human Rights Committee held Uruaguay to have violated Article 9 ICCPR on account
of its security forces having arbitrarily arrested and detained Mrs. Celiberti and her two
children in Porto Alegre, Brazil, while this operation was found to have been carried out
‘with the connivance’ of the Brazilian police: HRC 29 July 1981, Celiberti de Caseriego v
Uruguay, no. 56/1979, paras. 9-10. Also see HRC 29 July 1981, Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, no.
52/1979, para. 12. And, in the context of a joint procedural duty of states to investigate
cross-border human trafficking: ECtHR 7 January 2010, Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, no.
25965/04.
103 In the context of joint conduct of ad hoc nature, the ILC commentary speaks of two or more
states which ‘combine in carrying out together an internationally wrongful act in circum-
stances where they may be regarded as acting jointly in respect of the entire operation.
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then be distinguished from situations where identical offences are committed
in concert by two or more states, for example a joint military invasion into
a third state, where each state acts through its own organs and where,
consequently, each state is to be held responsible for its own conduct.104
3.2.4.2 Attributing joint conduct to a state
Holding states responsible for joint conduct or conduct of a joint organ not
having the status of international organisation does not appear to give rise
to particular problems under the law on state responsibility. It is not a situation
expressly addressed in the ILC Articles, but, according to the International Law
Commission, the solution is implicit in them: ‘according to the principles on
which those articles are based, the conduct of the common organ can only
be considered as an act of each of the States whose common organ it is. If that
conduct is not in conformity with an international obligation, then two or more
States will have concurrently committed separate, although identical, inter-
nationally wrongful acts’.105 This approach is upheld in the present com-
mentary to the ILC Articles106 and finds confirmation in international case
law and arbitration.107
Although responsibility for joint activity or acts of common organs is not
disputed as such, the determination of responsibility in these situations is not
entirely without its difficulties. A first obstacle, which may come to the fore
In that case the injured state can hold each responsible state to account for the wrongful
conduct as a whole’, Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part
Two), p. 124.
104 R. Ago, Seventh report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part One),
p. 54.
105 Ibid.
106 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 44, 64, 124.
107 In the Eurotunnel Arbitration, concerning the recovery of damages incurred by the Eurotunnel
company from the United Kingdom and France governments on account of their alleged
failure to prevent clandestine migrants from disrupting the operations of the tunnel beneath
the English Channel, the Arbitral Tribunal considered the Intergovernmental Commission
created by the UK and France to supervise the operation of the tunnel to be a joint organ
of the two states, whose decisions require the assent of both states and where action taken
by this Commission in breach of applicable international agreements would engage the
responsibility of both state, Eurotunnel Arbitration, Partial Award of 30 January 2007, para.
179. In the Case concerning certain phosphate lands in Nauru, the ICJ found the trusteeship
for Nauru not to have an international legal personality distinct from the states having
been designated as the ‘Administrative Authority’ – i.e. Australia, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom – and held that Australia could be sued alone for claims relating to the
administration of the territory, even though the responsibility for the administration was
shared with two other states. ICJ 26 June 1992, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru
v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 257-259, esp. paras. 45, 48. Also
see the separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 283-284, who endeavors to connect
Australia’s accountability to existing pronouncements of the International Law Commission
on state responsibility for acts of common organs.
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in all cases where the establishment of the international responsibility of one
state involves the scrutiny of the responsibility of another state, is the Monetary
Gold principle, which articulates that the adjudication by an international court
upon the responsibility of a state not party to the proceedings runs counter
to the principle of international law that an international court can only
exercise jurisdiction over a state with its consent.108 The Monetary Gold prin-
ciple is essentially a procedural barrier for obtaining redress before an inter-
national court and does not diminish the scope of a state’s responsibilities as
such.109
A second issue which has come to the fore is whether the principle of joint
and several liability applies to compensation obligations arising from a deter-
mination of responsibility. Again, this is a matter which is primarily relevant
for obtaining redress and not one touching upon the preliminary question of
a state’s international responsibility. Although Article 47 (2) ILC Articles ex-
pressly leaves open the question of distributing compensation obligations
between the wrongdoing states, it has been argued that the principle of joint
and several liability forms part of international law.110
Thirdly and most pertinently, it is not entirely clear when organs acting
on the behalf of two or more states must be considered as joint organs. If it
is accepted that responsibility for acts of common organs is not a matter
warranting special attention under the ILC Articles, it would be sound to
assume that an organ can be labeled as a common organ only if its acts can
be attributed to more than one state in accordance with the existing attribution
rules.111 This would mean that an organ created by two or more states is
to be considered a common organ if it can be regarded as a state organ of each
of them under, for example, Articles 4 or 5 ILC Articles; or that an existing
state organ which is put at the disposal of another state in accordance with
the terms of Article 6 ILC Articles, can be considered a common organ if it
108 ICJ 25 June 1954, Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, Preliminary Questions, ICJ Reports
1954, p. 32; ICJ 26 November 1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports
1984, p. 392, para. 88; ICJ 13 September 1990, Land Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El
Salvador/Honduras), ICJ Reports 1990, p. 92, para. 56.
109 In Nauru, the ICJ clarified that the Monetary Gold principle will only preclude the ICJ from
adjudicating upon a claim if the legal interests of a third state form ‘the very subject-matter
of the decision that is applied for’, Nauru, para. 54.
110 See esp. J.E. Noyes and B.D. Smith, ‘State Responsibility and the Principle of Joint and
Several Liability’, 13 Yale Journal of International Law (1988), p. 225-267; J. Crawford, Third
report on State responsibility, 10 July 2000, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add.2, paras. 272 and
276. In the Corfu Channel case, Albania was ordered to pay the full extent of the damages
suffered by the United Kingdom: ICJ 15 December 1949, Corfu Channel case (Assessment of
the amount of compensation due from the People’s Republic of Albania to the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern), ICJ Reports 1949, p. 244.
111 This appears to be the ILC’s approach: see esp. J. Crawford, Third report on State responsib-
ility, 10 July 2000, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add.2, para. 267.
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additionally remains to function as an organ of the lending state, for example
because it continues to receive instructions from, or continues to operate within
the machinery of the sending state.112 In accordance with the notion that
there must always be a connection between the international responsibility
of a state and its own sphere of activity, this may well imply that an organ,
but the same holds true for other forms of collaborative conduct, can only be
labeled as ‘joint’ when the activity complained of was carried out in accordance
with the instructions of all states involved and that all responsible states had
it in their power to prevent the alleged misconduct.
That there is a threshold for considering collaborative conduct as joint for
establishing the responsibility of multiple states finds support in the inad-
missibility decision in the case of Saddam Hussein v 21 Contracting States to the
ECRH, where the ECtHR was not prepared, without more, to hold the respondent
European countries responsible on account of their support for and/or taking
part in the coalition which had invaded and occupied Iraq and in the course
of which Saddam Hussein had been captured and allegedly been maltreated.
Even though one respondent state, the United Kingdom, was accepted to have
played a major part in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the ECtHR con-
sidered that the responsibility of any of the respondent states could not be
invoked ‘on the sole basis that those States allegedly formed part (at varying
unspecified levels) of a coalition with the US, when the impugned actions were
carried out by the US, when security in the zone in which those actions took
place was assigned to the US and when the overall command of the coalition
was vested in the US.’113 The Court found it of particular importance that
the applicant had not indicated which respondent state (other than the US)
had any – and if so, what – influence or involvement in his arrest and de-
tention.
In the early case of Hess v United Kingdom (1975), the legal and factual
embedding of the common organ was more precisely circumscribed. The
complaint in that case concerned the long and secluded detention of Rudolf
Hess in the Allied military prison in Berlin-Spandau. The supreme authority
over the prison was vested in the four allied powers, with the executive
authority consisting of four governors acting by unanimous decisions. Admin-
istration and supervision was at all times quadripartite, and instructions of
the governors were carried out by prison staff appointed by the governors.
The prison was guarded in monthly turns by military personnel of the four
allied powers. The complaint was lodged against the United Kingdom alone.
112 In this vein also S. Talmon, ‘A Plurality of Responsible Actors: International Responsibility
for Acts of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq’, in: P. Shiner and A. Williams, The
Iraq War and International Law, Oxford: Hart (2008), p. 203-204, who argues that although
it is not necessary for the organ to act on the joint instructions of both states, each of the
states must retain (at least some) control over the action of the organ.
113 ECtHR 14 March 2006, Saddam Hussein v Albania and twenty other states, no. 23276/04.
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The European Commission of Human Rights first considered the United
Kingdom to act as ‘a partner in the joint responsibility which it shares with
the other three powers’.114 From this wording, one could be inclined to
conclude that Hess is a schoolbook example of a case where conduct of a
common organ gives rise to the responsibility of each of the participating
states. The European Commission of Human Rights, nonetheless, found the
complaint inadmissible, because it was ‘of the opinion that the joint authority
cannot be divided into four separate jurisdictions and that therefore the United
Kingdom’s participation in the exercise of the joint authority and consequently
in the administration and supervision of Spandau Prison is not a matter
“within the jurisdiction” of the United Kingdom, within the meaning of Art. 1
of the Convention.’115
This is a prominent yet unsatisfactory example of how the notion of juris-
diction under human rights law may interrupt the ordinary application of the
law on state responsibility. Under the reasoning of the European Commission
of Human Rights, the fact that conduct of a common organ, which may be
in violation of a person’s human rights, can be attributed to a state is insuffi-
cient for holding a state responsible. It is additionally required that the injured
person finds himself within the jurisdiction of the state acting through the
common organ, and this is, according to the Commission, simply not possible,
because a joint authority cannot be divided into separate jurisdictions.
It is rather unfortunate that the Commission does not explain why the
activities of a joint authority, which presumably exercises joint jurisdiction,
cannot bring a person under the separate jurisdiction of each the states
involved – rather than under none of them. From the perspective of the inter-
national law meaning of the notion of jurisdiction, the United Kingdom was
perfectly within its right – as were the other allied powers – to block any
decision concerning the detention regime which would raise issues under the
ECRH. Possibly, the European Commission proceeded from the assumption
that the requirement of ‘jurisdiction’ is indissociable and cannot be shared
between two or more states, but this reasoning does not imperatively follow
from the text of Article 1 ECRH (which merely requires a person to fall under
a state’s jurisdiction – not excluding the possibility that a person may fall under
the concurrent jurisdiction of another state) and is difficult to reconcile with
later pronouncements of the ECtHR in, amongst other cases, Ilasçu (where the
detainees were considered to fall both within the jurisdiction of Russia and
Moldova) and Treska (where it was not excluded that both Italy and Albania
could incur obligations towards the expropriated applicants).116
Of course, the case of Hess does point to a problem which is likely to come
to the fore in all situations where states act through a common organ: due
114 EComHR 28 May 1975, Hess v United Kingdom, no. 6231/73.
115 Ibid.
116 See section 3.2.2.4. above.
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to the very nature of the organ, a state does not have it in its exclusive power,
but depends on the willingness of other states, to bring about a change in the
activities of the organ. Should the obligation at issue have been to immediately
release Rudolf Hess, it may well be that the United Kingdom had neither the
factual nor legal power to comply with such an obligation. But this argument
would, in line with our observations on positive obligations in chapter 2.5.3.
and section 3.2.2.4. above, seem to require a more in depth assessment of the
nature of the obligation at issue and the legal and factual capabilities the
United Kingdom had at its disposal to undertake particular action. In the case
of Hess, the primary request of the applicant, his wife Ilse Hess, had been for
the Commission ‘to press the United Kingdom to step up its efforts to secure
renegotiation of the Four Power Agreement in order to obtain the release’ of
her husband. Although the Commission’s competence was confined to review-
ing whether the ECRH had been complied with and did not extend to asserting
‘pressure’ on Contracting States, a reasoning under the doctrine of positive
obligations is well sustainable that because the United Kingdom was legally
and factually capable of exerting influence, it should therefore had taken steps
to prevent possible violations under Articles 3 and 8 ECRH from occurring.
3.3 DERIVED RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIDING AND ASSISTING ANOTHER STATE
3.3.1 Derived responsibility
The previous sections dealt with the international responsibility of states for
conduct which is attributable to them and which constitutes an international
wrong. As such, these rules and principles are well apt to be applied to situ-
ations of collaborative conduct of states, by way of holding each state inde-
pendently responsible for conduct attributable to it, regardless of whether
another state is also to be held responsible. There may however also be situ-
ations, and these are termed by the ILC as ‘exceptions to the principle of
independent responsibility’,117 where a state’s international responsibility
derives from, or depends upon, the conduct of another state. These situations,
interchangeably denoted as situations of indirect,118 derived,119 de-
pendent120 or accessory121 responsibility, have in common that a state has
117 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 65.
118 R. Ago, Seventh report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part One),
p. 52; J.D. Fry, ‘Coercion, Causation and the Fictional Elements of Indirect State Responsibil-
ity’, 40 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2007), p. 615.
119 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 65; G. Nolte
and H.P. Aust, ‘Equivocal Helpers – Complicit States, Mixed Messages and International
Law’, 58 ICLQ (2009), p. 5.
120 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 64.
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not itself carried out the breach of international law, but where it has been
involved, in one way or the other, in international wrongful conduct of another
state and where, on account of that involvement, the state should separately
assume responsibility. Chapter IV of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility
deals with situations of derived responsibility and covers: (i) the situation
where one state assists another in the commission of an international wrongful
act (Article 16 ILC); (ii) the situation where a state directs and controls another
state in the commission of an international wrongful act (Article 17); and (iii)
the situation where one state coerces another to commit an international
wrongful act (Article 18). One particular question raised by the incorporation
of these categories of derived responsibility in the ILC Articles is how they
correspond to the doctrine of positive obligations under human rights law,
which may also entail a duty to undertake preventive or protective action in
respect of human rights violations committed by another state.
Because Article 17 and 18 foresee in the rather atypical situations of im-
balanced state relationships where one state dominates, threatens, or uses force
against another state, they are not of immediate relevance to this study.122
Far more pertinent is the first situation, that of ‘aid and assistance’, as many
forms of cooperation in controlling migration embody the provision of all kinds
of assistance by states at the receiving end of migration flows to countries of
origin or countries of transit. This assistance can be financial, can take the form
of the supply of surveillance and coast watching equipment, can consist of
the training of border guards or of general programmes of capacity building.
The argument has been made, most notably, that through assisting third states
in closing the border, European states might facilitate the violation of refugee
and other migrants’ rights and therefore be complicit in the violation of those
rights.123 This section explores the contents of the international law concept
of ‘aid and assistance’, or ‘complicity’,124 and tries to establish, in particular,
under what circumstances states can be held responsible for providing aid
121 M. Brehm, ‘The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and
Human Rights Law’, 12 Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2008), p. 384.
122 In respect of Article 17 ILC Articles (‘direction and control’), the ILC Commentary mentions
that the term ‘control’ refers to domination over the commission of the wrongful act and
not simply the exercise of oversight and that similarly, the word ‘directs’ does not encom-
pass incitement or suggestion but ‘actual direction of an operative kind’, Commentary to
the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 69.
123 Eg Human Rights Watch, ‘European Union Managing Migration Means Potential EU
Complicity in Neighboring States’ Abuse of Migrants and Refugees’, New York, October
2006; A. Fischer-Lescano, T. Löhr and T. Tohidipur, ‘Border Controls at Sea: Requirements
under International Human Rights and Refugee Law’, 21 IJRL (2009), p. 280.
124 Originally, the notion of complicity featured in the work of the ILC, but was eventually
dropped in favor of the more factual connotation of ‘aid and assistance’, in order to avoid
inappropriate analogies with the term complicity in domestic law. Report of the International
Law Commission on the work of its thirtieth session, Yearbook of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part
Two), p. 102.
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which is, or may be, used to commit human rights violations. It is submitted
that the notion of aid and assistance is scarcely developed within international
law and that, specifically within human rights law, questions pertaining to
the provision of aid and international cooperation are more typically addressed
under the doctrine of positive obligations.
3.3.2 Aid and assistance
Unfortunately, there is surprisingly little international jurisprudence on the
legal meaning and contours of the notion of aid and assistance in international
law.125 Scholarly writings are more readily available, but these neither display
a firm consensus on the status of the concept in international law, nor on its
precise contents.126 We may nonetheless depart from the understanding that
aid and assistance has at least some basis in international law. In his Seventh
report on state responsibility, rapporteur Ago saw the existence of the norm
confirmed by various examples, such as a state placing its territory at the
disposal of another state to make it possible for that state to commit an act
of aggression against a third state; the provision of means for the closure of
an international waterway; the facilitation of the abduction of persons on
foreign soil; and assistance in the destruction of property belonging to nationals
of a third country.127 Other examples mentioned are Security Council resolu-
tions calling upon states not to render aid to activities of regimes previously
held to be in violation of international law, such as the call upon states not
to render assistance to the regime in Southern Rhodesia – which was labeled
as a racist and therefore illegal regime – and the appeal on states not to pro-
vide Israel with ‘assistance to be used specifically in connection with settle-
ments in the occupied territories’.128
On the basis hereof, and by ‘evoking the intention of progressive develop-
ment of international law’, the ILC sought to formulate a general rule on the
125 The most explicit pronouncement on the notion of ‘aid and assistance’ was made by the
ICJ in the Genocide Case, paras. 419-424.
126 For comprehensive exercises, see especially J. Quigley, ‘Complicity in International Law:
A New Direction in the Law of State Responsibility’, 57 British Yearbook of International Law
(1986), p. 77-131; B. Graefrath, ‘Complicity in the Law of International State Responsibility’,
29 Revue Belge de Droit International (1996), p. 370-380; K. Nahapetian, ‘Confronting State
Complicity in International Law’, 7 UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs (2002),
p. 99-127; V. Lowe, ‘Responsibility for the conduct of other states’, 101 Japanese Journal of
International Law (2002), p. 1-15; G. Nolte and H.P. Aust, ‘Equivocal Helpers – Complicit
States, Mixed Messages and International Law’, 58 ICLQ (2009), p. 1-30.
127 R. Ago, Seventh report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part One),
p. 58.
128 UN Security Council Resolution 232, 16 December 1966, UN Doc. S/INF/21/Rev. 1, para.
5; UN Security Council Resolution 465, 1 March 1980, UN Doc. S/INF/36, para. 7. On these
examples and others, see extensively Quigley (1986), p. 83-95.
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responsibility of states for their participation in wrongful acts of other
states.129 This was despite the suggestion of some members of the ILC to limit
the application of the concept to a particular set of international obligations,
such as those relating to the prohibition of the use of force.130 Special
rapporteur Crawford, when reviewing the provisionally adopted draft articles
in 1999, admitted that the examples on which the ILC had earlier based a
general norm of aiding and assistance were rather narrow and questioned
whether the norm actually had a place in the draft articles.131 Also in view
of the explicit recognition of the prohibition to act in complicity with regard
to specific prohibited conduct such as genocide or the use of force, the question
remains valid to pose whether the existence or not of a norm of non-complicity
is a matter belonging to the rules on state responsibility or rather to the field
of a state’s primary obligations.132 Very much alike to the scope of a state’s
positive obligations, there is merit to the argument that not only the existence
of a norm of non-complicity, but also the criteria for its application, may vary
from one substantive obligation to another. The argument could further be
advanced that instances of derived responsibility are essentially species of the
more general duty of due diligence, under which for example, a prohibition
to facilitate or render aid for the commission of a wrongful act forms part of
wider preventive or protective duties under a particular human rights pro-
vision.
In view of the above, it does not come as a surprise that the international
customary law status of ‘aid and assistance’ is also disputed. Contrary to the
attribution rules laid down in chapter II of the ILC’s Articles, which are widely
pronounced as embodying rules of customary international law, opinions on
the status of a general rule of complicity in international law remain divided,
although the ILC and a majority of authors have argued in favor of such a
status.133 And the ICJ, albeit cursory and without further explanation, noted
in the Genocide case that the notion of ‘aid and assistance’ is a category belong-
ing to the customary rules constituting the law of state responsibility.134 This
is not the place to review these pronouncements. But it is sound to approach
the international law concept of ‘aid and assistance’ with caution, especially
129 R. Ago, Seventh report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part One),
p. 59; Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirtieth session,
Yearbook of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 103.
130 See esp. the discussions in: Summary records of the thirtieth session, Yearbook of the ILC
1978, Vol. I, p. 233, 240 (Riphagen, Ago); Report of the International Law Commission on
the work of its thirtieth session, Yearbook of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 104.
131 J. Crawford, Second report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1999, Vol. II (Part
One), p. 49 (para. 177).
132 Ibid, p. 49, 51 (paras. 175, 187). Also see Graefrath (1996), p. 372.
133 For discussions, see: Quigley (1986), p. 81-107; Nahapetian (2002), p. 101-104; Nolte and
Aust (2009), p. 7-10; Graefrath (1996), p. 378
134 Genocide Case, para. 419.
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in so far as it aspires to embody a rule applicable to all international obliga-
tions. The ILC formulated the rule on aid assistance as follows:
‘A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally
wrongful act; and
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.’
The scope of Article 16 is limited in several ways. First, assistance or aid must
be given which enables another state, or which makes it materially easier for
another state, to commit an international offence.135 According to the ILC
Commentary, ‘there is no requirement that the aid or assistance should have
been essential to the performance of the internationally wrongful act; it is
sufficient if it contributed significantly to the act.’136 The notion of aid and
assistance itself is not defined and may therefore be very broadly interpreted.
The ILC has referred to the examples of economic aid, the use of a state’s
territory or military bases, overflight, military procurement, the training of
personnel and the provision of confidential information.137 Further, the pro-
vision of aid of a legal or political nature, such as the conclusion of treaties
which may facilitate the commission by the other party of a wrongful act, may
come under the ambit of aid or assistance.138 It is said that precisely because
virtually all conceivable forms of support and interstate cooperation can be
brought under Article 16 ILC Articles, the other conditions of Article 16 warrant
strict application.139
A second condition is that the conduct complained of must be equally
opposable to the acting and the assisting state, i.e. must constitute a breach
of an international obligation of both states. In view of their universal applica-
tion, this condition will ordinarily not pose problems under human rights
treaties. Neither however, should the regional nature of other human rights
treaties such as the ECRH be automatically taken to obstruct application of the
notion of aid and assistance in respect of wrongful conduct carried out by a
non-Contracting Party: Article 16 ILC does not require the act to be opposable
to both states under the very same international obligation – it is merely
135 R. Ago, Seventh report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part One),
p. 58 (at para. 72).
136 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 66 (at para.
5). Graefrath speaks of aid which must be ‘substantial’, Graefrath (1996), p. 373.
137 J. Crawford, Second report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1999, Vol. II (Part
One), p. 50 (at n. 349).
138 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirtieth session, Yearbook
of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 102.
139 Graefrath (1996), p. 374. It has been argued, moreover, that there should be a de minimis
threshold for prohibited aid or assistance: Nolte and Aust (2009), p. 10-13.
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required that the international wrongful conduct would also be wrongful if
committed by the assisting state itself.140
The most troublesome and debated aspect of the concept of complicity
as it has been laid down in Article 16 ILC is the requirement that the state has
provided assistance ‘with knowledge of the circumstances of the international
wrongful act’. In itself, this could simply be understood as requiring that the
assisting state is aware that the assistance will indeed facilitate an international
wrongful act. But in the Commentary to the Articles, and throughout its work
on the topic, the ILC has insisted that Article 16 ILC not only imposes the
requirement of knowledge, but also that of intent: ‘the aid and assistance must
be given with a view to facilitating the commission of the wrongful act’.141
And: ‘A State is not responsible (…) unless the relevant State organ intended
to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful conduct.’142 It is not entirely clear
whether the ILC considers the element of intent to simply be demonstrated
by proof that a state had knowledge of the circumstances or that it perceives
intent as a separate condition referring to the motives which inspire the actions
of assisting state, i.e. requiring that it is established that the assisting state had
the express purpose to facilitate the commission of a breach of international
law.143 The ICJ, in addressing Article 16 ILC in the Genocide case, refused to
pronounce itself on the question whether Article 16 ILC encompasses an intent
requirement by noting that ‘the least’ that is required is that an organ or person
acts knowingly of the crime to be committed.144
140 This corresponds to the rationale of Article 16 that a state should not be allowed to do by
another what it cannot do by itself. Also see Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of
the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 66 (at para. 6).
141 Ibid, at para. 5. The commentary to former Article 27 of the Draft Articles stated it as
follows: ‘As the article states, the aid or assistance in question must be rendered “for the
commission of an internationally wrongful act”, i.e. with the specific object of facilitating
the commission of the principal internationally wrongful act in question. Accordingly, it
is not sufficient that aid or assistance provided without such intention could be used by
the recipient State for unlawful purposes, or that the State providing aid or assistance should
be aware of the eventual possibility of such use. The aid or assistance must in fact be
rendered with a view to its use in committing the principal internationally wrongful act.’
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirtieth session, Yearbook
of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 104 (at para. 18).
142 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 66 (at
para. 5).
143 In his Seventh report on state responsibility, Ago appears to equate the requirements of
knowledge and intent: ‘The very idea of “complicity” in the internationally wrongful act
of another necessarily presupposes an intent to collaborate in the commission of an act
of this kind, and hence, in the cases considered, knowledge of the specific purpose for which
the State receiving certain supplies intends to use them.’ R. Ago, Seventh report on State
responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part One), p. 58 (at para. 72). Notably,
Crawford, in a footnote in his Second report, also reduces the requirement of intent to proof
of knowledge: ‘The proposal in the text retains the element of intent, which can be demonstra-
ted by proof of rendering aid or assistance with knowledge of the circumstances’. J. Crawford,
Second report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1999, Vol. II (Part One), p. 51 (at
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The insistence of the ILC on the requirement of intent may be regarded
as surprising, not only because any reference to that requirement is absent
in the text of Article 16 ILC, but also because the ILC has conscientiously
avoided throughout its Articles on State Responsibility to refer to any element
of fault or culpability, by noting that such requirements form part of the
substantive – or primary – obligations of states and that the Articles should
not lay down any presumption as regards subjective or objective standards
for breaches of an obligation.145
On the one hand, the condition of intent under Article 16 ILC has been
forcefully opposed by a variety of writers for it is seen to give rise to all sorts
of problems which risk making the whole concept of complicity unworkable.
One is that it is inherently problematic to conceive of the state as an actor
capable of making conscious decisions and that it is virtually impossible to
determine the state of mind of a state.146 Another is that a requirement of
intent could allow states to circumvent responsibility by simply omitting to
make any public statements declaring their intent.147 And thirdly, a require-
ment of intent would seriously narrow the scope of the norm, because states
will seldom act out of the specific motivation or desire to commit international
wrongs, less still to violate human rights, but are more likely prepared to incur
the occasional breach of certain obligations while being in the pursuit of some
perceivably higher aim.148 These arguments support an understanding of
the intent requirement that it should not refer to the mental motives underlying
the assistance but rather to the threshold that it is established that the assisting
state knows about the wrongful manner in which the assistance will be used.
On the other hand, the ILC’s emphasis on the intent requirement has been
explained from the view that there must be a certain threshold for triggering
responsibility in accordance with Article 16 ILC, because otherwise all sorts
of international cooperation which are in themselves generally beneficial, may
attract the assisting state’s responsibility.149 A strict literal reading of Article
16 ILC would not obstruct the conclusion for example, that a state is to be held
responsible for development aid it provides to another state in the knowledge
that a small portion of that aid may well be used contrary to human rights.
n. 362), emphasis added.
144 Genocide Case, para. 421.
145 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 34-35 (with
further references). Also see R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How
We Use it, Oxford University Press (1994), p. 160-161.
146 Quigley (1986), p. 111. This corresponds to the notion that international law is not normally
concerned with the specific motivations of one or more State officials, but rather with the
objective sufficiency or insufficiency of State action.
147 Graefrath (1996), p 375; Nahapetian (2002), p. 126.
148 A. Boivin, ‘Complicity and beyond: International law and the transfer of small arms and
light weapons’, 87 International Review of the Red Cross (2005), p. 471; Quigley (1986), p. 111;
Nahapetian (2002), p. 126.
149 Nolte and Aust (2009), p. 15; Graefrath (1996), p. 376.
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Because practically every form of contact with another state which is engaged
in human rights violations may be labeled as assistance, the category of situ-
ations to be brought under Article 16 ILC could thus become practically infinite.
It is probably for this reason that the ILC has underlined, in discussing the
‘knowledge’ requirement, that there must not only be a ‘clear and unequivocal
link’ between the aid or assistance and the subsequent wrongful conduct,150
but also that it is not sufficient that the state is, or ought to be, aware of the
‘eventual possibility’ of such a use.151 Rather, it is required that it is established
that the assisting state knows that its aid will be put to wrongful use.152 Others
have also stressed that, in view of the broad concept of assistance and the great
variety of situations in which states cooperate with one another, the link
between the aid and the wrongful activity should not be too remote.153
Adherence to a standard of some obvious link between the aid and assistance
is also in conformity with the examples relied upon by the ILC in the drafting
stages.154 In these examples, the assistance was used primarily or specifically
to commit the act in question and it was a certainty rather than a probability
that the assistance rendered would be used for committing the act.
Having – somewhat – clarified the various elements of Article 16 ILC, it
is now time to turn more specifically to the issue of aid or assistance in relation
to obligations stemming from human rights treaties. In this connection, the
ILC has repeatedly affirmed that the provision on aid and assistance also
applies to human rights treaties.155 A profound problem remains nonetheless
that the concept has scarcely been acknowledged by human rights treaty
monitoring bodies. To be sure, the concept of complicity may be said to have
found recognition in human rights law, but under other terms than those
referred to in Article 16 ILC. For example, in the course of the United States
program of extraordinary renditions and secret detentions following the
September 11 attacks, several European states were found to be ‘complicit’
150 J. Crawford, Second report on State responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC 1999, Vol. II (Part
One), p. 50 (at para. 180); Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol.
II (Part Two), p. 66 (at para. 5).
151 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirtieth session, Yearbook
of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 104 (at para. 18). Also see Nolte and Aust (2009), p. 10-
12, 14, who speak of a requirement of ‘certainty’.
152 Ibid. Also see Genocide Case, para. 432: ‘(…) an accomplice must have given support in
perpetrating the genocide with full knowledge of the facts’ and that it is not sufficient that
‘the State has been aware, or should normally have been aware, of the serious danger that
acts (…) would be committed’, emphasis added.
153 Nolte and Aust (2009), p. 10-12; Boivin (2005) p. 471; Nahapetian (2002), p. 106. Graefrath
(1996), p. 374.
154 See n. 127 and 128 supra.
155 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Yearbook of the ILC 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 67 (at para.
9); Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirtieth session, Yearbook
of the ILC 1978, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 105 (at para. 22); Report of the Commission to the
General Assembly on the work of its fifty-first session, Yearbook of the ILC 1999, Vol. II (Part
Two), p. 71 (at para. 262).
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in violations of human rights, in particular on account of the permitting of
the unlawful transportation of detainees through their territory; and by allow-
ing the secret detention of persons on their territory.156 But these issues were
not – and need not be – addressed under the terms of Article 16 ILC, but
typically dealt with under well-developed doctrines under the various substant-
ive human rights obligations, such as the obligation of states not to expose
persons within their territory to ill-treatment meted out in the territory of
another state; or the obligation to protect persons within their territory from
harm emanating from a third party.157 It transpires from these examples and
others that, at least in so far as a victim of human rights violations is present
on the territory of the assisting state, the doctrine of positive obligations is
an adequate and sufficient tool for arriving at the state’s responsibility.
It may however be more problematic to make operational duties of due
diligence in respect of instances of facilitating wrongful conduct which is
carried out by and in the territory of another state. In those situations, the
notion that the state has special protective duties towards persons present in
its territory is absent and it may consequently be more difficult to bring a
victim under the scope of a state’s positive obligations. One of the few
examples of a situation involving the rendering of aid to another state having
adverse human rights consequences in the other state brought before a human
rights body is the case of Tugar v Italy, concerning an Iraqi mine clearer by
profession, who stepped on a mine which had been laid by Iraq and was
illegally sold to the Iraqi government by a private Italian company.158 Relying
on Article 2 ECRH, Tugar submitted that the Italian government had knowingly
allowed the supply of anti-personnel mines to Iraq which were likely to be
used indiscriminately. The European Commission of Human Rights found
the complaint inadmissible, because there was ‘no immediate relationship
between the mere supply, even if not properly regulated, of weapons and the
possible indiscriminate use thereof in a third country, the latter’s action con-
stituting the direct and decisive cause of the accident which the applicant
suffered’. It followed that the ‘adverse consequences of the failure of Italy to
regulate arms transfers to Iraq were too remote to attract the Italian responsib-
ility’.
Although Tugar had phrased his complaint in terms resembling the inter-
national law concept of complicity, the European Commission understood
156 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Alleged secret detentions and unlawful
inter-state transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states (Report), Doc.
10957, 12 June 2006; European Parliament, Resolution on the alleged use of European
countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners,
P6_TA(2006)0316, 6 July 2006; House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee
on Human Rights, Allegations of UK Complicity in Torture (Report), HL Paper 152, HC
230, 4 August 2009.
157 Also see HRC 10 November 2006, Alzery v Sweden, no. 1416/2005.
158 EComHR 18 October 1995, Rasheed Haje Tugar v Italy, no. 22869/93.
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the complaint as one relating to a lack of protection of his right to life and
Italy’s positive obligation to appropriately regulate the arms trade. Should
the Tugar case have been assessed in the terms of Article 16 ILC Articles,
possibly relevant questions would have been whether the failure to regulate
the arms trade contributed to the commission of the wrongful act, whether
Italy could be said to have intended to assist Iraq or whether Italy was aware
of the circumstances under which the mines would be put to use. The Commis-
sion applied a more straightforward test in simply noting that there was no
‘immediate relationship’ between the supply of weapons and their indis-
criminate use and that the consequences were therefore too remote to attract
Italy’s responsibility. In terms of the notion of aid and assistance under inter-
national law, this reasoning does raise questions however, because the concept
of aid and assistance is premised on the very idea that the responsibility of
the assisting state derives from another state being the ‘direct and decisive
cause’ of a violation. The Commission’s reasoning may hence render the whole
concept of aid and assistance virtually meaningless under human rights law,
at least in those situations where the victim has never been inside the territory
of the assisting state.
To summarise, it appears that under human rights law a distinction must
be made between situations in which the victim of a violation of human rights
is inside or outside the territory of the assisting state. In situations where the
victim is present inside the assisting state’s territory, it will ordinarily not be
necessary to rely on the international law concept of aid or assistance to attract
the assisting state’s responsibility, because the responsibility directly hinges
upon a state having acted in violation of its substantive duty to protect indi-
viduals within its territory. In situations where the victim is outside the assist-
ing state’s territory, this protective duty is more difficult to establish, implying
that the notion of aid and assistance as laid down in the ILC Articles could
be instrumental in fleshing out the nature of the relationship between the act
of facilitation and the eventual wrongful act. There is however scarce case law
confirming this proposition.
Further, even within the terms of Article 16 ILC Articles, the notion of aid
and assistance would probably be too small a basis for holding EU Member
States internationally responsible for forms of assistance to third countries in
the course of migration control which involve, for example, the financing of
reception schemes or border controls or the training of foreign officials. The
requirement of a clear and unequivocal link between the facilitating act and
the subsequent wrongful conduct and in particular the requirement that the
assisting state knows that the aid will be put to wrongful use renders it prob-
lematic to consider general programmes of aid as giving rise to the responsibil-
ity of the assisting state. Although assistance in the form of the provision of
patrol boats or money to third states engaged in gross or systemic violations
of refugee and migrant rights could be construed as giving rise to the facilita-
ting state’s responsibility (under the reasoning that the latter state knew or
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ought to have known that the aid would be put to unlawful use), it is less
likely that assistance facilitating only occasional wrongdoings can also be
brought under the ambit of Article 16 ILC Articles. Assuming that it must yet
be proven that third states with whom European countries cooperate are
engaged in systematic violations of migrant rights, it is henceforth problematic
to label assistance rendered in the form of money, technical equipment or
training as unlawful.
3.4 FINAL REMARKS
This chapter has shown that international law provides multiple mechanisms
for allocating international responsibilities to states in situations where inter-
national wrongful conduct involves a plurality of actors. The chapter has
underlined that the rules on attribution and derived responsibility laid down
in the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility should not be assessed in isolation,
but in conjunction with obligations inherent in the state’s substantive, or
primary, international obligations, especially those stemming from the doctrine
of positive obligations. It follows that, in the determination of the responsibility
of the state for wrongful conduct involving multiple actors, three separate but
conjunctive questions may come to the fore: whether the act is actually com-
mitted by an agent of the state or should on some other account be attributed
to the state; whether the state should be held separately responsible for wrong-
ful activity which cannot be attributed to it but to which it has decisively or
materially contributed; or whether the state, on account of its involvement
in the circumstances giving rise to the wrongful conduct, has acted in breach
of its protective or preventive duties inherent to its substantive international
obligations.
A question which remains to be addressed is how the various rules for
connecting a state’s activity to internationally wrongful conduct as discussed
in this chapter relate to the conclusions of the previous chapter, which
described the personal scope of a state’s human rights obligations in an extra-
territorial context. It was said in the introduction to this chapter that the law
on jurisdiction must be distinguished from the law on state responsibility. As
Higgins has postulated: the law of jurisdiction is about entitlements to act, the
law on state responsibility is about obligations incurred when a state does act’.159
Higgins’ postulation obviously refers to jurisdiction in its ordinary meaning
under public international law. From that understanding, the relationship
between the notions of jurisdiction and state responsibility does not appear
to give rise to particular problems: a state may not be entitled to act, but when
it does act, it is accountable for the consequences.
159 R. Higgins, Problems & Process. International Law and How We Use it, Oxford: Clarendon Press
(1994) 146, emphasis in original.
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But it was concluded in the previous chapter of this book that, under
human rights law, the notion of jurisdiction has primarily been construed as
implying a criterion of factual control by the state over the affected individual.
As is also evidenced by case law discussed in this chapter, the construction
of ‘jurisdiction’ as a factual criterion has tended to complicate the relationship
between the delimitation of the personal scope of a state’s human rights
obligations and the law on state responsibility.
This is so because, firstly, in human rights law the term ‘jurisdiction’ gives
expression to the link which must exist between the state and the individual
and hence tends to leap over the various attribution rules which connect the
state to particular activity. Because a ‘jurisdictional link’ between the state and
the individual will normally depend on a state having engaged in certain
conduct affecting the individual, it can well be that the concept of attribution
is a prerequisite for the establishment of this jurisdictional link: in extraterri-
torial situations persons will normally only be brought under the jurisdiction
of a state if they are sufficiently affected by an act of that state (or brought
under the control of that state) – and that act (or assertion of control) has to
be attributable to that state in the first place.160
Secondly and more fundamentally, because the term jurisdiction in human
rights law deals with the wider link between the state and the individual, it
may also replace or even defeat the rules associated with the allocation of state
responsibility. It was described in this chapter that the regime on state re-
sponsibility has developed specific rules for attributing, for example, conduct
of joint organs to a state and for holding states responsible for aid and assist-
ance which is used by another state in violation of international law. These
rules aim to ensure that states do not divest themselves of responsibility in
situations where their involvement with a violation of an international norm
may be indirect but nonetheless of such a decisive or materially important
nature that it is appropriate to hold the state responsible. Important rationales
behind these rules are further that a state should always be held responsible
for the consequences of its own sphere of activity – also when that activity
is linked in a less direct manner to wrongful conduct – and that a state should
not be allowed to do through another actor what it cannot do by itself. But
the notion of jurisdiction under human rights law, and especially a rather
160 The case of Stocké may serve to illustrate this point. In that case, the European Commission
of Human Rights, in respect of the conduct of a private police informer returning against
his will a person present in France to Germany, developed the following general principle:
‘(…) authorized agents of a State not only remain under its jurisdiction when abroad, but
bring other persons “within the jurisdiction” of that State to the extent that they exercise
authority over such persons’. Thus, only if it could first be established that the police
informer was an agent of the state, did the question of ‘jurisdiction’ arise. It follows that
attribution is not only a requirement for establishing state responsibility, it may also be
a requirement for establishing ‘jurisdiction’. EComHR 12 October 1989, Stocké v Germany
(Report), no. 11755/85, para. 166.
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narrow outlook on that notion, may obstruct this application of the law on
state responsibility. If the proposition is adhered to that the condition of
‘jurisdiction’ necessarily requires that the state is directly involved in activity
affecting an individual, or that the state’s activity directly affects an individual
(or simply that the individual is under the state’s control), some of the rules
on state responsibility, but also the application of the doctrine of positive
obligations, may become simply inapt to be applied to extraterritorial human
rights violations, because these rules see precisely to circumstances where there
may only be an indirect link between the individual and the acting state. It
is therefore important to recall the conclusion of the previous chapter that more
recent case law of the ECtHR and ICJ on positive obligations in an extraterritorial
setting appears to proceed from a more generous understanding of the juris-
diction requirement, which was not seen to obstruct a reasoning under which
a state can still incur a duty to ensure and protect a person’s human rights
even in the absence of effective factual control over an individual. This outlook
on the jurisdiction requirement leaves room for accommodating the often
intricate forms of international cooperation and assertions of state influence
over other international actors, to which not only the doctrine of positive
obligations, but also the law on state responsibility, have endeavored to pro-
vide appropriate legal solutions.
In chapters 6 and 7 of this study, it will be shown that the various mechanisms
for allocating international responsibility as discussed in the present chapter
provide useful guidance for delimiting the responsibilities of European states
when they engage in external migration controls in conjunction with other
actors.
4 Extraterritorial asylum under international
law
4.1 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER
Traditionally, before the advent of human rights law, legal issues arising from
extraterritorial asylum were predominantly addressed in the context of
‘diplomatic asylum’, a term which refers to asylum in embassies or other
premises of a state located in the territory of another state.1 Legal discourse
on diplomatic asylum chiefly focused on the potential friction arising out of
grants of extraterritorial asylum between the state granting asylum and the
territorial state. Because extraterritorial asylum may constitute an affront to
the territorial sovereignty of the other state, it was seen to give rise to questions
of legitimacy under international law.
Both the maturation of human rights law and current policies of relocating
migration management warrant a legal restatement of the concept of extraterri-
torial asylum. Firstly, the various manifestations of pre-border migration
management question the extent to which existing discourse on diplomatic
asylum can be extrapolated to a more general theory on the legality of extra-
territorial asylum. Secondly, the present-day importance of human rights,
including the acceptance that human rights obligations may bind a state when
it is active in a foreign territory, require a determination of whether there can
be circumstances under which the petitioned state is under a human rights
obligation, vis-à-vis an individual, to grant protection and how such an obliga-
tion can be accommodated with possible concurrent and conflicting obligations
the petitioned state may have vis-à-vis the territorial state. In extraterritorial
situations, the scope of these protection duties is informed not only by the
duty of non-refoulement, but also involves the preliminary issue of whether
and under what circumstances the asylum-seeker should be granted the right
to physically bring himself within the territorial jurisdiction of the desired
state, for example by allowing him to present himself at the border of that
state. This is often referred to as the right to seek asylum, understood as the
right to relieve oneself from the authority of one country in order to be able
to request territorial asylum with the authorities of another.
1 F. Morgenstern, ‘‘Extra-Territorial’ Asylum’, 25 BYIL (1948), p. 236-261; F. Morgenstern,
‘Diplomatic Asylum’, 67 The Law Quarterly Review (1951), p. 362-382; A. Grahl-Madsen,
The Status of Refugees in International Law (Vol. II), Leiden: Sijthoff (1972), p. 45-56; S.P. Sinha,
Asylum and International Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1971), p. 203-271.
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The chapter aims at reconceptualising the international law notion of
extraterritorial asylum by exploring the applicability and interoperability of
the rights and obligations which regulate the triangular relationship between
the individual requesting protection, the territorial (or host) state and the
petitioned non-territorial (or sending) state. The relevant rights are subdivided
under the headers of ‘the right to grant asylum’ (section 4.2), ‘the right to
obtain asylum’ (section 4.3) and ‘the right to seek asylum’ (section 4.4). The
analysis undertaken in this chapter constitutes the international framework
defining the right of extraterritorial asylum within which specific policies of
external migration control, to be discussed in the following chapters, must
be situated.
The right to grant asylum, explored in section 4.2., is understood as the right
of the non-territorial state, vis-à-vis the territorial state, to confer asylum upon
an individual situated in the latter state. Although the relationship between
the state granting asylum and the state whose national is granted asylum is
currently scarcely addressed in international refugee law discourse – and for
a large part considered immaterial as a consequence of the principle of terri-
torial sovereignty coming to prevail2 – it remains of primordial importance
in extraterritorial situations, precisely because those situations are characterised
by the impossibility of the state addressed by the asylum-seeker to invoke
the shield of territorial sovereignty. Section 4.2. explores the extent to which
international law has recognised the institution of diplomatic and other forms
of extraterritorial asylum, how the institution of extraterritorial asylum involves
a reconciliation of potential conflicting claims of humanitarianism and terri-
torial sovereignty, and how the law on diplomatic and consular relations may
influence the legality and/or feasibility of grants of diplomatic asylum. It
should be noted here that this section deals only with grants of asylum within
the territory of another state. The other typical situation of extraterritorial asylum,
namely at sea, is addressed in chapter 6, which discusses questions of com-
peting state competences in the specific context of the Law of the Sea.
Under the right to obtain asylum, in section 4.3, it is examined under what
circumstances individuals have a right to obtain asylum from the non-territorial
state. This question concerns the right of asylum in its modern (human rights)
understanding: under what conditions can an individual claim entitlement
to protection? In situations where an individual requests protection from
another state than the one in which he is, a topical issue is whether inter-
national obligations protecting against refoulement have equal bearing in
territorial and extraterritorial situations and what the nature of the relationship
between the petitioned state and the individual must be to enliven human
rights obligations on the side of the former. This exercise mainly constitutes
2 This has now been confirmed in Article 1 of the United Nations General Assembly Declara-
tion on Territorial Asylum, see n. 6 infra and accompanying text.
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a specialis of Chapter 2, where the general issue of the extraterritorial applicab-
ility of human rights was addressed. Section 4.3. discusses relevant case law
and legal doctrine on the specific question of the extraterritorial implications
of the prohibition of refoulement.
Section 4.4. explores the scope and contents of the right to seek asylum.
In situations of ‘territorial asylum’ – where a persons requests protection with
and within the desired state of refuge – this right is often considered of
marginal importance, because the duty to protect the individual will stem
directly from the prohibition of refoulement and concomitant human rights
obligations. Where a state is confronted with an asylum-seeker in the territory
of another state however, and especially when it employs migration control
activities aimed at preventing an individual from reaching its own borders,
the right to seek asylum may well constitute a necessary prequel for the
individual to bring himself in a position to claim territorial asylum. A problem
with conceptualizing the right to seek asylum remains that, although pro-
nounced in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, it is not
as such codified in human rights treaties. Section 4.4. traces the outlines of
the right to seek asylum with reference to the right to leave a country and
will in particular address the questions when extraterritorial activities of a
state can be brought under the scope of the right to leave and how the specific
plight of persons seeking asylum informs the contents of the right to leave.
The final section 4.5 addresses the friction which may arise between the
duty of the sending state to respect the territorial sovereignty of the host state
as discussed in section 4.2 and possible concurrent duties to respect the human
rights of persons in need of protection as discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.4.
4.2 THE RIGHT TO GRANT ASYLUM
4.2.1 State sovereignty and extraterritorial asylum
The distinction between territorial and extraterritorial asylum has long standing
in international law. The notion of territorial asylum was traditionally under-
stood as the right of states to grant asylum to aliens on their territory, which
may be asserted vis-à-vis the pursuing state.3 In this vein, the right to grant
asylum has often been linked to the right to refuse extradition.4 In the Asylum
Case, the International Court of Justice equated the right of a state not to
extradite aliens present in its territory with the right to grant asylum and
confirmed that this right is a normal exercise of territorial sovereignty:
3 A. Grahl-Madsen, Territorial Asylum, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wicksel International (1980),
p. 2.
4 A. Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law (Vol. II), Leiden: Sijthoff (1972),
p. 4-5, 23.
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‘In the case of extradition, the refugee is within the territory of the State of refuge.
A decision with regard to extradition implies only the normal exercise of the
territorial sovereignty. The refugee is outside the territory of the State where the
offence was committed, and a decision to grant him asylum in no way derogates
from the sovereignty of that State.’5
The Declaration on Territorial Asylum adopted by the UN General Assembly
in 1967 affirms that the grant of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act,
a normal exercise of state sovereignty, and that it shall be respected by all other
states.6 The competence of states to grant asylum on their territory may thus
be seen as stemming directly from the principle of territorial sovereignty and
the derivative notion of states having exclusive control over the individuals
on its territory. While this principle is usually invoked in recognising the
power of states to exclude aliens, its reverse implication is that states are also
free to admit anyone they choose to admit.7 It follows that the right to grant
territorial asylum is subject only to extradition treaties and other overriding
rules of international law.8
Since it cannot benefit from the shield of territorial sovereignty, the grant
of extraterritorial asylum is a different matter. The question whether states
are entitled to grant asylum outside their territories has most frequently been
addressed in the context of so-called ‘diplomatic asylum’, referring to asylum
on the premises of embassies and legations, but it may also include asylum
in warships, military camps or other military facilities.9 As will be further
explored hereunder, the legal principles underlying the question of legitimacy
of diplomatic asylum do essentially not differ from those applicable to other
forms of extraterritorial asylum, the main difference being that certain
diplomatic and consular immunities apply only to the former.
The problem with accepting a right on the side of states to grant extraterri-
torial, or diplomatic, asylum has been aptly articulated in the Asylum Case:
5 ICJ 20 November 1950, Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru), I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 274. The Asylum
Case evolved around the question whether Columbia had legitimately granted asylum to
Dr. Victor Haya de la Torre, who was charged with the crime of military rebellion by the
Peruvian government, in its embassy in Lima. The incident gave rise to two further decisions
of the Court: ICJ 27 November 1950, Request for interpretation of the Judgment of November
20th, 1950, in the asylum case, I.C.J. Reports, p. 395 (declared inadmissible); and ICJ 13 June
1951, Haya de la Torre Case, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 71.
6 UN General Assembly, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 14 December 1967, A/RES/
2312(XXII), Article 1.
7 See, more extensively, F. Morgenstern, ‘The Right of Asylum’, 26 BYIL (1949), p. 327.
8 Ibid, p. 328, Grahl-Madsen (1972), p. 30.
9 The 1954 Caracas Convention on Diplomatic Asylum mentions asylum granted in legations
(defined as any seat of a regular diplomatic mission, the residence of chiefs of mission,
and the premises provided by them), war vessels and military camps or aircraft; Convention
on Diplomatic Asylum (28 March 1954) 18 OAS Treaty Series No. 18, Article 1. Also see
Convention of Havana on Right of Asylum (20 February 1928) 132 LNTS 323, Article 2;
and Montevideo Treaty on Political Asylum and Refuge (4 August 1939), Article 2.
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‘In the case of diplomatic asylum, the refugee is within the territory of the State
where the offence was committed. A decision to grant diplomatic asylum involves
a derogation from the sovereignty of that State. It withdraws the offender from
the jurisdiction of the territorial State and constitutes an intervention in matters
which are exclusively within the competence of that State. Such a derogation from
territorial sovereignty cannot be recognized unless its legal basis is established in
each particular case.’10
In Latin America – described (35 years ago) as a continent ‘where today’s
government officials may be tomorrow’s refugees, and vice versa’11 – the
problem that extraterritorial asylum will normally encroach upon the sover-
eignty of the territorial state has to some extent been relieved by the accepted
practice that states do not interfere with one another’s grant of diplomatic
asylum and that persons granted diplomatic asylum are allowed safe-conducts
out of the country to the territory of the state granting asylum. These practices
have – under strictly defined conditions – been codified in several regional
treaties.12 The general outline of these treaties is that diplomatic asylum may
only be granted in urgent situations and for the period indispensable to ensure
safety of the person seeking asylum13; that states may only grant diplomatic
asylum to persons who are sought for political reasons as opposed to common
criminals14; and that the territorial state may at all times request that the
10 Asylum Case, p. 274-275.
11 Grahl-Madsen (1972), p. 57.
12 See in particular the 1928 Havana Convention; Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum,
26 December 1933, 37 Pan-Am. T.S. 48; 1939 Montevideo Treaty on Political Asylum and
Refuge; and the 1954 Caracas Convention. Judge Read, dissenting in the Asylum Case,
described the Latin-American practice on diplomatic asylum in the following terms: ‘The
“American institution of asylum” requires closer examination. There is – and there was,
even before the first conventional regulation of diplomatic asylum by the Conference at
Montevideo in 1889 – an “American” institution of diplomatic asylum for political offenders.
It has been suggested, in argument, that it would have been better if the institution had
been concerned with ordinary people and not with politicians, that it is unfortunate that
political offenders were protected from trial and punishment by courts of justice during
the troubled periods which followed revolutionary outbreaks, and that it would have been
a wiser course for the republics to have confined the institution to protection against mob
violence. That is none of our business. The Court is concerned with the institution as it
is. The facts, established by abundant evidence in the record of this case, show that the
Latin-American Republics had taken a moribund institution of universal international law,
breathed new life into it, and adapted it to meet the political and social needs of the Pan
American world.’ Asylum Case, p. 316-317.
13 1928 Havana Convention, Article 2; 1954 Caracas Convention, Article V.
14 1928 Havana Convention, Article 1; 1939 Montevideo Treaty, Article 3; 1954 Caracas
Convention, Article III. This condition has created the problem – which gave rise to the
Asylum Case – that the states concerned may disagree about the correct characterization
of persons as ‘common criminals’ and the concomitant question which state should be
competent to qualify the offence as political in nature. The 1954 Caracas Convention was
drafted with a view to clarify these and other ambiguities found by the ICJ in the Havana
Convention in the Asylum Case.
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person granted asylum is removed from its territory.15 The conventions do
not give rise to an individual entitlement to receive asylum and petitioned
states are thus free to refuse asylum also when the grant would be lawful vis-à-
vis the territorial state.16 Although some of the regional conventions speak
of beneficiaries as ‘refugees’, this term does not correspond to the definition
of a refugee in the Refugee Convention: the right to grant asylum is enlivened
only in respect of political offenders or, alternatively, persons fleeing from
mob violence.17
Outside of Latin-America, attempts to codify the institution of diplomatic
asylum have remained inconclusive. The topic did feature on the agenda’s
of the United Nations General Assembly and the International Law Commis-
sion, but both ultimately decided to remove the item without adopting resolu-
tions or recommendations.18 The Institut de Droit International did adopt at
its Bath session in 1950 a resolution on asylum, which recognises the legality
of extraterritorial asylum also against acts of violence emanating from the local
authorities, but this resolution must be seen as an attempt at developing, rather
than codifying, the law on asylum.19 In the 1970s, the International Law
Association discussed a set of acceptable principles regarding diplomatic
asylum which lead to the adoption of a Draft Convention on Diplomatic
15 1928 Havana Convention, Article 2; 1939 Montevideo Treaty, Article 6; 1954 Caracas
Convention, Article XI.
16 1954 Caracas Convention, Article II.
17 Article VI of the 1954 Caracas Convention also covers individuals being sought by private
persons or mobs over whom the authorities have lost control.
18 The issue of diplomatic asylum was discussed by the UN General Assembly at its 29th and
30th sessions but the debate was inconclusive. A report of the Secretary-General on the topic
forwarded to the General Assembly mentioned that only seven of the 25 States which had
presented their views were in favor of drawing up an international convention on the topic;
see UN. Doc. A/10139. By its resolution 3497 (XXX) of 15 December 1975, the General
Assembly decided to give further consideration to the question at a future session, but this
decision was not followed up. In resolution 1400 (XIV) of 21 November 1959, the General
Assembly requested the International Law Commission to undertake the codification of
the principles and rules of international law relating to the right of asylum. Regarding
diplomatic asylum, the Commission concluded in 1977 that the topic did not appear at
that time to require active consideration by the Commission; see Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, 1977, vol. II (Part Two), para. 109.
19 Institut de Droit International, Session de Bath 1950 (Resolution I), ‘L’asile en droit inter-
national public (à l’exclusion de l’asile neutre)’, Article 3 (2). The third and most compre-
hensive part of the resolution was devoted to establishing rules on extraterritorial asylum.
The resolution recognizes and delimits the legality of extraterritorial asylum by laying down
that asylum can be given ‘à tout individu menacé dans sa vie, son intégrité corporelle ou
sa liberté par des violences émanant des autorités locales ou contre lesquelles celles-ci sont
manifestement impuissantes à le défendre, ou même qu’elles tolèrent ou provoquent. Ces
dispositions s’appliquent dans les mêmes conditions lorsque de telles menaces sont le
résultat de luttes intestines’. Grahl-Madsen questions whether this resolution must be seen
as lex lata; Grahl-Madsen (1972), p. 49.
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Asylum. This draft, neither of legally binding nature, followed closely and
elaborated upon the principles set out in 1954 Caracas Convention.20
The fact that a right to grant diplomatic asylum has not been recognized
outside Latin America does not preclude a state from offering refuge to persons
seeking shelter. It only implies that a grant of refuge remains subject to the
territorial sovereignty of the host state. This means that if the territorial author-
ities do not object to the grant of protection, the grant is perfectly legal. There
might be other situations in which a grant of asylum does, by its nature, not
derogate from the sovereignty of the territorial state. Thus, it has been con-
tended that to provide asylum to persons fleeing from mob-violence against
which the territorial authorities cannot offer protection, does not impinge upon
the prerogatives of the territorial state.21 From a similar rationale, it is stated
that to provide protection in situations of general political upheaval, in which
justice is not adequately administered, does not oppose the rule of non-inter-
vention.22
In other situations however, should the territorial state object to refuge
or demand surrender of the person requesting asylum, the extraterritorial state
will ordinarily not be entitled to grant asylum.23 The ICJ in the Asylum Case
underlined that ‘the safety which arises out of asylum cannot be construed
as a protection against the regular application of the laws and against the
jurisdiction of legally constituted tribunals’.24
Being subject to the territorial sovereignty of the host state implies, further,
that the state wishing to grant protection requires the consent of the territorial
state if it wishes to arrange for a safe-conduct out of the country. It has fre-
quently occurred that territorial states have refused to grant safe passage,
rendering the extent of protection dependant on the limited facilities diplomatic
missions have at their disposal.25 This can be problematic, especially if faced
20 The International Law Association discussed the topic of diplomatic asylum in close
connection to territorial asylum. For discussions and text of the draft convention, see
International Law Association, Legal Aspects of the Problem of Asylum, Part II: Report,
55 International Law Association Reports of Conferences (1972), p. 176-207.
21 Grahl-Madsen (1972), p. 46; Morgenstern (1951), p. 376; P. Porcino, ‘Toward Codification
of Diplomatic Asylum’, 8 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1976),
p. 446-447; R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th Ed. (1992),
Vol. I, p. 1084. This appears also the view of the ICJ, see Asylum Case, p. 282-283.
22 Morgenstern (1951), p. 377. To this effect also the dissenting judges Read, Badawi Pasha
and Azevedo in the Asylum Case, p. 312, 320, 333-335.
23 Grahl-Madsen (1972), p. 46.
24 Asylum Case, p. 284. Note that, although phrased in terms of general applicability, this
remark was made against the backdrop of the 1928 Havana Convention.
25 Even under the Havana Convention of 1928 and the Montevideo Treaty of 1939, it was
disputed whether the territorial State was obliged to accede to a request for a safe-conduct
out of the country if diplomatic asylum was granted on proper grounds. The ICJ held that
the treaty obligations entered into by Peru did not mean that Peru was legally bound to
allow a safe conduct; Asylum Case, p. 279. Article XII of the 1954 Caracas Convention on
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with large numbers of persons requesting protection,26 and can moreover
result in situations of protracted nature, such as the case of Cardinal Mind-
szenty, who was offered shelter in the US embassy in Budapest after the Soviet
Union put down the popular uprising in Hungary in 1956 and who left the
embassy only 15 years later after Pope Paul VI had ordered him to come to
Rome and after the Hungarian President had formally guaranteed his safe
departure.27 Another peculiar example is the case of the Dutch anti-apartheid
activist Klaas de Jonge, who was arrested by the South-African police in 1985
but managed to escape to the Dutch embassy in Pretoria where he was granted
refuge. When the embassy planned to move to another building, the South-
African authorities refused to allow de Jonge to travel on South-African terri-
tory, resulting in him being left behind in the abandoned building under the
protection of the Dutch military police where he stayed for two further
years.28 It is for these and other constraints that grants of diplomatic asylum
outside Latin America have been referred to as cases of tolerated stay or
temporary refuge rather than asylum proper.29
4.2.2 Extraterritorial asylum as humanitarian exception to state sovereignty
All this does not detract from the fact that extraterritorial asylum is essentially
about reconciling the principle of territorial sovereignty with claims of human-
itarianism.30 It could be upheld that, if confronted with conflicting claims
of humanitarianism and state sovereignty, exceptional circumstances may make
it legitimate for diplomatic missions to refuse surrender. Morgenstern has
Diplomatic Asylum does contain an obligation on the side of the territorial State to allow
departure for foreign territory, except in situations of force majeure.
26 A notable example is the overflowing of West German embassies in Prague and Budapest
by East-German citizens in 1989, who demanded passage to the west. The embassy in
Budapest was forced to take out a lease on a nearby building to house the throngs of East
Germans arriving every day. The embassy occupations played a significant role in the
Hungarian decision to open its borders to the west, and with it, the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The situation of North Koreans attempting to reach South Korea by seeking asylum in
foreign embassies and consulates in China resembles the plight of the East Germans. The
number of North Koreans seeking diplomatic refuge has risen steadily since the mid 1990s,
resulting in the Chinese taking ever more security measures around embassy compounds.
In October 2003, South Korea temporarily closed its consulate in Beijing where around 130
North Koreans had taken refuge.
27 According to the US Government, the decision to grant refuge to Cardinal Mindszenty
was taken ‘under highly exceptional and most unusual circumstances and on urgent
humanitarian grounds at a time of foreign aggression against Hungary’, see M. Whiteman,
Digest of International Law, Vol. 6 (1968), p. 451.
28 For an account, K. de Jonge, Dagboek uit Pretoria, Amsterdam: van Gennep, 1987.
29 Grahl-Madsen (1972), p. 49. According to Porcino, ‘the allowance of safe passage transforms
temporary refuge into permanent asylum’; Porcino (1976), p. 438.
30 Morgenstern (1948), p. 236.
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stated that ‘[i]t probably cannot be maintained that asylum can never be
granted against prosecution by the local government’.31 Likewise, Grahl-
Madsen does not rule out that in a case of ‘the most compelling considerations
of humanity’, heads of diplomatic missions may refuse to surrender a per-
son.32 And Riveles, in discussing the fate of the Durban Six, discussed below,
has argued that ‘[i]t should be recognized that a State has the permissible
response of granting temporary sanctuary to individuals or groups in utter
desperation who face repressive measures in their home countries.’33
In Oppenheim’s International Law, it is also mentioned that ‘compelling
reasons of humanity may justify the grant of asylum’.34 It refers, amongst
others, to the judgment in the Asylum Case, in which it was stated that:
‘In principle, therefore, asylum cannot be opposed to the operation of justice. An
exception to this rule can occur only if, in the guise of justice, arbitrary action is
substituted for the rule of law. Such would be the case if the administration of
justice were corrupted by measures clearly prompted by political aims. Asylum
protects the political offender against any measures of a manifestly extra-legal
character which a government might take or attempt to take against its political
opponents.’35
Although this consideration may be taken as suggesting that asylum may be
granted also against measures of the territorial state which are of ‘manifestly
extra-legal character’, it must also be underlined that the ICJ’s remarks served
to interpret the terms of the 1928 Havana Convention. It is henceforth doubtful
whether the ICJ intended to make a statement which has meaning outside that
particular context.
Some authors, supporting the existence of a rule that exceptional human-
itarian pressures justify a grant of diplomatic asylum, have referred to the
widespread practice of grants of diplomatic asylum throughout the world,
possibly warranting a conclusion that a right to grant diplomatic asylum has
established itself as customary international law. It is true that, on occasion,
states have granted asylum to fugitives, also in clear opposition to local rules
or demands of the host state. The Canadian government for example, chose
to grant refuge to six US diplomats on Canadian diplomatic premises during
the Tehran hostage crisis and to subsequently arrange for their covert departure
from Iran, which it later justified by maintaining that it ‘upheld rather than
31 Morgenstern (1951), p. 376.
32 Note that where Grahl-Madsen at p. 46 first suggests that this exception may even be
invoked vis-à-vis the authorities of the territorial State, he concludes at p. 77 by saying
that this ‘office of humanity’ may not be exercised vis-à-vis the lawful organs of the
territorial State; Grahl-Madsen (1972), p. 46-47, 77.
33 S. Riveles, ‘Diplomatic Asylum as a Human Right: The Case of the Durban Six’, 11 Human
Rights Quarterly (1989), p. 158.
34 Oppenheim’s International Law (Vol. I) (1992), p. 1085.
35 Asylum Case, p. 284.
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violated international law’, since the events at the US embassy were considered
to constitute an attack on the entire diplomatic corps in Iran and consequently
any embassy was entitled to assist American personnel.3637 Another example
is the case of the Durban Six, which evolved around six prominent members
of the South-African anti-apartheid movement who had been served detention
orders and who sought refuge at the British consulate in Durban in 1984. The
British consulate complied with their request and promised it would not force
them out of the consulate, although the authorities also made clear that they
would not intervene on their behalf with the South African authorities and
that they could not stay indefinitely. After the embassies of the United States,
France, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany had later denied
to offer sanctuary, the Durban Six decided to depart voluntarily resulting in
the immediate arrest of five of them in front of the consulate building.38
But a majority of legal opinion appears to agree that the practice of diplom-
atic asylum is not uniform and of too inconsistent character to constitute a
rule of international custom.39 Some countries, such as Japan,40 reject the
doctrine altogether, and other countries – and this point is also illustrated by
the divergent responses of Western governments in the case of the Durban
Six – apply different and sometimes arbitrary considerations in choosing to
grant asylum. Neither is there the required conviction among states that the
practice reflects a norm of international law.41 Even though countries such
as the United States and the United Kingdom have on occasion granted refuge
in opposition to demands of the territorial state, both countries have denied
that there exists a legal right to that effect.42 The rather inconsistent and
36 For the Canadian position, see L.H. Legault, ‘Canadian Practice in International Law during
1979 as Reflected Mainly in Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department of
External Affairs’, 18 Canadian Yearbook of International Law (1980), p. 304-305. For a legal
comment, see: C.V. Cole, ‘Is There Safe Refuge in Canadian Missions Abroad?’, 9 IJRL (1997),
p. 662.
37 Legault (1980), p. 304-305.
38 For a factual background and legal appraisal see Riveles (1989), p. 139-159.
39 Morgenstern, in particular, has forcefully rejected the proposition that a right to grant
diplomatic asylum is part of customary law; Morgenstern (1948), p. 241-246. Also see Porcino
(1976), p. 445-446; Sinha (1971), p. 238; B. Gilbert, ‘The Practice of Asylum in Legations
and Consulates of the United States’, 3 AJIL (1909), p. 585; A.M. Rossitto, ‘Diplomatic
Asylum in the United States and Latin America: A Comparative Analysis’, 13 Brooklyn
Journal of International Law (1987), p. 114.
40 See eg the position of Japan in General Assembly discussions on the desirability of a
convention on diplomatic asylum. UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1506 (1974), statements of Mr. Yokota
from Japan.
41 Also Porcino (1976), p. 445.
42 In surveying the 19th and 20th century practice of diplomatic asylum by the United Kingdom
and United States, Sinha observes that although both countries have on occasion authorized
asylum on humanitarian grounds, neither country has claimed that there is a right to grant
diplomatic asylum. Sinha (1971), p. 212-217. For the American position, see further Rossitto
(1987), p. 111-135.
Extraterritorial asylum under international law 123
contradictory manner in which states have asserted a right to grant protection
on humanitarian grounds detracts from the view that such a right has estab-
lished itself as customary international law. It does appear that political con-
siderations, rather than clearly outlined humanitarian principles, guide the
practice of offering refuge.
It can be concluded that granting extraterritorial asylum by way of human-
itarian exception in opposition to demands of the territorial state has a weak
legal basis. Such grants must be considered a derogation of the territorial
sovereignty of the host state and therefore require specific entitlement under
international law. In the absence of provisions of international treaty law or
a rule of international customary law recognising a right to grant extraterri-
torial asylum in exceptional humanitarian circumstances, one avenue for
underpinning its legality would be to construct the right in accordance with
the larger doctrine on humanitarian intervention in international law, within
which progressive attempts are made to formulate the circumstances and
conditions permitting intervention in the domestic affairs of another state. This
is a much contested debate and not one which is the particular focus of this
study.43 Moreover, modern discourse on humanitarian intervention may be
deemed to be of only modest importance for the specific question of extraterri-
torial asylum, because grants of extraterritorial asylum will normally not
involve the use of force nor involve action specifically undertaken with a view
to interfere in the domestic affairs of the other state.44
A second avenue for informing the legal basis of a humanitarian exception
to the duty to respect the territorial sovereignty of the host state could consist
of accommodating the rule of non-intervention with specific human rights
obligations a sending state may incur vis-à-vis an individual requesting pro-
tection in the host state. In theory, human rights obligations of the sending
state vis-à-vis an individual may complement the duties the sending state owes
vis-à-vis the host state. The scope of a state’s human rights obligations towards
persons claiming protection in a foreign territory is further explored in sections
4.3 and 4.4. Section 4.5 specifically addresses the question of whether and
43 For some views: W.M. Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary Inter-
national Law, 84 AJIL (1990), p. 872-873; A. D’Amato, ‘The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful
Response to Tyranny’, 84 AJIL (1990), p. 516-524; L. Henkin, ‘An Agenda for the Next
Century: The Myth and Mantra of State Sovereignty’, 35 Virginia Journal of International
Law (1994), p. 115-118; S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian intervention and
international law, Oxford University Press (2001); P. Hilpold, ‘Humanitarian Intervention:
Is There a Need for a Legal Reappraisal?’, 12 EJIL (2001), p. 437-467.
44 Porcino has argued that the protection of human rights warrants recognition and codification
of the right to grant asylum, by emphasising that the grant of asylum in an embassy is
only a ‘passive’ infringement on the rights of the sovereign: the foreign state does not enter
the territory of the sovereign state uninvited, and does not apply force or behave aggressive-
ly towards the territorial state. Accordingly, the state granting refuge makes only limited
incursion on the host state’s sovereign prerogatives: Porcino (1976), p. 446.
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under what circumstances human rights may displace the obligations of the
sending state vis-a-vis the territorial state.
4.2.3 Immunities and extraterritorial asylum
Although commonly addressed in the context of refuge in diplomatic missions,
the problem of reconciling humanitarian claims with the principle of territorial
sovereignty is a central issue for all forms of extraterritorial asylum. The legal
principles applicable to the institution of extraterritorial asylum discussed
above thus apply regardless whether asylum is granted in embassies, con-
sulates, military bases or other facilities. They are equally valid for con-
temporary practices of pre-border migration control where the sending state
is confronted with asylum claims in a foreign territory. The main difference
between diplomatic asylum and other grants of extraterritorial asylum is that
the law on diplomatic immunities applies to the former and not necessarily
to the latter. This means that although normally the territorial state has every
right to put an end to illegal grants of asylum on its territory, asylum-seekers
in diplomatic premises or other privileged facilities may be immune from
incursions by the territorial state. This section explores to what extent the law
on diplomatic and consular relations facilitates extraterritorial grants of asylum.
Historically, the bond between diplomatic asylum and the privileged position
of diplomatic envoys was stronger than it is in current times. Early scholars
such as Grotius explained the legality of diplomatic asylum from the fiction
of exterritoriality45 – holding that the ambassador’s premises are inviolable
for they are outside the territory of the host state and placed in that of the
sending state.46 One of the first to reject this fiction was van Bynkershoek,
in positing that the ambassador’s immunities are functional and that the
ambassador’s premises may not be used to offer refuge to criminals.47
Although no longer seen as valid, the fiction of exterritoriality has on occasion
resurfaced in defending the legality of diplomatic asylum.48 Other writers
45 In the law on diplomatic relations, the terms extraterritoriality and exterritoriality are used
interchangeably, although the latter term appears to prevail.
46 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 1625 (translated by F.W. Kelsey, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1925), Book II, Chapter 18, Section IV, para 5: ‘[B]y a similar fiction, ambassadors
were held to be outside the limits of the country to which they were accredited. For this
reason they are not subject to the municipal law of the State in which they are living.’
47 C. van Bynkershoek , De Foro Legatorum Liber Sigularis, 1744 (translated by G.J. Laing.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), Chapter XVI, p. 79-80.
48 Dissenting in the Asylum Case, Judge Alvarez posited that the fiction of exterritoriality is
the basis for diplomatic asylum in Latin America and that accordingly, asylum is considered
not to intervene in the sovereign prerogatives of the host State; Asylum Case, p. 292. This
view is difficult to reconcile with the fact that even in Latin America, diplomatic asylum
is deemed legitimate in limited circumstances only.
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have considered the practice of diplomatic asylum as having a legal basis in
the diplomatic function or in the privileges of diplomatic missions.49 This
argument has also met opposition, under the reasoning that diplomatic
privileges and immunities serve freedom and security in discharging diplom-
atic functions and that granting asylum is not part of those functions, but on
the contrary, may jeopardize relations between the sending and receiving
state.50
The Vienna conventions on diplomatic and consular relations do not
categorize asylum as one of the recognised diplomatic or consular functions.51
The topic of asylum was expressly omitted from both treaties, for it was at
that time under consideration of the UN General Assembly.52 This leaves us
with a somewhat unclear legal status of the institution of diplomatic asylum
under diplomatic and consular law. An implied reference to asylum can
nonetheless be found in Article 41 (3) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (VCDR), which includes as recognized functions of the mission those
functions laid down in special agreements concluded between the sending
and receiving State. This clause was inserted precisely to accommodate for
conventions on diplomatic asylum in force in Latin America.53 Although this
49 For an overview, see Sinha (1971), p. 20-27.
50 Van Bynkershoek stated it as follows: ‘All the privileges of ambassadors which they use
in accordance with the tacit agreement of nations have been instituted for the sole purpose
of enabling them to perform the duties of their office without delay and without hindrance
from anyone. But they can do this safely even if they do not receive or conceal criminals
and refrain from perverting (…) the jurisdiction of the prince in whose country they are.
But these things are of such a kind that they scarcely call for serious discussion.’ Van
Bynkershoek was of the opinion that ambassadors should open their houses to the pursuit
and seizure of criminals and that the sovereign states, to that purpose, have a perfectly
valid legal basis for entering it by force. Van Bynkershoek (trans. 1946), Chapter XXI (‘Does
the house of an ambassador afford asylum?’), p. 114-115. See further Sinha (1971), p. 24-26.
51 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95, Article 3;
and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963, 596 UNTS 261, Article 5.
52 Under both Conventions, a provision on asylum was proposed which would prevent states
to offer shelter to persons charged with an offense under local law. Both were defeated
under the reasoning that the subject of asylum was not intended to be covered. An addi-
tional reason for not taking in such provision in the VCCR was that it might be deduced
a contrario that the right of asylum did impliedly exist under the VCDR. For references,
see E. Denza, Diplomatic law: commentary on the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations,
Oxford University Press (2008), p. 141 and L.T. Lee, Consular Law and Practice, Oxford:
Clarendon Press (1991), p. 398. Regarding the VCDR, see further the discussions in the
ILC: Summary records of the ninth session, Yearbook of the ILC 1957, vol. I, p. 54-57.
53 Summary records of the ninth session, Yearbook of the ILC 1957, vol. I, p. 144 at para. 63.
Denza infers from the drafting history that the clauses ‘other rules of general international
law’ and ‘special agreements in force between the sending and receiving states ’ both
intended to cover asylum in diplomatic premises, implying that the prohibition to use
premises for other than recognized functions would also be waived in circumstances where
diplomatic asylum is permitted under customary international law, Denza (2008), p. 471-472.
It does not follow from the ILC discussions however that it was contemplated that diplom-
atic asylum formed part of customary international law.
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clause was not taken up in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(VCCR), the absence is compensated by Article 5 (m), which lists as residual
category of consular functions those functions ‘entrusted to a consular post
by the sending State which are not prohibited by the laws and regulations
of the receiving State or to which no objection is taken by the receiving State
or which are referred to in the international agreements in force between the
sending State and the receiving State’. This provision may be taken as not only
allowing for the conclusion of agreements on consular asylum, but also as
recognising asylum as consular function if it does not come in conflict with
local laws or does not meet the disapproval of the receiving state, subject to
the condition that asylum is granted with the consent of the authorities of the
sending state.
In the absence of special agreements, the question of asylum under both
Conventions depends, on the one hand, on the duties to not interfere with
domestic affairs and to not use diplomatic and consular premises in any
manner incompatible with recognised diplomatic or consular functions,54 and,
on the other hand, on the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises.55
It is clear that offering shelter to persons seeking to evade justice is in violation
of the duty not to interfere with local laws. Using diplomatic or consular
buildings to offer shelter to refugees may further come within the ambit of
Article 41 (3) VCDR or 55 (2) VCCR, if the situation of asylum is considered
‘incompatible’ with the functions of the mission.56 The element of ‘incompatib-
ility’ has been interpreted as prohibiting activities which fall outside the
diplomatic and consular functions and which constitute a crime under the
law of the receiving state.57 It may further be argued that even if not constitu-
ting a crime under local law, grants of refuge which meet disapproval of the
territorial state are an affront to friendly relations and therefore incompatible
with diplomatic and consular functions as laid down in Articles 3 (e) VCDR
and Article 5 (b) VCCR.
While diplomatic and consular asylum in opposition to demands of the
local State may thus be considered an abuse of privileges and immunities,
the inviolability of diplomatic premises remains a potent tool for sending states
to refuse to answer calls for surrender. The prohibition to enter diplomatic
premises laid down in Article 22 (1) VCDR does not allow for exception, imply-
54 Articles 41, paragraphs 1 and 3 VCDR and Articles 55 paragraphs 1 and 2 VCCR.
55 Articles 22, paragraph 1 VCDR and 31, paragraph 2 VCCR.
56 The original draft of the VCDR had held that the premises of the mission shall be used
solely for the performance of the diplomatic functions, whereas the final text merely prohibits
use which is incompatible with those functions. See Summary records of the ninth session,
Yearbook of the ILC 1957, vol. I, p. 143 at para. 55. Where the original text could have been
interpreted as prohibiting asylum on diplomatic premises per se – only allowing for deroga-
tion in case of special agreements; the standard of incompatibility is obviously more lenient.
57 B.S. Murty, The International Law of Diplomacy, The Diplomatic Instrument and World Public
Order, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff (1989), p. 417.
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ing that once an embassy has granted asylum, the territorial state is effectively
debarred from terminating the grant of refuge.58 It is due to the inviolability
of diplomatic premises that territorial states opposing refuge have often seen
no other option than to acquiesce in the situation and, in order to prevent
protracted stays and the political frictions flowing from it, have been willing
to grant safe conducts out of the country, also in situations where criminal
charges had been imposed on the fugitive.59
Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the inviolability of
consular premises is considerably more limited. Article 31 (2) prohibits the
receiving state to enter that part of the consular premises which is used
exclusively for the purpose of the work of the consular post.60 This could be
taken to mean that, if the receiving state has reason to believe that the con-
sulate is used for other purposes, it is permitted to enter the building and to
arrest persons charged with an offense.61 It follows that consular grants of
asylum are more susceptible to termination and that consulates are less appro-
priate locations for persons seeking asylum.62 Grahl-Madsen concludes that
the limited inviolability of consular premises makes a grant of refuge ‘pre-
carious at best’.63
Under general principles of treaty law a reasoning would be possible that
a grant of asylum interfering with local laws is a fundamental breach of the
VCDR or VCCR which relieves the receiving state from its own obligations under
these conventions vis-à-vis the sending state. Accordingly, the receiving state
would be able to legitimately assert a right to enter the premises in order to
ensure recover.64 The ICJ in the Tehran Hostage case made clear however that
the rules of diplomatic and consular law constitute a self-contained regime
which foresees the possible abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities
and specifies the means at the disposal of the receiving state to counter any
such abuse.65 The two recourses mentioned by the Court are to declare mem-
bers of the diplomatic or consular staff persona non grata – which will obviously
not succeed in terminating a grant of asylum – and to break off diplomatic
relations altogether and call for the immediate closure of the offending
mission.66 Although effective, the latter option is notoriously drastic and will
normally not be considered politically opportune. In situations where premises
58 Article 22 paragraphs 1 and 3 VCDR.
59 See for example the Soviet conduct in respect of its citizens which had been granted asylum
in United States embassies, in: Rossitto (1987), p. 120-127.
60 Emphasis added.
61 Lee (1991), p. 387.
62 Ibid, p. 398.
63 Grahl-Madsen (1972), p. 50.
64 Article 60 paragraph 2 (b) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
65 ICJ 24 May 1980, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980,
para 86.
66 Ibid, para. 85.
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are used for the sole purpose of sheltering refugees, a third option might
further be to withdraw the diplomatic status from those premises.67
Apart from refuge in diplomatic and consular premises, there are other
situations in which extraterritorial grants of asylum can benefit from im-
munities. The most topical situation is refuge granted on board warships or
other public vessels. Under international maritime law, warships and govern-
ment ships operated for non-commercial purposes enjoy complete inviolabil-
ity.68 In the case of warships in the territorial sea of another state not comply-
ing with the laws of that state, the only remedy for the coastal state is to
require the vessel to leave the territorial waters.69 The result of the absolute
inviolability of warships is that the legal situation regarding asylum is similar
to that of refuge granted on diplomatic premises, the main difference being
that the warship may sail away with the refugee on board. Because the prob-
lem of requesting a safe-conduct out of the country is not present, a grant of
‘full-fledged’ asylum is better possible.
Other immunities than those of diplomatic and consular envoys or warships
will often depend on the particulars of bilateral or multilateral treaties, such
as Status of Forces Agreements. These immunities will not be discussed here.
4.2.4 Interim conclusion
A grant of asylum by one state in the territory of another state is subject to
the sovereignty of the latter state. This will not pose problems as long as the
territorial state does not object to the grant, or in situations where persons
fear maltreatment from non-state actors or for other reasons falling beyond
the scope of local laws. If the person seeking refuge is fleeing from the author-
ities of the territorial state however, granting asylum is likely to infringe upon
the sovereignty of that state. States do not have to tolerate such incursions
on their territories.
The option of granting refuge in diplomatic premises is a distinct form
of extraterritorial asylum. If granted in opposition to demands of the territorial
state, it remains problematic from a legal point of view, but its practical
feasibility is much enhanced by the inviolability of diplomatic premises. It
could well be argued that it is the system of diplomatic immunity and in-
67 The reasoning would be that premises solely used for other purposes than the diplomatic
mission cannot be defined as “premises of the mission” under Article 1 (i) VCDR. On this
option, see Denza (2008), p. 471.
68 Article 8(1) Convention on the High Seas, 29 April 1958, 6465 UNTS 450; Article 32 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 396.
Criminal jurisdiction may be exercised on board government ships operated for commercial
purposes, see Article 27 UNCLOS.
69 Article 23 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 29 April 1958, 516
UNTS 205; Article 30 UNCLOS.
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violability, rather than a legal right to grant diplomatic asylum, which has
made the practice of diplomatic asylum a perpetuating phenomenon also
outside Latin America. Inviolability constitutes a legal obstacle to redress illegal
grants of asylum and hence gives rise to incentives on the part of the host state
wishing to terminate a grant of asylum to find alternative solutions. This,
together with the humanitarian and often passive nature of grants of diplom-
atic asylum, may explain why diplomatic asylum, also if constituting an affront
to local laws, is often tolerated and only rarely spurs bilateral frictions.
4.3 THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN ASYLUM
Human rights obligations of a state vis-à-vis an individual requesting pro-
tection with that state are first and foremost informed by the prohibition of
refoulement, laid down in Article 33 Refugee Convention, Article 3 CAT, Article
3 ECRH and Article 7 ICCPR.70 The potential extraterritorial applicability of
the prohibition of refoulement has, precisely in view of the proliferation of
practices of external migration control (and in particular interdictions at sea),
been subject to growing attention in legal literature.71 It was also a key issue
in the two arguably most topical judgments on the legality of practices of
external migration control: the 1993 judgment of the United States Supreme
Court in Sale, concerning the interdiction at sea and summarily return of
Haitian refugees, and the 2005 judgment of the House of Lords in Roma Rights,
on the refusal of British immigration officers stationed at Prague Airport to
grant leave to enter the United Kingdom to Roma asylum-seekers of Czech
nationality.72 Both courts concluded against any potential legal duty deriving
from Article 33 Refugee Convention in respect of aliens found outside a state’s
territory. The House of Lords neither found Articles 2 and 3 ECRH to enliven
70 This section does not deal with other treaties containing a prohibition of refoulement, nor
with other provisions of the ECHR and ICCPR which may be construed as also prohibiting
refoulement.
71 Current legal textbooks on international refugee law contain specific reference to the (extra-
)territorial locus of the prohibition of refoulement: J.C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under
International Law, Cambridge University Press (2005), p. 335-342; G.S. Goodwin-Gill and
J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press (2007), p. 244-253;
K. Wouters, International Legal Standards for the Protection from Refoulement, Antwerp: Inter-
sentia (2009), p. 48-56, 203-216, 372-376, 435-438. For contributions dealing specifically with
the issue see, amongst many others, G. Noll, ‘Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to
Entry under International Law?’, 17 IJRL (2005), p. 543-573; S. Legomsky, ‘The USA and
the Caribbean Interdiction Program’, 18 IJRL (2006), p. 677-695; and various contributions
in B. Ryan and V. Mitsilegas (eds), Extraterritorial Immigration Control. Legal Challenges,
Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff (2010).
72 U.S. Supreme Court 21 June 1993, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 US 155 (hereafter ‘Sale’);
House of Lords 9 December 2004, Regina v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another
ex parte European Roma Rights Centre and others, [2004] UKHL 55 (hereafter ‘Roma Rights’).
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a duty to protect the persons seeking asylum. The reasoning entertained in
the judgments attracted considerable criticism in legal commentary and con-
trasted the position taken by UNHCR.73 The judgments also raise questions
in view of several pronouncements of human rights treaty monitoring bodies
that the prohibition of refoulement does apply to the transfer or handover of
persons in and to another state.74
The issue of territorial application of the prohibition of refoulement forms
part of the wider debate on the territorial scope of human rights, described
in Chapter 2. Although the notion that a state is not discharged of its human
rights obligations when operating beyond its territories has now established
itself as a general rule, it presupposes that a specific human rights obligation
does lend itself to extraterritorial application.75 The question of territorial
effect of the prohibition of refoulement rests therefore not only upon general
human rights theory but also on the potential existence of explicit or implied
territorial restrictions in the various provisions laying down a prohibition of
refoulement. Not all human rights, due to their nature or wording, can be taken
73 Koh considered the Sale case ‘not lost in the legal but the political arena’ : H.H. Koh,
‘Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council’, 35 Harvard International Law Journal
(1994), p. 20; Henkin referred to the judgment as an ‘eccentric, highly implausible interpreta-
tion of a treaty’: L. Henkin, ‘Notes from the President’, ASIL Newsletter, September-October
1993, p. 1. UNCHR, which had filed amicus curiae briefs in both Sale and Roma Rights,
considered the Supreme Court’s judgment ‘a setback to modern international refugee law’
and ‘a very unfortunate example’: UNHCR EXCOM, ‘UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Responds to US Supreme Court Decision in Sale v Haitian Centers Council’ (released 22
June 1993), excerpts published in 32 International Legal Materials (1993), p. 1215. UNHCR
has repeatedly affirmed that the prohibition of refoulement applies wherever a state operates
– including at the frontier, on the high seas or on the territory of another state: UNHCR,
‘Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol’, Geneva, 26
January 2007, para 43; UNHCR, EXCOM, ‘Interception of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees:
The International Framework and Recommendations for a Comprehensive Approach’, UN
Doc. EC/50/SC/CRP.17, 9 June 2000, para 23. For further commentary see eg Legomsky
(2006), p. 686-691; G.S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Haitian Refoulement Case: A Comment’, 6 IJRL
(1994), p. 106-109.
74 The Inter-American Human Rights Commission considered Article 33 Refugee Convention
to apply to the Haitians interdicted on the high seas and found the United States Govern-
ment to have breached its treaty obligations in respect of Article 33: IACHR 13 March 1997,
The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. United States, Case 10.675, Report No. 51/96,
paras. 157-158. More recently, other treaty monitoring bodies have concluded that the
prohibition of refoulement (or: the wider duty not expose a person to ill-treatment) has no
territorial limitations, see the cases of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, Munaf v Romania and Marine
I, discussed in sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 below.
75 In this vein also ICJ 15 October 2008, Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) (Order), I.C.J.
Reports 2008, p. 642, para. 109, where the Court cumulatively observed that there was no
territorial restriction of general nature in the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination nor a specific territorial limitation in the provisions
at issue. See also chapter 2.6.
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to have extraterritorial implications. Article 14 ICESCR, for example, contains
an explicit territorial limitation in that it obliges a state party to secure com-
pulsory primary education ‘in its metropolitan territory or other territories
under its jurisdiction’. Another example is Article 22 (2) of the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Mem-
bers of Their Families, prohibiting expulsion ‘from the territory of a State
Party’. There may further be implied territorial restrictions to the scope of a
human right. In the context of the removal of aliens, the word ‘expulsion’ has
traditionally been understood as referring only to a formal measure of the
state to remove an alien from its territory who had previously been lawfully
staying there.76 Similarly, the practice of exile, or banishment, has been
defined as an order imposed on criminals to depart out of the country and
not to return to it.77 To construe such terms as applying also to state conduct
undertaken outside the state’s territory would contravene the provisions’
ordinary meaning, from which departure is only possible if not doing so would
lead to a result which is ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’.78
It is probably in this context – and this argument applies to the Refugee
Convention in particular – that it has been submitted that the obligation of
non-refoulement pertains to issues of admission to and expulsion from a state’s
territory only, and that it cannot therefore be read as regulating the conduct
of states outside their borders.79 Should this view be correct, the prohibition
of refoulement may be considered as lex specialis not subject to the general rule
that human rights obligations can also bind states when operating beyond
their borders. Hereunder, a comparative analysis is made of the text and nature
of the prohibitions of refoulement established under the Refugee Convention,
CAT, ECRH and ICCPR. Specific merit is paid to legal discussions surrounding
the Sale and Roma Rights judgments. It is argued that, although the prohibitions
of refoulement established under Article 33 Refugee Convention and Article 3
CAT are indeed equipped with specific delimiting terminology not present
under the more generally framed protective duties under the ECRH and ICCPR,
none of the prohibitions of refoulement contain language which opposes a
reading in line with general human rights theory that they can apply, as a
matter of principle, to external activity of states.
76 The European Court of Human Rights employs the term expulsion however also in regard
of removals from a state’s territory raising issues under Article 3 ECHR regardless of
previous legal residence. See further infra n. 92 and accompanying text.
77 Hobbes defined the term exile as follows: ‘Exile (banishment) is when a man is for a crime
condemned to depart out of the dominion of the Commonwealth, or out of a certain part
thereof, and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it’. Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan. The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil (1651),
(translated A. Martinich, Broadview Press (2002)), Part II, Chapter 28, p. 235.
78 Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. On the ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’-test, see R.K. Gardiner,
Treaty Interpretation, Oxford University Press (2008), p. 329-330.
79 In this vein: Roma Rights, para. 64.
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4.3.1 Extraterritorial application of the prohibition of refoulement under the
Refugee Convention
The Refugee Convention does not contain a general provision outlining its
personal scope but sets out a hierarchy of attachments of the individual with
the state in delimiting the personal scope of application of the various rights
contained therein.80 Some rights accrue to all refugees ‘present within a state’s
territory’,81 other rights are reserved to those ‘lawfully within the state’82
and still others can only be invoked by refugees who have their ‘habitual
residence’ in a contracting state.83 This continuum of legal attachments reflects
the intention of the drafters of the Refugee Convention that not all refugees
should be able to claim all benefits contained in the Refugee Convention –
and in particular not those refugees who had ‘imposed themselves upon the
hospitality of [reception] countries’,84 and that some rights should only be
granted after the legal position of the refugee was regularised.85
While a majority of rights contained in the Refugee Convention specifically
refer to the required level of attachment of the refugee with the state, some
core rights, including the prohibition of refoulement laid down in Article 33(1),
are not equipped with any qualification as to the required legal or physical
relationship between the state and the refugee.86 Logically, this unqualified
nature gives rise to an assumption that these rights have a broader personal
scope than other Convention rights and do not necessarily depend on any
of the attachments mentioned under the other Convention rights. This as-
sumption finds support in the Convention’s drafting history, from which it
transpires that these rights were considered so central to refugee protection
that they had to be accorded to all refugees.87
In defining the territorial scope of the prohibition of refoulement laid down
in Article 33(1) Refugee Convention, we may depart from the understanding
that it applies to all refugees present on a state’s territory. At the other extreme
end of the territorial scale, it does not appear that Article 33(1) can be invoked
by persons still within their country of origin. Because Article 33(1) only
applies to refugees, and because only persons outside their country of national-
ity can be defined as refugees, a textual interpretation of the prohibition of
refoulement dictates that it cannot apply to persons who remain inside their
80 For an extensive overview see Hathaway (2005), p. 156-192.
81 Articles 4 (freedom of religion), 27 (right to identity papers), 31(1) (prohibition to impose
penalties for illegal entry) Refugee Convention.
82 Articles 18 (right to self-employment), 26 (freedom of movement), 32 (prohibition of
expulsion save on grounds of national security or public order).
83 Articles 14 (artistic rights and industrial property), 16(2) (access to courts).
84 Statement of Mr. Cuvelier of Belgium, UN Doc. E/AC/32/SR.7, 23 January 1950.
85 Hathaway (2005), p. 157.
86 Also see Articles 3, 13, 16(1), 20, 22, 29 and 34.
87 Hathaway (2005), p. 157, 160-164.
Extraterritorial asylum under international law 133
country of origin.88 The incorporation of this territorial restriction in the
refugee definition is normally explained from the principle of territorial sover-
eignty: a state should not be obliged to grant protection if it constitutes an
interference in the domestic affairs of another state.89
Discord arises as to the applicability of Article 33(1) between these two
territorial extremes. Does it apply to the activity of a state in a third state?
Does it apply to activity at the high seas? And does it apply to refugees who
are at the threshold of entry, namely at the border but not yet within the
territory of the state? In Sale, the US Supreme Court concluded that the text
of Article 33 makes clear that it does not govern State Parties’ conduct outside
their national borders, although it was seen to cover exclusion at the border,
an interpretation which in the Court’s view is confirmed by the negotiating
history of the Convention.90 In Roma Rights, the House of Lords concurred
with the Supreme Court’s finding that the Refugee Convention lacks any
provision requiring a State to abstain from controlling the movements of people
outside its border and took this to imply that Article 33(1) Refugee Convention
neither applies to rejection at the frontier.91 It is notable that, although the
House of Lords saw its own interpretation of Article 33(1) confirmed by the
earlier judgment of the US Supreme Court, the line of reasoning of both courts
differs markedly. Not only did the courts apply divergent rules on treaty
interpretation, the courts also arrived at opposing outcomes on two crucial
issues, namely the applicability of Article 33(1) to rejections at the border and
the ordinary meaning of the term ‘return’. In scrutinizing the merits of both
judgments hereunder, it is submitted that both decisions rely on a doubtful
88 Article 1 (A)(2) Refugee Convention. According to the UNHCR Handbook: ‘It is a general
requirement for refugee status that an applicant who has a nationality be outside the country
of his nationality. There are no exceptions to this rule. International protection cannot come
into play as long as a person is within the territorial jurisdiction of his home country.’
UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, January 1992,
UN Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1, para. 88. Also Roma Rights, para. 64.
89 See, more extensively, chapter 8.1.
90 Sale at 181-182.
91 Roma Rights, esp. paras. 17, 64, 70. At first glance, the potential applicability of Article 33(1)
Refugee Convention to the situation at Prague Airport case appears problematic, because
the Roma asylum-seekers were of Czech nationality and still within their own country and
could therefore not be properly defined as refugees. It was nonetheless submitted by the
appellants that the actions of the immigration officers violated the principle of ‘good faith’
in implementing the Refugee Convention; that the acts had defeated the ‘object and purpose’
of the prohibition of refoulement; and that the principle of non-refoulement had established
itself as a rule of customary international law which applied regardless of the place where
the State would undertake to expose refugees to persecution or other forms of ill-treatment.
See, for an extensive exposé of these arguments the letter amicus curiae filed by UNHCR,
‘R (ex parte European Roma Rights Centre et al) v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport
and another (UNHCR intervening)’, reprinted in 17 IJRL (2005), p. 432-440.
134 Chapter 4
interpretation of the meaning of the term ‘return’ (‘refouler’) and an unconvinc-
ing reading of the travaux préparatoires.
4.3.1.1 The judgments in Sale and Roma Rights
The text, ordinary meaning and special meaning
In ascertaining the territorial scope of state obligations under Article 33(1),
the US Supreme Court and the House of Lords both addressed at length the
appropriate meaning of the words ‘expel or return (‘refouler’)’. The word ‘expel’
did not give rise to controversy. Both courts noted that the term is generally
understood as referring to the deportation of aliens who are already present
in the host country and can therefore not cover acts undertaken outside a
state’s territory.92 This view is supported in various legal commentaries.93
Discord did arise with regard to the verb ‘return’. In line with Article 31(4)
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – holding that a special
meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended – the Supreme Court referred to the parenthetical reference in Article
33(1) to the French verb ‘refouler’ and concluded that ‘return’ has a legal
meaning narrower than its common meaning. Because the French word ‘re-
fouler’ is not an exact synonym for the word ‘return’, and is commonly trans-
lated as ‘repulse’, ‘repel’ and ‘drive back’, the Supreme Court took these
translations to imply that ‘return’ means a ‘defensive act of resistance or
exclusion at a border, rather than an act of transporting someone to a particular
destination.’94 Accordingly, the US Supreme Court found the Refugee Conven-
tion to be applicable to the rejection of refugees at the border, but not applic-
able to the physical transportation of refugees who have never presented
themselves at a state’s national borders.95
92 Sale at 180. Roma Rights, para. 17.
93 It seems that we can still subscribe the view of Grahl-Madsen, that ‘the term “expulsion”
refers to a formal measure which is used against aliens who have so far been lawfully
staying in the country’; A. Grahl-Madsen, Commentary of the Refugee Convention 1951 (Articles
2-11, 13-37), written in 1963, re-published by UNHCR, October 1997 (under Article 33,
Comments, para. 2); Also see P. Weis, The Refugee Convention, 1951. The Travaux Préparatoires
Analysed with a Commentary by the Late Dr Paul Weis, Cambridge University Press (1995),
p. 328, 334-335. But see G.S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law,
Oxford University Press (2007), p. 206, who submit that the term ‘expel’ has no precise
meaning in general international law. It is also noteworthy that various provisions of human
rights treaties refer to ‘expulsion’ explicitly in connection to a state’s ‘territory’: eg Article
22(2) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families and Article 3 (1) Protocol 4 ECHR. These references must either
be seen as tautological or as acknowledgement that expulsion not necessarily occurs from
a state’s territory alone. Also see n. 76 supra.
94 Sale at 181-182.
95 Ibid.
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The House of Lords also accepted that the word ‘refouler’ may have a
different dictionary definition than the word return, but reasoned that the
putting of the French word ‘refouler’ between brackets in the English text was
done to clarify the meaning of the word ‘refouler’ rather than ‘return’. Accord-
ing to Lord Bingham of Cornhill, the requirement of Article 31(4) VCLT that
a special meaning is to be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended was pertinent, because ‘the parties have made plain that “refouler”,
whatever its wider dictionary definition, is in this context to be understood
as meaning “return”.’96 And because the term ‘return’ was considered only
applicable to measures imposed on refugees within the territory but not yet
resident there, Article 33(1) not only has no bearing on refugees outside a
state’s territory, but neither on refugees who are rejected at the border.97
The explanation of the Supreme Court for the inclusion of the term ‘refouler’
in the English text is more plausible than the one of the House of Lords. If
the intention of the Convention drafters had indeed been to make clear that
the French word ‘refouler’ was to have no different meaning than the English
word return, one should have expected the drafters to clarify the French
version of the treaty by inserting the English word return between brackets,
rather than the other way around. It indeed appears from the negotiating
history that the drafters were primarily occupied with finding an appropriate
translation for the French word ‘refouler’. This term had also featured in the
1933 Refugee Convention, of which only the French language version was
authentic, and which had been translated in the unauthentic English version
as ‘non-admittance at the frontier’, and with reference to the French word
‘refouler’ between brackets.98 In discussing the meaning of the term ‘return’
during one of the last sessions of the conference of plenipotentiaries in 1951,
the United Kingdom delegate had remarked that the Style Committee had
considered that the word return was the nearest equivalent in English to the
French word ‘refoulement’, from which the delegate deduced that the word
‘return’ had no wider meaning than the French term ‘refouler’. Upon this
remark, the president had proposed to insert the French word ‘refouler’ in
brackets in the English text, as had also been done in the 1933 Convention.99
In line with Article 31(4) VCLT, we may hence assume that the parenthetical
reference in Article 33(1) to the French verb ‘refouler’ suggests that return has
96 Roma Rights, paras. 17-18, per lord Bingham of Cornhill; Lord Hope of Craighead appears
to share this interpretation, see para. 70.
97 Ibid. Both Law Lords derived this narrow interpretation of the word return from early
legal commentaries to the Refugee Convention.
98 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, 28 October 1933, 159 LNTS
200, Article 3.
99 Statements of Mr. Hoare from the United Kingdom and Mr. Larsen (President), UN Doc.
A/CONF.2/SR.35, p. 21-22.
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no meaning different than the word ‘refouler’, an interpretation confirmed by
the preparatory works of the treaty.100
In elaborating upon the ordinary meaning of the term ‘refouler’ – and hence,
the special meaning of the term ‘return’ – an interpretation that it includes
exclusion at the border appears valid. Grahl-Madsen has explained:
‘The word “refoulement” is used in Belgium and France to describe a more informal
way of removing a person from the territory and also to describe non-admittance
at the frontier. It may be applied to persons seeking admission, persons illegally
present in a country, and persons admitted temporarily or conditionally, in the
latter case, however, only if the conditions of their stay have been violated.’101
As noted above, the statement that ‘refoulement’ includes exclusion at the
frontier is supported by the 1933 Refugee Convention, where the word ‘refoule-
ment’ in the official French text was translated as ‘non-admittance at the
frontier’.102 It was further expressly stated during the drafting of the 1951
Convention that the practice of ‘refouler’ – unknown to English-speaking
countries – consisted of non-admittance orders enacted by police measures.103
What remains problematic in the US Supreme Court’s judgment, is that
the Court defines the ordinary meaning of the term ‘refouler’ not merely by
referring to its literary connotation, but by additionally assuming that ‘refoule-
ment’ is not known to apply to practices beyond the border. Hathaway has
aptly observed that this is simply reflective of the empirical reality that at the
time the Convention was drafted no country had ever attempted to deter
refugees outside its borders, from which it not automatically follows that the
term ‘refouler’ cannot be used to describe such practices.104 Indeed, it does
not appear from the French dictionary that ‘refouler’ has any geographical
connotation.105 This flaw in the Court’s deductive reasoning was also
addressed by the dissent in Sale:
100 Article 32 VCLT.
101 Grahl-Madsen (1963/UNHCR 1997) (under Article 33, Comments, para. 2).
102 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, referring to the commentary of Grahl-Madsen, nonetheless
concluded that the word ‘refouler’ in the 1933 Convention was not used to mean ‘refuse
entry’, Roma Rights, para. 13. This appears to be a misreading however: the explicit require-
ment formulated in the 1933 Convention that the prohibition of refoulement applies only
to refugees who have been authorized to reside regularly adjusts the scope of the provision
rather than the meaning of the term refoulement.
103 Statements of Mr. Giraud (Secretariat) and Mr. Cuvelier of Belgium, UN Doc. E/AC.32/
SR.21 (2 February 1950), paras. 14-15; Statement of Mr. Cuvelier of Belgium, UN Doc. E/
AC.32/SR.20 (1 February 1950), para. 47.
104 Hathaway (2005), p. 337.
105 The Cambridge Klett Compact Dictionary (2003) gives the following translation: 1. (re-
pousser: attaque, envahisseur) to push back; (foule) to drive back; (intrus) to turn back; (de-
mande) to reject 2. (réprimer) to hold back; ~ sa colère to keep one’s anger in check; (pulsion)
to repress; (souvenir) to suppress; (larmes) to choke back.
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‘I am at a loss to find the narrow notion of “exclusion at a border” in broad terms
like “repulse,” “repel,” and “drive back.” Gage was repulsed (initially) at Bunker
Hill. Lee was repelled at Gettysburg. Rommel was driven back across North Africa.
The majority’s puzzling progression (“refouler” means repel or drive back; therefore
“return” means only exclude at a border; therefore the treaty does not apply) hardly
justifies a departure from the path of ordinary meaning. The text of Article 33.1
is clear, and whether the operative term is “return” or “refouler,” it prohibits the
Government’s actions.’106
The negotiating history
The Supreme Court concluded that ‘the text of Article 33 cannot be reasonably
be read to say anything at all about a nation’s actions toward aliens outside
its own territory’, and saw this textual analysis confirmed in commentaries
to the Convention and by statements made during the Convention’s drafting
history. The House of Lords also referred to the Convention’s drafting history,
but appeared to do so not in order to confirm its textual interpretation of
Article 33(1), but because the meaning of the provision was in doubt, in which
case recourse may be had to the travaux préparatoires to determine the meaning
of the terms of a treaty (Article 32(a) VCLT).
The Supreme Court referred to contributions made by the Swiss and Dutch
delegates during the conference of plenipotentiaries, which had both expressed
the view that the provision on non-refoulement should apply only to those who
are already admitted into a country (‘expel’) and those who are already within
a country but not yet resident there (‘return’).107 The Dutch delegate had
stated that he had gathered that the general consensus of opinion was in favor
of this interpretation.108 If taking the statements of the Dutch delegate for
granted, this would mean that the Supreme Court’s observation that ‘return’
must be understood as applying inter alia to exclusion at the border is also
to be discarded. The Swiss and Dutch statements have not been without
ramifications. Not only were they relied upon by the Supreme Court to deny
extraterritorial effect of Article 33; the commentaries of Robinson and Grahl-
Madsen, long taken as authoritative – and on which especially the House of
Lords relied upon in its interpretation of the word ‘return’ – denied extraterri-
torial applicability of the Convention by referring precisely to these state-
ments.109
106 Sale at 192-193.
107 Ibid, at 184-186.
108 For the statements of the Swiss and Dutch delegates, see UN Docs. A/CONF.2/SR.16, p.
6 (11 July 1951) and A/CONF.2/SR.35 (25 July 1951), p. 21-22.
109 N. Robinson, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Its History, Contents and Interpreta-
tion, Institute of Jewish Affairs, New York (1953), see esp. p. 139 at footnote 275; and Grahl-
Madsen (1963/UNHCR 1997) (under Article 33, Comments, para. 3). It is worth noting
how Grahl-Madsen grapples with the peculiar results of his own narrow territorial approach:
‘And if the frontier control post is at some distance (a yard, a hundred meters) from the
actual frontier, so that anyone approaching the frontier control point is actually in the
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There are two reasons to treat the delegates remarks with caution. First,
the declarations made by the Swiss and Dutch appear to have been instigated
by a fear that Contracting States would be compelled to allow mass migrations
across their frontiers.110 Indeed, the Dutch delegate had only wished ‘to have
it placed on the record that the Conference was in agreement with the inter-
pretation that the possibility of mass migration across frontiers or of attempted
mass migrations was not covered by article 33’, to which no objections were
made.111 Accordingly, the only interpretation placed on the record (but not
voted upon112) was that Article 33(1) was considered not to cover mass migra-
tions – not that return only applies to those already within a country but not
resident there.
Secondly, the rather isolated comments of the two delegates stand in sharp
contrast with the views on this particular issue taken by the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee on Statelessness and Related Problems, which prepared the draft text
forwarded for adoption to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries. The Ad Hoc
Committee had extensively debated the provision laying down the prohibition
of refoulement and had achieved consensus on the substance of the obligation.
In discussing differences in state practice as regards deportation and non-
admission, the US delegate had stated that the Convention ought to apply to
persons who asked to enter the territory of the contracting parties and that
country, he may be refused permission to proceed farther inland, but he must be allowed
to stay in the bit of the territory which is situated between the actual frontier line and the
control post, because any other course of action would mean a violation of Article 33 (1).’
In an effort to explain why these results – which Grahl-Madsen admits may seem strange
from a logical point of view – are nonetheless not devoid of merit, Grahl-Madsen continues
by giving an even more bewildering statement: ‘It must be remembered that the Refugee
Convention to a certain extent is a result of the pressure by humanitarian interested persons
on Governments, and that public opinion is apt to concern itself much more with the
individual who has set foot on the nation’s territory and thus is within the power of the
national authorities, than with people only seen as shadows or moving figures “at the other
side of the fence.” The latter have not materialized as human beings [sic], and it is much
easier to shed responsibility for a mass of unknown people than for the individual whose
fate one has to decide.’
110 Mr. Zutter, the Swiss delegate had remarked that Switzerland would only be willing to
accept the provision on non-refoulement if the other delegates accepted his interpretation
that the word return applied solely to refugees who had already entered a country but
were not yet resident there and that ‘[a]ccording to that interpretation, States were not
compelled to allow large groups of persons claiming refugee status to cross its frontiers.’
Statement of Mr. Zutter from Switzerland, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16, p. 6 (11 July 1951).
The Dutch delegate similarly communicated: ‘article 28 [current Article 33 – author] would
not have involved any obligations in the possible case of mass migrations across frontiers
or attempted mass migrations.’ And: ‘The Netherlands could not accept any legal obligations
in respect of large groups of refugees seeking access to its territory.’ Statements of Baron
van Boetzelaer of the Netherlands, A/CONF.2/SR.35 (25 July 1951), p. 21-22.
111 Ibid, Statement of Baron van Boetzelaer of the Netherlands.
112 The dissent in Sale observed that the fragments of the negotiating history referred to by
the majority ‘were never voted on or adopted, probably represent a minority view, and
in any event do not address the issue in this case’, Sale at 198.
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‘[w]hether it was a question of closing the frontier to a refugee who asked
admittance, or of turning him back after he had crossed the frontier, or even
of expelling him after he had been admitted to residence in the territory, the
problem was more or less the same.’113 The Israeli delegate confirmed this
view by declaring that ‘[t]he Article must, in fact, apply to all refugees, whether
or not they were admitted to residence; it must deal with both expulsion and
non-admittance, and must grant to all refugees the guarantees provided in
the draft (…).’114 The Belgian delegate explained that ‘the term ‘expulsion’
was used when the refugee concerned had committed some criminal offence,
whereas the term ‘refoulement’ was used in cases when the refugee was
deported or refused admittance because his presence in the country was
considered undesirable.’115 The UK delegate concluded that the notion of
‘refoulement’ could apply to (1) refugees seeking admission, (2) refugees illegally
present in a country, and (3) refugees admitted temporarily or condition-
ally.’116 Suspending the discussion, the chairman observed that ‘it had in-
dicated agreement on the principle that refugees fleeing from persecution
should not be pushed back into the arms of their persecutors’.117
Although one could contend that in using the travaux as means of treaty
interpretation greater weight should be accorded to declarations made during
the Conference on Plenipotentiaries than in the Ad Hoc Committee, the un-
equivocal and concerted nature of statements made in the latter undermines
the House of Lords’ observation that the travaux préparatoires yield ‘a clear
and authorative’ answer to the question of territorial scope of Article 33.118
It is regrettable that, while relying heavily on the travaux, the House of Lords
and US Supreme Court failed to take note of these earlier discussions.119
Object and purpose
It is not surprising that the judgments in Sale and Roma Rights have attracted
widespread criticism. Apart from apparent flaws in the courts’ lines of reason-
ing, various commentators have submitted that the conclusion that Article
33(1) cannot have extraterritorial application sincerely jeopardizes the effective
meaning of the prohibition of refoulement, because it would allow states to
simply circumvent their obligations by going forth and seize aliens outside
113 Statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States, UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.20, 1 February 1950,
paras. 54-56.
114 Statement of Mr. Robinson of Israel, ibid, para. 60.
115 Statement of Mr. Cuvelier of Belgium, UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.21, 2 February 1950, para. 15.
116 Statement of Sir Leslie Brass of the United Kingdom, ibid, para. 16.
117 Statement of Mr. Leslie Chance of Canada, ibid, para. 26.
118 Roma Rights, para 17.
119 It remains unclear why no weight was accorded to those earlier proceedings. In its letter
amicus curiae to the Supreme Court in Sale, UNHCR did refer to statements made in the
Ad Hoc Committee, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘The
Haitian Interdiction Case 1993, Brief amicus curiae’, re-printed in 6 IJRL (1994), p. 100.
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their borders and return them to persecution, a course of conduct striking at
the heart of the provision’s basic purpose and the humanitarian intentions
of the Refugee Convention.120 These authors underline that the essential pur-
pose of Article 33 is to prevent refugees from ending up in the country they
were fleeing to escape.121
Both in Sale and the Roma Rights case, the applicants had advanced that
the object and purpose of Article 33(1) would militate against the conduct
complained of. In the Roma Rights case, it was also contended that the principle
of good faith, referred to in Article 26 and Article 31(1) VCLT, would oppose
state conduct that would prevent the Refugee Convention of being triggered.
The US Supreme Court admitted that to gather fleeing refugees and return
them to the one country they were fleeing to escape, ‘may violate the spirit
of Article 33’, but reasoned that ‘a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated
extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it through no more than its
general humanitarian intent’.122 Because it had already concluded that the
text of Article 33(1) could not reasonably be read to say anything at all about
a nation’s actions toward aliens outside its own territory, the object and
purpose of the treaty were too meager a basis for establishing a finding to
the contrary. The House of Lords concurred with this reasoning and additional-
ly observed that the facts of the Roma Rights case differed on a crucial point
from the plight of the interdicted Haitians. The Haitians were clearly outside
Haiti, their country of nationality, and could therefore be defined as refugees,
while the Roma were still within their own country and could not be so
defined.123 Accordingly, the House of Lords understandably concluded that
to rely on the principle of good faith in considering the Refugee Convention
applicable to the Roma asylum-seekers, would impose new obligations on State
Parties in conflict with the clear Convention wording that protection is only
to be assured to persons who are in countries that are not their own.124
120 See the dissent in Sale, at 197. Also see H.H. Koh, ‘The “Haiti Paradigm” in United States
Human Rights Policy’, 103 Yale Law Journal (1994), p. 2417; Hathaway (2005), p. 318.
121 This also transpires from the drafting sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness
and Related Problems. The Canadian chairman had gathered that there was agreement
among the delegates on the principle that ‘refugees fleeing from persecution on account
of their race, religion, nationality or political opinions should not be pushed back into the
arms of their persecutors’, Statement of Mr. Chance of Canada, UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.21,
2 February 1950, para. 26. In commenting upon the Sale judgment, Louis Henkin, former
US delegate in the Ad Hoc Committee, had found it ‘incredible that states that had agreed
not to force any human being back into the hands of their oppressors intended to leave
themselves free to reach out beyond their territory to seize a refugee and return him to
the country from which he sought to escape’. Henkin (1993), p. 1.
122 Sale at 183.
123 Roma Rights, paras. 18, 21, 26, 64
124 Ibid, para. 63.
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4.3.1.2 Interim conclusion
Following the VCLT rules on treaty interpretation and the considerations above,
the most plausible approach for interpreting the territorial scope of Article
33(1) Refugee Convention would be to conceive the term ‘return’ in accordance
with the French term ‘refouler’, which translates as defensive or exclusive acts
and which is not necessarily restricted to conduct undertaken within the state’s
territory (Article 31(4) VCLT). That Article 33(1) includes rejection at the border
and outside the border is in line with the object and purpose of the provision
(Article 31(1) VCLT). Because the meaning of the terms ‘refouler’ (and hence,
‘return’) and the object and purpose of the provision shed sufficient light on
the question of territorial scope, it is not necessary to have recourse to the
preparatory work of the treaty (Article 32 VCLT), which in any event does not
yield a clear answer to the anticipated territorial scope of the provision. This
interpretation finds further contextual support in the phrase not to return a
refugee ‘in any manner whatsoever’ laid down in Article 33(1) Refugee Con-
vention, which reflects the notion that the form or manner of the act amounting
to expulsion or return is immaterial and that it may cover a great variety of
measures by which refugees are expelled, refused admittance or removed.125
It does however not follow that Article 33(1) Refugee Convention can apply
to all excluding acts vis-à-vis refugees undertaken outside the state’s territory.
Firstly, as mentioned above, the provision does not cover persons still within
their country of nationality or habitual residence. Secondly, it follows from
the words ‘to the frontier of territories’ that only acts of return (or other defens-
ive acts) taking place outside the territory where persecution is feared can come
within its ambit. This not only affirms the finding that the Refugee Convention
is anyhow not applicable to persons still within their country of origin, but
also means that Article 33(1), which can also protect against persecution in
125 E. Lauterpacht and D. Betlehem, ‘The scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement:
Opinion’, in: E. Feller c.s. (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law. UNHCR’s Global
Consultations on International Protection, Cambridge University Press (2003), p. 112. Hathaway
(2005), p. 317-322. Note however that the formula ‘in any manner whatsoever’ does not
detract from the requirement that the act must still qualify as an act of ‘expulsion’ or ‘return
(‘refouler’)’. It is unclear, for example, whether the act of extradition, in form and manner
very similar to the act of expulsion, comes within the ambit of Article 33 Refugee Conven-
tion. Lauterpacht and Betlehem infer from the wordings ‘in any manner whatsoever’ that
Article 33 also covers extradition: Lauterpacht and Betlehem (2003), p. 112-113. Goodwin-Gill
and McAdam note that although the preparatory work indicates that Article 33(1) did not
prejudice extradition, state practice indicates that non-refoulement also protects refugees from
being extradited. This conclusion is however mainly based on developments under the
ECHR, CAT and ICCPR; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) p. 257-262. Under the ECHR,
the word expulsion is expressly understood not to cover extradition: ‘With the exception
of extradition, any measure compelling the alien’s departure from the territory where he
was lawfully resident constitutes “expulsion” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No.
7’; ECtHR 12 February 2009, Nolan and K. v Russia, no. 2512/04, para. 112.
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a third country,126 cannot literally be construed as applying to excluding
acts undertaken within a third country where persecution is feared: one cannot
return (or ‘drive back’) a person to the territory of a third state if that person
already finds himself in that territory. It appears, in other words, that Article
33(1) Refugee Convention can only apply to activity which involves the cross-
ing of the border of the state where the persecution takes place.
4.3.2 Extraterritorial application of the prohibition of refoulement under the
Convention Against Torture
The Convention Against Torture does not contain a general clause setting out
the personal or territorial scope of the treaty, but several provisions in the CAT
limit their application to ‘any territory under a State Party’s jurisdiction’.127
These terms have been interpreted by the Committee Against Torture much
in line with the approaches of the ECtHR and HRC set out in Chapter 2 of this
book. In response to the position recently taken up by the US government that
Article 2 CAT (the obligation to prevent torture), applies only to US territory
and not to the detention facilities located in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, the CAT
considered that
‘the provisions of the Convention expressed as applicable to “territory under the
State party’s jurisdiction” apply to, and are fully enjoyed, by all persons under
the effective control of its authorities, of whichever type, wherever located in the
world.’128
A similar formula is now included in General Comment No. 2, on the scope
of Contracting States’ obligations under Article 2 CAT.129 It may be noted
that although Article 2 CAT speaks of jurisdiction over territory, the Committee
speaks of jurisdiction – in the sense of effective control – over persons. To some
126 This follows from the words ‘the frontiers of territories where (…).’ See E. Lauterpacht and
D. Betlehem, ‘The scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement: Opinion’, in: E.
Feller c.s. (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law. UNHCR’s Global Consultations on
International Protection, Cambridge University Press (2003), p. 122.
127 This wording is found in Articles 2(1), 5(2), 11, 12, 13 and 16 CAT.
128 Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, United States of
America, CAT/C/USA/CO/2, 25 July 2006, para. 15.
129 ComAT, General Comment no. 2, CAT/C/GC/2, 24 January 2008, para 16: ‘The Committee
has recognized that “any territory” includes all areas where the State party exercises, directly
or indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de facto effective control, in accordance with
international law. The reference to “any territory” in article 2, like that in articles 5, 11,
12, 13 and 16, refers to prohibited acts committed not only on board a ship or aircraft
registered by a State party, but also during military occupation or peacekeeping operations
and in such places as embassies, military bases, detention facilities, or other areas over
which a State exercises factual or effective control.’
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extent, this interpretation corresponds with the treaty’s preparatory work. The
original obligation to prevent torture had prevented torture from being
practiced ‘within its [a State Party’s – author] jurisdiction’,130 but these words
were replaced with the words ‘any territory under its jurisdiction’, under the
reasoning that nationals (who for some purposes may be considered to fall
under the state’s legislative jurisdiction) living in another country should not
be able to rely on such protection.131 It was nonetheless underlined that ‘any
territory under its jurisdiction’ could also refer to acts taking place in such
foreign locations as ships, aircrafts and occupied territories.132 Similar to the
discussions in the preparatory stages of the ECRH and ICCPR therefore, the
preparatory work of the CAT suggests that the drafters were well aware of
the limits to a state’s capacity to provide human rights protection abroad, but
that they also agreed that when states would embark upon extraterritorial
adventures, the CAT would not automatically be void of meaning.133
Article 3 CAT explicitly prohibits refoulement. The provision was partly
modeled after Article 33 Refugee Convention and is equipped with similar
terminology.134 It prohibits states to ‘expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite
a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture’. Article 3 CAT does
not contain a reference to the jurisdiction or territory of the State Party, but
the references in other Convention provisions to territories under a state’s
jurisdiction support a contextual understanding that Article 3 CAT may also
apply extraterritorially. This was confirmed by the Committee in its view in
the Marine I case, concerning the Spanish rescue and processing of a group
of migrants whose ship had been in distress close to the shores of Senegal and
who were subsequently brought to an abandoned fish processing plant in
Mauritania. The Committee considered that its interpretation of the concept
of jurisdiction as reflected in General Comment No. 2 is applicable in respect
not only of Article 2, but of all provisions of the Convention, and that ‘such
jurisdiction must also include situations where a State Party exercises, directly
or indirectly, de facto or de jure control over persons in detention’.135 It
observed that Spain maintained control over the persons on board the Marine I
from the time the vessel was rescued and throughout the identification and
repatriation process that took place at the plant in Mauritania and that, by
130 GA Res. 3452 (XXX) of 9 December 1975 and UN Doc. E/CN.4/1285.
131 UN Doc. E/CN.4/L. 1470, para. 30.
132 Ibid. For a commentary and further references, see M. Nowak and E. McArthur, The United
Nations Convention Against Torture. A Commentary, Oxford University Press (2008), p. 92.
133 See chapter 2.3.
134 On the drafting of Article 3 CAT and its relationship with Article 33 Refugee Convention,
see G. Noll, Negotiating Asylum. The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common
Market of Deflection, The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff (2000), p. 435-437 and
Nowak and McArthur (2008), p. 134, 195.
135 ComAT 21 November 2008, J.H.A. v Spain (Marine I), no. 323/2007, para. 8.2.
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virtue of that control, the alleged victims were subject to Spanish jurisdiction
for the purpose of the complaints regarding possible onward removal of the
migrants to the conflict in Kashmir in violation of Article 3.
The extraterritorial application of Article 3 CAT was also addressed by the
Committee Against Torture in the context of the transfer of detainees held
in custody by United Kingdom military forces in Afghanistan and Iraq to the
Iraqi and Afghan authorities. Regarding these transfers, the Committee
observed that ‘the Convention protections extend to all territories under the
jurisdiction of a State Party and considers that this principle includes all areas
under the de facto effective control of the State Party’s authorities’. Specifically
referring to the prohibition of refoulement, the Committee recommended that
‘the State Party should apply articles 2 and/or 3, as appropriate, to transfers
of a detainee within a State Party’s custody to the custody whether de facto
or de jure of any other State.’136
It was concluded above that the wording of Article 33 Refugee Convention
makes it difficult to bring persons under its ambit who are still within the
country from which the threat with persecution emanates. This limitation is
also present under Article 3 CAT, which speaks of ‘expel, return (“refouler”)
or extradite a person to another State where (…)’.137 A literal reading would
implicate that Article 3 CAT can only apply to situations where a person is
outside the country from which the threat stems: one can simply not transfer
someone to a place where he already is. This was also the United Kingdom’s
position in response to the Committee’s recommendations on the transfer of
detainees held captive in Iraq and Afghanistan.138 Nowak and McArthur
endorse the Committee’s approach however by holding that ‘[t]aking into
account the purpose of the absolute prohibition of refoulement, the term ‘an-
other’ State should in fact be interpreted as referring to any transfer of a person
from one State jurisdiction to another’.139 It is indeed notable that, different
from Article 33 Refugee Convention, Article 3 CAT does not speak of return
‘to the frontiers of territories’ but of return ‘to another State’. One could
accordingly contend that because the word state not necessarily refers to a
territorial entity but may also refer to all the organs making up a state, Ar-
ticle 3 CAT can be applicable to all situations where a person is transferred
136 Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, United Kingdom,
CAT/C/CR/33/3, 10 December 2004, paras. 4(b) and 5(e).
137 Emphasis added.
138 The UK government argued that ‘[a]lthough a detainee may be physically transferred from
UK to Iraqi custody, there is no question of expulsion, return (refoulement) or extradition
to another State, as referred to in Article 3, all of which include an element of moving a
person from the territory of one State to that of another’, Comments by the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the conclusions and
recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, CAT/C/GBR/CO/4/Add.1, 8 June
2006, para. 14.
139 Nowak and McArthur (2008), p. 199.
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from the organ of one state to another, regardless of any territorial considera-
tions. This suggestion remains problematic nonetheless, because the placement
of the adverb ‘where’ immediately after the term ‘State’ in Article 3 CAT would
appear to indicate that, in the context of Article 3 CAT, the term state has a
geographical rather than a functional meaning (otherwise the adverb should
have been ‘which’). To wit, one could maintain that departure from the strict
literal meaning of Article 3 CAT is justified by the purpose of the absolute
prohibition of torture and the fact that the drafters of the CAT had probably
not contemplated situations in which refoulement would take place in an
extraterritorial setting. Construing Article 3 CAT in this way appears moreover
better possible than under the Refugee Convention, because the CAT was not
designed as an instrument to address the problem of persons having fled their
country of origin, but to maximize the effectiveness of the struggle against
torture throughout the world.140
4.3.2 Extraterritorial application of the prohibition of refoulement under the
ECRH and ICCPR
The difference in approach of, on the one hand, the House of Lords and the
US Supreme Court in interpreting the extraterritorial applicability of Article 33
Refugee Convention, and, on the other hand, the Committee Against Torture
in interpreting Article 3 CAT, is remarkable to say the least, given the similarity
in wording of both provisions. This difference also points to the broader
jurisprudential development in which human rights treaty monitoring bodies
have construed the body of international human rights as having extraterri-
torial implications. On a general level, one may indeed contrast the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality propounded by the House of Lords and
the US Supreme Court in regard of Article 33(1) Refugee Convention not only
with the position taken by the Committee Against Torture, but also with the
considerably more lenient position of the ECtHR and HRC in matters involving
extraterritorial acts of states as described in chapter 2. This difference in
approaches may be explained from the explicit reference in the ECRH and ICCPR
to the term jurisdiction, which is generally accepted to be not necessarily
confined to a state’s territory; and from the fact that Article 33 Refugee Conven-
tion speaks specifically of ‘expel’ and ‘return’, terms which are traditionally
used only in relation to the deportation of persons from a state’s territory. But
it is perhaps also appropriate to acknowledge that, in interpreting treaty terms,
human rights monitoring bodies have tended to attribute primary importance
to a teleological interpretation focused on the object and purpose of the treaty.
Meron and others have observed that this ‘teleological bias’ of human rights
140 See the CAT’s preamble (‘Desiring to make more effective the struggle against torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world’).
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courts has on occasion resulted in the ordinary meaning of treaty terms being
overridden and the legislative history or preparatory work ignored.141
In the context of extraterritorial state activity, the Human Rights Com-
mittee’s interpretation of the terms ‘within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction’ laid down in Article 2(1) ICCPR is perhaps the most salient example
of this development. While it has been (tacitly) acknowledged by the Human
Rights Committee – and explicitly in legal discourse142 – that a literal reading
of this provision can only imply that ‘territory’ and ‘jurisdiction’ are cumulative
requirements for attracting a state’s obligations under the ICCPR, the Human
Rights Committee, in a course later adopted by the International Court of
Justice,143 has discarded this ordinary grammatical meaning by concluding
that ‘it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under
article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State Party to perpetrate violations
of the Covenant on the territory of another state, which violations it could
not perpetrate on its own territory.’144 One may continue to oppose this
approach as being contra legem or as constituting an affront to the mainstream
of international treaty law.145 Nonetheless, the essentially convergent views
of the different human rights treaty bodies and the confirmation thereof by
ICJ, allow us to presently depart from the understanding that human rights
treaties, including the ICCPR, bind states with regard to persons in foreign
territories who can be considered to fall within the jurisdiction of that state.
Because the rights and freedoms defined in human rights treaties benefit
anyone within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State, it may be assumed that
extraterritorial acts of refoulement can bring potential victims within the ambit
141 T. Meron, The Humanization of International Law, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff (2006),
p. 193.
142 See esp. Noll (2000), p. 440; Noll (2005), p. 557.
143 ICJ 9 July 2004, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, paras. 108-111; ICJ 19 December 2005, Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), para. 216.
144 HRC 29 July 1981, Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, no. 52/1979, para. 12.3. In justifying
this departure from the text of Article 2(1) ICCPR, the Committee referred to Article 5 (1)
ICCPR, which stipulates that: ‘[n]othing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as
implying for any state, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant’. Article 5 ICCPR,
a provision otherwise rarely invoked, is reminiscent of the good faith argument brought
forward by the applicants in the Roma Rights case. Tomuschat however, found Article 5
ICCPR to be incorrect as a basis for affirming the applicability of the Covenant outside
a State’s territory and instead suggests that construing the words “within its territory”
pursuant to their strict literal meaning must be rejected because that would lead to ‘utterly
absurd results’. See Individual opinion appended to the Committee’s views of Mr. C.
Tomuschat.
145 Noll (2005), p. 558-564, who, while acknowledging the HRC’s divergent position on the
matter, maintains that ‘[t]he expansion of Article 2(1) ICCPR (…) is hard to justify in
dogmatic terms’, and that the Committee’s interpretation ‘runs counter to the ordinary
meaning of its terms (an ‘and’ not being synonymous to an ‘or’)’, at p. 563.
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of a Contracting State’s obligations. In Roma Rights, Lord Bingham of Cornhill
expressed doubts as to whether the functions performed by British immigration
officers at Prague airport could be said to be an exercise of jurisdiction ‘in any
relevant sense’, but eventually discarded the refoulement-argument based on
Articles 2 and 3 ECRH by submitting that the agreed facts did not disclose any
threat to treatment sufficient to engage Articles 2 and 3.146 It is remarkable
that where the Law Lords scrupulously addressed the issue of extraterritorial
applicability of Article 33 Refugee Convention – which even broadly inter-
preted could not benefit the Roma asylum-seekers since they had not left their
country of origin and could accordingly not be defined as refugees – they only
succinctly touched upon the relevance of the ECRH, which has a considerable
less disputed capacity for giving rise to extraterritorial obligations. What is
also remarkable is that the issue of jurisdiction apparently plaid a role in
establishing whether Articles 2 and 3 ECRH were applicable to the case, but
was not deemed relevant in concluding that the United Kingdom had violated
the prohibition of discrimination under various international treaties, with
explicit references to Articles 2 and 26 ICCPR, Article 14 ECRH, Article 2 ICERD
and Article 3 Refugee Convention.147
Article 3 ECRH and Article 7 ICCPR have been construed by the ECtHR and
HRC as implicitly containing a prohibition of refoulement. Article 3 ECRH and
Article 7 ICCPR do not make mention of such acts as expulsion or return, do
not refer to a location to which the transfer of persons is prohibited, but simply
and boldly pronounce that no one is to be subjected to torture or inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment. Accordingly, the nature of a state’s
obligations under Article 3 ECRH and Article 7 ICCPR is substantially different
from that under Article 3 CAT and Article 33 Refugee Convention. The pro-
hibition of refoulement under the ECRH and ICCPR would not appear to hinge
on the question whether an act can be labeled as ‘expulsion’ or ‘return’; nor
on the question whether a person is actually outside the state from which the
threat with ill-treatment stems.
The rationale for reading a prohibition of refoulement into Article 3 ECRH
was articulated by the ECtHR as follows:
‘In interpreting the Convention regard must be had to its special character as a
treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms
(…). Thus, the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the
protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted
and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective (…). In addition,
any interpretation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed has to be consistent with
146 Roma Rights, para. 21.
147 Roma Rights, paras. 98-100, per Baroness Hale of Richmond. Like Article 33, Article 3 Refugee
Convention does not refer to a required level of attachment between the refugee and the
state.
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“the general spirit of the Convention, an instrument designed to maintain and
promote the ideals and values of a democratic society” (…).
The fact that a specialised treaty should spell out in detail a specific obligation
attaching to the prohibition of torture [Article 3 CAT- MdH] does not mean that
an essentially similar obligation is not already inherent in the general terms of
Article 3 of the European Convention. It would hardly be compatible with the
underlying values of the Convention, that “common heritage of political traditions,
ideals, freedom and the rule of law” to which the Preamble refers, were a Contract-
ing State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State where there were
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected
to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed. Extradition in such
circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief and general wording
of Article 3, would plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of the Article,
and in the Court’s view this inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to
cases in which the fugitive would be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of
exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by that
Article.’148
Accordingly, with references to the object and purpose of both the Convention
as a whole and Article 3, a prohibition of refoulement is inserted in the Euro-
pean Convention. This is notwithstanding the fact that neither the text nor
the drafting history indicates that Article 3 was envisaged to apply to such
situations, notwithstanding that it concerns acts taking place outside a
country’s territory, notwithstanding that it concerns acts committed by or
under the responsibility of another state, and notwithstanding that it concerns
conduct which is yet (and may indeed prove never) to materialize.
In Soering, the key criterion for engaging a State’s responsibility was
formulated as there ‘having been shown substantial grounds for believing that
the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting
country.’149 On a more general note, the Court added that the extraditing
Contracting State’s liability is incurred ‘by reason of its having taken action
which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed
ill-treatment.’150 These considerations put the prohibition of refoulement under
Article 3 ECRH much in line with the Court’s doctrine on positive obligations,
and in particular the duty to protect, requiring states to take measures designed
to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to treat-
ment contrary to Articles 2 and 3. Under this doctrine, states are required to
undertake reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities
had or ought to have had knowledge, regardless of whether the ill-treatment
stems from private persons, from state organs or from naturally occurring
148 ECtHR 7 July 1989, Soering v the United Kingdom, no. 14038/88, paras. 87-88.
149 Ibid, para. 91.
150 Ibid.
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illnesses.151 These categories are also covered by the protection against refoule-
ment.152 And similar to cases concerning expulsion or extradition (or foreign
cases), the existence of a ‘real risk’ of treatment contrary to the Convention
has in domestic situations been considered decisive in enlivening a duty on
the side of the state to undertake protective measures.153
Accordingly, the case law of the European Court is highly supportive of
a general rule that, whenever it is known or when it ought to have been known
that an individual within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State is exposed
to a real risk of ill-treatment, it is incumbent on that state to take steps to
prevent that risk from materializing. Decisive, in this regard, for engaging a
state’s duty to protect is not the form or manner in which the risk materializes,
nor the manner in which the state can negate this risk (be it through providing
police protection,154 through providing necessary medical services,155 by
removing abused children from parental care,156 through not releasing a
dangerous criminal from prison,157 or, indeed, by not expelling a person)
but whether the state has taken reasonable and appropriate preventive
measures to remove the risk of ill-treatment, or at the least to alleviate that
risk to such a level that it is no longer ‘real’ or ‘immediate’.
So construed, the prohibition of refoulement under the ECRH and ICCPR is
essentially an obligation to shield a person from harm. This protective duty
is well apt to apply regardless of territorial considerations, provided that a
person is within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State. In the context of
Article 2 ECRH, the right to life, the ECtHR has confirmed that states may also
incur protective duties in respect of persons outside their national bound-
aries.158 The ECtHR has affirmed that the same rationale applies to situations
where a state transfers or hands over a person in and to a potentially maltreat-
ing state. In the case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, further discussed in section
4.5 below, the ECtHR found the physical transfer of two Iraqi detainees held
in a British military facility in Iraq to the custody of the Iraqi authorities to
have breached the United Kingdom’s obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of
151 ECtHR 28 October 1998, Osman v the United Kingdom, no. 23452/94, para. 115. ECtHR 10
May 2001, Z. a.o. v the United Kingdom, no. 29392/95, para. 73; ECtHR 4 May 2001, Kelly
a.o. v the United Kingdom, no. 30054/96, paras. 94-95; ECtHR 9 June 1998, L.C.B. v the United
Kingdom, no. 23413/94, para. 38.
152 ECtHR 29 April 1997, H.L.R. v France, no. 24573/94 (non-state organs); ECtHR 27 May 2008,
N. v the United Kingdom, no. 26565/05 (natural illness).
153 L.C.B. v the United Kingdom, para. 38; ECtHR 10 October 2000, Akkoc v Turkey, nos. 22947/93
and 22948/93, para. 81; ECtHR 28 March 2000, Mahmut Kaya v Turkey, no. 22535/93, para.
89; Osman v the United Kingdom, para. 116.
154 Osman v the United Kingdom, para. 115-121.
155 L.C.B. v United Kingdom, paras. 36-41.
156 Z. a.o. v the United Kingdom, para. 74.
157 ECtHR 24 October 2002, Mastromatteo v Italy, no. 37703/97, para. 69.
158 ECtHR 11 January 2001, Xhavara a.o. v Italy, appl. 39473/98. ECtHR 24 June 2008, Isaak v
Turkey, appl. 44587/98.
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the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13 because there were substantial
grounds for believing that the applicants would face a real risk of being
sentenced to death and executed.159 A similar reasoning, although no finding
of a violation of the ICCPR, was adopted by the Human Rights Committee in
the case of Munaf v Romania, concerning the handover of an Iraqi-American
dual national from the Romanian embassy in Baghdad to the multinational
forces in Iraq who was subsequently sentenced to death. The Human Rights
Committee held its previous jurisprudence in refoulement-cases to also apply
to the circumstances of this case, but considered that the Romanian authorities
could not have known that the complainant would face criminal charges.160
To conclude, the prohibition of refoulement established under the ECRH and
ICCPR articulates the essential protective duty of a State Party to not expose
a person within its jurisdiction to a real risk of ill-treatment. If established that
a person can be considered to be within the state’s jurisdiction, the state
becomes bound to comply with this protective duty, regardless of whether
the person is on the territory of that state, in his country of origin or in a third
state from which the threat with ill-treatment stems. This is not to exclude
however, that the limited practical and/or legal capabilities a state in certain
foreign situations may have, can inform (or displace) the substance (or material
scope) of a state’s protective duties.161
4.4 THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM
4.4.1 The right to seek asylum in international law
There is no common understanding of ‘the right to seek asylum’ in inter-
national law. Although pronounced in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (together with the right to ‘enjoy’ asylum), the right to seek
asylum was not codified in binding human rights treaties adopted under the
auspices of the United Nations or regional organizations, with the exception
of Article 12(3) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.162
Possibly, the right to seek asylum could be read into the broadly formulated
‘right to asylum’ laid down in Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights.163
159 ECtHR 2 March 2010, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom, no. 61498/08.
160 HRC 21 August 2009, Mohammad Munaf v Romania, no. 1539/2006, paras. 14.2, 14.5.
161 See, in general, chapter 2.5.2; and specifically with respect to situations where human rights
obligations may conflict with obligations vis-à-vis the host state, section 4.5.
162 Article 12(3) African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: ‘Every individual shall have
the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance
with the law of those countries and international conventions.’
163 OJ 2007 C303/01. See further chapter 5.3.3.
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Although lacking a clear basis in treaty law, legal scholars have employed
the right to seek asylum as informing a variety of rights associated with the
institution of asylum, albeit in divergent manner. Some perceive the right to
seek asylum as covering the entire range of rights associated with receiving
a proper status determination in and from the desired state of refuge,164 while
others connect the right to persons who try to flee from persecution but who
are subjected to deterrent mechanisms preventing them from reaching and
successfully claiming asylum in a safe country.165 Notably, most authors
derive from the right to seek asylum obligations of destination countries vis-à-
vis asylum-seekers instead of what could perhaps be its most obvious and
immediate significance: a right to escape from persecution – which is first and
foremost exercisable vis-à-vis the country which one attempts to flee.
It transpires from the drafting history of Article 14 UDHR that the right to
seek asylum was perceived as a right to escape persecution and that this right
did not prejudice the right of the petitioned state to deny asylum. The Drafting
Committee, responsible for preparing the text of the UDHR, had recommended
to include a provision stipulating that “Everyone has the right to escape
persecution on grounds of political or other beliefs or on grounds of racial
prejudice by taking refuge on the territory of any State willing to grant him
asylum”, a right which could be read as exercisable by both the individual
and the state granting asylum vis-à-vis the country of persecution but which
falls short of endowing the individual with a right to be granted asylum.166
Later discussions in the drafting sessions predominantly concerned the question
of whether the provision on asylum should not explicitly recognize a right
of the individual to be granted asylum by another state. A majority of re-
presentatives in the Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights was
in favor of including such a right and provisionally agreed upon the formula
that “Everyone has the right to seek and be granted, in other countries, asylum
from persecution.”167 During the final negotiations In ECOSOC however,
164 D. Stevens, ‘The Asylum and Immigration Act 1996: Erosion of the Right to Seek Asylum’,
61 The Modern Law Review (1998), p. 207-222; K. Coffey, ‘The Due Process Right To Seek
Asylum in the United States: The Immigration Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy’,
19 Yale Law and Policy Review (2001), p. 255-291; E. Ferris, ‘Internal Displacement and the
Right to Seek Asylum’, 27 Refugee Survey Quarterly (2008), p. 76-92; H. O’Nions, ‘The Erosion
of the Right to Seek Asylum’, 2 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues (2006)
165 M. Kjaerum, ‘Article 14’, in: A. Eide et al. (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
A Commentary, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press and Oxford University Press (1992),
p. 221-224; B. Frelick, ‘‘Preventive Protection’ and the Right to Seek Asylum: A Preliminary
Look at Bosnia and Croatia’, 4 IJRL (1992), p. 439-454; T. Gammeltoft-Hansen and H.
Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘The Right to Seek – Revisited. On the UN Human Rights Declaration
Article 14 and Access to Asylum Procedures in the EU’, 10 EJML (2008), p. 439-459.
166 UN Doc. E/CN.4/21, Annex F. For commentaries to the drafting of Article 14 UDHR see
A. Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, vol. II, Leiden: Sijthoff (1972),
p. 100-102; H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, Hamden: Archon Books
(1968 reprint), p. 421-422; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Gammeltoft-Hansen (2008), p. 442-446.
167 UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.57, p. 11.
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several delegations firmly opposed any reference to a right to be granted (or
to obtain) asylum because it was felt that states were not under a general
obligation to admit to their territories all persons fleeing from persecution.168
The United Kingdom delegation instead proposed to refer to the right ‘to seek
and to enjoy asylum’, with the term ‘enjoy’ referring to an individual right
of asylum which is subject to approval of the petitioned state. Even though
some delegations opposed this formula because there was ‘no point in a
guarantee of enjoying asylum unless there was also established the right to
obtain it’, subsequent proposals to insert some form of moral obligation to
grant asylum were all defeated.169
Noting the explicit disclaimer of an intention to assume an obligation to
grant asylum, Lauterpacht concludes that Article 14 of the Declaration is
‘artificial to the point of flippancy’ and that it would be confusing ‘to refer
in this connection to the “right of asylum” – a phrase implying that it is a right
belonging to the individual’.170 Rather, as is also underlined by Grahl-Mad-
sen, Article 14 of the Declaration refers primarily to the right of states to grant
asylum to non-nationals – the right to offer refuge and resist demands for
extradition as discussed in section 4.2.1 – and a corresponding duty of respect
for it on the part of the state of which the refugee is a national (which primar-
ily finds reflection in the word ‘enjoy’).171 In so far as Article 14 UDHR does
provide for a right which can be labeled as a human right, it is the mere right
to seek asylum – a right which, according to Grahl-Madsen, does not say much
more than the right to leave any country including his own, as already secured
by Article 13 (2) UDHR.172
The right to seek asylum is taken here as giving expression to the right of
persons fearing persecution to make use of their right to leave a country for
the specific purpose of trying to obtain asylum. Although the right to seek
asylum and the more generally applicable right to leave a country are only
scarcely touched upon in international refugee law, they would appear to have
special significance in the context of extraterritorial migration controls, precisely
because those controls may prevent persons from approaching a destination
country in order to apply for asylum. In the absence of self-standing legal
168 UN Doc. A/C.3/253, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.121, see in particular statements by Mrs. Corbet
from the United Kingdom; cf. UN Doc. E/800.
169 UN Doc. A/C.3/244, Statement of Mr. Pavlov from the Soviet Union.
170 Lauterpacht (1968), p. 422 at n. 72.
171 Ibid; Grahl-Madsen (1972), p. 101.
172 Ibid. In this vein also Kjaerum, in: Eide (1992), p. 224-225: ‘The right to seek asylum has,
in fact, one of its basis in the ‘right of emigration’’, referring to Article 13(2) UDHR, Article
12(2) ICCPR and Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR. Contra, Gammeltoft-Hansen and Gammeltoft-
Hansen (2008) p. 446, who, after a lengthy review of the drafting history of Article 14 UDHR
posit that the right to seek asylum should be perceived as a procedural right: the right to
be allowed access to an asylum procedure, which should be guaranteed by the receiving
state.
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provisions giving substance to the right to seek asylum, this section describes
the contents of the right to seek primarily by analogy to the conditions under
which the right to leave can be asserted. Particular attention is paid to the
following questions: under what circumstances can refusing leave to migrants
in general, and asylum-seekers in particular, be considered in breach of the
right to leave? What is the relationship between measures of entry control and
the right to leave? Can the right to leave only be invoked vis-à-vis the terri-
torial state or also against a state employing extraterritorial border measures?
4.4.2 The right to leave in international law
Although often not codified in national constitutional charters, the freedom
to leave any country, including his own, is a historical norm in human society,
and has found expression in virtually all modern human rights treaties.173
The right to leave is pronounced in Article 12(2) ICCPR, Article 2(2) Protocol 4
ECRH, Article 22 American Convention on Human Rights and Article 12 African
Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights. It has also been codified in treaties
guaranteeing human rights for specific categories of persons, including the
Refugee Convention, the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
173 The origins of the right to leave can be traced back to the Magna Carta of 1215 which
stipulated that ‘All merchants may safely and securely go away from England, come to
England, stay in and go through England, (…)’ and that ‘Every one shall henceforth be
permitted, saving our fealty, to leave our kingdom and to return in safety and security,
by land or by water (…)’, Articles 41 and 42. Grotius also connected the right to leave to
the idea of free trade. He defended the axiom that ‘[e]very nation is free to travel to every
other nation, and to trade with it’, by observing that nature had not supplied every place
with all the necessaries of life and that, given the need for mutual exchange of resources
and services, ‘[n]ature has given to all peoples a right of access to all other peoples’, Hugo
Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, originally published 1608, trans. by R. Van Deman Magoffin,
New York: Oxford University Press (1916), Ch. 1. Vattel recognised the right of a citizen
‘to quit his country’, which in some cases he regarded as absolute: ‘[t]here are cases in which
a citizen has an absolute right to renounce his country, and abandon it entirely – a right
founded on reasons derived from the very nature of the social compact.’ Vattel distinguishes
the right to quit a country from the right of emigration, which he also sees as a natural
right with which the state may not interfere: ‘[i]f the sovereign attempts to molest those
who have a right to emigrate, he does them an injury; and the injured individuals may
lawfully implore the protection of the power who is willing to receive them.’ E. de Vattel,
The Law of Nations, originally published 1758, trans. J. Chitty, Philadelphia: Johnson (1867),
Bk. 1, Ch. XIX, paras. 223-226. For modern appraisals of the right to leave, see eg R. Higgins,
‘The Right in International Law of an Individual to Enter, Stay in and Leave a Country’,
49 International Affairs (1973), p. 342; S. Juss, ‘Free Movement and the World Order’, 16 IJRL
(2004), p. 292; H. Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice,
Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff (1987), p. 4; C. Harvey and R.P. Barnidge,
‘Human Rights, Free Movement, and the Right to Leave in International Law’, 19 IJRL (2007).
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Workers and Members of Their Families.174 Discrimination with respect to
the right to leave is prohibited under Article 5(d) of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Of the
relevant treaty monitoring bodies, it are predominantly the HRC and ECtHR
which have examined the scope of the right to leave in significant detail.
The right to leave is pronounced in the exact same terms in Article 12 (2) ICCPR
and Article 2(2) Protocol 4 ECRH: Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.175 The HRC and ECtHR have interpreted the right to leave
broadly and have affirmed that the right to leave is a self-standing norm, the
enjoyment of which does not depend on the purposes of travel.176 Apart from
travel bans or border-police measures preventing persons from leaving a
country,177 the HRC and ECtHR have accepted that that the confiscation, refusal
to issue or refusal to renew a passport can also come within the ambit of the
right to leave. According to the ECtHR ‘[a] measure by means of which an
individual is dispossessed of an identity document such as, for example, a
passport, undoubtedly amounts to an interference with the exercise of liberty
of movement’.178 The Human Rights Committee has explained that ‘[s]ince
international travel usually requires appropriate documents, in particular a
passport, the right to leave a country must include the right to obtain the
necessary travel documents.’179 Although passports are indeed the sine qua
non of the right to leave,180 analogous considerations apply to all identity
174 Refugee Convention, Article 28; Convention on Stateless Persons, Article 28; International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families, Article 8.
175 This is not a coincidence. While the original draft of Article 2 (2) Fourth Protocol to the
ECHR spoke of the right ‘to leave any State’, the Committee of Experts decided to substitute
the word ‘State’ for ‘country’, by referring to the text of Article 12 (2) ICCPR. The difference
appears marginal, although it was considered that the term ‘country’ could also apply to
regions which could not be designated as states. Council of Europe Committee of Experts,
‘Explanatory reports on the Second to Fifth Protocols to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, Doc. H (71) 11, Strasbourg (1971),
para. 10.
176 HRC, General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), 2 November 1999,
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, para. 8. ECtHR 13 November 2003, Napijalo v Croatia, no. 66485/
01, para. 73.
177 Eg ECtHR 23 May 2006, Riener v Bulgaria, appl. 46343/99, para. 110 (travel ban); ECtHR
17 July 2003, Luordo v Italy, appl. 32190/96, para. 92 (travel ban). With regard to the former
East-German border-policing regime, see ECtHR 22 March 2001, Streletz, Kessler and Krenz
v Germany, appls. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98, paras. 98-101.
178 Napijalo v Croatia, para. 69. Also see ECtHR 31 October 2006, Földes and Földesné Hajlik v
Hungary, no. 41463/02, para. 33; ECtHR 22 May 2001, Baumann v France, no. 33592/96, para.
62; ECtHR 21 December 2006, Bartik v Russia, no. 55565/00, para. 36.
179 HRC, General Comment 27, para. 9.
180 Harvey and Barnidge (2007), p. 7
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and travel documents necessary for exercising the right to leave, such as exit
visa.181
Other infringements of the right to leave may consist of the imposition
of various legal and bureaucratic barriers, such as exceedingly high fees for
travel documents,182 the obligation to describe precisely the envisaged travel
route,183 the requirement to be in the possession of a return ticket,184 or
such far-reaching measures as a prohibition on women to leave without the
consent of their husband.185 It has also been considered that to make depart-
ure of a mentally deranged offender conditional on the receiving country
placing that offender in a mental hospital may fall under Article 2 (2) Protocol
No. 4 ECRH.186
The expression any country in Article 12 (2) ICCPR and Article 2(2) Protocol 4
ECRH is important and implies, firstly, that the right to leave is applicable to
nationals and aliens alike, which also follows from the word ‘everyone’.187
Secondly, and of particular importance for this study, the expression has been
interpreted as obliging states not only to secure the right to leave from their
own territories, but also from that of territories of other states. In Peltonen v
Finland, the European Commission of Human Rights held the right to leave
to be applicable to a situation in which a Finnish national had already left
Finland for Sweden and when the Finnish authorities consecutively took
measures which prevented him from leaving Sweden.188 Similarly, the Human
Rights Committee has repeatedly accepted that that to refuse a passport to
a national living abroad can impede a person from leaving that other country
and therefore come within the ambit of the right to leave.189 In Peltonen v
Finland, the European Commission did not address the question whether
181 On exit visas, see HRC 26 April 2005, Concluding observations on Uzbekistan, CCPR/CO/
83/UZB, para. 19; HRC 24 April 2001, Concluding observations on Syrian Arab Republic,
CCPR/CO/71/SYR, para. 21; HRC 18 November 1996, Concluding observations on Gabon,
CCPR/C/79/Add.71, para. 16.
182 HRC 19 November 1997, Concluding observations on Iraq, CCPR/C/79/Add.84, para. 14.
183 HRC, General Comment 27, para. 17.
184 Ibid.
185 HRC 1 April 1997, Concluding observations on Lebanon, CCPR/C/79/Add.78, para. 18.
186 EComHR 4 October 1989, I.H. v Austria, appl. 10533/83, par. 11. For a situation of com-
pulsory care preventing a person from leaving his country see also EComHR 13 October
1993, Nordblad v Sweden, appl. 19076/91.
187 To this effect, see eg HRC Concluding Observations on Lebanon, 1 April 1997, CCPR/C/79/
Add.78, para. 22; and HRC 18 November 1996, Concluding observations on Gabon, CCPR/
C/79/Add.71, para. 16, concerning the confiscation of passports of foreign workers and
exit visa requirements imposed on foreign workers, respectively.
188 EComHR 20 February 1995, Peltonen v Finland, no. 19583/92.
189 HRC 15 November 2004, Loubna El Ghar v Libya, no. 1107/2002, para. 7.3.; HRC 29 July
1994, Peltonen v Finland, no. 492/1992, para. 8.4; HRC 23 March 1982, Vidal Martins v
Uruguay, no. R.13/57, para. 7; HRC 31 March 1983, Montero v Uruguay, no. 106/1981, para.
9.4; HRC 31 March 1983, Lichtensztejn v Uruguay, no. 77/1980, para. 8.3; HRC 22 July 1983,
Nunez v Uruguay, no. 108/1981, para. 9.3.
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Peltonen actually was ‘within the jurisdiction’ of Finland for the purposes of
Article 1 ECRH. The Human Rights Committee, on the other hand, has explicitly
accepted that nationals living abroad who are refused a passport, come within
the jurisdiction of the refusing state.
In the case of Baumann v France, the ECtHR considered that ‘the right to
leave implies a right to leave for such country of the person’s choice to which
he may be admitted’.190 Although this reasoning could be taken as to imply
that a right to leave only exists in so far as another country is willing to accept
a person,191 the better interpretation is that the Court indicates that the right
to leave can also be interfered with in situations where a person may be able
to leave for one particular country, but is prohibited from going to another.192
This is also apparent from the earlier Commission decision in the case of
Peltonen v Finland – from which the quote in Baumann was taken – in which
the denial to issue a passport to mr. Peltonen was considered to constitute
an interference with the right to leave, even though the refusal did not prevent
him from leaving Sweden for another Nordic country. It is from a similar
rationale that the Human Rights Committee has frequently stressed that ad
hoc travel documents such as laissez-passers or safe conducts out of the country
are no adequate substitutes for a passport, since they only allow for travel
to one particular destination.193 According to the Human Rights Committee:
‘the right of the individual to determine the State of destination is part of the
legal guarantee’.194
In line with the interpretation that an interference of the right to leave does
not depend on there being another country willing to grant entry, the ECtHR
has on multiple occasions stated that measures making it impossible for
persons to travel abroad must be considered as automatically restricting the
right to leave, also when the person concerned has no inclination to travel
abroad. Thus, in Napijalo v Croatia, the Court held that to deny the use of an
identity document to the applicant which, ‘had he wished’, would have per-
mitted him to leave the country, restricted his right to liberty of movement.195
And in Luordo v Italy, the Court found an order to stay in a place of residence
190 Baumann v France, para. 61, emphasis added. The formulation was repeated in Földes and
Földesné Hajlik v Hungary, para. 32; Napijalo v Coatia, para. 68; Bartik v Russia, para. 36.
191 G.S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press
(2007), p. 381; V. Moreno Lax, ‘Must EU Borders have Doors for Refugees? On the Com-
patibility of Schengen Visas and Carriers’ Sanctions with EU Member States’ Obligations
to Provide International Protection to Refugees’, 10 EJML (2008), p. 352.
192 On the relationship between the individual right to leave and the right of the state to control
entry, see section 4.4.3 below. It does not transpire from the case of Baumann or from later
judgments of the ECtHR that the question of whether another country is in fact prepared
to allow entry is material for applicability of the right to leave.
193 Loubna El Ghar v Libya, para. 7.2; Nunez v Uruguay, para. 9.2; Lichtensztejn v Uruguay, para.
8.2; Vidal Martins v Uruguay, paras. 6.2, 9; Montero v Uruguay, paras. 9.2, 10.
194 HRC, General Comment 27, para. 8.
195 Napijalo v Croatia, para. 73. Also see Bartik v Russia, para. 36.
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to be in violation of Article 2 Protocol No. 4, ‘[e]ven though there is nothing
in the case file to indicate that the applicant wished to move away from his
place of residence or was refused permission to do so.’196 Apparently, the
mere fact of being unable to travel a fortiori constitutes an interference with
the right to leave.197
Because the right to leave encompasses departure from any country where
a person is, because it covers departure to any country of the person’s choice,
and because a state’s obligations are not necessarily confined to its own terri-
tories but may extend to the territories of other states; it would logically follow
that states may also interfere with a person’s right to leave by imposing
measures of immigration control which have the effect of preventing a non-
national from leaving another country. Although the case law referred to above
on measures having the effect of preventing persons from leaving another
country concerned restrictions imposed on nationals living abroad, there is
nothing in the text of Articles 12(2) ICCPR and 2(2) Protocol No. 4 ECRH which
prevents non-nationals present in a foreign country from also coming within
the potential ambit of a state’s obligation to respect the right to leave. The
Human Rights Committee has endorsed this view in its General Comment
on Article 12 ICCPR by inviting States to ‘include information in their reports
on measures that impose sanctions on international carriers which bring to
their territory persons without required documents, where those measures
affect the right to leave another country’.198 And in its concluding observa-
tions on Austria, the HRC expressed concerns about certain features of Austria’s
law on asylum-seekers and immigrants, amongst which ‘sanctions against
passenger carriers and other pre-frontier arrangements that may affect the
rights of any person to leave any country, including his or her own.’199 This
supports the proposition that immigration policies having effects in other
countries can (but see below) be construed as infringements of the right to
leave another country.
196 Luordo v Italy, para. 96.
197 This position was nonetheless contested by dissenting judges Costa, Bratza and Greve in
the Baumann judgment, who pointed out that the contested measures ‘must also have
actually interfered with the right to liberty of movement’, and that, because the seizure
of Baumann’s passport had not deprived him of his right to leave France and because it
had never been alleged that he was prevented from leaving Germany, there was no causal
link between the impugned seizure and the applicant’s freedom of movement. Joint partly
dissenting opinion judges Costa, Bratza and Greve in Baumann v France.
198 HRC, General Comment 27, para. 10.
199 HRC 19 November 1998, Concluding observations on Austria, CCPR/C/79/Add.103,
para. 11.
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4.4.3 The right to leave and the right to enter
It was posited above that a state may interfere with the right to leave also if
no other state is in fact willing to grant entry. The question may be posed,
conversely, whether a state, by refusing entry into its territory, may also
interfere with a person’s right to leave the territory of another state. It is,
indeed, sometimes argued that measures of immigration control imposed by
countries of destination have a negative impact, or may even nullify, a person’s
right to leave his country of residence. Juss, stressing that 20th century re-
strictions on migration are a departure from the historical norm of free move-
ment, posits that immigration barriers render the right to leave practically
meaningless.200 Nafziger argues that the right to leave imposes an implicit
obligation on territories not to entirely deny entry to foreign nationals.201
And Dummett goes so far as to state that an individual authorized to leave
his country but not accepted by any other country would see his right to
emigration violated.202 Although it is certainly true that the practical meaning
of the right to leave depends on a corresponding right to be allowed entry
into another country, one must, for a number of reasons, be careful in con-
struing immigration restrictions as infringements of the right to leave. Such
pronouncements risk neglecting that the rights to enter and to leave are firmly
set apart in human rights law and subject to different principles of international
law.
First, one must not confuse the right to leave with a right to emigrate. The
latter is not a right in international law. Although the HRC states that the
freedom to leave covers ‘departure for permanent emigration’, this pronounce-
ment must be understood from the HRC’s insistence that the right to leave is
to be secured regardless the purpose of travel, and that it may not, for example,
be made dependent on whether a person intends to return or not.203 Concept-
ually, the difference between a right to emigrate and the right to leave is that
the former encompasses not only the activity of leaving but also that of (per-
manent) settlement in another country. It is clear that the possibility of obtain-
ing permission to settle in another country is a totally different matter than
the act of leaving a country. It may well be that persons who will not be able
to enter a country for purposes of settlement, are able to enter that country
for other purposes, such as business or family visits.204
200 Juss (2004), p. 294.
201 J.A.R. Nafziger, ‘The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, AJIL Vol. 77
(1983), p. 842.
202 A. Dummett, ‘The Transnational Migration of People seen from within a Natural Law
Perspective’, in: B. Barry and R.E. Goodin (eds), Free Movement. Ethical Issues in the Trans-
national Migration of People and of Money, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf (1992), p. 169-180.
203 HRC, General Comment 27, para. 8.
204 Hannum concludes that, in combination with the right to return to one’s own country,
the right to leave must be interpreted as embodying a right to travel: Hannum (1987), p. 20.
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Secondly, rights can exist without possibilities – and vice versa. While the
possibility to leave a country can very well be dependent on another country
allowing entry (unless one wishes to sail the Seven Seas), the right to leave
is not in principle affected by the unwillingness of other countries to allow
entry. To be sure, a person could still endeavor to make lawful use of his right
to leave in order to try to gain illegal entry. Vattel, therefore, after positing
that there is not only a right of citizens ‘to quit’ their country but also a ‘right
to emigrate’, rightfully submits that this is not a ‘full’ right ‘but imperfect with
respect to each particular country’, because the citizen ‘must ask permission
of the chief of the place; and, if it is refused, it is his duty to submit’.205 Such
interpretation does not render the right to leave nugatory. While one may
perceive the right to leave as an ‘imperfect’, ‘half’ or ‘dormant’ right when
no other country is willing to open its doors, its practical consequences get
in full swing once another country is willing to grant entry.
Thirdly and most fundamentally, the problem with construing entry
restrictions as potential infringements of the right to leave is that this would
in effect transform the right to leave into a qualified right of entry into another
state which would then only be subject to the restrictions permitted under
Articles 12 (3) ICCPR and 2(3) Protocol No. 4 ECRH.206 Such interpretation
would seriously transgress upon the axiom that states have, subject to their
treaty obligations, exclusive control over the admittance of aliens into their
territory. To account for the latter problem, Nafziger has submitted that the
right to leave would seem to require states, taken together, to respect the right
by not totally barring entry.207 This view corresponds with the one of Vattel,
when he speaks of the right as perfect in the general view but imperfect with
respect to individual countries. The reasoning would be, accordingly, that the
international community as a whole is under the duty to complete the right
to leave by allowing entry into at least one its constituents. As Nafziger admits
however, construing the right to leave as imposing a corresponding duty of
entry on the international community at large would have practical meaning
only if that duty is made more concrete and specific, by negotiating and
formulating agreements giving expression to the notion that a state has a
qualified duty to admit aliens.208 And as long as such agreements do not
exist, it remains problematic to construe the right to leave as more than a right
engaging the responsibility of individual states, in which the starting point
is that each state is primarily to guarantee this right to those within their own
territories.209
205 de Vattel (1758), Bk. 1, Ch. XIX, par. 230.
206 See also Lichtensztejn v Uruguay, para. 8.3 and Nunez v Uruguay, para. 9.3: ‘On the other
hand, article 12 does not guarantee an unrestricted right to travel from one country to
another. In particular, it confers no right for a person to enter a country other than his own.’
207 Emphasis added.
208 Nafziger (1983), p. 842-847.
209 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007), p. 382.
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4.4.4 Extraterritorial migration control and the right to leave
The question remains whether this reasoning – i.e. entry controls should not
be construed as coming within the scope of the right to leave – should also
apply to pre-frontier border control arrangements, which sort their practical
or legal effect already within the territory of the country of departure. There
is as of yet only scarce legal authority addressing the issue. Although, as noted
above, the HRC has accepted that carrier sanctions and other pre-frontier
arrangements do attract a state’s duties under the right to leave, the ECtHR,
in Xhavara v Italy, considered the ramming of an Albanian migrant boat by
an Italian coast guard vessel in international waters not to raise an issue under
the right to leave because the aim of the Italian operation was not to prevent
Albanians to depart from their country, but rather to prevent their entry into
Italy:
‘La Cour relève que les mesures mises en cause par les requérants ne visaient pas
à les priver du droit de quitter l’Albanie, mais à les empêcher d’entrer sur le territoire
italien. Le second paragraphe de l’article 2 du Protocole n° 4 ne trouve donc pas
à s’appliquer en l’espèce.’210
Although Xhavara concerned measures undertaken in the high seas instead
of on the territory of another country, the statement of the ECtHR could be taken
as a general rule that measures which have the goal of preventing entry can
simply not come within the scope of the right to leave. If this is indeed correct,
it would follow that the entire range of pre-border control measures employed
by a country – which, we may assume, all have the aim of preventing un-
solicited migration into the state’s territory in one way or the other – cannot
attract applicability of the right to leave. But the pronouncement of the Court
is rather crude and difficult to reconcile with the ordinary approach of the
Court under which the purpose for taking a particular measure is not con-
sidered relevant for delineating the material scope of a particular human right,
but rather for determining whether an interference can be deemed to serve
a ‘legitimate aim’ and hence justifies a restriction of the right. It is, on a general
note, anathema to human rights law to refer to the goal of a measure in order
to define the scope of a particular right, because many infringements of human
rights may come about for other reasons than to expressly deprive a person
of his fundamental rights.
A more meaningful distinction between measures which essentially fall
within the state’s sovereign prerogative to control the entry of aliens and
measures which interfere with the right to leave another country would be
to construe measures of entry control as coming within the ambit of the right
to leave only if the measure already sorts its legal or practical effect in the
210 ECtHR 11 January 2001, Xhavara v Italy, no. 39473/98, emphasis added.
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country of departure. If a control measure is implemented within the territorial
boundaries of another country, resulting in the legal and/or practical im-
possibility for a person to leave that country, there is little doubt that the
measure interferes with the right to leave. But when the measure sorts its
practical or legal effect only at the threshold of entry into the state of destina-
tion, the measure should be examined in the sphere of the right of the state
to set limits to the entry of aliens. In the case of visas, for example, a person
who is refused a visa will not normally be prevented from leaving his country
of origin for the non-issuing state, although he will be refused entry at the
moment he presents himself at the border of that state. Should that state
however enforce the visa obligation already within the country of origin –
for example by making use of pre-clearance controls – the person is effectively
prevented from leaving his country. In the latter situation, immigration control
not only prevents a person from effectuating an illegal entry, but has the
additional effect (and aim) to obstruct the person from leaving the other
country and would thus interfere with his right to leave.
Although this distinction seems sound and practicable, there may also be
intermediate situations where measures of entry control sort their primary
effect outside the territory of the country of departure but which may addi-
tionally compel the person concerned to return to that country. In respect of
enforcement activities at sea for example, migrant vessels may be intercepted
at the high seas and immediately returned to the territorial waters or ports
of the country of embarkation. Could the migrants then contend that – perhaps
as soon as their boat would re-enter the territory of the country they intend
to leave – the intercepting state would infringe their right to leave? And if
one would accept this line of reasoning, should it then also be accepted that
every forcible return of a migrant, by which the expelling state ensures that
the migrant is physically returned to his country of origin, interferes with that
person’s right to leave – perhaps as soon as the airplane transporting him
enters the territory of the country of origin?
It cannot be denied that such lines of reasoning would stretch the right
to leave to proportions hitherto unexplored. Nonetheless, those intermediate
situations may lend themselves for meaningful further distinction. There are,
for example, notable differences in nature between extraterritorial border
measures and measures of forcible expulsion or removal. In the context of
forcible returns, migrants have already left their country proper, have been
granted the opportunity to claim a right of entry in another country and, if
that claim was denied, will often have first been granted the opportunity to
voluntarily leave the country. All this does not seem to interfere with a per-
son’s right to leave. It is only after it has been established that the migrant
has no right to stay and when that migrant does not leave on its own accord,
that the state enforces its immigration laws by forcibly returning a person to
his country of origin. In the context of sea border controls on the other hand,
when migrants are immediately and forcibly returned as soon as they have
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crossed the border of the territorial sea, a person’s right to leave his country
is deprived of any meaningful effect and the preventing of departure consti-
tutes an essential element of the enforcement activity. As is explained in the
section below, it does not follow from this reasoning that such controls are
necessarily in violation of the right to leave, but rather that the interference
must find justification in the particular circumstances of the case.
4.4.5 Permitted restrictions to the right to leave
Different from the prohibition of refoulement under Articles 3 ECRH and 7 ICCPR,
the right to leave is not absolute. Although external migration controls restrict-
ing persons from leaving another country may well serve a legitimate purpose
and can hence find justification in international law, the cardinal implication
of the finding that such measures may interfere with the right to leave is that
they should comply with the requirements of Articles 2(3) Protocol No. 4 ECRH
and 12(3) ICCPR.211 This has profound consequences for the manner in which
such controls must be conducted: they are exported from the realm of a state’s
discretionary powers regarding entry and admittance, and placed in the regime
of human rights scrutiny in which it must be assessed whether a person’s right
to leave is affected, whether the restrictions are taken in pursuit of a legitimate
aim, whether they are in accordance with the law, and whether they can be
considered necessary and proportionate. A general framework for assessing
the legitimacy of restrictions under Article 12 ICCPR is set out in General
Comment 27 of the HRC. Although more scarce than under other qualified
rights, the available case law of the ECtHR on permitted restriction under Article
2(3) Protocol No. 4 ECRH indicates that the test to be applied is similar to that
under other provisions.212
What follows from these requirements, in particular, is that restrictions
which are applied outside a legal and procedural framework and implemented
not on an individual but general basis are problematic. The quality of law-
doctrine requires the law not only to establish the grounds for restricting the
right to leave but also to protect against arbitrary interferences, which implies
that the law ‘must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the
211 It is said, in the context of the ECHR, that the right to leave a country does not have a very
broad effective scope, because practically all conceivable motives on the part of the author-
ities to refuse a person this right can be brought under the permitted restrictions: Van Dijk,
F. van Hoof, A. van Rijn et al (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human
Rights, Antwerpen/Oxford: Intersentia (2006), p. 942. This argument is not very persuasive,
as the permitted restrictions under Articles 2(3) Protocol No. 4 ECHR and 12(3) ICCPR
do essentially not differ from those listed under other qualified human rights.
212 See, in particular, Bartik v Russia, Luordo v Italy, Napijalo v Croatia, Földes and Földesné Hajlik
v Hungary, Riener v Bulgaria.
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competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity.’213
It follows from the requirements of necessity and proportionality that re-
strictions must be assessed in the light of the individual circumstances of the
case, implying that restrictive measures must always take account of the
particular situation of each individual subjected to the measure.214 Further,
the right to an effective remedy requires allegations of violations of the right
to be subject to the possibility of thorough and effective scrutiny by the re-
sponsible authorities.215
In view of current practices of external immigration control, several more
specific remarks are in order. Firstly, as regards the requirement of ‘legitimate
aim’, it can be observed that the aim of immigration controls conducted in
foreign countries which may prevent foreigners from leaving that country not
necessarily corresponds with that of border checks and border surveillance
conducted along the state’s own territorial border. These latter, ‘regular’
controls are normally conducted as a measure of immigration enforcement,
to prevent illegal entry and to prevent persons from circumventing border
checks.216 Pre-border controls, on the other hand, have been described as
primarily aiming at reducing the potential burden posed by ‘failed’ migrants
altogether: by preventing persons who are unlikely to have a right of entry
from presenting themselves at the border, the risk of having to incur admin-
istrative, financial and social costs as a result of processing asylum-seekers
and not being able to enforce the removal of failed asylum-seekers or other
categories of migrants is minimized.217 If it can be established that this is
indeed the aim of a particular measure of pre-border control, the question rises
under what legitimate aim the measure must fall. Notably, the aim of ‘eco-
nomic well-being’ of the country, which is frequently referred to by the Euro-
pean Court as justification of measures of immigration control interfering with
213 ECtHR 2 August 1984, Malone v the United Kingdom, no. 8691/79, paras. 66-68; ECtHR 24
March 1988, Olsson v Sweden (No. 1), appl. 10465/83, para. 61; ECtHR 20 June 2002, Al-Nashif
v Bulgaria, 50963/99, para. 119 ; ECtHR 24 April 2008, C.G. a.o. v Bulgaria, no. 1365/07, para.
39. For the application of these requirements to restrictions on the right to leave, see in
particular Riener v Bulgaria, paras. 112-113.
214 The ECtHR has derived a duty on the side of the authorities under Article 2 of Protocol
No. 4 ‘to take appropriate care that any interference with the right to leave one’s country
should be justified and proportionate throughout its duration, in the individual circum-
stances of the case’: Riener v Bulgaria, para. 128. Similarly, the Human Rights Committee
speaks of the application of restrictions which, ‘in any individual case’, must be based on
clear legal grounds and meet the test of necessity and proportionality, HRC, General
Comment No. 27, para. 16.
215 Article 13 ECHR; Article 2(3) ICCPR.
216 This is also the manner in which border controls are defined in the Schengen Borders Code,
see Articles 2 (9)-(11) EC Regulation 562/2006.
217 In this vein: Roma Rights, para. 2, where the posting of British immigration officers at the
airport of Prague was explained from the background of there being an ‘administrative,
financial and indeed social burden borne as a result of failed asylum-seekers’.
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a person’s family life,218 is no recognised legitimate aim under Articles 12(3)
ICCPR and 2(3) Protocol No. 4 ECRH. While the prevention of having to tolerate
persons without a legal residence status may be deemed to be for the benefit
of ‘public order’ (which is explicitly mentioned as a legitimate aim for restrict-
ing the right to leave), it is more difficult to apply this reasoning to the goal
of reducing economic and social costs involved in processing and harboring
migrants.219
Secondly, one of the problems identified in the context of measures of
migration control employed in territories of foreign countries is that they do
not always have a clear legal basis, that the agents involved in these controls
have rather wide discretionary powers and that no legal remedies are offered
to persons refused leave to enter. This appears to be the case, for example,
with regard to interception and diversion measures undertaken by European
states in territorial waters in third countries, which fall beyond the scope of
domestic statutes or European law and are grounded in bilateral agreements
which are often outside the public domain.220 Similar concerns have been
voiced with regard to controls conducted by private air and sea carriers and
by immigration or border guard officers stationed in foreign countries.221
In respect of the conduct of immigration officers stationed at Prague airport,
the House of Lords concluded that the tasks performed by these officers had
a clear basis in domestic immigration rules, which included a description of
their competences and the grounds under which the officers were allowed
to refuse leave to enter. The relevant legislation moreover allowed for judicial
review.222 But it does not seem, as is further explored in chapters 5-7, that
European countries commonly consider their domestic immigration statutes
to apply to controls undertaken in third countries, raising the question on what
218 For instance ECtHR 21 June 1988, Berrehab v the Netherlands, no. 10730/84, para. 26; ECtHR
31 January 2006, Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v the Netherlands, no. 50435/99, para. 44.
219 The question whether limitations for economic reasons can be brought under the permitted
restrictions of Article 2(3) Protocol No. 4 ECHR and Article 12(3) ICCPR has received
considerable attention, although mainly in the context of limitations imposed by countries
of departure for purposes of preventing ‘brain drain’. Van Dijk, van Hoof and van Rijn
(2006), at p. 944, conclude, in the context of Article 2(3) Protocol No. 4 ECHR, that the
freedom to leave may not be restricted on purely economic grounds. Hannum (1987), at
p. 40, in respect of Article 12(3) ICCPR, concludes that ‘most limitations imposed on the
right to leave on economic grounds must be judged in the context of good faith – or lack
thereof – of the government concerned. If the limitation of a particular right is necessary
to deal with a demonstrable socio-economic problem that threatens public order in a country
– particularly when the limitation is proportional, temporary , and determined with ade-
quate notice to those affected by it – it may well fall within the narrow range of limitations
permitted under article 12(3) of the Covenant.’
220 See extensively chapter 6.
221 P. Minderhoud and S. Scholten, ‘Regulating Immigration Control: Carrier Sanctions in the
Netherlands’ 10 EJML (2008), p. 131, 137-138; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Gammeltoft-Hansen
(2008), p. 450-451.
222 Roma Rights, paras. 5, 77-86.
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legal basis particular enforcement activity is undertaken and whether that
activity takes sufficient account of procedural guarantees which must ac-
company restrictions to the right to leave.
Thirdly, it follows from the requirements of necessity and proportionality
that a fair balance must be struck between the public interest and the indi-
vidual’s rights at issue.223 The Human Rights Committee indicates that for
the necessity-requirement to be satisfied, it is not sufficient that the restrictions
serve the permissible purposes, they must also be necessary to protect
them.224 For measures to be in conformity with the principle of proportion-
ality, they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must
be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the
desired result; and they must be proportionate to the interest to be pro-
tected.225 In the case of Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v Germany, the European
Court addressed the former East German border-policing regime entailing
the pertinent refusal to allow GDR citizens to travel to Western Germany,
without giving reasons and enforced by unparalleled technical sophistication
and the indiscriminate use of firearms. The Court concluded not only that the
shooting of persons attempting to flee the GDR failed to have a basis in
domestic GDR law, but also that ‘[i]t cannot be contended that a general
measure preventing almost the entire population of a State from leaving was
necessary to protect its security, or for that matter the other interests men-
tioned.’226 Although the case of East Germany is extreme, certain practices
of external migration control, and this argument applies in particular to general
diversions schemes coupled with summarily returns at sea, do by their nature
not seem to take account of any individual considerations, making it difficult
to evaluate their legitimacy in the light of their proportionality vis-à-vis each
individual.227
4.4.6 Asylum-seekers and the right to leave
Although the material scope of the right to leave is limited on account of its
qualified nature, the personal scope is wider than that of duties inherent to
the prohibition of refoulement as discussed in section 4.3. The right to leave
not only benefits persons who are seeking – and entitled to – international
protection, but can be invoked by anyone who wishes to leave a country, for
whatever (or indeed: no) purpose he may have in mind.
223 Földes and Földesné Hajlik v Hungary, para. 32; Riener v Bulgaria, para. 109.
224 HRC, General Comment 27, para. 14.
225 Ibid.
226 Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v Germany, para. 100.
227 G. Cornelisse, ‘European Vessels, African Territorial Waters and ‘Illegal Emigrants’: The
Right to Leave and the Principle of (Il)legality in a Global Regime of Mobility’, available
at <www.libertysecurity.org>.
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It could be posited that the specific plight of asylum-seekers warrants a
more thorough scrutiny of the justifiability of restrictions to the right to leave.
The argument would be that the notorious repercussions an impossibility of
departure may have for asylum-seekers render restrictions to the right to leave
particularly problematic, implying that the interests of persons fleeing from
maltreatment should more readily outweigh the interest of authorities to
prevent departure. One manner to incorporate this line of thought into an
assessment of permitted restrictions to the right to leave would be, as has been
suggested, to accord additional weight to the interests of the individual in
examining the proportionality of the measure.228 The difficulty with this
argument is however that not to be persecuted or not to be subjected to mal-
treatment is normally seen as an – absolute – right which is difficult to in-
corporate in a test of proportionality. If it is the territorial state which prevents
departure, and if this state is also the actor of persecution, one may well defend
the reasoning that a refusal to leave is an act contributing to persecution and
on that account attracting the state’s human rights obligations. If, on the other
hand, the persecution stems from non-state actors and the territorial state
prevents persons from escaping that persecution, the state may be held re-
sponsible under human rights law for failing to provide protection against
maltreatment – in this case by allowing or facilitating a safe conduct out of
the country – as is inherent to the rights to life and to be free from torture,
both phrased in absolute terms. A similar reasoning applies to a non-territorial
state employing measures which prevent asylum-seekers from fleeing another
country. If the other requirements for attracting the responsibility of such a
extraterritorially operating state are met, a refusal to leave which results in
a real risk that the person concerned will be exposed to maltreatment can
possibly come within the ambit of Articles 2 and 3 ECRH, 6 and 7 ICCPR and/or
Article 33 Refugee Convention, as discussed in section 4.3. It follows that the
‘aggregate right to leave to seek asylum’229 constitutes a lex specialis of ab-
solute character to the general and qualified right to leave. In the context of
the right to leave, this implies that restrictions to that right which result in
a violation of other protected fundamental rights must automatically be con-
strued as disproportionate to the aim pursued.230
228 See, in this connection, Moreno Lax (2008), p. 356; who argues that ‘the aggregate right
to leave to seek asylum imposes a stricter principle of proportionality’.
229 Ibid.
230 This reasoning corresponds to the requirement under Article 12(3) ICCPR that restrictions
of the right to leave may not impair other rights of the Covenant.
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4.5 A RIGHT TO BE PROTECTED BUT NO RIGHT TO PROTECT?
The previous sections 4.3 and 4.4 concluded that the prohibition of refoulement
and the right to leave any country, including his own, inform the duties of
states who are confronted with asylum-seekers in another state. But it was
also concluded in section 4.2 that the conduct of the sending state must as
a rule respect the sovereignty of the host state and that the sending state has
a right to grant extraterritorial protection only in so far as that right does not
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
the host state. Scenarios may arise in which the sending state is approached
by a person requesting asylum or another form of protection but where the
host state opposes to the grant of protection. These scenarios are not merely
hypothetical. Persons subjected to pre-entry clearances at a foreign airport who
wish to exit that country without valid identity papers, for example, will
normally offend the laws of that country and immigration officers of a sending
state conducting pre-clearances must respect the local laws in force. But they
may also be confronted with valid individual claims for asylum. This may
confront the sending state with a conflict of norms, one stemming from being
party to a human rights treaty, the other stemming from the principle of
territorial sovereignty and the derivative rule of non-intervention. How should
a state reconcile these opposing norms?
This question should be addressed in conjunction with the deliberations
on the different meaning of the term jurisdiction in general international law
and human rights law as set out in Chapter 2. It would follow from that
analysis that essentially two approaches to the question would be conceivable.
First, it could be argued, in line with the ordinary meaning of the term ‘juris-
diction’ in general international law, that the requirement of ‘jurisdiction’ under
a human rights treaty may avoid a situation of norm conflict from arising,
by considering the person in question not to fall under the jurisdiction of the
sending state. The reasoning would be that even though a person may
(initially) be within the ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘effective control’ of the sending state,
any act with regard to that person which constitutes an affront to the territorial
sovereignty of the host state is an act over which the sending state de jure lacks
‘control’ or ‘authority’, because this control and authority accrues to the host
state in its capacity as the sovereign power. It would follow from this reasoning
that the sending state is only obliged to secure the human rights of the person
concerned in so far as doing so will not encroach upon the host state’s sover-
eignty.231
The other conceivable approach would be to argue that the term ‘juris-
diction’ within human rights law has clearly distanced itself from the original
notion under international law and has attained sui generis standing. This
231 See chapter 2.4.
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approach would not preclude the possibility of a state being obliged to ensure
human rights to persons who are within their ‘jurisdiction’ in the human rights
meaning of the term, also if they remain subject to the concurrent jurisdiction
of another state and if an act regarding that person would transgress upon
the sovereignty of the other state. In this approach, the mere existence of a
sufficiently close legal or physical relationship between the extraterritorial state
and the individual suffices to enliven the state’s human rights obligations vis-à-
vis the individual. The question whether this would conflict with obligations
stemming from other sources of international law is then not relevant for the
jurisdiction issue, but may alternatively be incorporated in defining the scope
of a state’s substantive human rights obligations.
Outside the asylum context, confirmation of the first proposition can be
found in the case of Gentilhomme, concerning complaints lodged against the
refusal of French state schools situated in Algeria to continue to enrol several
children with dual French and Algerian nationality. The refusal was in com-
pliance with an indication of the Algerian government to the French govern-
ment that French state schools in Algeria should close their doors for children
with Algerian nationality. The ECtHR, while expressly noting that ‘a State may
not actually exercise jurisdiction on the territory of another without the latter’s
consent, invitation or acquiescence’,232 considered that the French refusal
constituted an implementation of a decision imputable to Algeria, taken by
the sovereign on its own territory and therefore beyond the control of
France.233 Accordingly, it found that the children could not be said to fall
within French jurisdiction.
In the particular context of grants of protection which may run counter
to demands of the host state, a similar approach was followed by the England
and Wales Court of Appeal in the case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, which was
later brought before the European Court of Human Rights. The case concerned
the lawfulness of the proposed transfer of two Iraqi nationals, who were
accused of the murder of two British soldiers, from British military facilities
in Iraq to Iraqi custody for trial by the Iraqi High Tribunal. The Iraqi Tribunal
had repeatedly requested their transfer and the United Kingdom was, under
the various agreements concluded with the interim government of Iraq, obliged
to comply with these requests. The Court of Appeal, quoting at length from
the ECtHR decision in Bankovic and recalling that the ECtHR, in interpreting the
term jurisdiction, had underlined that account had to be taken of ‘of any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
232 ECtHR 14 May 2002, Gentilhomme v France, nos. 48205/99, 48207/99 and 48209/99, para.
20. The Court referred here to its earlier pronouncements in Banković, paras. 59-61.
233 Ibid.
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parties’ (Article 31(3)(c) VCLT),234 held that for a person to come within
‘Article 1 jurisdiction’ a mere exercise of de facto power – in the meaning of
effective control or authority – is insufficient. Instead, Lord Justice Laws
formulated four ‘core propositions’ from which it would follow, amongst other
things, that the question of jurisdiction must be ascertained in harmony with
other applicable norms of international law and that it implies the possibility
of exercising sovereign legal authority.235 Observing that the British forces
in Basra were not, from at least May 2006 until 31 December 2008, entitled
to carry out any activities on Iraq’s territory in relation to criminal detainees
save as consented by Iraq and that the British forces no longer enjoyed a legal
power to detain any Iraqi from 1 January 2009 onwards, Lord Justice Laws
concluded that the United Kingdom ‘was not exercising any autonomous
power of its own as a sovereign state’ and that ‘the detention of the appellants
by the British forces at Basra did not constitute an exercise of Article 1 juris-
diction by the United Kingdom’.236
The England and Wales Court of Appeal had approached the matter
differently in the earlier case of B and others, on the traditional question of
diplomatic asylum. The case concerned the legality under the United Kingdom
Human Rights Act and the ECRH of the refusal of the British authorities to
comply with a request for asylum lodged by two minor Afghan brothers in
the British consulate in Melbourne, Australia, who submitted that their return
234 Court of Appeal (England and Wales) 21 January 2009, R (on the application of (1) Faisal
Attiyah Nassar Al-Saadoon (2) Khalaf Hussain Mufdhi) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2009]
EWCA Civ 7, para. 25.
235 Ibid, para. 37: ‘It is not easy to identify precisely the scope of the Article 1 jurisdiction where
it is said to be exercised outside the territory of the impugned State Party, because the
learning makes it clear that its scope has no sharp edge; it has to be ascertained from a
combination of key ideas which are strategic rather than lexical. Drawing on the Bankovic
judgment and their Lordships’ opinions in Al-Skeini, I suggest that there are four core
propositions, though each needs some explanation. (1) It is an exceptional jurisdiction. (2)
It is to be ascertained in harmony with other applicable norms of international law. (3) It
reflects the regional nature of the Convention rights. (4) It reflects the indivisible nature of
the Convention rights. The first and second of these propositions imply (as perhaps does
the term jurisdiction itself) an exercise of sovereign legal authority, not merely de facto power,
by one State on the territory of another. That is of itself an exceptional state of affairs,
though well recognized in some instances such as that of an embassy. The power must
be given by law, since if it were given only by chance or strength its exercise would by
no means be harmonious with material norms of international law, but offensive to them;
and there would be no principled basis on which the power could be said to be limited,
and thus exceptional.’
236 Ibid, paras. 32-36, 40. The language used may be taken to suggest that the actions of the
British forces should not be attributed to the United Kingdom but to Iraq. The Court of
Appeal only dealt with the jurisdiction issue however; the High Court had already con-
cluded that, in view of the autonomous tasks performed by the Multi-National Forces, the
detention and possible transfer of the appellants were properly attributable to the United
Kingdom: High Court (England and Wales) 19 December 2008, Al-Saadoon & Anor, R (on
the application of) v Secretary of State for Defence, [2008] EWHC 3098 (Admin), para. 79.
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to the Australian authorities would subject them to treatment contrary to
Articles 3 and 5 ECRH on account of the circumstances of aliens detention in
Australia.237 While within the consular premises, the Australian authorities
informed the British consulate that they sought the earliest possible return
of the two brothers. On the jurisdiction issue, the Court of Appeal, after an
extensive review of relevant Strasbourg case law on the extraterritorial applic-
ability of the European Convention, proceeded from the assumption that, while
in the consulate, the applicants were sufficiently within the authority of the
consular staff to be subject to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for the
purpose of Article 1 ECRH.238 It chose subsequently to define the scope of
the United Kingdom’s substantive obligations under the ECRH in accordance
with its concomitant obligation vis-à-vis Australia in holding that the ‘Soering
principle’ (or: the prohibition of refoulement as implied under Article 3 ECRH),
should not have automatic application in situations where asylum is sought
in consular premises. It inferred from relevant passages in Oppenheim’s Inter-
national Law and the fate of the Durban Six, both discussed in section 4.2.2.
above that the ‘basic principle’ that the authorities of the territorial state can
request surrender of a fugitive allows only for limited exceptions, although
the exact scope of the exceptions is ill-defined.239 One situation identified
by the Court of Appeal in which a state is entitled to refuse requests for
surrender identified was where the territorial state intends to subject the
fugitive to treatment amounting to a crime against humanity.240 Applying
these general principles to the facts of the case, the Court of Appeal found
the type and degree of the threat to be insufficiently serious to justify a grant
of diplomatic asylum and that, in the absence of an entitlement under inter-
national law to grant asylum, neither could the ECRH be construed as imposing
an obligation on the United Kingdom to grant asylum.241
The European Court of Human Rights, in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, ap-
proached the jurisdiction issue in a similar vein. It observed that the applicants
237 Court of Appeal (England and Wales) 18 October 2004, R (B and others) v Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2004] EWCA Civ 1344, [2005] QB 643.
238 Ibid, para. 66. In particular, the Court of Appeal relied on an analogy with the case of WM
v Denmark, which had also concerned a person seeking refuge at an embassy (the Danish
embassy in Eastern Berlin), and where the European Commission of Human Rights had
applied the test of whether the acts of the Danish ambassador constituted an ‘exercise of
authority’ over the person in question to an extent sufficient to bring him within the
jurisdiction of Denmark: EComHR 14 October 1992, W.M. v Denmark, no. 17392/90. Also
see chapter 2.5.2.
239 Ibid, paras. 85-89.
240 Ibid, para. 88. The Court of Appeal further did not exclude the possibility that a lesser level
of threatened harm could also justify an entitlement to grant diplomatic asylum, but the
law to provide insufficient guidance on the issue..
241 Ibid, paras. 93-94. This approach was followed in the first instance decision in Al-Saadoon
and Mufdhi: High Court 19 December 2008, Al-Saadoon & Anor, R (on the application of) v
Secretary of State for Defence, [2008] EWHC 3098 (Admin).
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were arrested by British armed forces, that they were detained in premises
which were inviolable and subject to exclusive control and authority of the
Multi-National Forces and that, ‘given the total and exclusive de facto, and
subsequently also de jure, control exercised by the United Kingdom authorities’,
the individuals were within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction.242 As to the
question whether the obligations vis-à-vis Iraq could nonetheless ‘modify or
displace’ the obligations under the ECRH, the Court found that this was a matter
to be considered in relation to the merits of the complaints.243 In its judgment
on the merits, the ECtHR refrained from according the principle of territorial
sovereignty overriding importance however. Instead of defining the scope of
a contracting state’s duties under the ECRH in accordance with that principle,
the Court referred to the principles set out in its earlier case law – which
concerned situations where the guaranteeing of human rights within a state’s
territory potentially conflicted with other international law obligations – in
holding that ‘a Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of the Conven-
tion for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or
omission in question is a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to
comply with international legal obligations.’244 It made a reference to the
Soering case, in observing that the Court in that case had neither limited the
application of Article 3 ECRH on account of a conflicting obligation on the part
of the United Kingdom under the Extradition Treaty it had concluded with
the United States in 1972. It follows, according to the Court, that in principle
all acts and omissions attributable to the state are subject to the Court’s
scrutiny.245 Although the Court did not explicitly consider that this can also
imply that the European Convention may require a contracting state to act
in contravention of another state’s sovereignty, it found the United Kingdom
to have made insufficient attempts at procuring a guarantee that the detainees
would not be subjected to the death penalty and to have entered into an
arrangement with another state which conflicted with its obligations under
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13.246 And,
in respect of the complaint under Article 34 ECRH, it considered that the
242 ECtHR 30 June 2009, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom, no. 61498/08 (admissib-
ility), paras. 86-88.
243 Ibid, para. 89.
244 ECtHR 2 March 2010, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom, no. 61498/08 (merits),
para. 128, referring to ECtHR 30 June 2005, Bosphorus v Ireland, no. 45036/98, para. 153.
Also see ECtHR 18 February 2009, Andrejeva v Latvia, no. 55707/00, para. 56: ‘the fact that
the factual or legal situation complained of is partly attributable to another State is not
in itself decisive for the determination of the respondent State’s “jurisdiction”.’
245 Also see Bosphorus, para. 137. Although this may be different in situations where state
activity serves the effective fulfillment of the mandate of United Nations Security Council,
see ECtHR 2 May 2007, Behrami v France and Saramati v France and Norway, nos. 71412/01
and 78166/01, para. 149 and ECtHR 9 June 2009, Galić v the Netherlands, no. 22617, paras.
47-48.
246 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi (merits), paras. 141-143.
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absence, on 31 December 2008, of any available course of action on the part
of the United Kingdom consistent with respect for Iraqi sovereignty other than
the transfer of the applicants, was of the respondent state’s own making and
did not modify its duty to comply with an interim measure indicated by the
Court.247
The case law above signifies that courts have developed divergent lines of
reasoning in reconciling the rule of non-intervention with human rights obliga-
tions. The different approach of the ECtHR in Gentilhomme and Al-Saadoon and
Mufdhi on the question whether respect for the territorial sovereignty of another
state is relevant for the jurisdiction issue underscores the conclusion in chapter
2 that the European Court’s interpretation of that term is not always consistent
and that the Court tends to confuse the ordinary meaning of the term juris-
diction under international (i.e. to allocate state competences) with the more
specific delimiting function it fulfils in human rights law. The most recent
approach of the ECtHR in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi also affirms the conclusion
of Chapter 2 however that the ECtHR is distancing itself from the imperative
to interpret the term jurisdiction in conformity with its ‘ordinary meaning’,
leaving room for an interpretation that limits set by other norms of inter-
national law do not as such prevent the Convention from being applicable.
Other and potentially conflicting international obligations remain subject to
the scrutiny of the Court, which also implies that the Court leaves open the
possibility that extraterritorial human rights obligations may trump the prin-
ciple of respect for the territorial sovereignty of the host state.
What is notable in this respect is that the ECtHR in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi
does not appear to distinguish as a matter of principle between state activity
carried out on its own territory and activity carried out within the territorial
sovereignty of another state. Its reference to the Soering case appears to indicate
that in establishing whether other international obligations can modify the
scope of a state’s obligations under the ECRH, the obstacle of the territorial
sovereignty of another state should not be addressed fundamentally different
from ordinary extradition obligations. This raises questions in view of the ICJ’s
emphasis in the Asylum Case on the fundamental distinction which exists
between situations involving extradition and situations of extraterritorial
asylum, with the latter constituting a potential intervention in the sovereign
matters of the other state. It should also be observed however that the Court
underlined the lack of genuine efforts on the part of the United Kingdom’s
authorities to ensure that a potential future transfer would not expose the
applicants to treatment contrary to the Convention. The Court hence avoids
an explicit pronouncement that human rights must prevail over territorial
sovereignty, and instead appears to argue that because the United Kingdom
247 Ibid, para. 162.
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had knowingly allowed a situation of irresolvable norm conflict from coming
into being, that norm conflict cannot serve to justify non-applicability of the
ECRH. On this point, the case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi differs from the situation
present in B and others: while in the former case the British forces had decided
of their own accord to arrest and detain the applicants and to enter into
bilateral arrangements setting the conditions for the exercise of prosecution
activities and cooperation with the local Iraqi criminal procedures, the United
Kingdom authorities in B and others were more or less accidentally confronted
with a fugitive asylum-seeker and had no means at their disposal to avoid
a situation of norm conflict from coming into being. It can therefore not be
excluded that the ECtHR would accord greater value to the principle of terri-
torial sovereignty in situations of diplomatic asylum proper.248
4.6 FINAL REMARKS
This chapter has conceptualized the international legal framework which
regulates the relationship between the individual, the territorial state and the
non-territorial state in situations of extraterritorial asylum. Because this re-
lationship is triangular and takes place within the territory and sovereignty
of a foreign state, the international law notion of ‘extraterritorial asylum’ differs
from ‘territorial asylum’ in three respects.
First, it is not self-evident that human rights regulate the conduct of sending
states in a similar vein as that of host states which receive asylum-seekers.
Although it was concluded that the prohibitions of refoulement established
under the Refugee Convention, CAT, ECRH and ICCPR do not as such oppose
extraterritorial application, a first complication is that the wording of Article
33 Refugee Convention and Article 3 CAT renders it problematic to construe
these prohibitions as applicable also to activity undertaken in respect of per-
sons who are in the territory from which the threat with persecution or torture
stems. This limitation is not present under the prohibitions of refoulement
established under the ICCPR and ECRH, which entail a protective duty of more
general nature. Secondly, because the presumption that an individual is subject
to the jurisdiction of the state in which he is does not apply to activity which
may affect a person in a foreign territory, the actual applicability of human
rights to the relationship between an individual and a sending state requires
prior examination of the nature of this relationship, as discussed in chapter 2.
Second, when states act in a foreign territory, their actions must as a rule
respect the territorial sovereignty of the foreign state. When the host state
requests a person to remain within its own authority, the sending state may
be confronted with a conflict between, on the one hand, humanitarian concerns
248 The ECtHR appears to hint in this direction in para. 140 of the judgment.
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and/or human rights obligations in respect of the individual and the rule of
non-intervention on the other hand. As was shown in the last section of this
chapter, attempts undertaken in recent case law to reconcile the norms in
question have not been consistent, which is due not only to divergent inter-
pretation of the notion of ‘jurisdiction’ in human rights law, but also to the
fundamental status of both human rights and the notion of territorial sover-
eignty in international law.
Third, the right to seek asylum – understood as the right to leave a country
in order to escape persecution – remains crucial for asylum-seekers who are
subjected to measures of border enforcement in countries of origin or countries
of transit. Policies aimed at preventing persons from leaving another country
may well interfere with the right to leave. Although there can be legitimate
reasons for placing restrictions on that right, those restrictions must have a
basis in law, may not be applied arbitrarily and must be subject to meaningful
and independent review. These conditions constrain the liberty of states to
deter or prevent migrants from leaving another country and ordain that such
activity is grounded in norms of procedure and good administration. Although
persons fearing ill-treatment or persecution who are restricted in their right
to leave may also base a claim directly on one of the prohibitions of refoulement
(or the underlying prohibition of exposure to ill-treatment), the fact that the
right to leave may be invoked by anyone, regardless of protection entitlements,
implies that it engenders a general procedural framework for employing
measures of external migration control which have the potential to deprive
persons of the factual possibility to leave the country in question.
5 Extraterritorial asylum under European
Union law
5.1 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER
The European Union’s internal admission policies can roughly be framed
according to the threefold distinction between legal immigration, illegal immi-
gration and asylum. Border controls and other measures of migration enforce-
ment must necessarily reflect this distinction: they are not purely restrictive
or aimed at putting migration to an end, but translate the needs and interests
of Member States, international obligations and general humanitarian traditions
into a system of selection and control. Essential guarantees for persons request-
ing asylum arriving at the EU external border are laid down in the Schengen
Borders Code and the Common European Asylum System. Under these
regimes of law, a highly rationalised model of entry conditions, admissibility
criteria and enforcement measures has developed, which incorporates funda-
mental rights and subjects refusals of entry or residence to the rule of law.
In parallel to this internal dimension, under the paramount consideration
that any effective migration policy must be embedded in the broader frame-
work of external action and cooperation with third countries, the EU is shaping
a distinct ’external dimension’ to its asylum and migration policy. Under this
external dimension, Member States are urged to proactively respond to the
migration challenge, rather than to sit back and await the spontaneous arrival
of migrants and asylum-seekers.
The key question addressed in the current chapter is how refugee concerns
are incorporated into this external dimension: in what manner does EU law
constrain the activity of individual Member States when they embark upon
external policies of migration control? Is this external dimension also premised
on a fundamental distinction between asylum-seekers and other migrants?
Does it, in essence, merely export the existing ‘internal’ model of migration
control, together with its essential safeguards, or is it premised on altogether
different selection and admissibility criteria, potentially displacing the stand-
ards of the EU’s internal admission policy?
Answering these questions requires an analysis on two levels. The first
part of the chapter discusses in detail how refugee concerns are reflected in
the strategic aims of the EU external migration and asylum policy and the
concrete measures adopted under that policy. These measures include, apart
from specific action programmes on the protection of refugees in countries
of transit and regions of origin, a variety of instruments implementing the
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idea of remote migration management, including rules on visa, carrier sanc-
tions, immigration liaison officers and joint operations of border control. This
part of the chapter focuses in particular on the tension which exists between
the goals of preventing irregular migration and of guaranteeing asylum-seekers
access to protection. This tension arises especially in the context of various
pre-border control arrangements which are targeted at mixed flows of migrants
and asylum-seekers and are criticized for not effectively distinguishing between
the two.
The second part of the chapter addresses the legal relationship between
the EU’s internal rules on asylum and border control and the evolving external
dimension. It makes some general observations on the territorial locus of
European Union law and specifically explores the manner in which the Schen-
gen border crossings regime and the Union’s asylum acquis may govern
extraterritorial activity of Member States.
The chapter argues that, despite a firm rhetoric on the part of EU institu-
tions that external action on migration matters should not jeopardize access
to protection by those entitled to it, the concrete measures implementing the
policy of external migration management generally fail to regulate the legal
status of persons requesting international protection. Because most EU instru-
ments on external migration control leave considerable implementing discretion
to Member States and often only in general terms refer to the duty to respect
international standards, they do not give meaningful guidance on the crucial
question of how refugee concerns should be confronted in practice. The con-
clusion is then that, in contrast with the EU’s internal migration and asylum
policy, the external dimension fails not only to formulate a system of selection
and admission which pays account to the needs of refugees, but that it also
tends to neglect the essential requirements of the rule of law: it does not specify
the material and procedural conditions for the undertaking of external migra-
tion enforcement, it leaves the taking of coercive action to the virtual complete
discretion of Member States, and it does not secure a system of judicial review
for those migrants who are directly affected by external measures of migration
control.
Although since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the European Com-
munity has ceased to exist as a legal entity, the present and following chapters
employ the term ‘(European) Community’ when referring directly to judicial
or other legal sources mentioning the term. Otherwise, the term EU or Union
is used.
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5.2 THE EU’S EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF ASYLUM AND MIGRATION
5.2.1 The external dimension as a policy strategy of the Union: from Tampere
to Stockholm
What is now commonly referred to as the ‘external dimension’ of the European
Union’s immigration and asylum policy has from the outset formed an integral
part of that policy. Already in 1994, in exploring the new possibilities of the
Treaty on European Union, which had designated the subjects of immigration
and asylum as matters of common interest of the Member States, the European
Commission had proposed that a comprehensive and effective immigration
policy should be built upon the three components of action on migration
pressure, action on controlling migration, and action to strengthen policies
for legal immigrants.1 This included a strong focus on cooperation with the
main countries of ‘would-be’ emigration to Europe.2 The Tampere European
Council of October 1999 confirmed this comprehensive approach. It outlined
not only the future contents of the new first pillar instruments to be adopted
on admission and residence of asylum-seekers and legal immigrants, but
signaled that these instruments should be embedded in a broader framework
of external action and cooperation on migration with third countries. The
Tampere milestones contained separate paragraphs on ‘Partnership with
countries of origin’ and ‘Management of migration flows’, in which the heads
of state and government of the EU Member States stressed the importance of
a ‘comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights
and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit’ along
with the need ‘for more efficient management of migration flows at all their
stages.’3 Apart from interlinking the Union’s migration policy with more
general development issues, the Tampere conclusions called inter alia for the
establishment of information campaigns on actual possibilities for legal migra-
tion in third countries, the further development of a common policy on visas,
assistance to third countries in order to promote voluntary returns and to
combat trafficking in human beings, and the conclusion by the Council of
readmission agreements with third countries.4
The Conclusions of the Seville and Thessaloniki European Council meetings
of June 2002 and June 2003 set further political guidelines for integrating
immigration policy into the Union’s relations with third countries.5 These were
followed up in the 2004 Hague programme, which included an extensive
1 COM(1994) 23 final, 23 February 1994, foreword.
2 Ibid, esp. paras. 47-68.
3 Presidency Conclusions 15/16 October 2009, ‘Towards a Union of Freedom, Security and
justice: The Tampere Milestones’ (hereafter ‘Tampere programme’), paras. 11-12, 22-27.
4 Ibid.
5 Presidency Conclusions 21/22 June 2002, paras. 30-36; Council of the European Union,
Presidency Conclusions 19/20 June 2003, esp. paras. 9, 15, 19.
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paragraph on the ‘external dimension of asylum and migration’.6 This dimen-
sion should, in general, aim at assisting third countries in managing migration
and protecting refugees.7 More specifically, EU policy should help preventing
illegal migration, inform on legal channels for migration, resolve protracted
refugee situations, build border-control capacity and tackle the problem of
return. In respect of regions of origin, the Hague Programme called for the
development of EU Regional Protection Programmes, to be established in
conjunction with third countries and UNHCR, which should primarily focus
on building capacity for refugee protection and include a joint EU resettlement
programme on the basis of voluntary participation of Member States.8 With
regard to regions and countries of transit, the European Council called for
capacity-building in national asylum systems, border control and wider migra-
tion issues ‘to those countries that demonstrate a genuine commitment to fulfil
their obligations under the Geneva Convention on Refugees’.9 Issued one and
a half year after the British New Vision for Refugees,10 the Hague Programme
also called for a study, to be conducted in close consultation with UNHCR, into
‘ the merits, appropriateness and feasibility of joint processing of asylum
applications outside EU territory.’11 Such processing should however, not
replace protection and processing within the Union, but rather complement
the Common European Asylum System and should comply with international
standards.12 In the sphere of border checks and migration control, the Hague
Programme further stressed the need for closer cooperation in external border
control, both between Member States and with third countries.13 It welcomed
the establishment of the European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) and initiatives taken in the
context of controls and rescue operations at sea. It further called for the ‘ firm’
establishment of immigration liaison networks in relevant third countries.14
One year later, at the Brussels summit of December 2005, the European
Council adopted the EU Global Approach to Migration.15 This Approach
6 Presidency Conclusions 4/5 November 2004, Annex I, ‘The Hague Programme: Strengthen-
ing Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union’ (hereafter ‘The Hague program-
me’), para. 1.6.
7 Ibid, para. 1.6.1.
8 Ibid, para. 1.6.2.
9 Ibid, para. 1.6.3.
10 United Kingdom Home Office, ‘New International Approaches to Asylum Processing and
Protection’, reproduced in: House of Lords European Union Committee – Eleventh Report,
‘Handling EU asylum claims: new approaches examined’, 30 April 2004, Appendix 5.
11 The Hague programme, para. 1.3.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid, paras. 1.6.3, 1.7.1.
14 Ibid, para. 1.7.1.
15 Presidency Conclusions 15/16 December 2005, Annex I, ‘Global Approach to Migration:
Priority Actions Focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean’ (hereafter ‘Global Approach
to Migration’).
Extraterritorial asylum under European Union law 179
responded specifically to the events in the Mediterranean region, including
the incident in September 2005 when hundreds of migrants had tried to climb
over the fences erected around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in
Morocco.16 It called for action to reduce illegal migration flows and the loss
of lives, to ensure safe returns, strengthen durable solutions for refugees and
build capacity to better manage migration. It explicitly affirmed the ‘indi-
vidual’s right to seek asylum’, called on Frontex to organize joint operations
in the Mediterranean region, for the establishment of regional networks of
immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs), to establish a pilot Regional Protection
Programme (RPP) and to carry out a study to ‘improve understanding of the
root causes of migration’.17 It mentioned Morocco, Algeria and Libya as coun-
tries with which dialogue and cooperation in migration management should
be sought, but did not reiterate the condition formulated in the Hague Pro-
gramme to do so only if these countries had showed a commitment to fulfil
their obligations under the Refugee Convention.
The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, formally adopted by
the 27 Heads of State and Government on 16 october 2008, reaffirmed the goals
outlined in the Global Approach to Migration and the need to engage in close
partnership with countries of origin and countries of transit.18 It called,
amongst others, for a greater allocation of resources to the Frontex agency
to allow it to cope with crisis situations such as occurring in the Mediterranean
and to increase EU aid for the training and equipping of border guards of third
countries. It also called for closer operation with UNHCR to ensure better
protection for refugees in third countries, possibly including schemes for
resettlement in the European Union.
The most recently adopted long-term EU strategy in the field of Justice and
Home Affairs, the Stockholm Programme, consolidates and further elaborates
the wide variety of measures making up the external dimension of the EU’s
asylum and immigration policy. It takes stock of problems encountered in the
past implementation of various policies and, as such, is much more outspoken
in acknowledging that refugee interests and dangers of migrant smuggling
require attention in shaping policies aimed at preventing irregular migration.
It stipulates that the strengthening of border controls should not prevent access
16 This particular incident later gave rise to allegations that some of the arrested migrants
– those with a nationality other than countries with which Morocco had a readmission
agreement – were subsequently abandoned in the desert by the Moroccan authorities. For
further details see: Human Rights Watch news release 12 October 2005, ‘Spain: Deportations
to Morocco Put Migrants at Risk – Violence against Migrants in Ceuta and Melilla Requires
Independent Investigation’; European Commission, ‘Visit to Ceuta and Melilla – Mission
Report Technical mission to Morocco on illegal immigration, 7th October – 11th October
2005’, 19 October 2006.
17 Global Approach to Migration, p. 5.
18 Council of the European Union, ‘European Pact on Immigration and Asylum’, 23 September
2008, doc. 13440/08.
180 Chapter 5
to protection to those entitled to benefit from it and formulates ‘the twin
objective of facilitating access and improving security’.19 It specifically calls
for proposals to clarify the mandate of Frontex and clear rules of engagement
for joint operations at sea, ‘with due regard to ensuring protection for those
in need who travel in mixed flows’ and to ‘better record and identify migrants
trying to reach the EU’.20 The Stockholm programme remains firmly support-
ive nonetheless of furthering efforts to combat illegal migration. The notions
of integrated border management and cooperation with countries of origin
and transit are accorded key priority and more effective action is called for
in respect of inter alia cooperation in conducting border controls, the conclusion
of readmission agreements, capacity building in third countries and the posting
of immigration liaison officers in both countries of origin and transit.21 In
respect of ‘the external dimension of asylum’, the heads of State and govern-
ment note that ‘any development in this area needs to be pursued in close
cooperation with UNHCR’, that the newly founded European Asylum Support
Office should be fully involved in this external dimension and that ‘[i]n its
dealings with third countries, the EU has the responsibility to actively convey
the importance of acceding to, and implementing of, the 1951 Geneva Conven-
tion on Refugees and its Protocol’.22 Concrete measures to be implemented
should aim at capacity building for the protection of refugees, should expand
the idea of Regional Protection Programmes and increase, on a voluntary basis,
the number of refugees resettled in the European Union. The Stockholm
Programme no longer explicitly requested a study into the feasibility of ex-
ternal processing of asylum-seekers, but in somewhat more ambiguous terms
invited the Commission to explore ‘new approaches’ concerning access to
protection in main transit countries, such as ‘certain procedures for examination
of applications for asylum, in which Member States could participate on a
voluntarily basis’.23
It transpires from the various policy conclusions and programmes for action
that the European Union is unmistakably shaping a distinct external strategy
to its immigration and asylum policy. It is not as such remarkable that the
external dimension features so prominently in the Union’s immigration and
asylum agenda. Policies of return and readmission, which by their nature
19 The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens
(hereafter ‘Stockholm programme’), OJ 2010 C115/01, para. 5.1.
20 Ibid, paras. 5.1, 6.
21 Ibid, para. 6.1.6.
22 Ibid, para. 6.2.3.
23 Ibid. See also, para. 6.2.1, where the Commission is invited to ‘finalise its study on the
feasibility and legal and practical implications to establish joint processing of asylum
applications’. This probably refers to joint processing within the European Union. A
Communication of the European Commission setting out the priorities for the future
Stockholm Programme had referred to a continuation of the analysis of the legal and
practical feasibility of joint processing of asylum applications outside the Union: COM (2009)
262 final, 10 June 2009, para. 5.2.2.
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depend on cooperation with countries of origin and transit, are central to any
effective immigration policy. The competence of the Union to adopt measures
in the sphere of repatriation was explicitly conferred by Article 63(3)(b) of the
EC Treaty. This has now been supplemented with a specific competence of
the EU to conclude readmission agreements with third countries in Article 79(3)
TFEU. The external dimension of the Union’s immigration and asylum policy
is however much wider in scope than issues of return and readmission. In
neutral and widest terms, it propagates cooperation with third countries in
the service of the two overarching aims of organising legal migration and
controlling illegal immigration.24 Apart from the facilitation of returns, this
includes the goals of preventing illegal immigration, of facilitating legal migra-
tion and of contributing to refugee solutions in third countries. This rather
inclusive scope of the external dimension has also found reflection in the TFEU,
which provides a more express legal basis for future external action in the
fields of migration and asylum than the former EC Treaty. Articles 77(1)(c),
77(2)(d), 78(2)(g) and 79(1) TFEU call respectively for the adoption of measures
in the sphere of integrated border management; the creation of partnerships
with third countries for managing inflows of asylum-seekers; and measures
for the prevention of illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.
The external dimension of the EU’s immigration and asylum policy is
multifaceted and not all the instruments adopted under it require this study’s
scrutiny. The two aspects of the external dimension which fall within the heart
of this study’s scope are the measures implementing what one may call the
externalisation of external border management; and, secondly, the external
dimension of the EU’s asylum policy.
5.2.2 Integrated Border Management and pre-border controls
One of the most prominent and probably best developed facets of the EU’s
external dimension on migration and asylum is the creation of a multi-layered
system of pre-entry control measures forming part of the strategy for the
management of the Schengen external borders. This sytem gives voice to the
concept of integrated border management, defined as involving measures taken
at the consulates of Member States in third countries, measures in countries
of transit, measures at the border itself and measures taken within the Schen-
gen area.25 The concept of integrated border management is premised on
24 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, p. 2.
25 COM(2008) 69 final, para. 1.2. Building upon the Conclusions of the Laeken European
Council and a Commission Communication on the management of the external borders,
the concept of integrated management of the external borders was first adopted by the
JHA Council in 2002 in its action plan for the management of external borders. Although
focusing on the coordination of Member States activities, this action plan already envisaged
border management cooperation with third countries, including the pooling of immigration
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the idea that border controls are most effective when deployed in parallel with
the various stages of the immigrants’ travel towards (and inside) the Union.
Partly adopted in the course of the intergovernmental Schengen acquis, and
partly under Article 62 of the former EC Treaty, it is possible to categorize the
relevant EU policy instruments implementing the idea of remote control under
four headers: the EU visa requirement; carrier sanctions; the posting of
immigration liaison officers in third countries; and the creation and operational
activity of the Frontex external borders agency. Further, the EU has increasingly
provided financial and technical assistance to third countries in order to
strengthen border control capacity in third countries.26
The key question arising with regard of these policies is to what extent
they may impede asylum-seekers from gaining access to protection. As a matter
of policy principle, the European Council, the European Commission and the
European Parliament have all affirmed that the strengthening of border controls
and other measures to combat illegal migration should not prevent persons
entitled to protection access to protection and that therefore protection-sensitive
border controls should be developed.27 The question to be answered then,
is to what extent this policy principle has effectively been implemented under
EU law.
5.2.2.1 The EU visa regime
The EU visa policy does not accord special consideration to refugees. The Visa
Requirement Regulation, listing the countries whose nationals are subject to
a visa requirement, does not include refugee concerns in the consideration
of whether a particular country should be included in the common list, nor
does it list refugees as one of the categories of persons exempted from the visa
requirement.28 The Visa Requirement Regulation does make specific reference
to stateless persons and recognised refugees, but only in stipulating that for
purposes of the Regulation, they must be treated similarly as nationals of the
third country where they reside and which issued their travel documents,
implying that they are in principle to be subjected to the visa requirement on
liaison officers to be posted in third countries and the dispatching of EU special border
advisors to third countries.
26 These measures are discussed hereunder in conjunction with the EU’s thematic programme
on asylum support in third countries, see infra section 5.2.3.
27 Eg European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, p. 11; Stockholm Programme, para. 5.1.;
Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System, 6 June 2007, COM(2007)
301 final, para. 5.3.; European Parliament resolution of 18 December 2008 on the evaluation
and future development of the FRONTEX Agency and of the European Border Surveillance
System (EUROSUR) (2008/2157(INI)), recital (p) and pts. 13, 18, 28.
28 Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001, Article 4.
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the same footing as the nationals of the country in which they reside.29 The
Visa Code, communautarising and streamlining the regime on the issuing of
short stay visas as formerly set forth in the Schengen Implementation Agree-
ment (SIA),30 applies to all third-country nationals, including refugees, who
must possess a visa pursuant to the Visa Requirement Regulation.31 The condi-
tions for obtaining a visa include inter alia the entry conditions of the Schengen
Borders Code,32 but without reiterating the specific derogations and
safeguards the Borders Code provides in respect of persons requesting
asylum.33
It must, on the other hand, also be concluded that the EU visa policy does
not prevent Member States from making favourable provisions to persons
requesting asylum. Firstly, the Visa Code allows for the issue of visa with
limited territorial validity (i.e. valid only in respect of the territory of the
issuing Member State and possibly other Member States should they consent
to it) on humanitarian grounds or because of international obligations.34
Secondly, the issuing of long stay visa remains at the discretion of Member
States,35 implying that Member States may issue humanitarian- or other pro-
tection visa to persons in need of international protection, including for
example special visa for refugees who are to be resettled, in accordance with
their national laws. Lastly and most pertinently, it must be underlined that
although the EU visa policy does not grant favourable treatment to refugees
or other persons seeking protection, persons requesting asylum at the EU
external border are exempted from the visa requirement pursuant to Articles
5(4)(c) and 13(1) of the Schengen Borders Code. This brings about the paradox
that refugees are not generally exempted from the visa requirement, except
at the very moment when that requirement is enforced, namely when it is
verified whether the person complies with the entry conditions set forth in
the Schengen Borders Code. This means, for practical purposes, that an EU
visa requirement bestowed on a refugee wishing to enter the EU is problematic
29 See Article 3 and recital 7. This is however without prejudice to more favourable provisions
of the European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees (...). Further, Member
States may decide that recognised refugees residing in a third country which is exempted
from the visa reuirement must nonetheless be in the possession of a visa.
30 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Govern-
ments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and
the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, OJ 2000
L 239, p. 19–62.
31 See the express confirmation in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Visa Code, COM(2006)
403 final, p. 15: ‘ The concept of “third-country national” is defined by default, by excluding
citizens of the European Union within the meaning of Article 17(1) of the EC Treaty. It
therefore also includes refugees and stateless persons.’
32 Article 21(1) Regulation (EC) No 562/2006.
33 See extensively section 5.3.2 infra.
34 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009, Art. 25(1).
35 Article 18 SIA.
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only in those instances where the requirement is enforced by other means of
border control than verification of compliance with the entry conditions in
the meaning of the Schengen Borders Code. As is explained below other EU
instruments do not expressly oblige Member States to verify compliance with
the visa requirement in the various pre-border situations. But this may well
be different in respect of Member State practices. Most notably, in making
use of carrier sanctions and immigration officers entasked to check documents
at foreign airports, verification of the visa requirement may be standard
procedure.36 This is especially problematic if these checks are not accompanied
with alternative guarantees for refugees.
5.2.2.2 Carrier sanctions
Carrier sanctions have been incorporated in the Schengen acquis under Article
26 SIA, which was supplemented by the 2001 Carrier’s Liability Directive.37
Article 26 SIA requires Schengen countries to impose the threefold obligation
on carriers to (i.) return aliens who are refused entry into the territory of a
Contracting State to the appropriate third State, (ii.) ensure that aliens trans-
ported by the carrier are in possession of the travel documents required for
entry, and (iii.) pay penalties for transporting aliens not having the requisite
travel documents.38 As a matter of law, the Schengen carriers regime does
not jeopardize the position of refugees. Firstly, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article
26 SIA make implementing measures subject to obligations resulting from the
Refugee Convention, confirming that carriers sanctions must respect inter-
national refugee law obligations. Secondly, the obligation of return only applies
to aliens who have been refused entry into the territory of a Contracting State,
and refusals of entry may under the Schengen borders Code not be effectuated
in disregard of both international and EU provisions on the right of asylum.39
For a similar reason, the obligations of carriers to ensure that aliens have the
required documents and to incur penalties otherwise, which refer respectively
to ‘travel documents required for entry’ and ‘necessary travel documents’,40
could well be interpreted as not being applicable to persons entitled to inter-
national protection, because the Schengen Borders Code exempts these persons
from the condition to possess valid travel documents. It would follow, hence,
that the Schengen carriers regime does not oblige Member States to impose
obligations on carriers in respect of persons who are entitled to protection or
36 See notes 44, 45 and 53 infra and accompanying text.
37 Directive 2001/51/EC.
38 Article 26 (1)(a)(b) and (2) SIA. The obligation of returning the alien does not apply to land
border crossings, see Article 26 (3) SIA.
39 Current Article 13(1) Schengen Borders Code; former Article 5(2) SIA.
40 Article 26 (1)(b) and (2) SIA.
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who otherwise fall within the ‘special provisions concerning the right of
asylum’ as specified under Article 13 (1) Schengen Borders Code.
However, with carrier sanctions, the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
Exonerations of asylum-seekers under carrier sanction schemes are commonly
seen as problematic in practice because they would depend on private carriers
making their own assessment of whether a person is indeed exempted from
the requirement of possessing valid travel documents – obliging them to
entertain asylum applications themselves.41 Apart from the lack of expertise
and training on the side of carriers, the limited processing time and expedient
nature of boarding procedures at foreign ports or airports are manifestly ill-
suited for conducting such assessments. By consequence, in order to rule out
the imposition of fines and return obligations, carriers are prone to rely
exclusively on establishing the validity of travel documents, also in respect
of persons claiming to be a refugee.42
Still, it is arguable that under the current system of EU law, by reading
the carriers regime in conjunction with both the Schengen Borders Code and
provisions of the Common European Asylum System, carriers need not
necessarily be burdened with the hazardous task of verifying themselves
whether passengers requesting asylum do indeed have a valid claim. Instead,
the argument can be made that all persons requesting asylum, regardless of
whether their claim is valid, fall outside the scope of the EU carrier sanctions
regime. Because Article 7 of the Asylum Procedures Directive confers a ‘right
to remain’ in the Member State upon any third country national applying for
asylum at the border or in the territory of a Member State pending the exam-
ination of the application, it would seem that no third country national who
lodges an asylum request may be refused entry in the meaning of the Schengen
Borders Code, necessarily implying that they are also exempted from the
requirement of possessing a valid travel document for being allowed entry.
It would follow that the EU carrier sanctions regime does not oppose a system
under which airlines and other carriers could simply accept all persons being
improperly documented provided they present themselves as asylum-seekers
when arriving at the EU external border.43 Obviously, such a system could
41 S. Taylor, ‘Offshore Barriers to Asylum-seeker Movement: The Exercise of Power without
Responsibility?’, in: J. McAdam (ed), Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security, Oxford:
Hart Publishing (2008), p. 100-101; E. Feller, ‘Carrier Sanctions and International Law’, 1
IJRL (1989), p. 57; F. Nicholson, ‘Implementation of the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability)
Act 1987: Privatising Immigration Functions at the Expense of International Obligations?’,
46 ICLQ (1997), p. 599-601.
42 Ibid.
43 It appears that this was also the manner in which the original French initiative for the
Carrier’s Liability Directive was drafted: ‘It is essential that the existence of such provisions
should not prejudice the exercise of the right to asylum. With this in mind, it is important
that Member States should not apply the penalties which they are required to introduce
under this Directive if the third-country national is admitted to the territory for asylum
purposes’, recital 2 of Initiative of the French Republic with a view to the adoption of a
186 Chapter 5
easily undermine the very purpose of carrier sanctions – by prompting every
undocumented migrant to claim asylum – which is probably why States rarely
apply such a general waiver for asylum-seekers in their domestic regimes.
It transpires from several studies that EU and other Western States incorporate
refugee concerns in their carrier sanctions’ arrangements in a widely divergent
manner, with some countries fining carriers regardless of whether it concerns
refugees, some countries waiving fines in case of persons admitted to the
asylum procedure and other countries waiving sanctions only in case of
improperly documented migrants who are granted refugee status.44 Further,
there are Members States operating arrangements in which carriers, when
confronted with persons claiming asylum, are first required to contact the
immigration authorities of the Member States.45
A further issue left unaddressed by the EU carrier sanctions regime is
whether sanctions should also be imposed for carrying persons without the
required visa. Article 26 SIA only refers to ’travel documents’, which is listed
under the Schengen Borders Code as an entry condition separate from possess-
Council Directive concerning the harmonisation of financial penalties imposed on carriers
transporting into the territory of the Member States third-country nationals lacking the
documents necessary for admission, OJ 2000C 269/06. But note that this formula does not
distinguish all too clearly between persons admitted entry into the asylum procedure and
persons admitted residence on asylum grounds. The adopted Directive 2001/51/EC merely
restates that carrier sanctions should not prejudice obligations under the Refuge Convention,
leaving the manner of implementation to the Member States, see recital 3.
44 According to a 2007 study of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, France, Italy
and the Netherlands waived the fines if a person was admitted to their asylum procedure
(but see note below in respect of the Netherlands), while Denmark, Germany and the United
Kingdom fined carriers regardless of protection concerns; European Council on Refugees
and Exiles, Defending Refugees’ Access to Protection in Europe, December 2007, p. 28. Another
study indicates that the United Kingdom does waive fines in respect of recognised refugees:
United Kingdom Refugee Council, ‘Remote Controls: how UK border controls are endange-
ring the lives of refugees’ (Report), December 2008, p. 45. A study on Australia reaveals
that Australian law and policy makes no provision for non-imposition or refund of penalties
in case of refugees: Taylor (2008), p. 100.
45 According to Dutch policy, carriers who ‘consider’ (‘overwegen’) to bring to the Netherlands
improperly documented persons who have claimed asylum are required to first obtain
permission of the Dutch immigration authority. When this permission is granted, no fines
are subsequently imposed. Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000 [Aliens Circular 2000], para. A2/
7.1.5. Air carriers are under this procedure required to call the general phone number of
the Dutch Ministry of Justice, which forwards the call to the Border Guard Unit at airport
Schiphol. No information is available on what grounds this Unit would grant permission,
nor does it appear that this procedure is effectively in use. In the reporting period 2007,
the immigration authority had received no requests of carriers to transport undocumented
asylum-seekers; Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst [Immigration- and Naturalisation
Department], Letter of 4 October 2007, no. INDUIT07-4752 [on file with the author]. On
the Dutch carrier sanctions regime extensively: S. Scholten and P. Minderhoud, ‘Regulating
Immigration Control: Carrier Sanctions in the Netherlands’, 10 EJML (2008), p. 123-147.
The United Kingdom also recommends carriers to contact either representatives of UNHCR
or the UK on how to proceed in case of persons claiming asylum, United Kingdom Refugee
Council Report (2008), p. 45.
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ing valid visa.46 The original proposal for the Carriers Liability Directive had
expressly included the lack of required visa as a ground for penalties, but this
reference was not included in the adopted directive.47 It transpires that Mem-
ber States also impose sanctions for bringing into their territory persons
without the required visa.48
It must be said that it is notoriously difficult to envisage a carrier sanctions
regime which can meaningfully reconcile control concerns with refugee con-
cerns. From a refugee perspective, it would not seem that a system waiving
penalties only for recognised refugees (or other protection beneficiaries) is
sufficient in preventing refugees from not being allowed to board, because
this would allocate the risk of ‘getting it wrong’ to the carrier. From a control
perspective, a system exempting all persons requesting asylum from sanctions
may be prone to abuse and therefore neither feasible. UNHCR has alternatively
suggested that sanctions should be waived in respect of persons who have
a ‘plausible claim’ for refugee or subsidiary protection status, to the effect that
no sanctions are imposed when claims are not found to be manifestly
unfounded.49 This would however still require carriers to make their own
assessment of asylum claims and encourage them to not take financial risks.
A further solution would be for carriers to refer asylum-seekers to a third party
which is able to provide effective protection or conduct a preliminary status
determination, such as diplomatic missions which are competent to issue
protection visa or the UNHCR. But such arrangements may be resource-intens-
ive, would require the consent of the third country concerned and may be
burdened with all kinds of procedural issues.
5.2.2.3 Immigration Liaison Officers
As a corollary to carrier sanctions regimes, and to assist carriers in complying
with their obligations, Western States have increasingly deployed immigration
control officers in foreign countries, most commonly at airports. These officers
are termed differently under national law,50 but referred to under EU law
46 Article 5 (1)(a) and (b) SBC.
47 Article 4 of the French Initiative, n. 43 supra.
48 This is the case for example in the Netherlands, see Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000 [Aliens
Circular 2000], para. A2/7.1.2; and in the United Kingdom: United Kingdom Refugee
Council Report (2008), p. 44.
49 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Position: Visa Requirements and Carrier Sanctions’, September 1995.
50 It appears that the term ‘Airline Liaison Officer’ is most commonly used to depict officers
supporting carriers in discharging their duties under carrier sanctions regimes, while
‘Immigration Liaison Officers’ are endowed with the broader tasks of collecting information
and advising host state authorities. On the functioning of these officers in respectively the
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, see more extensively: United Kingdom Refugee
Council Report (2008), p. 35-21; A. Brouwer and J. Kumin, ‘Interception and Asylum: When
Migration Control and Human Rights Collide’, 21 Refuge: Canada’s periodical on refugees
(2003); Taylor (2008).
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as Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs). Under the intergovernmental Prüm
Treaty, binding seven of the 27 Member States, they are alternatively called
‘document advisors’.51 The role of immigration officers in impeding asylum-
seekers from boarding aircrafts bound to places of safety has been lamented
by commentators and has also prompted questions asked by Members of
European Parliament.52 The critique pertains in particular practices whereby
immigration officers either directly prohibit persons from entering a plane
or where they indirectly ‘recommend’ a carrier or a foreign border authority
to not allow boarding or exiting the country. These practices are alleged not
to distinguish between persons claiming to be refugees and other improperly
documented travelers, or to provide asylum guarantees which are inherently
ineffective.53
EU law has done little to harmonise the tasks of immigration officers posted
in third countries. Regulation EC 377/2004 created a network of immigration
liaison officers, who are posted to the consular authorities of either another
Member State or a non-Member State with a view to contributing to the
prevention of illegal immigration, facilitating returns and the management
of legal migration.54 The Regulation foresees in the formation of local net-
works of ILOs from different Member States who are posted to the same
country, in order to exchange information and adopt common approaches.55
The Regulation does not oblige Member States to employ ILOs and does not
51 Article 20 Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,
the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom
of the Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border coopera-
tion, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration (Hereafter
‘Prüm Treaty’), 27 May 2005.
52 S. Taylor (2008); Brouwer and Kumin (2003); European Parliament, Written Question by
Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert (ALDE), Emine Bozkurt (PSE) and Thijs Berman (PSE) to the
Commission, ‘Immigration liaison officers (ILOs)’, no. E-3228/08; European Parliament,
Written Question by Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert (ALDE) to the Commission, ‘Immigration
liaison officers (ILOs)’, no. E-2276/09.
53 Several countries, including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom,
deploy immigration liaison officers who do not issue refusals of entry but instead provide
pre-boarding recommendations to air carriers. The United Kingdom has in the past also
employed immigration officers conducting pre-clearance controls, extensively addressed
in the Roma Rights case, discussed in chapter 4.3.1.1. It is reported that in Canada, Australia
and the United Kingdom, instructions are in place for immigration officers to refer inter-
cepted asylum-seekers to either the local UNHCR office, a diplomatic mission or the local
authorities. It is also reported however, that such referrals scarcely occur, because inter-
cepted persons seldom articulate a wish for asylum and because immigration officers are
reluctant to put the relationship with the host country in jeopardy. In the Netherlands,
ILOs confronted with asylum-seekers are instructed to contact the Dutch immigration
authority on a similar footing as carriers, but there is no data supporting this practice. See
the references in n. 44 and 45 supra.
54 Regulation (EC) No. 377/2004, Article 1.
55 Article 4.
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exhaustively define the tasks and powers of the ILOs.56 They must however,
be competent to collect and exchange information on a variety of issues and
must further be entitled to render assistance in establishing the identity of third
country nationals and in facilitating returns.57 The Prüm Treaty is somewhat
more specific in referring to document advisers as having the competence to
advice and train both private carriers and the host country border control
authorities – although it does not specify whether this ‘advise’ is of general
nature or should also pertain to checks conducted on individuals.58
The ILO Regulation leaves the status and operational activity of immigration
liaison officers rather obscure. The Regulation is adopted on the basis of Article
63(3)(b) of the EC Treaty, referring to measures on ‘illegal immigration and
illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal residents’, which may explain
why the regulation does not contain any reference to rights of refugees or other
protection beneficiaries, and neither refers to the proper observation of other
substantive EU instruments on border control, visa or legal migration.59 Fur-
ther, no public information is disseminated on the functioning of the EU ILO
networks ,60 although a proposal is pending to forward the currently classified
biannual reports on their functioning to the European Parliament.61 In view
of its legal basis however, the Commission has considered it impossible to
include in these biannual reports specific information on how asylum-seekers
are affected by the network.62
One question of particular relevance under EU law is whether immigration
officers, should they carry out tasks which can be properly defined as amount-
ing to ‘border control’ or ‘border checks’ in the meaning of the Schengen
Borders Code,63 should not also be regarded as ’border guards’ under the
Borders Code and/or be required to comply with all procedural and other
standards laid down in the Code. This question touches not only upon the
definitional terms of the Borders Code, but also upon its territorial scope, and
is further addressed in section 5.3.2. of this chapter below.
56 Article 1(4)
57 Articles 2 and 4.
58 Prüm Treaty, Article 21 (2) and (3).
59 It must also be noted that the regulation was adopted before inter alia the Schengen Borders
Code and the Visa Code.
60 According to Article 6 paragraph 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 a biannual
report on the activities of immigration liaison officers networks should be forwarded to
the Council and Commission, but this report is classified.
61 COM(2009) 322 final, Article 1 (3).
62 Commission Decision 2005/687/EC of 29 September 2005 sets forth that this report must
inter alia include information on refusals of entry at the frontiers of the host country. Where
relevant, information on asylum-seekers must also be included, but only in so far as asylum-
seekers present a ‘risk and threat at the host country’s borders’, see Annex, paras. 6.2.
and 6.4.
63 See Article 2 (9) and (10) Schengen Borders Code.
190 Chapter 5
5.2.2.4 Frontex
Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, has
acquired remarkable notoriety in its relatively short life span. Founded in 2004,
the agency was presented as a decisive step forward in ensuring effective
Member State cooperation in external border controls, border surveillance and
the removal of third country nationals.64 Especially Member States faced with
considerable migration pressure at the EU external borders have welcomed
Frontex as a vehicle for the pooling of expertise, intelligence and material and
personal assets. Others however, have denounced the agency as primarily
functioning as a European security instrument, as an agency ‘militarising’ the
EU external border, or even as the ‘migrant hunting agency of the European
Union’.65 The agency itself, acutely aware of the contested environment in
which it operates, has stressed its subsidiary role and underlined that it ‘is
not and never will be a panacea to problems of illegal migration’.66
Frontex’ executive powers are rather limited. After the idea of setting up
a supranational European Corps of Border Guards was abandoned in June
2002, it was agreed that an agency should instead be created which would
facilitate cooperation, coordination and consistency between the national border
guards of the EU Member States – without replacing them.67 The Frontex
regulation lays down that ‘responsibility for the control and surveillance of
external border lies with the Member States’, while the Agency shall ‘facilitate
and render more effective the application of existing and future Community
measures relating to the management of external borders’.68 Frontex is both
a regulatory and coordinating agency, which assists national border guard
services by providing technical assistance and training and facilitating the
cooperation between national border guards.69 It is also competent to co-
64 COM(2003) 687 final.
65 Noborder network 30 September 2009, ‘Act against the migrant hunting agency of the Euro-
pean Union!’
66 The Executive Director of Frontex mr. I. Laitinen, ‘Frontex – facts and myths ‘, Frontex Press
Release, 11 June 2007.
67 European Council 14 June 2002, ‘Plan for the management of the external borders of the
Member States of the European Union’, doc. 9834/1/02 FRONT 55 COMIX 392 REV, para.
IV. For a summary of discussions on the possible creation of a European Corps of Border
Guards, see: House of Lords Select Committee on European Union – Twenty-Ninth Report
(‘Proposals for a European Border Guard’), 1 July 2003. Also see A.W. Neal, ‘Securitization
and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of Frontex’, 47 Journal of Common Market Studies
(2009), p. 340-341.
68 Article 1(2) Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004
69 Article 2. Extensively, J.J. Rijpma, Building Borders: The Regulatory Framework for the Manage-
ment of the External Borders of the European Union, dissertation Florence (2009), p. 258-260.
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operate with third countries in matters covered by the Regulation, by con-
cluding working arrangements.70
A prominent feature of Frontex’ mandate concerns its power to initiate
and approve proposals for joint operations of border control.71 Responding
to the sense of urgency concerning irregular sea arrivals, Frontex has been
particularly active in launching joint operations of maritime border control
and it is precisely in the context of these operations that refugee concerns have
been raised.72 As is extensively explored in the next chapter, some of these
operations have allegedly been accompanied with immediate diversions of
migrants to the third country of embarkation, without screening for refugees
and without allowing persons access to a status determination procedure.73
Although Frontex plays a leading role in the preliminary phase of deciding
upon and outlining the modus operandi of joint operations, it is not directly
involved in the actual operations themselves. The decision to implement a
joint operation and the contents of the operational plan require the consent
of both Frontex and the Member State hosting the operation.74 The RABIT
regulation has introduced a specific procedure for deciding upon the deploy-
ment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams in the case of emergency
situations.75 This procedure similarly foresees in the close collaboration and
mutual consent of Frontex and the host Member State in deciding upon the
launch of the operation and the drawing up of the operational plan.76 Once
a decision upon the undertaking of a joint operation has been taken however,
the Member States remain in command and control over the activity under-
taken by the border guards. Although the original Frontex Regulation left the
competences and legal status of officers of Member States participating in a
joint operation undefined, the RABIT Regulation, by amending the Frontex
Regulation, has now exhaustively regulated the tasks, powers and liability
of border guards of one Member State who are posted in another Member
State (guest officers).77 In essence, the adopted legal framework equates guest
officers with the border guards of the Member State hosting the operation:
70 Article 14.
71 Article 3.
72 For an overview of Frontex activities, see Report on the evaluation and future development
of the Frontex Agency, COM(2008) 67 final; also see SEC(2008) 150/2.
73 Chapter 6.2.
74 Article 3 and 20 (3) Regultion (EC) No. 2007/2004. The current Frontex Regulation does
not lay down a procedure for decisions to launch joint operations nor does it explicitly
refer to the drawing up of an operational plan. These matters are currently regulated in
Frontex’ Internal Rules of Procedure, see extensively: Rijpma (2009), p. 270-273. The proposal
for amending the Frontex Regulation contains a new provision on the drawing up of
operational plans, which must be agreed upon by Frontex and the host state, COM(2010)
61 final, Article 3a. See also chapter 6.5.
75 See the new Article 8d Regulation 2007/2004 as amended by Regulation (EC) No. 863/2007.
76 Articles 8d (3)(5)(6) and 8(e).
77 Article 10.
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they are incorporated into the command structure of the host Member State,
they must comply with the laws of the host Member State and they must be
treated as officials of the host Member State for purposes of civil and criminal
liability.78 This rather far-reaching model of putting Member State officials
at the disposal of another Member State means that the host Member State
has decisive influence over the manner of operation of guest officers. The
Frontex Regulation endows the host Member State with the power of in-
struction over guest officers and stipulates that decisions to refuse entry shall
be taken only by the host Member State.79 What this means in terms of attri-
buting conduct to one or the other Member State is addressed in the next
chapter.80
The core of the Frontex mandate is rather broadly described as rendering
‘more effective the application of existing and future Community measures
relating to the management of external borders’.81 The original Regulation
did not refer to specific EU instruments on migration and border control and
only in general terms affirmed that the Regulation respects fundamental
rights.82 The lack of a specific reference to international refugee obligations
in the mandate of Frontex contributed to a perception that Frontex is pre-
occupied with security concerns and the prevention of illegal migration,
without meaningfully addressing the needs and rights of persons seeking
international protection.83 A variety of stakeholders, including the EU institu-
tions themselves, have called for a clarification of the Frontex mandate in this
respect, with a view to ensuring that joint border operations are ‘protection-
sensitive’.84 In the Stockholm Programme, the European Council specifically
requested the Commission to make further amendments to the Frontex legis-
78 Articles 10(2)(3), 10b and 10c. Also see Rijpma (2009), p. 283.
79 Article 10(3)(10).
80 See chapter 6.5.
81 Article 1(2).
82 Recital 22. The RABIT Regulation, adopted after the entry into force of the Schengen Borders
Code, incorporated a reference to the Schengen Borders Code in Article 10 of the Frontex
regulation. Article 2 of the RABIT Regulation also refers to rights of refugees, in particular
the prohibition of refoulement. Also see recital 17 Regulation 863/2007.
83 S. Carrera, ‘The EU Border Management Strategy FRONTEX and the Challenges of Irregular
Immigration in the Canary Islands’, CEPS Working Document No. 261, March 2007; Rijpma
(2009), p. 348.
84 Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System, COM(2007) 301 final, para.
5.3; UNHCR, Response to the European Commission’s Green Paper on the Future Common
European Asylum System, September 2007, p. 48; European Parliament resolution of 18
December 2008 on the evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX Agency and
of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), P6_TA(2008)0633, para. 18;
COM(2008) 67 final, para, 15; Also see COWI, ‘Frontex, External evaluation of the European
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the
Member States of the European Union’ (Final Report), January 2009, p. 19; House of Lords
European Union Select Committee, Ninth Report, ‘FRONTEX: the EU external borders
agency’, 5 March 2008, paras. 140-145.
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lative framework, including ‘common operational procedures containing clear
rules of engagement for joint operations at sea with due regard to ensuring
protection for those in need who travel in mixed flows, in accordance with
international law’ and a mechanism for reporting and following up on inci-
dents occurring in these operations.85
Early 2010, the European Commission tabled a general recast for the Frontex
Regulation which establishes a permanent pool of available border guards
for joint operations (‘Frontex Joint Support Teams’) and includes several
provisions specifically addressing joint operations at sea and the plight of
persons seeking asylum.86 The proposal includes an explicit reference to
obligations related to access to international protection, an express legal basis
for initiating joint operations outside the territory of the Member States, a
requirement that all border guards participating in operational activities
coordinated by the Agency have received training in refugee law and an
obligation of reporting incidents of alleged breaches of relevant EU law and
fundamental rights.87 Further, the proposal foresees in non-binding super-
vision of Frontex on the manner in which host Member States are carrying
out operations, by obliging the host Member State to take the views of the
Frontex coordinating officer ‘into consideration’.88
Specifically responding to the call in the Stockholm programme to establish
common procedures for joint operations at sea, the Council further adopted
a Council Decision (2010/252/EU) in April 2010 which embeds sea border
operations coordinated by Frontex in the framework of the Schengen Borders
Code.89 A remarkable novelty of the Decision, which establishes binding rules
for interception at sea and non-binding rules for rescue operations in the course
of Frontex missions, is that it introduces, as a general principle, that ‘[n]o
person shall be disembarked in, or otherwise handed over to the authorities
of, a country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement, or from which
there is a risk of expulsion or return to another country in contravention of
that principle’.90 Arguably, this can be taken as a codification, for the first
85 Stockholm programme, para 5.1.
86 COM(2010) 61 final.
87 Articles 1(2), 1a(2), 2(1a), 3a(h)(i), 3b(4), 8e(h)(i) and recitals 10, 17 and 23.
88 Article 3c(2).
89 Council Decision 2010/252/EU of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code
as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational coopera-
tion coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. The decision was
based on a Commission proposal issued on 27 November 2009, COM(2009)658 final.
90 Council Decision 2010/252/EU, Annex, Part I, para. 1.2.
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time in EU law, that the prohibition of refoulement also applies to extraterritorial
conduct of Member States.91
Although firmly embedding international refugee obligations within the
Frontex mandate, the proposal for recasting the Frontex Regulation and Council
Decision 2010/252/EU do not as such resolve the fundamental issue of how,
precisely, the material and procedural requirements stemming from the prohi-
bition of refoulement should be made operational in conducting maritime
interdictions. The instruments do not set forth in what manner screening for
refugees should occur, whether intercepted persons have the right to lodge
an asylum application when intercepted, whether third country compliance
with refugee and human rights should be a precondition for engaging in
cooparation with these countries, and where, ultimately, persons claiming
international protection should be disembarked.92 These are all modalities
which must presumably be spelled out in the individual operational plan of
each joint operation.93 Given the importance accorded to refugee concerns
in the proposed amendments to the Frontex mandate however, it would seem
that Frontex would at the least become bound to take such issues into meaning-
ful account when drafting and deciding upon the operational plan.
The European Parliament has decided to bring an action for annulment
of Council Decision 2010/252/EU to the ECJ on account of the Council having
exceeded its implementing powers as prescribed under the Schengen Borders
Code.94 The relation of Council Decision 2010/252/EU with the Schengen
Borders Code is more extensively discussed in section 5.3.2.1 below. In chapter
6, the relationship between Council Decision 2010/252/EU and obligations
deriving from international maritime law and the pertinent rights of persons
seeking asylum is more extensively addressed.
91 The original Commission proposal had expressly considered that the prohibition on
refoulement ‘would apply regardless of the status of the waters the people were in’,
COM(2009)658 final, para. 2. Also see Annex, para. 4.2. of the original proposal, referring
to the material obligation not to expose persons to a risk of harm, rather than adherence
to the ‘principle of non-refoulement’.
92 The only elaboration of the prohibition of refoulement is rather ambiguously formulated
obligation to inform intercepted or rescued persons ‘in an appropriate way so that they
can express any reasons for believing that disembarkation in the proposed place would
be in breach of the principle of non-refoulement’, Annex, Part I, para. 1.2.
93 Also see Annex, Part II, para. 1.2.
94 Case C-355/10, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, action brought on 14
July 2010.
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5.2.3 The EU’s external asylum policy
The evolving EU’s external asylum policy95 is of an altogether different legal
nature than the instruments making up the EU system of integrated border
management. The policies which have in recent years been developed, primar-
ily in the context of the Hague Programme, and which specifically address
the plight of refugees in third countries, have almost exclusively taken the
form of programmes of financial and technical aid and do not directly touch
upon the legal status of individuals. Despite intense discussions both in- and
outside EU institutions on the merits and feasibility of establishing a EU pro-
gramme for the processing of asylum claims in third countries,96 the most
recent EU policy documents refrain from proposing such a far-reaching scheme
and focus instead on the implementation of a strategy – much in line with
UNHCR’s Convention Plus initiative97 – which should build capacity in third
countries to provide effective protection and contribute to solving protracted
refugee situations.98
Formally, the external asylum dimension is built on two pillars: the man-
aged entry of refugees into the Europen Union and protection of refugees in
the regions of origin.99 These two pillars support the general strategy of ‘con-
solidating protection capacities in the region of origin and the treatment of
protection requests as close as possible to needs and the regulation of safe
95 The Stockholm Programme refers to this policy as ‘The external dimension of asylum’, para.
6.2.3.
96 See, extensively eg M. Garlick, ‘The EU Discussions on Extraterritorial processing: Solution
or Conundrum?’, 18 IJRL (2006), p. 601-629. G. Noll ‘Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and
Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit Processing Centres and Protection Zones’, 5 EJML
(2003), p. 303–341.
97 The Convention Plus inititiative, officially launched by UNHCR in June 2003, sought to
develop a normative framework supplementing the Refugee Convention for global burden-
sharing that would increase the involvement of Western states in guaranteeing adequate
protection for refugees in their regions of origin. The Convention Plus intitiative was
incorporated in UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection, first endorsed in 2002. Statement by Ruud
Lubbers, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, First Meeting of the High
Commissioner’s Forum, 27 June 2003; UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Agenda for
Protection, October 2003, Third edition, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
4714a1bf2.html [accessed 19 March 2010]. For a comprehensive appraisal of the Convention
Plus Initiative see: M. Zieck, ‘Doomed to Fail from the Outset? UNHCR’s Convention Plus
Initiative Revisited’, 21 IJRL (2009), p. 387-420.
98 The Stockholm Programme still foresees in the conducting of a ‘study on the feasibility
and legal and practical implications to establish joint processing of asylum applications’,
but without referring to processing outside the territory of the Member States; Stockholm
Programme, para. 6.2.1. Also see COM (2009) 262 final, para. 5.2.2.
99 The European Commission mentions Regional Protection Programmes as a distinct third
part of the external asylum dimension, but these programmes may well be perceived as
a more targeted manner of enhancing protection and managing entry: COM(2004)410 final,
paras. 4-5; 36-54. Also see Presidency Conclusions 19/20 June 2003 (Thessaloniki), para. 26.
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access to the European Union for some of those in need of international
protection’.100
Financing is the principal means through which the EU implements the
notion of enhanced protection in regions of origin. Under the AENEAS budget
line and the successor ‘Thematic programme for the cooperation with third
countries in the areas of migration and asylum’, funds are allocated to projects
in third countries contributing to inter alia the strengthening of institutional
capacities to provide protection, the promotion of norm-setting on asylum,
the support of registration of asylum applicants and refugees and the support
for improving reception conditions and prospects for local integration.101
These funds form part of the broader financing scheme embracing all ‘essential
facets of the migratory phenomenon’, which also covers projects aimed at
discouraging illegal immigration and improving border management capacities
in third countries.102 Given the wide material and geographical scope of the
financial programme on asylum and migration, the resources available may
be perceived as rather modest: the EU budget for actions in third countries
in these fields has risen from an annual amount of C= 10 million in 2001 to just
over C= 50 million in 2010.103
The funding made available under this thematic budget line must also
provide the means for developing EU Regional Protection Programmes. These
programmes are presented as a vehicle for intensified commitment of the EU
to specific regions hosting many refugees, in order to contribute to the three
‘Durable Solutions’ of repatriation, local integration or resettlement and are
to be developed in close cooperation with UNHCR.104 A first pilot project,
funded by the EU and implemented by UNHCR, for the three countries of
Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, was officially launched in April 2009.105
The second limb of the EU’s external asylum policy, that of facilitating
organized arrivals of refugees in the EU, is considerably less developed, or,
indeed, not developed at all. The main instrument having a reasonable chance
of adoption in this area is a Joint EU Resettlement Programme, proposed by
100 COM(2004)410 final, para. 2.
101 European Commission, ‘AENEAS Programme. Financial and technical assistance to third
countries in the field of migration and asylum, 19 February 2003’; COM(2006) 26 final,
para.3.2; Article 16(2)(e) Regulation (EC) No. 1905/2006; European Commission, ‘Strategy
Paper for the Thematic Programme of Cooperation with Third Countries in the Areas of
Migration and Asylum 2007-2010’ (undated).
102 Article 16(2)(c) Regulation (EC) No. 1905/2006.
103 Strategy Paper, note above, p. 5, 12. Note that other EU budget lines may also cover financial
aid in migration matters, notably in the context of pre-accession countries and the European
Neighbourhood Policy.
104 Ibid, p. 29; and in general see European Commission Communication, ‘On Regional
Protection Programmes’, COM(2005) 388 final.
105 Press Release UNHCR 23 April 2009, ‘Regional project to support integration of refugees
in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine launched in Kyiv’; Press release Söderköping Process
Secretariat, 14 April 2009, ‘UNHCR Regional Protection Support Project launched in Kiev’.
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the Commission in September 2009.106 The proposal foresees in the setting
by the Commission of common annual priorities on resettlement, in which
Member States would participate on a voluntary basis. To this end, it is pro-
posed to include in the Decision establishing the European Refugee Fund a
provision stipulating that Member States will receive a fixed amount of 4.000
Euros for each resettled refugee.107 The decision was not adopted as of
August 2010.108
Despite the modesty of the proposals, the establishment of an EU resettle-
ment scheme would in itself signify an important departure from the tradi-
tional reluctance of European countries to contribute to worldwide resettlement
efforts.109 Nonetheless, it is difficult to see how a EU resettlement scheme,
even if it receives widespread Member State participation, could meaningfully
address the ambition formulated by both the European Council and European
Commission to create effective mechanisms of orderly entry into the EU for
refugees, mitigating the need to resort to illegal migration channels and the
services of migrant smugglers.110 By their nature, resettlement policies are
subject to numeral ceilings, regional allocations and the selection of specific
categories of refugees – and do not grant individual entitlements of entry.111
Hence, they cannot reasonably be expected to alleviate the phenomenon of
refugees arriving spontaneously and by disorderly means. Although the
European Union has discussed the establishment of alternative pre-entry
procedures allowing refugees to lodge formal applications in third countries
for entry into EU territory as employed in various forms by individual Member
106 European Commission Communication, ‘On the Establishment of a Joint EU Resettlement
Programme’, COM(2009) 447 final. Also see Stockholm Programme, para. 6.2.3.
107 Proposal for a Decision amending Decision No 573/2007/EC establishing the European
Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of the General programme “Solidarity
and Management of Migration Flows” and repealing Council Decision 2004/904/EC,
COM(2009) 447 final. The decision was not adopted as of August 2010.
108 In a resolution on the joint EU resettlement programme, the European Parliament considered
that a budget line and financial support are not sufficient to establish a real EU-wide
resettlement programme and recommended the setting up of a permanent Resettlement
Unit as part of the European Asylum Support Office: European Parliament Resolution T7-
0163/2010 of 18 May 2010. The EP also proposed to amend the Refugee Fund so as to
increase the funding received per resettled person for Member States participating for the
first and second years to 6.000 and 5.000 Euros respectively. European Parliament Resolution
P7_TA(2010)0160 of 18 May 2010.
109 Currently, nine states host the bulk of the refugees who are annually resettled, of which
four are EU Member States: United States, Canada, Australia, Sweden, Norway, Finland,
New Zealand, Denmark, The Netherlands. For figures, see UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook
(country chapters updated September 2009), 1 November 2004. Also see S. Kneebone, ‘The
Legal and Ethical Implications of Extraterritorial Processing of Asylum-seekers: The ‘Safe
Third Country’ Concept’, in: J. McAdam (ed), Forced Migration, Human RIghts and Security,
Oxford: Hart Publishing (2008), p. 136.
110 COM(2004) 410 final, paras. 12-21.
111 These selection criteria are also foreseen in the Commission’s proposal, COM(2009) 447
final, para. 3.2.1.
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States (Protected Entry Procedures or PEPs) – under which refugees can apply,
for example, for special protection visa at diplomatic missions – the European
Commission ultimately decided to refrain from pursuing further the setting
up a EU Protected Entry Procedure mechanism, because of a lack of Member
State commitment.112
In summary, the EU’s external asylum policy is as of yet scarcely developed
and of ambivalent character. On the one hand, it is beyond question that the
aid and assistance provided by the EU to building capacity for receiving and
protecting refugees in third countries may come to the benefit of many persons
who are genuinely in need of protection.113 On the other hand, the evolving
EU’s external asylum policy embodies more than a mere gesture of international
solidarity, but is also premised on a theory of ‘containment’, i.e. the idea that
enhanced protection in regions of transit and origin reduces incentives for
people to try to receive protection elsewhere.114 This containment idea is
in fact accorded key priority in the financial programme on asylum and
migration support in third countries. Out of a total of C= 205 million made
available for the years 2007-2010, C= 120 million is apportioned to projects along
the ‘Southern’ and ‘Eastern Migratory Routes’, while only C= 4 million is ear-
marked for asylum and refugee protection globally.115 It is also noteworthy
that the first pilot Regional Protection Programme – originally presented as
aimed at providing durable solutions for refugees close to regions of origin
– is implemented in the EU’s Eastern neighboring (transit) region, and that
this programme, apart from contributing to the protection of refugees, includes
a strong focus on border management.116
5.3 THE TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF EU LAW ON BORDER CONTROL AND ASYLUM
In the previous section I have noted that the specific instruments on external
migration management do not succeed in satisfactorily regulating the legal
status of refugees subjected to coercive action of Member States, and that they
neither make, in the alternative, any meaningful linkage with the pertinent
112 COM(2004) 410 final, paras. 20, 35. An extensive study on Member State practices and the
feasibility of establishing EU protected entry procedures was conducted on behalf of the
European Commission in 2002: G. Noll, J. Fagerlund and F. Liebaut, Study on the Feasibility
Of Processing Asylum Claims Outside the EU Against the Background of the Common
European Asylum System and the Coal of a Common Asylum Procedure (final report),
European Commission/The Danish Centre for Human RIghts, 2002.
113 Garlick (2006), p. 629.
114 Ibid, p. 612. Also see K. de Vries, ‘An Assessment of ‘Protection in Regions of Origin’ in
relation to European Asylum Law’, 9 EJML (2007), p. 84.
115 Strategy Paper, n. 101 supra, p. 33.
116 Supra n. 105.
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internal rules of the European Union on border control and asylum. The
present section explores the latter relationship from the perspective of the
internal rules. Is it possible that when, for example, a Member State makes
use of immigration officers in controlling the borders of a foreign country or
when it patrols the territorial sea of a third country, the migrants subjected
to such activities can invoke the Union’s ordinary regime on border controls
and asylum?
It has been suggested that the internal rules on border control and asylum
are not designed to address extraterritorial activity of Member States and that
therefore, EU law does not comprehensively regulate the manner in which
Member States may subject asylum-seekers to coercive measures outside their
territories.117 The current section challenges this assumption – in part. It first
shows that EU law may, in general, well regulate relationships or activities
which can be situated outside the territory of the European Union. The section
then specifically explores the territorial scope of the Schengen border crossings
regime and the Common European Asylum System. Although the instruments
making up the Common European Asylum System are equipped with specific
terminology limiting their territorial scope, the Schengen Borders Code is
remarkably responsive to different types of pre-border control measures and
may as such constrain the freedom of European Member States in subjecting
migrants to controls away from their borders. However, in attempts to embed
Frontex sea operations within the Schengen border crossings regime, the
Council and the European Commission have tried to do so in questionable
disregard of the specific procedural guarantees ordained under that regime.
5.3.1 Some observations on the territorial scope of European Union law
The European Union’s legal relationship with the wider world can be
approached from a multitude of angles. Most typically legal discourse focuses
on defining the EU’s external competences with reference to the Union’s treaty
making powers and its competence to participate in international organisations,
touching upon the dual questions of the sources of these competences and
the division of power between the Union and the Member States. Although
117 See, with respect to the Schengen Border Crossings regime House of Lords Report (2008),
para. 143; and Rijpma (2009), p. 337. With respect to the Common European Asylum System,
H. Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
(2006), p. 209-211. Also see R. Weinzierl, ‘Human Rights at the EU’s common external
maritime border, Recommendations to the EU legislature’, German Institute for Human
Rights: Policy Paper No. 11, September 2008, p. 4.
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indirectly of relevance to this study, this topic has received ample attention
in literature and case law of the ECJ and is not further dealt with here.118
A question of a different nature concerns the EU’s external prescriptive,
or legislative, competence. This issue is also commonly commented upon, but
mainly in the context of prescriptive jurisdiction in the field of EU competition
law. Here, the most paramount question has been to what extent the EU’s
competition rules apply to undertakings which have no physical presence in
the Union but whose conduct negatively affects the functioning of the internal
market. In Wood Pulp, the ECJ took position in a theoretical debate which had
been ongoing for some years on the question whether the European Commun-
ity is entitled, along the model previously endorsed by the United States
Supreme Court, to assert jurisdiction over companies established outside the
Community on the basis that those companies, by engaging in conduct pro-
ducing substantial effects within the internal market, act contrary to EU
antitrust law.119 The ECJ, avoiding the effects doctrine as an explicit basis
for the establishment of jurisdiction, concentrated instead on the factor that
it suffices that an agreement is ‘implemented’ within the Community’s internal
market and found this basis for asserting jurisdiction over third country
companies to accord with ‘the territoriality principle as universally recognized
in public international law’.120 The judgment was received by some authors
as a clear rejection of the effects doctrine as adhered to by the United
States,121 while others observed that the ECJ had upheld an effects doctrine
in disguise.122 What is, in the context of the present study, most noteworthy
about the Wood Pulp case, is that in defining the territorial scope of Community
law, an assessment was made, firstly, of the wording of a particular Treaty
provision and whether particular conduct can be brought within the ambit
of that provision. And secondly, if such assessment may have extraterritorial
118 See the contributions in two fairly recently published textbooks, A. Dashwood and M.
Maresceau (eds), Law And Practice Of EU External Relations; Salient Features Of A Changing
Landscape, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2008); M. Cremona (ed), Developments
in EU External Relations Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2008). And specifically in
the context of competences for the management of the EU’s external borders: Rijpma (2009),
p. 313-318.
119 For an overview of the US ‘effects doctrine’, eg A. Robertson and M. Demetriou, ‘“But that
was in Another Country …”: The Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Laws in the
US Supreme Court’, 43 ICLQ (1994), p. 417-425.
120 ECJ 27 September 1988, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö a.o. v Commission (Wood Pulp I), Joined Cases
89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 and 125/85 to 129/85, paras. 16-18.
121 V. Lowe, ‘International Law and the Effects Doctrine in the European Court of Justice’,
48 The Cambridge Law Journal (1989), p. 9-11.
122 J.J. Friedberg, ‘Convergence of Law in an Era of Political Integration: The Wood Pulp Case
and the Alcoa Effects Doctrine’, 52 University of Pittsburgh law review (1990), p. 291. See also
the discussions following the more recent judgment in Gencor rendered by the Court of
First Instance: Court of First Instance 25 March 1999, Gencor v Commission, Case T-102/96;,
M.P. Broberg, ‘The European Commission’s Extraterritorial Powers in Merger Control, The
Court of First Instance’s Judgment in Gencor v. Commission’, 49 ICLQ (2000), p. 172-182.
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implications, decisive weight in defining the territorial scope of the Treaty
is accorded to the limits set by public international law and in particular the
principle of non-intervention.123
Wood Pulp evolved around the question to what extent international law
permits the European Community to establish jurisdiction over foreign under-
takings. The issue of accommodating the Union’s competences with the sover-
eign interests of third countries is not normally apparent in situations where
it are the Member States themselves who engage in extraterritorial activities.
It is precisely this relationship – to what extent does EU Law regulate the
extraterritorial conduct of Member States – in which this study is particularly
interested. Unfortunately, this question has received surprisingly little scholarly
attention and it is perhaps for this reason that in recent discussions on the
extraterritorial applicability of EU legislation on border control and immigra-
tion, the knee-jerk proposition has been advanced that EU law cannot govern
the extraterritorial activity of the Member States. But this proposition is, as
may also be implicitly inferred from Wood Pulp and as is more explicitly
explained below, misfounded, at least in so far as it intends to suggest that
EU rules can only have effect within the common territories of the Member
States. Hereunder, a review is made of several cases dealing with the specific
issue of the application of EU law to Member State activity outside the common
territories of the EU.
In the Sea fisheries-case, the question was to what maritime zones the Regula-
tion laying down a common structural policy for the fishing industry
applied.124 The ECJ held that secondary legislation adopted on the basis of
the Treaty in principle applies to the same geographical area as the treaty itself
and that the delimitation of this geographical area depends on the legal context,
the subject matter and the purpose for which the regulation was adopted.125
Because the Regulation specified that its scope was confined to the ‘maritime
waters coming under [the Member State’s] sovereignty or within its juris-
diction’ as ‘described by the laws in force in each Member State’,126 the ECJ
found the geographical scope of the Regulation to necessarily correspond with
the extent to which a Member State exercised its sovereignty in maritime
waters and that any extension of national competences in this respect auto-
matically means ‘precisely the same extension of the area to which the Regula-
tion applies.’ It observed that this interpretation was the only one which
accorded with the subject matter and the purpose of the Regulation, which
123 This dual assessment implicitly follows from the Court’s judgment in paras. 11-13 and 15-18
and was explicitly followed in the Conclusion of the Advocate-General: Opinion of AG
Darmon 25 May 1988, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö a.o. v Commission (Wood Pulp I), Joined Cases
89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 and 125/85 to 129/85, paras. 8-10; 19 et seq.
124 ECJ 16 February 1978, Commission v Ireland (Sea fisheries), Case 71/77.
125 Ibid, paras. 45-46.
126 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 101/76, Article 2 (1)(3).
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was to establish a ‘common system for fishing’ throughout the whole of the
maritime waters belonging to the Member States.127 This meant that the
Regulation and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality
laid down in the EEC Treaty applied to the newly adopted Irish fishery policies
within the Irish Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
A similar approach had been followed in Case 167/73, on the question of
applicability of the EEC Treaty to sea and air transport, including transport
outside the territories of the Member States.128 The case concerned the con-
formity of restrictions set by French legislation on the number of foreign
workers on French commercial and fishing vessels with the primordial treaty
provisions on the free movement of workers. Even though the Community
had not (yet) made use of its explicit power conferred by former Article 84
(2) EEC Treaty to regulate the air and sea transport, the Court found the or-
dinary treaty regime on free movement to apply to the French Code du Travail
Maritime, precluding the French legislator to give preferential treatment to
French nationals vis-à-vis nationals of other Member States in respect of work
on French vessels.
The Court has not departed from this line of reasoning in various later
cases concerning employment relations carried out outside the territory of the
EU between a national of one Member State and an undertaking of another
Member State. In respect of such employment, the ECJ has consistently held
that EU law on free movement of workers applies to ‘all legal relationships
in so far as those relationships, by reason of either the place where they were
entered into or the place where they took effect, could be located within the
territory of the Community.’129 This implies, according to the ECJ, that ‘activ-
ities temporarily carried on outside the territory of the Community are not
sufficient to exclude the application of [Community law], as long as the em-
ployment relationship retains a sufficiently close link with that territory’.130
In the case of SARL Prodest, the Court considered that a link of that kind can
be found in the fact that the Community worker was engaged by an under-
taking established in another Member State and, for that reason, was insured
under the social security scheme of that State and in the fact that he continued
to work on behalf of the Community undertaking even during his posting
to a non-Member Country.131 In Mário Lopes da Veiga, concerning the question
127 Sea fisheries, paras. 48-50.
128 ECJ 4 April 1974, Commission v French Republic, Case 167-73.
129 ECJ 12 July 1987, SARL Prodest v Caisse Primaire d’Assurance Maladie de Paris, Case 237/83,
para. 6 ; ECJ 27 September 1989, Mário Lopes da Veiga v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 9/88,
paras. 15-16; ECJ 29 June 1994, R.L. Aldewereld v Staatssecretaris van Financiën, Case C-60/93,
para. 14.
130 SARL Prodest v Caisse Primaire d’Assurance Maladie de Paris, para. 6 ; Mário Lopes da Veiga
v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, paras. 15-16; R.L. Aldewereld v Staatssecretaris van Financiën,
para. 14.
131 SARL Prodest v Caisse Primaire d’Assurance Maladie de Paris, para. 7.
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of applicability of free movement law to a Portuguese national working as
a seaman for a Dutch shipping company, the Court found the relevant criteria
for the establishment of a ‘sufficiently close connection’ to be that the person
in question worked on board a vessel registered in the Netherlands, that he
was employed by a Dutch undertaking, that the employment relationship was
subject to Dutch law and that he paid his taxes in the Netherlands.132 This
case is particularly noteworthy in the context of the present study, because
it signified that whereas the Dutch Aliens Act did not impose requirements
in respect of the holding of a residence permit on board a Dutch vessel sailing
on the high seas, this did not preclude Community law from governing the
matter of the person’s residence rights in the Netherlands.
In Boukhalfa,133 the ECJ confirmed the case law above and explicitly con-
sidered that the general rule that the EC Treaty applies to the territories of the
Member States as currently laid down in Article 52 TEU134 ‘does not preclude
Community rules from having effects outside the territory of the Commun-
ity’.135 It reiterated the ‘sufficiently close link’-criterion in establishing whether
employment relations are covered by Community law and specified that this
link sees primarily to the connection between the employment relationship,
on the one hand, and the law of a Member State and thus the relevant rules of
Community law, on the other.136 Decisive in the specific case was that the
employment contract of a Belgian national who worked for the German
embassy in Algiers was entered into in accordance with German law – even
though this law stipulated that conditions of employment were to be deter-
mined in accordance with Algerian law – that employment disputes had to
be brought to courts in Bonn and that the employee was at least partially
covered by the German State social security system.137
It is difficult to infer from this rather small collection of cases, mostly
dealing with free movement of EU citizens, a general set of legal criteria for
deciding upon the extraterritorial applicability of European Union law. But
it is possible to conclude, firstly, that EU law may well have implications for
activities engaged in outside the common territories of the Member States.
Secondly, it seems that the question of extraterritorial scope of EU law is
inspired by two issues in particular. The first is the object and purpose of EU
law, which ordains that the goal of establishing a harmonized system of EU
rules may be jeopardized if extraterritorial Member State activity is auto-
matically excluded from the ambit of EU law. Secondly, it transpires that the
territorial scope of EU law derives primarily from the territorial scope of the
132 Mário Lopes da Veiga v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, para. 17.
133 ECJ 30 April 1996, Ingrid Boukhalfa v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-214/94.
134 Former Article 299 TEC.
135 Ingrid Boukhalfa v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, para. 14.
136 Ibid, para. 15.
137 Ibid, para. 16.
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domestic laws of the Member States. If persons or activities outside the territory
of the Union are nonetheless covered by the domestic laws of a Member State
(and can hence ‘be located within the territory of the Community (or the EU)’),
and if the domestic law with regard to that person or activity normally falls
within the ambit of EU law, the ECJ has been willing to accept that EU law also
extends to that person or activity.
5.3.2 The territorial scope of the Schengen border control regime138
If one looks at the EU’s border control regime through a territorial lens, prob-
lems of legal conceptualisation become readily apparent. On the one hand,
EU law on the crossing of external borders signifies the geographical threshold
where persons become obliged to comply with the Union’s rules on entry
conditions and, in general, rights of residence and free movement. On the other
hand, it is precisely with a view to maximizing the effective implementation
of those rules that the EU has shaped its external migration and asylum policy,
which is premised on the very idea that one should control the border well
before persons have arrived at it. This conceptual tension may lead to all sorts
of legal problems, relating both to the definition of the powers of the European
Union and the Member States to subject persons not yet having arrived at the
border to coercive measures and, on the other hand, to the identification of
rights of persons under EU law who are subjected to such measures. It has
been questioned for example, whether EU law provides a basis for engaging
in pre-border controls at all.139 It has also been suggested that persons who
are subjected to such measures cannot rely on safeguards deriving from EU
law, because those safeguards are triggered only upon the moment one makes
contact with Europe’s external borders as understood in its geographical
meaning.140
The Schengen Borders Code is highly relevant for asylum-seekers seeking
entry into the European Union for two reasons. Firstly, it lays down generally
applicable norms on procedures and good administration to be respected in
conducting border controls. These include the procedure to be followed in
conducting entry checks, the material entry conditions, the obligation that entry
may only be refused by means of a substantiated decision and the right of
138 In addressing the EU legal regime regulating external border controls, a distinction must
be made between the Schengen external borders, where border procedures are governed
by the Schengen Borders Code, and the external borders of non-Schengen Member States,
where national laws determine the procedures to be followed, although within the limits
set by EU rules on free movement of persons. On this difference and legal implications
extensively, Rijpma (2009), chapters IV, V and VI. The present section exclusively focuses
on the Community border regime applicable to the external Schengen border.
139 House of Lords (2008), para. 142-145.
140 Ibid. Also see Rijpma (2009), p. 337.
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persons to appeal against refusals of entry.141 Secondly, the Code accounts
for the special position of asylum-seekers who are subjected to border controls.
Article 3(b) affirms that the Code does not prejudice the rights of refugees
and persons requesting international protection, in particular as regards
refoulement. This general norm also finds expression in Article 5 (4)(c), allowing
Member States to derogate from the entry conditions on humanitarian grounds
or because of international obligations. And in Article 13(1), it is provided that
entry may not be refused if this comes in conflict with special provisions
concerning the right of asylum and to international protection. The practical
implication of these provisions must be that in case of asylum-seekers who
do not meet the cumulative list of conditions for entry as provided by the
Borders Code, border guards may nevertheless not refuse entry and that, at
least if an asylum application can be considered to have been made ‘at the
border or in the transit zones of the Member States’, the special procedural
safeguards laid down in the Asylum procedures Directive become applic-
able.142
The definition of the external border is set forth in Article 2(2) Schengen
Borders Code: “the Member States’ land borders, including river and lake
borders, sea borders and their airports, river ports, sea ports and lake ports,
provided that they are not internal borders”. This definition does not precisely
map where the external borders lie, but implicates that the EU external border
is congruent with that of the Member States. Amongst other things, this implies
that EU law does not interfere with various territorial disputes, such as over
Gibraltar or the boundary disputes which have arisen as a consequence of
the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.143
Even though EU law does not precisely map the location of the external
borders, it transpires from the various definitions laid down in the Borders
Code that the border control regime is closely intertwined with the physical
location of the external border. Border checks are defined as “checks carried
out at border crossing points” and border guards are defined as public officials
who are assigned “to a border crossing point or along the border, or in the
immediate vicinity of that border”.144 Article 3 of the Code, further, limits
its scope to persons ‘crossing the internal or external borders of Member
States’. Even though these provisions are equipped with some geographical
flexibility (‘along’, ‘at’, ‘immediate vicinity’) the most immediate impression
of these provisions surely is that the Schengen Borders Code focuses on the
physical external border as the very object of its scope.
141 Articles 6-13 Schengen Borders Code.
142 Asylum Procedures Directive, Art. 3 (1). But see S. Peers, ‘Revising EU Border Control Rules:
A Missed Opportunity?’, Statewatch analysis, 6 June 2005, who expresses reservations as
to whether the Borders Code must be interpreted as meaning that asylum-seekers may
not be refused entry and considers it preferable to set out this obligation more clearly.
143 See, extensively, Rijpma (2009), p. 76-84.
144 Articles 2 (10) and 2 (13) Schengen Borders Code.
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The precise geographical delimitation of the external borders (e.g. does
it also include the contiguous maritime zone or the disputed maritime border
between Slovakia and Croatia?) may be considered as not terribly important,
as the control regime in respect of the external border is operationalised
through the obligation incumbent on any person crossing the external borders
to do so only at notified border crossing points and during the fixed opening
hours.145 These border crossing points are designated by the Member States,
notified to the European Commission and generally labelled merely by the
name of the town located at an external land border, the name of the inter-
national airport or the name of the port-city. These border crossing points,
as is also apparent from the compiled list of border crossing points published
by the European Commission, need not necessarily be located ‘at’ the physical
border but may, on the one hand, be located well within the territory of the
Schengen area – as is the case with international airports – or on the other
hand, well outside the territory of the Schengen area, as is the case with
Ashford International railway station in Kent, England and the London Water-
loo station, both listed as authorised French border crossing points in the
meaning of Article 2(8) of the Schengen Borders Code.146 Hence, persons
may for legal purposes be considered to have crossed the external Schengen
border even though they remain physically outside the Schengen area and
vice versa. This fiction of law is often used in national immigration legis-
lation.147
For enforcement purposes, the Schengen Borders Code foresees in two sorts
of policing instruments, both designated as ‘border controls’. Border controls,
in the meaning of the Code, can consist either of border checks or border
surveillance.148 ‘Border checks’ are the checks carried out at border crossing
points, which, with respect to third-country nationals, comprise verification
of whether the person complies with the entry conditions as laid down in the
Code.149 Persons who do not fulfill the entry conditions and do not belong
to one of the exempted categories (including persons applying for asylum),
must then be refused entry.150 ‘Border surveillance’ means the surveillance
of borders between border crossing points of which the main purpose is to
prevent unauthorized border crossings, to counter criminal activity and to
145 Article 4(1). Exceptions are provided in Article 4(2).
146 Update of the list of border crossing points referred to in Article 2(8) of Regulation (EC)
No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing
a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schen-
gen Borders Code), OJ 2007 C 316/01, 28 December 2007.
147 P. Boeles et. al., European Migration Law, Antwerp/Oxford/Portland: Intersentia (2009), p. 16-
17. That this legal fiction does not preclude persons from being within the jurisdiction of
a state for human rights purposes was confirmed in ECtHR 25 June 1996, Amuur v France,
no. 19776/92, para. 52.
148 Article 2(9) Schengen Borders Code.
149 Articles 2(10), 5, 7(3).
150 Article 13 (1).
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take measures against those who have gained illegal entry.151 Although the
Borders Code does not define precisely what measures border guards sur-
veilling the external border may take in respect of persons who have crossed
or try to cross the border at a place other than the border crossing point, the
non-binding Schengen Handbook mentions the checking of documents of such
persons and to stop and to bring them to the nearest border guard’s
station.152 This procedure would then allow for refusing such persons entry
in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the possible imposition
of auxiliary penalties for having gained illegal entry in accordance with the
domestic laws of the Member States.153
The model described so far is fairly simple: the Schengen rules on the entry
of persons wishing to cross the border are effectuated by means of border
checks at one of the authorized border crossing points; and to prevent persons
from crossing the border elsewhere, the areas in between those crossing points
should be held under surveillance.154 It is probably with a view to this sim-
plified model that it has been questioned whether Frontex has a mandate to
operate beyond the external borders of the EU, i.e. to coordinate operations
where surveillance and checks are carried out far away from any designated
border crossing point and which are accompanied with measures which in
the terms of the Schengen Borders Code would amount to a ‘refusal of
entry’.155 But if this mandate is indeed not provided by the Code, it must
also be questioned – in view of the legal character of the Borders Code and
because the Code expressly aims at the establishment of a ‘common corpus’
of legislation as regards border controls – on what basis the Member States
themselves may take measures which would normally fall within the ambit
of the Code but have the effect of modifying its scope.156
151 Articles 2(11), 12.
152 Commission Recommendation establishing a common “Practical Handbook for Border
Guards (Schengen Handbook)” to be used by Member States’ competent authorities when
carrying out the border control of persons, C(2006) 5186 final, 9 November 2006, Part 3,
para. 2.3 (e).
153 In this vein also COM(2002) 233 final, para. 8: ‘Surveillance is exercised in the spaces located
between the permitted passage points in order to dissuade persons from crossing the
external border illegally.’
154 One explicit exception to this model is that authorities may also conduct a ‘second line
check’, which means a further check carried out in a special location away from the border
crossing point, in case there is a need for making additional verifications, see Articles 2(12)
and 7(5) SBC.
155 Supra n. 139-140.
156 According to recital 4, the Schengen Borders Code aims at ‘the establishment of a ‘common
corpus’ of legislation (…) on the management of the external borders’. As a general rule,
the legal character of a Community regulation opposes its transformation into domestic
law provisions and Member States may not adopt measures which have the effect of altering
its scope or adding provisions to it, unless provided for in the regulation itself. See, in
general, P.J.G. Kapteyn, A.M. McDonnell, K.J.M. Mortelmans, C.W.A. Timmermans and
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The proposition that the Schengen Borders Code only regulates the regime
on border crossings in the immediate vicinity of the external border (or only
‘at’ authorized border crossing points) is difficult to sustain however. It would
not only create an anomaly as regards practices of border control carried out
at other places, but, more pertinently, is difficult to reconcile with the terms
of the Borders Code itself. Crucially, Article 18 of the Code allows for the
adoption of specific rules on different types of border controls, in order to
tailor checking procedures to the various types of traffic and modes of trans-
port. These specific regimes are set forth in Annex VI of the Code and may
derogate from the provisions on entry conditions, border checks and refusal
of entry laid down in Articles 5 and 7 to 13.157 What is most noteworthy
about the specific regimes as currently laid down in this Annex is that some
of them expressly allow for border checks in third countries, thus incorporating
the Union’s strategy of integrated border management.
With regard to train traffic this Annex spells out that, pursuant to agree-
ments with third countries, border checks on persons may be carried out in
the stations in a third country where persons board the train, during transit
or in the station where the persons disembark.158 And in respect of maritime
traffic, the Annex expressly refers to checks carried out in a third country or
during sea crossings:
‘Checks on ships shall be carried out at the port of arrival or departure, on board
ship or in an area set aside for the purpose, located in the immediate vicinity of
the vessel. However, in accordance with the agreements reached on the matter,
checks may also be carried out during crossings or, upon the ship’s arrival or
departure, in the territory of a third country.’159
This paragraph constituted an overhaul of the existing provisions of maritime
checking of the Schengen Common Manual on checks at the external bor-
ders,160 and was drafted in the light of the previous recommendations of
the Civipol Conseil study and the Programme of measures to combat illegal
immigration across the maritime borders of the European Union,161 which
L.A. Geelhoed, The Law of the European Union and the European Communities, Alphen aan
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International (2008), p. 280-282.
157 Article 18.
158 Schengen Borders Code, Annex VI, paras. 1.2.1.-1.2.2.
159 Ibid, para. 3.1.1.
160 Decision of the Executive Committee of 28 April 1999 on the definitive versions of the
Common Manual and the Common Consular Instructions (SCH/Com-ex (99) 13), OJ L
239, p. 317.
161 Civipol Conseil, ‘Feasibility study on the control of the European Union’s maritime borders’
(final report), 4 July 2003, reproduced in Council doc. 11490/1/03 REV 1 LIMITE FRONT
102 COMIX 458; ‘Programme of measures to combat illegal immigration across the maritime
borders of the Member States of the European Union’, Council Doc. 15445/03.
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called for the stepping up of border cooperation with third countries and the
conducting of port-to-port checking of persons.162
The paragraph on maritime checking adds that ‘[t]he purpose of [these]
checks is to ensure that both crew and passengers fulfil the conditions laid
down in Article 5’. This explicit reference to the entry conditions enumerated
in Article 5 of the SBC would seem to imply that in respect of such checks,
the ordinary entry conditions and therewith the substantive requirements
concerning inter alia travel documents, visa, purposes of stay, means of sub-
sistence and public order concerns apply. This may certainly be described as
a prominent example of where EU law establishes prescriptive extraterritorial
jurisdiction as regards substantive EU requirements on immigration and border
control, but it does so only in so far as ‘agreements reached on the matter’
allow for this type of border checks.
Contrary to various other specific border procedures mentioned in Annex VI
of the Code, the paragraph on checking procedures on maritime traffic does
not mention any derogation to Articles 5 and 7 to 13 as allowed for under
Article 18 of the Code being applicable. It logically follows that the procedural
rules on the conducting of border checks, including safeguards on refusal of
entry and the right of appeal, apply equally to the maritime border checks
provided for by Annex VI of the Code, including those carried out during sea
crossings or in the territory of a third country. Because the specific checking
procedure on maritime traffic may not derogate from Article 4 which provides
that external borders may only be crossed at border crossing points, this special
regime thus allows for the physical relocation of border checks, but does not
relieve persons subjected to such checks from the obligation to cross the
external border at one of the authorized border crossing points. It is not
specified whether this means that the person must again be checked upon
arrival at the border crossing point.
Since one of the primary aims of the Borders Code is to provide a ‘common
corpus’ of legislation applicable to external border controls and to ensure
‘uniform application by border guards of the provisions of Community law
on the crossing of external borders’, it makes sense that the Code recognises
and arranges for the undertaking of extraterritorial controls by virtue of the
specific rules set out in Annex VI.163 The extension of the Borders Code to
areas away from the Union neither appears to be particularly problematic from
the perspective of the sovereign rights of third countries. In those instances
where instruments of the Union refer to border activity affecting the rights
162 COM(2004) 391 final, p. 25-26.
163 See in particular recital 4 Schengen Borders Code. Also see Article 3(1)(c) Council Decision
No. 574/2007/EC.
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of third countries, this activity is made conditional upon the prior approval
of the third country concerned.164
The logic which thus emerges is that, even though some definitional
provisions of the Borders Code appear to locate the legal regime on Schengen
border crossings ‘at’ the external border, the Code and related EU instruments
are also equipped with flexibility in terms of the geographical areas where
border controls may be conducted and that the Code does provide a legal basis
for border checks away from the physical external border. As regards train
and sea traffic, the Code already allows for subjecting persons to border checks
at foreign ports or stations or during transit – but without derogating from
the ordinary procedures under the Borders Code. Although Annex VI of the
Code also contains an extensive paragraph on air traffic checking procedures,
this paragraph does not refer to the checking of persons at airports in a third
country.165
This logic would also ordain that, if Member States would deem it
necessary to establish further extraordinary procedures on the checking of
persons in foreign territories which would derogate from the standards con-
tained in Articles 5 and 7 to 13 Schengen Borders Code, appropriate rules must
be incorporated in Annex VI Borders Code, requiring amendments in accord-
ance with the co-decision procedure.166 This would not only imply that
border controls at sea involving the checking of identities and travel documents
and possibly the issuing of refusals of entry, but also checking procedures
at foreign airports, such as pre-clearances, require – in so far as they do not
confirm with the ordinary procedures – prior incorporation in the Borders
Code.
This is a conclusion with rather far-reaching implications, as it may render
current practices of sea and air border control in foreign territories, which
involve the taking of measures which can properly be defined as ‘border
checks’ or ‘refusals of entry’ in the meaning of the Code but which derogate
from the Code’s procedural standards, void of legal basis – and therefore
illegal.
5.3.2.1 Council Decision 2010/252/EU
But an altogether different outlook on the undertaking of extraterritorial
controls under the Schengen Borders Code is followed in the Council Decision
for maritime Frontex operations, referred to in section 5.2.2.4 above. The
Decision constitutes an attempt not only at harmonizing interception practices
164 See the references in Schengen Borders Code, Annex VI, para. 3.1.1.. Also see Article 14
Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004
165 Annex VI, para. 2.1.2.
166 This also appears to be the view of European Parliament, see n. 176-177 infra and accom-
panying text.
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in operations initiated by Frontex, but also at legally embedding those opera-
tions in the Schengen Borders Code. The Decision creates a legally binding
set of norms for conducting border controls at sea and non-binding guidelines
for search and rescue situations.167
The (binding) ‘Rules for sea border operations coordinated by the Agency’
set out in Part I of the Annex introduce a truly extraordinary range of migra-
tion enforcement measures to be employed at sea. Rather than setting the
modalities for carrying out border checks or issuing refusals of entry in mari-
time areas, the rules allow for no less than seven types of interception measures
taken in respect of migrant vessels, including the requesting of information
and documentation on the identity, nationality and other relevant data on
persons on board; the stopping, boarding and searching of the ship and
persons on board; the seizure of the ship and apprehension of persons on
board; ordering the ship to modify its course or escorting the vessel until it
is heading on such course; and the conducting and handing over of the ship
and persons on board to a third country or another Member State.168
Although the rules do set out that such measures may only be taken in accord-
ance with the prohibition of refoulement and with the competences of states
under the law of the sea, extensively discussed in chapter 6 below, the rules
do not refer to any of the individual safeguards mentioned under the relevant
provisions on border checks and refusals of entry in the Schengen Borders
Code.169
That the rules do not require compliance with the Schengen Borders Code’s
procedural standards on border checks and refusals of entry is the consequence
of the choice of the Council – seconding that of the Commission’s earlier
proposal170 – to hook up the draft on Article 12 (5) of the Borders Code,
which allows for the adoption of implementing measures governing ‘surveil-
lance’ in accordance with the comitology procedure. In legal terms, this choice
can only be understood as following a presumption that the Schengen Borders
Code would allow for two kinds of procedures for undertaking coercive
measures in respect of persons wishing to enter the European Union. One is
the procedure on border checks and refusals of entry, which may only be
conducted in accordance with the strict procedural guarantees laid down in
Borders Code, unless specific derogations are provided under Annex VI. And
the second one is border surveillance, which is less precisely defined in the
Code but apparently perceived by the Commission and the Council – as long
as it is conducted in compliance with international law – as covering the
complete spectrum of migration enforcement measures, encompassing not only
the checking of identities and documents, but also the issuing of refusals of
167 These are set out in Parts I and II of the Annex, respectively.
168 Annex Part I, para. 2.4.
169 Annex Part I, para. 1.2.
170 COM(2009)658 final.
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entry, the apprehension of persons and the return of persons to a third country
– and where none of these measures need to be accompanied with individual
safeguards or norms of good administration. As the proposal currently stands,
one may even wonder how it would be possible for a EU citizen who is inter-
cepted and refused further passage somewhere at sea in accordance with these
draft rules, to vindicate his right to enter the European Union.
A further peculiarity of questionable legal nature concerns the legal basis
for undertaking these coercive measures. The Decision lays down that the
various ‘surveillance’ measures may be taken against ships ‘with regard to
which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that they carry persons intending
to circumvent the checks at border crossing points’.171 Thus, rather than
creating a legal basis for taking coercive measures in respect of migrants at
sea by means of relocating the material entry conditions, the Decision foresees
in the taking of sanctions on account of a prospect of gaining illegal entry. This
is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the rules are silent on the kind of
activity which gives rise to such suspicion. This may give rise to evidentiary
problems as it may be difficult to determine whether persons do indeed have
the intention to queue up at an authorized border crossing point or not. In
particular, persons seeking asylum may simply wish to step on shore and
immediately report to the appropriate authorities in order to request asylum.
But secondly and more fundamentally, the sanction of interception and return
is imposed not on the basis of a failure to comply with entry conditions, but
on an attempt to gain illegal entry. In ordinary migration law discourse,
gaining illegal entry is certainly regarded as an offence, but not one which
without more constitutes a ground for refusing entry or denying a right to
stay. The proposal thus represents a fundamental shift away from the sub-
stantive norms on entry and residence under EU law, creating an almost
unfettered basis for not allowing persons entry into the European Union.
Possibly, the absence of references to procedural guarantees in the Decision
could be remedied by including such guarantees in the operational plans
drawn up for each operation coordinated by Frontex.172 In respect of
questions of disembarkation of rescued or intercepted persons, the Decision
already stipulates that the operational plan should spell out the ‘modalities’
of such disembarkation.173 As is more extensively discussed in the following
chapter, procedural norms protecting against possible human rights violations
must however find a basis in a law which is accessible and foreseeable and
which must afford sufficient protection against arbitrary interferences.174 In
view of their confidential character, Frontex operational plans cannot be
deemed as complying with these requirements. It can also be noted that,
171 Annex Part I, para. 2.4.
172 Article 1 Council Decision 2010/252/EU.
173 Annex Part II, para. 2.1.
174 Chapters 6.4.2-6.4.3.
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because the Decision has brought Frontex maritime operations within the
framework of the Schengen Borders Code and therewith the ambit of EU law,
the Member States participating in the operations, in giving effect to the rules
on interdiction as laid down in the Decision, are bound by the EU fundamental
rights regime, as embodied in general principles of EU law and the EU Charter
on Fundamental Rights.175 The substance of the relevant human rights in
the context of maritime controls is discussed in the next chapter.
The European Parliament has opposed the adoption of the Decision, on
account of the decision exceeding the implementing powers of the Schengen
Borders Code and has brought an action for annulment of the Decision before
the ECJ under Article 263 TFEU.176 The key objection formulated by the Par-
liament is that the proposed measures exceed the scope of Article 12(5) SBC
since they do not constitute additional measures governing ‘surveillance’, but
modify the essential elements of the Borders Code which are reserved to the
legislator.177 One may take this argument further by noting that the proposed
measures not only exceed a reasonable interpretation of the term ‘surveillance’,
but that they also exceed the scope of the Borders Code as a whole. In parti-
cular, rules on the apprehension of migrants and their return to a third country
are not laid down in the Borders Code but in the Returns Directive.178 The
Parliament nonetheless requests the Court to exercise its discretion to maintain
the effects of the contested Decision until such time as it is replaced (Article
264(2) TFEU). But because the rules not merely supplement the rules on border
checks and border surveillance, but appear to derogate from several provisions
of the Borders Code it is questionable whether the Court would comply with
that request.
The most pertinent conclusion which can be drawn from the above is that
the Council Decision for maritime Frontex operations is premised on an
inherently contradictory view on the possible extraterritorial application of
the Schengen border crossings regime. On the one hand, it is accepted that
the common rules on external border control do provide a legal basis for
Member States to engage in all sorts of coercive conduct in respect of migrants
outside the common EU territories. But they ignore the very same extraterri-
torial application of the individual safeguards laid down in the Code. This
is an illustration of the essential tension between the EU’s internal and external
175 Also see section 5.3.3 below.
176 Case C-355/10, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, action brought on 14
July 2010.
177 Also see European Parliament, Motion for a Resolution, 11 March 2010, B7-0227/2010, which
refers to an opinion of the EP’s Legal Service, in which it was considered that the proposed
measures ‘did not constitute ‘additional measures governing surveillance’ in general, but
specific rules on reinforcing border checks and/or on refusal of entry at the external sea




migration agenda. It shows how the instrument of border control functions
internally as a neutral policy enforcing the Union’s rules on admission and
residence, while it is employed externally as a tool allowing for the exertion
of virtual complete and unchecked state power, which has the potential to
displace the Union’s substantive rules on legal migration and asylum.
5.3.3 The territorial scope of the asylum acquis
The Common European Asylum System was expressly conceived as a body
of law applying only to asylum applications made within the territory of the
EU Member States or at their border and not to claims lodged outside a Mem-
ber State’s territory. The former EC Treaty contained specific territorial
restrictions to this effect.179 These restrictions have been reiterated and further
specified in the various EU asylum instruments adopted under the EC Treaty.
The Dublin mechanism for establishing the Member State responsible for
examining the application applies only to applications which have been lodged
in one of the Member States, which includes claims lodged at the border.180
The Reception Conditions Directive only applies to reception standards pro-
vided within a Member State and only to asylum-seekers who have lodged
their request at the border or in the territory of a Member State.181 The Asylum
Procedures Directive has a similar restriction: it applies only to standards on
procedures in Member States and only to those applications “made in the
territory, including at the border or in the transit zones of the Member
States”.182 The Asylum Procedures Directive further expressly excludes
asylum applications from its scope which are submitted in diplomatic or
consular representations of Member States.183
The one existing (first phase) asylum instrument not containing an explicit
territorial restriction is the Qualification Directive, laying down the eligibility
criteria and standard of protection to be granted to holders of a protection
status. Neither do the corresponding provisions on qualification for inter-
national protection of the former EC Treaty embody a restriction of territorial
character.184 It is not entirely clear what should be inferred from this absence.
179 Article 63 (1)(a)(b) and (d) TEC.
180 Articles 1 and 3(1) Regulation EC 343/2003.
181 Articles 1 and 3 Directive 2003/9/EC.
182 Articles 1 and 3(1) Directive 2005/85/EC. The addition of ‘transit zones’ is in conformity
with Amuur judgment, where the ECtHR stated that the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) fully applies in transit zones and that the latter
should be considered as an integral part of a state’s territory: ECtHR 10 June 1996, Amuur
v. France, Application No. 19776/92.
183 Ibid, Article 3(2).
184 Article 63(1)(b) and (2)(a) EC Treaty and Article 1 (on ‘subject matter and scope’) of Directive
2004/83/EC.
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The original Commission proposal for the Qualification Directive did contain
a provision on territorial scope similar to the one inserted in the Dublin
regulation and the Reception Conditions directive, but this provision was
deleted because a number of Member States wanted the scope of the directive
to be consistent with that of the Procedures directive and considered the issue
of territorial scope a matter to be decided by the latter directive.185 This
would imply that we should not assume that the Qualification Directive has
a territorial scope different from the other directives. It has further been argued
that it is (i) hardly likely that the EU legislator intended to oblige Member
States to grant refugee status to persons who apply for asylum outside their
territorial boundaries and that (ii) the absence of a territorial restriction on
the scope of the Qualification Directive would be at odds with the consistency
advanced by the Common European Asylum System.186 A further contextual
argument against extraterritorial application of the Qualification Directive is
that several provisions of the Directive describing the content of international
protection presume that protection is enjoyed inside the territories of the
Member States.187
And even though these arguments not necessarily oppose a strict literal
reading – in line with the observation that EU law in general may well govern
extraterritorial member State activity188 – under which the Qualification
Directive would oblige EU Member States deciding to examine a claim for
protection in an extraterritorial setting to respect the eligibility standards laid
down in the Qualification Directive, the Directive does not on its own solve
the question of how to proceed with asylum claims made in foreign territories.
It contains no free-standing right to make an asylum application, does not
generate an obligation to examine a claim, nor does it lay down the procedural
safeguards to be respected in the examination. Thus, even a broad interpreta-
tion as to its territorial scope would leave the Directive of only modest practical
value for the various ways in which European States attempt to regulate the
movement of asylum-seekers outside their borders.189
In the absence of specific EU asylum instruments regulating the legal status
of refugees in the broader phenomenon of external migration control, the
question of rights to be accorded to refugees who come within the ambit of
the EU’s external dimension will primarily depend on the scope and meaning
of the primordial right to asylum as a principle of EU law and as enshrined
185 COM(2001) 510 final, Article 3; for the Council discussions, see Council doc. 7882/02, 24
April 2002, p. 5. Also see Battjes (2006), p. 217 at n. 71.
186 H. Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
(2006), p. 209-210.
187 See Articles 28 (social welfare),31 (accommodation) and 32 (freedom of movement).
188 See section 5.3.1.
189 Also see K. Wouters and M. den Heijer, ‘The Marine I Case: a Comment’, 22 IJRL (2010),
p. 17-18.
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in Articles 18 and 19 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights.190 Because
the content and scope of this right to asylum must correspond to the Refugee
Convention and the rights guaranteed by amongst others the European Con-
vention on Human Rights,191 this right may well have a territorial scope
broader than that contained in the secondary instruments EU instruments.192
Further, the explicit reference in Article 18 of the EU Charter to the ‘right to
asylum’ allows for an interpretation focusing not only on the prohibition of
refoulement (which is separately codified in Article 19 of the Charter), but also
on the rights associated with gaining access to protection mechanisms and
the content of protection.
It follows from the right to asylum as a principle of EU law that both in
the interpretation and the implementation of EU law this must be respected,
also in situations where EU law expressly permits or obliges States to take
action in respect of migrants and asylum-seekers away from the Schengen
external border.193 As indicated above, general references to fundamental
rights, the Refugee Convention or the prohibition of refoulement have also been
incorporated in the EU’s carrier sanctions regime, the Frontex’ mandate and
the Schengen Borders Code. These references, together with the general
doctrine of implementing EU law in accordance with fundamental rights,194
may thus set potent limits to Member State activity falling within the scope
of the relevant EU instruments. But the key challenge which EU law has yet
to take up, is to translate these general principles into a useful framework of
rights, procedures and practical guidelines.
In the proposals for the second phase asylum instruments, no change of
the territorial scope of the various instruments is foreseen, although the pro-
posal for recasting the procedures directive does specify that the directive must
also apply to asylum applications made in the territorial waters of the Member
States.195 A complication for urging the European Union to specify in more
detail the procedural standards and rights of asylum-seekers to be respected
when Member States engage in forms of pre-border control is that the pertinent
provisions on asylum in Article 63 EC Treaty contained a strict territorial
outlook as noted above. In the new Article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union, laying down the Union’s competence to develop a
common policy on asylum, the previous references in Article 63 EC Treaty to
asylum applications, procedures and reception conditions ‘in Member States’
have been omitted. It has also added a new paragraph which calls for engaging
in ‘partnership and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of
190 OJ 2007 C303/01..
191 Articles 52 (3) and 53 Charter.
192 As discussed in chapters 2 and 4.
193 Article 51(1) Charter.
194 ECJ 27 June 2006, Parliament v Council, C-540/03, paras. 104-105; ECJ 13 July 1989, Wachauf,
5/88, para. 19.
195 COM(2009) 554 final, Article 3(1).
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managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary
protection’.196 Read together, these provisions do not oppose the adoption
of a more comprehensive Union framework where instruments on border
control and other facets of the external migration and asylum agenda are
supplemented with safeguards on the protection of refugees and persons
seeking asylum. Article 78 TFEU would thus provide a suitable legal basis for
the conclusion of future legislative instruments or agreements with third
countries on inter alia safeguards of asylum-seekers subjected to pre-border
controls, the installment of alternative protection mechanisms for refugees in
third countries or the development of mechanisms for the managed entry of
persons in need of international protection. The European Asylum Support
Office, created on the basis of Articles 74 and 78 TFEU, has expressly been
endowed the competence to be involved in the external dimension of the EU
asylum policy, amongst others by coordinating issues arising from the imple-
mentation of relevant instruments and facilitating operational cooperation
between Member States and third countries.197
5.4 FINAL REMARKS
As they stand, the EU instruments adopted under the external migration and
asylum policy do not directly require Member States to interfere with refugee
rights. But neither do they take the special position of refugees and other
protection seekers meaningfully into account. Pre-border migration enforcement
measures in the form of carrier sanctions and a variety of pre-clearances have
become an object of EU law, but their reconciliation with refugee concerns is
primarily a matter of Member State implementation. It is no surprise therefore,
that in making use of carrier sanctions schemes, immigration officers or con-
trols at the high seas, Member States employ highly divergent mechanisms
for dealing with persons claiming asylum.
A key challenge for the future external migration policy of the Union, and
in particular its strategy of ‘integrated border management’, is how it will seek
to distinguish refugees from other irregular travelers. At the extreme ends,
the Union faces the choice of either simply equating the two categories of
migrants, in line with the approaches of several Member States, or to export
the ‘internal’ safeguards in respect of asylum claimants also to those who are
intercepted far away from Union territory.
It is suggested however that the policy freedom of the European Union
in devising external forms of border control is limited. Firstly, several issues
will presumably be a matter of the crystallization of law rather than of un-
restrained policy-making. The proposition cannot ultimately be maintained
196 Article 78(2)(g) TFEU.
197 Articles 2(1), 7 and 49(2) Regulation (EU) No. 439/2010.
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that EU law would allow for the creation of two altogether different regimes
on border controls, where one would have the potential of defeating the core
guarantees, and therewith the object and purpose, of the other. This means
that, in the context of extraterritorial control measures which in fact amount
to border checks or refusals of entry as defined in the Schengen Borders Code,
including interceptions at sea but possibly also activity undertaken by ILOs
in third countries, such measures will, sooner rather than later, have to appro-
priately correspond with or embedded in the prevailing framework of EU law
and in particular the Borders Code. In view of the special protection accorded
to persons requesting asylum under the Borders Code, this would also present
a possible solution to the problem that refugees without a valid visa may
currently be refused further passage in the context of controls other than those
carried out at the external Schengen Border. Because i) the Schengen Borders
Code aims to set forth a common corpus for the controls of persons who wish
to enter the Schengen states, because ii) there is no rule of general character
stipulating that EU law cannot govern extraterritorial activity of Member States,
and because iii) the Code already recognises the possibility of conducting
controls at sea and in third states, there is a strong argument for employing
the Code as a standard for all controls on persons wishing to cross the external
border, also if conducted away from that border. It follows that, should Mem-
ber States wish to maintain or establish special procedures for conducting
border checks or refusals of entry which derogate from the ordinary pro-
cedures, specific rules must be incorporated into the Borders Code in accord-
ance with Article 18 of the Code, instead of through adopting additional rules
with regard to ‘surveillance’ as has been done with Council Decision 2010/252/
EU.
Secondly, implementing measures taken under EU law must comply with
fundamental rights. This not only follows from the Member States’ inter-
national obligations, but also from the duty incumbent under EU law to imple-
ment EU rules in a manner consistent with requirements flowing from funda-
mental rights.198 The obligations set by international law on the protection
of refugees in extraterritorial settings as explored in the first part of this book
thus set limits to the discretion of states in their dealings with refugees. Hence,
the key question is not whether refugee interests are of concern, but rather
how they must be responded to. The discussions on the drafting of Council
Decision 2010/252/EU evidence the difficulties Member States encounter in
agreeing upon common standards and practical arrangements for guaranteeing
human rights in the course of pre-border controls. This is due not only to the
reluctance to accept that human rights law does set limits to the state’s dis-
cretion to conduct controls, but also due to the absence in international law
of a clear duty to allow persons claiming international protection access to
198 C-540/03, para. 105.
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the territory and/or asylum procedure of the state. Because neither inter-
national law nor European Union law oblige Member States to allow persons
requesting asylum with their agents in foreign territories entry into their
territory, there is, at least in theory, room for devising alternative arrange-
ments. The challenge for EU law, should it wish to bring more coherence in
the Member States’ approaches, is not only to identify and reiterate the relevant
human rights which set limits to external border controls, but also to translate
these norms into practical guidelines and rules addressing the questions how
refugee screening should occur, whether asylum claimants should be allowed
access to an asylum procedure and which authority should be responsible for
the reception and the processing of claims. The search for solutions in this
respect will touch upon the fundamental dilemma of how to reconcile refugee
concerns with control concerns. In the following two chapters, the merits and
feasibility of several ‘protection-sensitive’ arrangements for conducting external
border controls are further explored.

6 Interdiction at sea
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of refugees and undocumented migrants travelling by sea
gives rise to a number of distinct issues under international law. It raises the
question of the allocation of responsibilities for the protection of refugees; it
questions the duties of states to preserve life at sea; and it questions the
international competence of states to control the sea as an instrument of
immigration policy. These are topics which challenge the interpretation and
application of the right of asylum and other human rights, but also the rights
and freedoms under the Law of the Sea.
Not all these issues are new. Some of them came to the fore in the context
of the Vietnamese exodus of ‘boat people’ in the 1970s, when thousands of
refugees fled the coasts of Vietnam in small fishing boats, hoping to be rescued
by freighters on busy shipping lanes on the high seas.1 They came to the fore
also in the context of the United States’ Caribbean Interdiction Programme,
which was initiated as early as 1981, when President Reagan concluded an
agreement with the Haitian government allowing the US Coast Guard to board
Haitian vessels on the high seas and redirect them to Haiti.2 In more recent
years, the obligations of states towards refugees found at sea attracted renewed
interest in the aftermath of the international incident around the MV Tampa,
which concerned the taking of control by Australian security forces of a
container vessel which had rescued 438 asylum-seekers and which was
subsequently prevented from entering Australian ports and eventually diverted
to Port Moresby, the capital of Papua New Guinea.3 The Tampa incident and
1 The questions of rescue and admission of refugees found at sea have been addressed by
UNHCR’s Executive Committee on several occasions: EXCOM Conclusion No. 2 (XXVII),
1976, paras. (f)-(h), EXCOM Conclusion No. 14 (XXX), 1979, paras. (c)-(d), EXCOM Conclu-
sion No. 15 (XXX), 1979, para. (c), EXCOM Conclusion No. 20 (XXXI), 1980, paras. (a)-(g),
EXCOM Conclusion No. 23 (XXXII), 1981, paras. (1)-(5). For an account of the Vietnamese
boat people and international law see J.Z. Pugush, ‘The Dilemma of the Sea Refugee: Rescue
Without Refuge’, 18 Harvard International Law Journal (1977), p. 577-604.
2 For a historical and legal analysis: S. Legomsky, ‘The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction
Program’, 18 IJRL (2006), p. 679-683.
3 For a historical and legal analysis: P. Mathew, ‘Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake
of the Tampa’, 96 AJIL (2002), p. 661-676; E. Willheim, ‘MV Tampa: The Australian Re-
sponse’, 15 IJRL (2003), p. 159-190; C.M.J. Bostock, ‘The International Legal Obligations
owed to the Asylum-seekers on the MV Tampa’, 14 IJRL (2002), p. 279-301.
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the subsequent installment of Australia’s Pacific Solution served as a catalyst
for debate and action of both UNHCR and the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO), in particular on the issues of treatment and disembarkation of
asylum-seekers rescued at sea.4
This chapter discusses migrant interdiction practices at sea employed by
EU Member States. It focuses not on the general question how EU Member
States, the European Union, or the international community at large should
cope with refugees at sea, but deals specifically with those instances where
EU Member States on their own motion or in accordance with international
arrangements engage in interdiction strategies at sea. The chapter seeks to
delineate firstly, the international competences of states to interdict boat
migrants and, secondly, the circumstances under which EU Member States
can be held responsible under international law for the manner in which these
interdictions affect the rights of persons seeking asylum.
Various terms are used in describing enforcement actions relating to
migrants at sea. In policy documents, Frontex and the European Commission
employ the terms ‘interception’ and ‘diversion’, without specifying the nature
of the distinction.5 International maritime law usually distinguishes between
on the one hand, measures amounting to the boarding and searching of a ship
(or visit) and, on the other hand, the taking of coercive measures which may
include the arrest of the persons on board and the seizure of the ship (in-
cluding the placing of the vessel under (forcible) escort).6 This chapter will
use the more general term ‘interdiction’ to describe all forms through which
states make contact with migrant vessels in the course of sea border controls
and will specifically refer to appropriate maritime law terminology where
relevant.7
4 See extensively section 6.3.2.2. below. Australia’s Pacific Solution, entailing the transfer
of all unauthorised boat arrivals to processing centers in the Pacific region, is extensively
discussed in chapter 7.
5 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Report from the Commission
on the Evaluation and Future Development of the Frontex Agency, Statistical Data, 13
February 2008, SEC(2008) 150/2; Frontex News Release 17 February 2009, ‘HERA 2008 and
NAUTILUS 2008 Statistics’. In the latter document, it is mentioned that ‘migrants diverted
back’ are ‘[p]ersons […] who have either been convinced to turn back to safety or have
been escorted back to the closest shore.’
6 According to Guilfoyle, international maritime law generally distinguishes between ‘board-
ing’ or ‘search’ on the one hand, and ‘seizure’ on the other hand. D. Guilfoyle, Shipping
Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, Cambridge University Press (2009), p. 4, 9. See in particular
Articles 105, 109(4) and 110(2) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 396.
7 UNHCR commonly employs the term ‘interception’, which it has defined as measures
employed by States to: ‘(i.) prevent embarkation of persons on an international journey;
(ii.) prevent further onward international travel by persons who have commenced their
journey; or (iii.) assert control of vessels where there are reasonable grounds to believe
the vessel is transporting persons contrary to international or national maritime law’,
EXCOM Conclusion No. 97 (LIV), 2003.
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Section 2 of this chapter provides the necessary background by describing the
European interdiction programme, which is comprised primarily of Member
States’ driven efforts to assert control over undocumented migrants traveling
towards Europe by sea. Section 3 discusses relevant provisions of the Law
of the Sea. These relate, firstly, to entitlements of migrants under the principle
of free navigation and, secondly, to specific duties incurred by states in respect
of migrants who are in distress at sea. Section 4 appreciates migrant inter-
dictions at sea in terms of human rights. It discusses specific duties towards
refugees (non-refoulement, disembarkation, status determination), but also duties
with a wider personal scope, in particular the right to leave and the right to
liberty. The chapter will argue that although the Law of the Sea leaves ample
room for states to cooperate for purposes of migrant interdiction, requirements
of human rights law, in particular those of a procedural nature, substantially
restrict the discretion of EU Member States to subject undocumented migrants
to various types of coercive measures at sea. It will conclude that the key
challenge facing EU Member States employing interdictions at sea is to develop
a meaningful human rights strategy which supplements and restrains the
policy of sea interdiction. The development of such a framework is however
controversial, as it may well imply that particular interdiction practices need
to be fundamentally reconsidered.
6.2 THE EUROPEAN INTERDICTION PROGRAMME
The phenomenon of boat migration to Europe and the policy responses of
Southern European governments have been extensively covered in other studies
and need not be recounted in full here.8 The picture which emerges from those
studies is that the daily images of overcrowded boats with migrants from
Morocco and other African countries arriving at European shores brought
about a notable change in the perception of irregular migrants arriving at
Europe’s southern border. While governmental policies as well as local com-
munities in the beginning of the 1990s were still focused on providing humane
responses based on notions of solidarity and compassion, the increase of the
8 J. Simon, ‘Irregular Transit Migration in the Mediterranean – some facts, figures and
insights’, in: N. Nyberg Sorensen (ed), ‘Mediterranean Transit Migration’ (Report), Danish
Institute for International Studies (2004); S. Alscher, ‘Knocking at the Doors of “Fortress
Europe”: Migration and Border Control in Southern Spain and Eastern Poland’, The Center
for Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper No. 126, San Diego (November 2005);
M. Albahari, ‘Death and the Moral State: Making Borders and Sovereignty at the Southern
Edges of Europe’, The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper No.
136, San Diego (June 2006); P. Cuttitta, ‘The changes in the fight against illegal immigration
in the Euro-Mediterranean area and in Euro-Mediterranean relations’, CHALLENGE
working paper (22 January 2007); H. de Haas, ‘Irregular Migration from West Africa to
the Maghreb and the European Union: An Overview of Recent Trends’, IOM Migration
Research Series, IOM Geneva (2008).
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number of illegal entries and often negative media coverage lead to a cor-
responding decrease in the willingness of states and communities to provide
shelter to large amounts of them. Several authors have described the change
in attitude of Southern European societies towards boat migrants as a process
in which ‘a spirit of humanitarian reception and solidarity’ gradually gave
way to a fear of an ‘invasion of the poor’.9 This process was accompanied
by acute governmental efforts to seal off the maritime border.
It is difficult to draw an exhaustive picture of what this sealing off exactly
amounts to. There is not one model employed by EU Member States for the
surveillance and control of the sea border. The deployed strategies have varied
in time, from one Member State to the other and they may further differ
according to the third country from where the migrants have embarked on
their journey (and with which agreements may or may not have been con-
cluded). For the purposes of this study it suffices to focus on those interdiction
measures which may preclude asylum-seekers from gaining access to a EU
Member State. In this connection, it is possible to identify three general models
of migrant interdiction which are of particular interest.
The first are joint operations in territorial waters of a third country. Es-
pecially Spain and Italy have been active in concluding agreements with
several North-African countries which allow them to participate in border
patrols in the territorial seas of those third countries. Since 2003, Morocco and
Spain have collaborated in joint naval patrols and Spain later concluded similar
agreements with Mauritania (2006), Senegal (2006), Cape Verde (2007) and
with Gambia, Guinea and Guinea Bissau (2008).10 In 1997, Italy signed an
exchange of letters with the Albanian government, followed up by a Protocol,
allowing the Italian navy to enter the territorial waters of Albania and to
interdict vessels carrying undocumented migrants.11 In the years 2000-2007,
Italy entered into several agreements with Libya for cooperation on irregular
migration, including a protocol of 29 December 2007, which foresees in joint
Italian and Libyan patrols in the territorial waters of Libya, together with the
transfer of Italian coast guard gutters to Libya to be manned by mixed Italian
and Libyan crews.12 What makes it difficult to comprehensively describe the
modus operandi of these joint controls with third country authorities is that
9 Alscher (2005), p. 14; Albahari (2006), p. 3-5, 8-12.
10 P. García Andrade, ‘Extraterritorial Strategies to Tackle Irregular Immigration by Sea: A
Spanish Perspective’, in: B. Ryan and V. Mitsilegas (eds), Extraterritorial Immigration Control.
Legal Challenges, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff (2010), p. 319.
11 ECtHR 11 January 2001, Xhavara a.o. v Italy and Albania, no. 39473/98 (under ‘B. Relevant
domestic law’); A. di Pascale, ‘Migration Control at Sea: The Italian Case’, in: Ryan and
Mitsilegas (2010), p. 293-296.
12 Di Pascale (2010), p. 297-300; J.J. Rijpma, Building Borders: The Regulatory Framework for the
Management of the External Borders of the European Union, dissertation Florence (2009), p. 342.
The contents of the protocol have not been published. A formal launch ceremony for the
joint Italian-Libyan patrols was held in the southern Italian harbour of Gaeta at May 14,
2009.
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virtually all the agreements on the joint conducting of border patrols are
outside the public domain.13 One of the few disclosed agreements providing
specific details of how the operations are carried out is the 2008 Agreement
between Spain and Cape Verde on joint monitoring of maritime areas under
the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Cape Verde.14 This treaty foresees in the
conducting of joint patrols along the ‘shiprider model’, where Cape Verdean
personnel is placed on board Spanish vessels, with the former being exclusively
competent in deciding upon the visit and arrest of vessels and those on
board.15 It does appear that this shiprider model is commonly followed in
joint operations of border control in the territorial sea of third countries. As
noted above, the Italian-Libyan Protocol foresaw in the delivery of Italian coast
guard gutters to be manned by mixed Italian and Libyan crews. The Frontex
operational plan for the Hera III operation, which implements bilateral agree-
ments between Spain and Mauritania and Senegal, also mentions the com-
pulsory placement of Senegalese and Mauritanian agents on board vessels
of EU Member States, who are exclusively competent in sanctioning visits and
arrests.16
The second group of interdiction practices can be classified as the inter-
diction and summarily return of migrants to a third country, which have also
been called ‘push-backs’. These interdictions are normally undertaken at the
high seas and also presuppose that a third state is willing to accept the return
of the migrants. The most prominent example of these push-backs are the
interdictions accompanied with immediate forcible return carried out by Italian
vessels in respect of migrants having embarked in Libya or Algeria, in accord-
13 See, for an overview of the agreements concluded between Spain and African countries
allowing for joint border controls, Rijpma (2009), p. 341. Also see Guilfoyle (2009), p. 216-220.
14 Agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of Cape Verde on Monitoring
Joint Maritime Areas Under the Sovereignty and Jurisdiction of Cape Verde (Acuerdo entre
el Reino de España y la República de Cabo Verde sobre vigilancia conjunta de los espacios
marítimos bajo soberanía y jurisdicción de Cabo Verde, done at Praia, 21 February 2008.
15 Ibid, Articles 3 (1)(b) and 6. On shiprider agreements, see eg Guilfoyle (2009), p. 72-73.
16 According to the operational plan for the Hera III mission, the task of Member States would
consist inter alia of carrying out ‘an optimal maritime and aerial surveillance of the waters
close to Mauritania and Senegal, with the authorization of the Mauritanian and Senegalese
authorities, carrying onboard the E.U. vessels personnel from these countries that are the
responsible of the operations and are the people that must send back the immigrants to
the national authorities in the coast’, Frontex, Operational plan Hera III, (partly public
accessible, on file with the author), para. 19.1. Also see Frontex press release 9 September
2008, ‘HERA 2008 and NAUTILUS 2008 Statistics’, in which it is explained that ‘Spain
concluded agreements with Mauritania and Senegal which allow diverting of would-be
immigrants’ boats back to their points of departure from a certain distance of the African
coast line described in the agreements that Spain has between Mauritania and Senegal.
A Mauritanian or Senegalese law enforcement officer is always present on board of deployed
Member States’ assets and is always responsible for the diversion.’
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ance with agreements concluded with these two countries.17 According to
the Italian authorities, from 6 May 2009, when the operations were first imple-
mented, to 31 July 2009, it had returned 602 migrants to Libya and 23 to
Algeria.18 Since that period, the push-back operations have continued.19 This
has resulted in a substantial fall of the number of migrants embarking by boat
from Libya.20 Despite submissions of UNHCR that it had found that many of
the interdicted persons were seeking international protection, the Italian
authorities officially acknowledged that they did not proceed with a formal
identification of the pushed back migrants and that there is no procedure in
place for entertaining asylum applications.21 Apart from such formalized
return policies, EU Member States have been reported to engage in diversions
of informal nature, with the goal of either preventing migrants entry into their
territorial waters or to drive them back to the high seas.22 In the absence of
return agreements with a third country, these diversions are primarily aimed
at preventing irregular entries.
17 For an extensive appraisal of these push backs and their legal basis see: CPT, Report to
the Italian Government on the visit to Italy from 27 to 31 July 2009, 28 April 2010, CPT/Inf
(2010) 14. Also see UNHCR Press Release 7 May 2009, ‘UNHCR deeply concerned over
returns from Italy to Libya’; UNHCR Press Release 14 July 2009, ‘UNHCR interviews
migrants pushed back to Libya’; Human Rights Watch Press Release 7 May 2009, ‘Italy/
Libya: Forced Return of Migrants Violates Rights’; Human Rights Watch, ‘Pushed Back,
Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat Migrants and Asylum-seekers, Libya’s
Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum-seekers’ (report), September 2009.
18 CPT Report on Italy (2010), para. 13. The figure reported by UNHCR to the CPT was over
900.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid. According to media reports, in Malta, while during 2008 a total of 84 boats with 2,775
illegal immigrants arrived from Libya, this number dropped to 17 boats with a total of
1,475 illegal immigrants in 2009. The majority of the arrivals in 2009 moreover reached
Malta in the months before the push-backs were started; Times of Malta, ‘Frontex patrols
stopped as Malta quits. Italy, Libya patrols proving to be very effective’, 28 April 2010.
21 CPT report on Italy (2010), paras. 13-14. The Italian government submitted that no migrant
encountered in the operations expressed an intention to apply for asylum and that there
was accordingly no need for their identification.
22 These informal diversions may take a variety of forms. It was reported for example that
in August 2009 a patrol boat, allegedly belonging to Malta, had provided the passengers
of a ship which had been adrift for twenty days with fuel and directions for the Italian
island of Lampedusa; Migration Policy Group, Migration News Sheet, Brussels, Sept. 2009,
p. 12. Diversions have also been reported to include lamentable practices such as the
puncture of rubber dinghies of migrants or the dissuasion of migrants from further passage
by intimidating encircling maneuvers or the deliberate creation of waves. See eg Foundation
Pro Asyl and Group of Lawyers for the Rights of Refugees and Migrants, ‘The truth may
be bitter but it must be told. The Situation of Refugees in the Aegean and the Practices
of the Greek Coast Guard’ (Report) (October 2007); mentioning practices such as encircling
manoeuvres, the puncture of dinghies, and the robbing and beating of migrants. Spanish
border guards were also allegedly involved in cutting holes in inflatable dinghies; Migration
Policy Group Brussels, Migration News Sheet, Brussels, April 2008, p. 8.
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A third model of migrant interdictions relevant for this study are rescue
operations followed by disembarkations in a third country. Rescue operations
of migrants who are in distress at sea are by their nature conducted on an
ad hoc basis. This has on multiple occasions resulted in rather protracted
situations whereby EU Member States and/or third countries entered into
toilsome negotiations as to the appropriate place of disembarkation of the
rescuees. Although it is possible to infer from past experiences that irregular
migrants rescued by Member State coast guards are usually allowed to dis-
embark in one or another Member State,23 it has also occurred that third
countries were persuaded in taking in the migrants. One prominent example
is the Marine I case, concerning the 369 passengers of African and Asian origin
of a boat which had gone adrift in international waters and which was towed
by a Spanish rescue tug to the territorial waters of Mauritania. After a standoff
which lasted a week, the Mauritanian government eventually allowed the
Spanish Guardia Civil to offload the passengers in one of its ports, after Spain
had guaranteed that it would arrange for their repatriation.24 The Council
Decision for maritime Frontex operations stipulates, as a general rule of thumb,
that in respect of rescue operations taking place in the context of border
controls coordinated by Frontex, priority should be given to disembarkation
in the third country from where the ship carrying the persons departed or
through which territorial waters or search and rescue region the ship
transited.25
A final distinction of legal relevance in discussing European practices of
sea interdiction is between interdictions with and without involvement of the
EU external borders agency Frontex. This distinction is primarily relevant for
issues of attributing conduct. Here, the question may rise to whom a migrant
should direct a claim if he feels his human rights are unjustifiably interfered
with on account of the conduct of an officer who receives his salary from and
wears the uniform of one Members State, but who also wears a blue armband
with the insignia of the European Union and who receives his instructions
from yet another Member State.26
6.3 MIGRANT INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
In chapter 4 of this book, it was addressed at length how international law
puts limits to the freedom of states to engage in extraterritorial conduct. As
a general rule, and failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary,
a state may not enforce its authority outside its own territories. This means
23 See also the examples mentioned in section 6.3.2. of this chapter.
24 M. den Heijer and K. Wouters, ‘The Marine I Case: a Comment’, 22 IJRL (2010), p. 1-19.
25 Council Decision 2010/252/EU, Annex, Part II, para. 2.1. See further section 6.3.2.2.
26 Article 10 (3)(4) Regulation 2007/2004.
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that the freedom of states to enforce their migration policies, but also to secure
human rights, within another country may face the obstacle of the other state
asserting its territorial sovereignty. Interdictions at sea do not take place within
the exclusive territorial sovereignty of one state or another but are governed,
instead, by the specific regime of the Law of the Sea, which distributes inter-
national legal titles and obligations within the different maritime zones. Most
relevant for the topic of this chapter are those norms of the Law of the Sea
pertaining to the Member States’ control powers in the different sea areas and
duties of search and rescue of migrants who are in distress.
The EU Justice and Home Affairs Council also identified these two topics
as warranting special scrutiny in the course of border controls at sea.27
Addressing these issues, the European Commission presented a Study on the
international law instruments in relation to illegal immigration by sea in May
2007, in which it sought to identify possible obstacles sprouting from the Law
of the Sea for the effective exercise of maritime controls and surveillance.28
This study prompted the further installment of an informal working group
consisting of representatives of Member States, Frontex, IMO and UNHCR to
draft specific guidelines for Frontex operations at sea which should inter alia
set out the competences of states in taking measures in the course of sea border
control operations by paying due respect to norms of international maritime
law and human rights law. After it transpired that the working group could
not agree on issues such as human rights implications and the identification
of the places of disembarkation, the European Commission proposed a draft
implementing decision under Article 12 (5) Schengen Borders Code based on
the provisional outcomes of the working group.29 Due to several Member
States opposing a binding regime for rescue operations and the disembarkation
of migrants, the Council subsequently divided the proposal in a set of binding
rules for the conducting of interceptions in the course of sea border controls
coordinated by Frontex and non-binding guidelines for search and rescue
situations and disembarkation.30 The relationship of this Decision with the
Schengen Borders Code was discussed in chapter 5.
Section 6.3.1 examines the interdiction powers of states in the different
maritime areas and questions the extent to which migrants and refugees may
27 JHA Council Conclusions 2 December 2004, ‘Conclusions evaluating the progress made
with regard to the implementation of the Programme of measures to combat illegal immigra-
tion across the maritime borders of the Member States of the European Union’, 15087/04
FRONT 201 COMIX 709, p. 7. Also see Presidency Conclusions 15/16 December 2005, Annex
I, ‘Global Approach to Migration: Priority Actions Focusing on Africa and the Mediter-
ranean’, 15744/05 ASIM 66 RELEX 761, p. 4.
28 European Commission, Study on the international law instruments in relation to illegal
immigration by sea, Brussels, 15 May 2007, SEC(2007) 691.
29 COM(2009) 658 final.
30 Council Decision 2010/252/EU
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rely on the principle of free navigation. Section 6.3.2 discusses the contents
of international maritime obligations of search and rescue. Where relevant,
references are made to the Commission study on the international law instru-
ments in relation to illegal immigration by sea and Council Decision 2010/252/
EU.
6.3.1 The right to interdict
6.3.1.1 The territorial sea
In respect of the powers of the state to regulate conduct within the territorial
sea, the doctrine has come to prevail that ‘the rights of the coastal state over
the territorial sea do not differ in nature from the rights of sovereignty which
the state exercises over other parts of its territory.’31 This is now confirmed
in Article 2 UNCLOS and Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
That the state’s sovereignty extends to its territorial sea does not mean that
its municipal laws automatically apply to the territorial sea.32 The question
whether, for example, an immigration statute applies to persons having crossed
the borders of the territorial sea but who have not yet set foot on land, must
be answered on the basis of relevant domestic law provisions.33 The United
States, in this connection, has installed a ‘wet-foot/dry-foot policy’, under
which those Cuban migrants ‘touching’ the US soil, bridges, piers or rocks
become subject to US immigration processes. If their feet are ‘wet’, on the other
hand, they are generally returned to Cuba, unless they establish a credible
fear of prosecution, in which case they are taken to the naval base at Guan-
tanamo Bay for further status determination and possible removal to third
country.34 Australia entertains a distinction between ‘offshore entry persons’
and ‘onshore’ arrivals, to the effect that all aliens who have first entered
Australia at an ‘excised offshore place’ without lawful authority – which
includes all persons arriving by boat without the valid visa – are detained
and transferred to Australia’s Christmas Island, where their reasons for being
31 Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its eighth session, YBILC
1956, II, p. 265.
32 R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, Juris Publishing, Manchester University
Press (1999), p. 75.
33 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam observe that States generally apply their immigration laws
not within territorial waters, but within internal waters, G.S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam,
The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press (2007), p. 273-274. But see notes
37-40 infra and accompanying text.
34 See, extensively and for further references, Legomsky (2006), p. 684.
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in Australia are identified.35 The offshore entrants remain subject to Australian
jurisdiction and the provisions of Australia’s Migration Act, except for the
purposes of applying for a visa, including protection visa for refugees. This
means that persons claiming asylum are subject to a non-statutory refugee
status assessment, where claims are assessed directly against the criteria set
out in the Refugee Convention, but without a legal entitlement of entry into
Australia if a person is found to be a refugee.36
Contrary to these two countries, European states have not ‘excised’ their
territorial sea (or their overseas territories) from their domestic migration
statutes.37 Current European practices indicate that, even though diversions
from the territorial sea reportedly occur, ships found in the territorial waters
of a Member State are generally considered to be subject to the relevant asylum
and immigration safeguards under either domestic, European or international
law and that, rather than being pushed back to the open sea or transferred
to some other place, these ships are escorted to a port and the passengers
processed according to the ordinary procedures.38 In order to accommodate
the situation of asylum-seekers arriving at sea borders, the proposal for recast-
ing the Asylum Procedures Directive foresees in a clarification of the territorial
scope by specifying that the notion of ‘territory’ includes the territorial waters
of the Member States.39 This amendment would ensure that in the treatment
of persons applying for asylum in their territorial sea, Member States must
uphold the standards of the Asylum Procedures Directive.40
The main impediment for states to enforce their laws within the territorial
sea is the right of innocent passage guaranteed under Articles 17-26 UNCLOS
and Articles 14-20 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone. The right of innocent passage embodies both the right of freely travers-
ing through the coastal state’s territorial seas and the right to proceed to and
35 Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), Fact sheets
60, 61, 75, 81; Australian Migration Act 1958, Sections 5, 6, 46A. The Australian programme
for the offshore processing of asylum-seekers is extensively discussed in chapter 7.
36 According to the Australian government however, ‘It will generally be the case that where
such unauthorised arrivals are assessed as engaging Australia’s protection obligations under
the non-statutory refugee status assessment process, the Minister will lift the bar on making
a valid visa application and they will be allowed to validly apply for a visa under the Act.’,
DIAC Fact sheet 81.
37 See, in respect of Italy, CPT Report on Italy (2010), para. 11.
38 In the context of the Italian push-backs, Italian media quoted Berlusconi as saying: ‘Our
idea is to take in only those citizens who are in a position to request political asylum and
who we have to take in as stipulated by international agreements and treaties,’ while
referring to ‘those who put their feet down on our soil, in the sense also of entering into
our territorial waters’; Human Rights Watch News Release 12 May 2009, ‘Italy: Berlusconi
Misstates Refugee Obligations’.
39 COM(2009) 554/4, Article 3 (1). This is in line with the Commission study on illegal
migration and the law of the sea, which stipulated that the Community asylum instruments
also extend to the territorial sea of the Member States, SEC(2007) 691, Annex, para. 4.2.2.10.
40 See, on the territorial scope of EU asylum law, chapter 5.3.3.
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from a coastal state’s internal waters or ports.41 Passage is only innocent if
it is not prejudicial to the ‘peace, good order or security’ of the coastal state.42
Under UNCLOS, it is specified that the unloading of persons contrary to im-
migration regulations renders passage non-innocent.43 Ships that have for-
feited the right of innocent passage remain subject to the full jurisdiction of
the coastal state and may be arrested for violation of local laws or in some
other manner prevented from passage through the territorial sea.44 States
may, moreover, adopt laws in respect of innocent passage aimed at preventing
infringements of its immigration laws, for example the setting of conditions
of access to its ports.45 Because UNCLOS excludes ships violating immigration
laws from the rights of innocent passage, it is commonly considered that the
law of the sea permits states to prevent irregular immigrants traveling on a
ship from setting foot on land and to require the ship to leave the territorial
waters.46 This may, as noted above, however come in conflict with immigra-
tion guarantees under domestic or international law.
According to UNCLOS, the unloading of passengers only renders passage
non-innocent if this unloading is contrary to the immigration laws of the
‘coastal State’.47 This begs the question whether migrant vessels which are
merely traversing through the territorial waters of a state in order to enter
the territorial waters (and the territory) of that of another, may also be sub-
jected to interdiction. In its study on the international law instruments in
relation to illegal immigration by sea, the European Commission considers
the passage of undocumented migrants wishing to land in another Member
State than the Member State through which waters they are traversing to be
non-innocent, under the reasoning that, in view of the common rules on the
crossing of external borders, illegal entries in another Member State must also
be considered as prejudicial to the good order and security of the coastal
Member State.48 This interpretation would appear to textually depart from
the language of UNCLOS, but an argument can also be made that, because the
European Union is itself a party to UNCLOS, Member States patrolling and
41 Art 18 (1) UNCLOS; Article 14 (2) Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, 29 April 1958, 516 UNTS 205.
42 Article 19 (1) UNCLOS; Article 14 (4) Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone.
43 Article 19(2)(g) UNCLOS.
44 In respect of the right to deny and suspend non-innocent passage in the territorial sea, see
more extensively Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 87-88.
45 Articles 21(1)(h) and 25(2) UNCLOS.
46 SEC(2007) 691, para. 2.1.2. For a discussion: M. Pallis, ‘Obligations of States towards Asylum-
seekers at Sea: Interactions and Conflicts Between Legal Regimes’, 14 IJRL (2002), p. 355-359.
47 Articles 19(2)(g), 21(1)(h) UNCLOS.
48 SEC (2007) 691, para. 4.2.2.6.
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controlling one another’s coastal waters are doing so in the exercise and for
the benefit of the European Union’s rights under UNCLOS.49
In the framework of interstate cooperation in the suppression of undocu-
mented migration, states increasingly conduct border patrols and subsequent
interdictions within one another’s territorial sea. Because these operations take
place within the territorial sovereignty of another state they will require the
consent of and must be conducted in accordance with the conditions set by
the coastal state. Special arrangements facilitating the interdiction by one
Member State in the coastal sea of another Member State are provided by the
Frontex Regulation, as amended by the RABIT Regulation.50 The Council
Decision for maritime Frontex operations stipulates that any interdiction carried
out by one Member State in the territorial sea of another requires prior author-
ization of the coastal Member State.51 In the proposal for recasting the Asylum
procedures Directive, it is further set out that asylum applications made to
the authorities of one Member State carrying out immigration controls in the
territory of another must be dealt with by the Member State in whose territory
the application is made.52 Although this provision clarifies responsibilities,
it may also raise issues of indirect refoulement.53
Joint operations of border control in the territorial sea of a third country
must necessarily be carried out in accordance with agreements between the
coastal state and an EU Member State or possibly the EU itself. An anomaly
in the Frontex framework defining the task and powers of guest officers is
the absence of references to the law and sovereignty of the third country. The
relevant provisions presume compliance with the laws of the host Member
State and ordain that guest officers take instructions from the host Member
State, whereas the ‘shiprider agreements’ concluded with several North African
49 The European Community acceded to UNCLOS on 1 April 1998. According to Article 4(3)
of Annex IX, UNCLOS, international organizations may ‘exercise the rights and perform
the obligations which its member States which are Parties would otherwise have under
this Convention, on matters relating to which competence has been transferred to it by
those member States’. In depositing the instrument of ratification, the European Community
formally declared its ‘acceptance, in respect of matters for which competence has been
transferred to it by those of its Member States which are parties to the Convention, of the
rights and obligations laid down for States in the Convention and the Agreement’; Declara-
tion concerning the competence of the European Community with regard to matters
governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
and the Agreement of 28 July 1994 relating to the implementation of Part XI of the Conven-
tion, 1 April 1998. The argument would accordingly be that in applying, for example, the
Schengen Borders Code, the Member States are enforcing not merely their municipal
immigration laws, but also the common Union corpus on external border controls, thus
giving effect to the right of the European Union established under UNCLOS to protect the
common external borders from irregular infringements.
50 See chapter 5.2.2.4.
51 Council Decision 2010/252/EU, Annex, Part I, para. 2.5.1.2.
52 COM(2009) 554/4, Article 4(5).
53 See extensively, section 6.4.1. below.
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countries stipulate that not the host Member State, but the third country is
ultimately competent in deciding upon visits and arrests.
6.3.1.2 The contiguous zone
States may assert, in respect of particular subject matters, jurisdiction over
the contiguous zone adjacent to the territorial sea. This zone does not form
part of the territorial sovereignty of the coastal state and hence, its laws and
regulations cannot apply in this zone. Article 33 (1) UNCLOS does permit states,
however, to exercise the control necessary to: ‘(a) prevent infringement of its
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its terri-
tory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regula-
tions committed within its territory or territorial sea.’54 Accordingly, UNCLOS
does allow for the taking of specific measures in the contiguous zone on
immigration matters.
The key question here concerns the scope of these powers. Some authors
consider that Article 33 (1) UNCLOS enlivens a general competence to intercept
and redirect irregular migrants found in the contiguous zone.55 In this vein
also, Council Decision 2010/252/EU does not distinguish between enforcement
activity undertaken in the territorial sea and contiguous zone. it set forth that,
in respect of decisions concerning inter alia the seizure of the ship and persons
on board or the escorting of the vessel towards the high seas, ultimate com-
petence lies with the coastal Member State.56
But other authors have stressed the distinction in Article 33 UNCLOS
between measures of prevention and measures of punishment.57 Under this
reasoning, the power to ‘punish’ refers to measures taken in response to
infringements of the coastal state’s law which have been committed within
its territory or territorial sea, by analogy to the doctrine of hot pursuit. The
power to prevent would, on the other hand, merely entail a right to approach,
inspect and warn a vessel, rather than to take enforcement measures such as
arrest, diversion or the forcible escort to a port.58 This would correspond with
the notion that because undocumented migrants not yet having entered the
territory or territorial waters of the coastal state have not (yet) acted in contra-
vention of a coastal state’s immigration laws, there is no explicit jurisdictional
basis for subjecting these persons to coercive measures. Contrary to Council
Decision 2010/252/EU, the earlier Commission study on the law of the sea
54 Also see Article 24 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
55 S. Trevisanut, ‘The Principle of Non-Refoulement at Sea and the Effectiveness of Asylum
Protection’, 12 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2008), p. 233.
56 Annex, Part I, paras. 2.5.1.1.-2.5.1.2.
57 Guilfoyle (2009), p. 12-13. Also see D. P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea, vol. I,
Oxford: Clarendon Press (1982), p. 1058; A. Shearer, ‘Problems of Jurisdiction and Law
Enforcement against Delinquent Vessels’, 35 ICLQ (1986), p. 330.
58 Ibid.
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aligned with this interpretation, in noting that it seemed impossible that a state
is allowed in the contiguous zone, in addition to the right to approach the
vessel and to prevent its entry into territorial waters, to arrest it or bring it
to a port.59 It would follow from this reasoning, firstly, that if found that there
is a prospect of a vessel infringing the immigration regulations of the coastal
state, the general rule of flag-state jurisdiction implicates that any further
enforcement action is possible only with the consent of the flag state.60 And,
secondly, if the flag-state has not waived its jurisdiction, the coastal state must
refrain from enforcement action until the vessel does indeed enter territorial
waters – and therewith bring itself within the ordinary legal order and possible
concomitant safeguards on border control and asylum of the coastal state.
6.3.1.3 The high seas
International waters, or the high seas, constitute that part of the seas which
does not belong to the territorial seas, the contiguous zone, or the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ).61 The legal order on the high seas is based on the two
foundational ideas of freedom of navigation and flag state jurisdiction.62
Under the former, it is prohibited for any state to subject the high seas to its
sovereignty and guaranteed that every state may sail its ships on the high
seas.63 The notion of flag state jurisdiction embodies the basic rule that a ship
is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state whose flag it flies.64
The rule of flag state jurisdiction implicates that states may not, without
prior agreement or consent, interdict vessels flying a foreign flag. By analogy
to bilateral treaties concluded for the suppression of drug trafficking, European
states have concluded treaties amongst themselves and with third countries,
in which permission is granted for the interdiction of vessels on the high seas
which are suspected of carrying undocumented migrants.65 Through such
59 SEC(2007) 691, Annex, para. 4.2.4.
60 See section 6.3.1.3 below.
61 Article 86 UNCLOS. Within the EEZ or exclusive economic zone, coastal States enjoy specific
rights and competences in respect of economic exploration and exploitation. For immigration
related matters, the legal regime applicable to the EEZ does not differ from that applicable
to the high seas; see Articles 56 and 58 UNCLOS.
62 Codified in Articles 87 and 92 (1) UNCLOS; Articles 2 and 6 (1) Convention on the High
Seas, 29 April 1958, 450 UNTS 82.
63 Articles 89 and 90 UNCLOS; Article 4 Convention on the High Seas.
64 Article 92 (1) UNCLUS; Article 6 (1) Convention on the High Seas.
65 See above, section 6.2. Also see the Exchange of notes between the United States and Haiti
constituting an agreement concerning the interdiction of and return of Haitian migrants,
Port-au-Prince, 23 September 1981, providing for inter alia: ‘Upon boarding a Haitian flag
vessel, in accordance with this agreement, the authorities of the United States Government
may address inquiries, examine documents and take such measures as are necessary to
establish the registry, condition and destination of the vessel and the status of those on
board the vessel. When these measures suggest that an offense against United States
immigration laws or appropriate Haitian laws has been or is being committed, the Govern-
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treaties, consent to the visit, search and seizure of the vessel may be given
in advance and no further authorization is needed at the moment that a vessel
wishes to conduct a boarding. Article 110 UNCLOS explicitly allows for the
conclusion of such agreements.66 Without advance or ad hoc permission from
the flag state, a state may not subject a foreign vessel to coercive measures
and it has been suggested that at best, a state may approach and warn a
foreign vessel carrying undocumented migrants that it will be seized or forced
back as soon as it enters the territorial sea – provided this is done, of course,
in accordance with other norms of international or domestic law.67 It has been
observed that European states have on occasion circumvented the rule of flag
state consent by interdicting migrant vessels under the pretext of search and
rescue operations, also in opposition to demands of those on board the
vessel.68 Council Decision 2010/252/EU holds that in the absence of authoriza-
tion of the flag state, a Member State may not take enforcement action, but
should survey the ship at a prudent distance, unless the ship is in an emerg-
ency situation.69
One particular question which may come to the fore if a state interdicts
a foreign vessel is what law applies to the vessel, its crew, its passengers and
the boarding officers. This will generally depend on the contents of the agree-
ment between the flag- and the boarding state. The rule of flag-state jurisdiction
signifies that the flag state stipulates the conditions under which another state
may exercise its jurisdiction over the vessel and that the flag state reserves
the right to withdraw its consent and resume exclusive control over, for
example, detention and subsequent prosecution.70 This also means that, unless
agreed otherwise, the vessel and all what happens on board remains subject
to the applicable laws of the flag state. In cases where a boarding party violates
the laws of the flag state, questions of immunity from foreign law enforcement
may arise, which will not be further discussed here.71
6.3.1.4 The problem of stateless vessels
More controversial is the question of the assertion of jurisdiction in the high
seas over ships without a nationality. Many migrants crossing the seas between
Africa and Europe, it has probably been correctly submitted, do so on board
ment of the Republic of Haiti consents to the detention on the high seas by the United States
Coast Guard of the vessels and persons found on board.’
66 According to Article 110 (1) UNCLOS: ‘[e]xcept where acts of interference derive from
powers conferred by treaty (…)’.
67 Guilfoyle (2009), p. 212.
68 Rijpma (2009), p. 343 (speaking of the ‘forcible rescue’ of persons aboad unseaworthy ships);
Legomsky (2006), p. 685.
69 Annex, Part I, para. 2.5.2.6.
70 Guilfoyle (2009), p. 10.
71 See, extensively, Guilfoyle (2009), p. 299-323.
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stateless vessels.72 A ship may be considered stateless if, upon request, it fails
to successfully claim a nationality.73 In its study on international law instru-
ments, the European Commission posits that in respect of a vessel without
a nationality, a state may prevent its further passage, arrest and seize it, or
escort it to a port, provided this is done with due respect for fundamental
rights and other applicable norms of international law.74 This interpretation
corresponds with the school of thought that ships without a nationality do
not enjoy the protection of any state and that, in the absence of competing
claims of state sovereignty, any state can apply its domestic laws to a stateless
vessel and to that purpose proceed with the boarding, searching and seizure
of that vessel.75 That stateless vessels are subject to such deprivational
measures is further explained by the fact that the registration of ships and
the need to fly the flag of the country where the ship is registered are con-
sidered essential for the maintenance of order on the open sea and to prevent
the open sea from becoming a region of lawlessness and anarchy.76 The para-
mount principle that each vessel sailing the high seas must fly a flag is
recognised under Article 92 (1) UNCLOS, stipulating that any vessel must have
a nationality – and one only.
But this view is not uncontested. Churchill and Lowe maintain that there
must be some further jurisdictional nexus for a state to extend its laws to those
on board a stateless ship and enforce the laws against them.77 Article 110
(1)(d) UNCLOS clearly allows states to assert jurisdiction over ships without
nationality, but it speaks only of a ‘right of visit’. This is defined as the right
‘to proceed to verify the ship’s right to fly its flag’, which includes the boarding
of the vessel, the checking of documents, and, if suspicion remains, a further
examination on board the ship ‘which must be carried out with all possible
72 SEC(2007) 691, Annex, para. 4.3.1.3.
73 This can either mean that the shipmaster of the vessel does not claim the vessel to have
a nationality or that the claim is denied by the State whose registry is claimed. See, on issues
of nationality, flags and registry: H.E. Anderson, ‘The Nationality of Ships and Flags of
Convenience: Economics, Politics, and Alternatives’, 21 Tulane Maritime Law Journal (1996),
p. 140-170.
74 SEC(2007) 691, Annex, Para. 4.3.1.3. This approach is followed in Council Decision 2010/
252/EU, Annex, para. 2.5.2.5. Note however that the Council Decision further requires
reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship is engaged in the smuggling of migrants.
75 According to Oppenheim’s International Law: ‘In the interest of order on the open sea, a vessel
not sailing under the maritime flag of a State enjoys no protection whatsoever, for the
freedom of navigation on the open sea is freedom for such vessels only as sail under the
flag of a State’, R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. I, London:
Longman, 9th edition, (1996), p. 546. Also see P. Malanczuk (ed.), Akehurst’s modern intro-
duction to international law, London: Routledge, 7th rev. ed (1997), p. 186; R.G. Rayfuse, Non-
Flag State Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff (2004), p. 57.
76 Oppenheim’s International Law (1996), p. 727; and, extensively, M.S. McDougal, W.T. Burke
and I.A. Vlasic, ‘The Maintanance of Public Order at Sea and the Nationality of Ships’,
54 AJIL (1960).
77 Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 214. Also see Anderson (1996), p. 141; Pallis (2002), p. 351.
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consideration’.78 Surely, if such verification leads to suspicions as regards
criminal activity over which the inspecting state may assert jurisdiction (such
as piracy, the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, human smuggling or
human trafficking79), the state can enforce its criminal jurisdiction over the
ship and its crew in accordance with the relevant provisions of international
law. But, in contrast with the other instances under which Article 110 UNCLOS
allows for a right to visit, neither UNCLOS nor other parts of the Law of the
Sea confer an explicit right upon states to subject an interdicted stateless vessel,
its crew or its passengers to such far-reaching measures as seizure or arrest.80
Guilfoyle submits therefore, that ‘treaty practice’ is consonant with the require-
ment of a further jurisdictional nexus permitting coercive action, but he also
admits that state practice would appear to favor the absence of a general
prohibitive rule on further coercive action taken in respect of stateless
vessels.81
The main problem with the requirement of a specific or further juris-
dictional link allowing a state to enforce its laws upon stateless vessels is that
it is premised on the idea that the system of the Law of the Sea would indicate
that interdiction of stateless vessels is only allowed if it provides for a clear
permissive statement to that effect. But it is questionable whether such explicit
entitlement needs to exist in respect of stateless vessels. Under UNCLOS and
the Law of the Sea in general, the freedom of navigating the high seas, and
all related freedoms (including the right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea discussed above), are exclusively endowed upon states.82 The
implication of this state-centered view of the Law of the Sea is that it removes
stateless vessels from the general safeguards on the freedom of navigation
and that, therefore, a state subjecting a stateless vessel to its jurisdiction does
not act contrary to any of the rights recognized under the Law of the Sea. It
is precisely on the basis that the law of the sea accords protection only to ships
flying the flag of a state and not to stateless ships, that national courts, in-
cluding in the United Kingdom and the United States, have considered inter-
national maritime law to permit any nation to subject stateless vessels to its
78 Article 110 (2) UNCLOS.
79 In respect of migrant smuggling, see section 6.3.1.5. below.
80 See, with regard to piracy and unauthorized broadcasting, Articles 105 and 109 UNCLOS,
which explicitly provide for arrest and seizure.
81 P. 17, 296.
82 See eg Article 87 (1) UNCLOS (‘The high seas are open to all States, (…)’); Article 90
UNCLOS (‘Every State (…) has the right to sail ships flying its flag’); emphasis added.
According to Article 92 (1) UNCLOS, the principle of exclusive jurisdiction only accrues
to ships flying under the flag of a State. Accordingly, it is perhaps better to speak not of
the open sea as being common to all mankind but rather as common to all nations.
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jurisdiction.83 In literature, this view is also endorsed, and explained by the
fact that, were it otherwise, stateless vessels would become ‘floating sanctuaries
of freedom from authority’, which is an unacceptable situation for a universally
applicable system of international law.84 Accordingly, the reasoning would
be that, in the absence of any specific rights or freedoms endowed by the Law
of the Sea on stateless vessels and in the absence of any competing claims of
states in respect of such vessels, international law sets no barriers for states
to subject stateless vessels to their domestic laws, implying that the state is
empowered to assert its full jurisdiction, both of legislative and enforcing
nature, over those ships.
This does, on the other hand, not mean that interventions against stateless
vessels take place outside the realm of international law. It has rightly been
observed that the interdiction of vessels without a nationality may lead, firstly,
to assertions of diplomatic protection by the state whose nationals are on board
the intercepted stateless vessel.85 Secondly, and for our purposes of the utmost
relevance, the taking of coercive measures in respect of any vessel and those
on board is likely to come within the ambit of human rights law. As is ex-
tensively addressed in section 6.4.3 below, deprivations of liberty or other
interferences with human rights are as a rule only permitted if they have a
basis in law and if this legal basis is of sufficient quality. This will ordinarily
83 United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit 9 July 1982, United States v. Marino-Garcia,
679 F.2d 1373, paras. 12, 17: ‘ Vessels without nationality are international pariahs. They
have no internationally recognized right to navigate freely on the high seas. (…) Moreover,
flagless vessels are frequently not subject to the laws of a flag-state. As such, they represent
“floating sanctuaries from authority” and constitute a potential threat to the order and
stability of navigation on the high seas. (…) [I]nternational law permits any nation to subject
stateless vessels on the high seas to its jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction neither violates the
law of nations nor results in impermissible interference with another sovereign nation’s
affairs. We further conclude that there need not be proof of a nexus between the stateless
vessel and the country seeking to effectuate jurisdiction. Jurisdiction exists solely as a
consequence of the vessel’s status as stateless.’ In the Asya case (1948), the United Kingdom
Privy Council held it to be lawful for a State to seize a stateless ship on the high seas. The
case concerned a ship with illegal immigrants on its way to Palestine but seized in the high
seas by a British naval vessel and escorted to a Palestinian port, where the passengers were
sent to a clearance camp. In respect of the argument that the illegal immigrants could rely
on the freedom of navigation, the Privy Council held: ‘the freedom of the open sea, whatever
those words may connote, is a freedom of ships which fly and are entitled to fly the flag
of a State which is within the comity of nations. The Asya did not satisfy these elementary
conditions. No question of comity nor of any breach of international law can arise if there
is no State under whose flag the vessel sails.’ The Council further confirmed that, having
been brought involuntarily in Palestinian territorial waters, the passengers had become
subject to the Ordinances dealing with immigration into Palestine and on that basis liable
to deprivational measures. Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 20 April 1948, Naim
Molvan v. Attorney General for Palestine (The “Asya”), [1948] AC 351.
84 H. Meijers, The Nationality of Ships, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff (1967), p. 319.
85 Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 214; D. Guilfoyle, Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 12 Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2007), p. 10; Guilfoyle (2009), p. 18.
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imply that coercive measures taken in respect of persons on board stateless
vessels may only be taken pursuant to domestic (or, if existent, international)
law provisions setting the conditions and limits for engaging in coercive
activity.
6.3.1.5 The UN Protocol on Migrant Smuggling and extraterritorial criminal juris-
diction
From the challenges posed by the phenomenon of undocumented sea migration
consensus has emerged that, similar to activities as piracy, unauthorized
broadcasting, the slave trade and drug trafficking, international law should
broaden the basis for states to assert criminal jurisdiction over the offence of
migrant smuggling, also when committed at sea. Studies suggest that, not least
due to the sharpening of maritime controls and surveillance, migrants increas-
ingly make use of the services of smugglers in their efforts to cross the seas
to Europe.86 The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea
and Air, adopted in Palermo in 2000, obliges states to criminalize migrant
smuggling, defines the term ‘migrant smuggling’ and provides specific rules
on the interdiction of migrant smugglers at sea.87 The Protocol is annexed
to the UN Convention against Transnational Organize Crime (UNTOC),88 which
expressly permits state Parties to establish (prescriptive) jurisdiction over
offences listed in the Convention which are inter alia committed outside their
territory, if they are committed ‘with a view to the commission of a serious
crime within its territory’.89
Because serious crimes are defined as those offences ‘punishable by a
maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years’,90 it will depend on
the national laws criminalizing the facilitation of illegal entry whether the
Migrant Smuggling Protocol, read together with UNTOC,91 allows for the
vesting of criminal jurisdiction over smuggling which takes place outside the
state’s territory. That there must be a link between the smuggling and a
punishable offence within the state’s territory further implicates that UNTOC
only provides for the establishment of jurisdiction on the basis of the principle
of protection and not on the principle of universality, from which it follows
86 Supra n. 8.
87 UN doc. A/RES/55/25 (2001), Annex III (hereafter Migrant Smuggling Protocol), Articles
3, 6 and 7-9. The Migrant Smuggling Protocol was adopted together with the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children.
Unlike the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, the Human Trafficking Protocol contains no specific
provisions on the maritime interdiction of persons suspected of engagement in human
trafficking. Not all EU Member States have as of yet ratified the protocol.
88 15 November 2000, 2237 UNTS 39574.
89 Article 15 (2)(c).
90 Article 2(b).
91 According to Article 1 (2) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, the provisions of UNTOC
apply unless the Protocol provides for a lex specialis.
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that states may only undertake coercive activity in accordance with the Protocol
in respect of smugglers who wish to enter their territory. But because the
establishment of prescriptive criminal jurisdiction over offences committed
abroad is not commonly considered as being subject to general permissive
statements under international law, the Protocol does not in itself prevent states
from proscribing the extraterritorial offence of migrant smuggling in a wider
manner.92
One of the specific aims of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol is to expedite
the cooperation of states in the interdiction of vessels which are suspected of
being engaged in migrant smuggling. The Protocol’s provisions in this respect
follow the general maritime rule of flag-state jurisdiction, implying that a state
wishing to interdict a vessel flying another state’s flag may only do so upon
prior authorization of the flag state.93 The flag state is not obliged to comply
with such a request, but it is under a duty to respond to requests expeditious-
ly.94 The flag state may, further, set the conditions for waiving its jurisdiction
to the other state.95 In its study on the international law instruments in re-
lation to illegal immigration by sea, the European Commission suggests to
consider a broadening of the criminal (enforcement) jurisdiction of States, so
as to allow states to interdict any vessel engaged in migrant smuggling or
human trafficking, either along the model of universal jurisdiction as applicable
to the crime of piracy, or along the model of unauthorized broadcasting, where,
apart from the flag state, the state of nationality of the suspect or the state
receiving the transmission may proceed with the arrest, seizure and pro-
secution of the vessel and suspects on board.96
The Migrant Smuggling Protocol also specifically provides for states to
interdict stateless vessels suspected of engagement in migrant smuggling.97
In case of stateless vessels or when flag state consent is obtained, states may
proceed with the boarding and search of suspected vessels.98
If evidence confirming the suspicion is found, the state may take further
‘appropriate measures with respect to the vessel and persons and cargo on
board’.99 Presumably, to ‘take appropriate measures’ must be taken to
correspond not only with what is necessary to suppress the vessel from being
used for migrant smuggling, but also with the conditions set by the flag state
92 Permanent Court of International Justice 7 September 1927, S.S. ‘Lotus’ (France v. Turkey),
1927 PCIJ Series A. No. 10, p. 13. Also see European Committee on Crime Problems,




96 SEC(2007) 691, Annex, para. 4.3.2.4. The specific regimes on piracy and unauthorised
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and/or the form and degree in which states have established prescriptive
criminal jurisdiction over the offence of migrant smuggling by sea. Because
states are expressly allowed under the Migrant Smuggling Protocol and UNTOC
to establish extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over the offence of migrant
smuggling, the taking of appropriate measures would, subject to the rule flag
state consent, necessarily seem to imply a right to seize the ship and to place
the crew under arrest and to instigate prosecution.100
A crucial question left unaddressed by the Protocol is what this power
to ‘take appropriate measures’ implies for the migrants who are the objects
of the smuggling. Article 5 of the UN Migrant Smuggling Protocol prohibits
the criminalization of migrants who have been the object of migrant smuggling,
raising the question on what legal basis a state could subject the migrants –
instead of the smugglers – to coercive measures such as arrest, detention or
forcible escort into its territory. Even though it may well be that to bring
migrants who have been the object of migrant smuggling forcibly to a port
will be the only practicable option a state may have which wishes to enforce
its criminal jurisdiction over the offences committed on board the vessel, the
express prohibition to subject migrants to criminal jurisdiction renders the
Protocol an insufficient legal basis to subject the smuggled migrants to arrest
or other coercive measures amounting to a deprivation of liberty.101
The logical implication of the prohibition to assert criminal jurisdiction
over migrants solely on the basis that they have been the object of smuggling
must be that the issue of a state wishing to subject smuggled migrants to penal
or administrative sanctions must be answered on the basis of the general
regime on interdictions on the high seas discussed above. This means that,
on the one hand, the power to take coercive action will depend on the contents
of the agreements in place between the interdicting state and the flag state.
And in the case of stateless vessels and vessels flying the state’s own flag, the
power to subject the migrants to coercive measures must necessarily follow
100 It may be useful here to draw an analogy with the United Nations Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/
15) which similarly, and also subject to the rule of flag State consent, allows States to, ‘[i]f
evidence of involvement in illicit traffic is found, take appropriate action with respect to
the vessel, persons and cargo on board’ (Article 17(4)). Various national courts have
interpreted this formula as necessarily implying a right to seize the ship and to place the
crew under arrest and to instigate prosecution. This interpretation also finds confirmation
in the Council of Europe Agreement on Illicit Traffic by Sea, implementing article 17 of
the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (31 January 1995, CETS 156), which is expressly meant to carry out and enhance
the effectiveness of the said provision of the UN Narcotics Convention, and which author-
izes States to require the vessel and persons on board to be taken into the territory of the
intervening or another State and, upon the finding of evidence that a relevant offence has
been committed, to proceed with the arrest of the persons or detention of the vessel. See,
extensively and with further references, Guilfoyle (2009), p. 84-85.
101 In Article 16(5) of the Protocol, the possibility of detention of smuggled migrants is men-
tioned, but without indication as to the basis of this detention.
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from applicable domestic law.102 In both situations however, a key problem
which may come to the fore is that to be without proper identity- or travel
documents at the high seas will not normally constitute an offence under the
laws of a coastal State. Hence, in the absence of specific international agree-
ments or domestic laws setting the conditions for asserting coercive action
over smuggled migrants, a state may lack the competence to subject smuggled
migrants to coercive measures, which may consequently constitute a practical
obstacle for taking ‘appropriate measures’ in respect of the smugglers. As is
further explained below,103 the ultimate consequence of a lack of a proper
legal basis for undertaking coercive measure against migrants at the high seas
could be that human rights law prohibits the taking of such measures, which
may greatly constrain the possibility of states to seize vessels engaged in
migrant smuggling and bring them to a port.
6.3.2 Obligations of search and rescue
The issues of which EU Member State should be responsible for saving migrants
at sea and where the rescued persons should be disembarked have been subject
to intense debate in the context of operations concerning the EU’s sea borders
coordinated by Frontex. The debate essentially evolves around the recon-
ciliation of humanitarian aspirations with fears of having to carry the migrant
burden.
In terms of international law, the two key principles to be reconciled are,
on the one hand, the duty of both private shipmasters and coastal states to
provide assistance to those who are in peril at sea and, on the other hand,
the equally well established sovereign right of states to control the entry of
non-nationals into its territory. In the context of the Vietnamese exodus, Pugash
described the plight of the boat people as the ‘Catch 22 of the Law of the Sea’:
‘The shipmaster of a freighter in international waters off Indochina is obligated
to rescue Vietnamese sea refugees, but no nation is bound to take the refugees
once they have been rescued.’104
Despite attempts of UNHCR, the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
and, on a regional level, the EU, this anomaly remains prevalent today.105
In the European context, migrants having embarked on the often perilous sea
journey to the European continent have often found themselves in distress
and, after being rescued, wound up as subjects in international negotiations
102 This is also the manner in which the USA had organised the competences of the US Coast
Guard to interdict any vessel carrying undocumented aliens. See Executive Order 12324
– Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, September 29, 1981; and Executive Order 12807 – Interdiction
of Illegal Aliens, May 24, 1992.
103 See section 6.4.3.
104 Pugash (1977), p. 578.
105 See n. 143-148 infra and accompanying text.
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on their disembarkation, sometimes resulting in rather protracted situations.
In one incident in May 2007, the shipmaster of a tuna pen flying the Maltese
flag had rendered assistance to a group of 28 irregular migrants whose ship
had sunk in the rough seas of the Mediterranean but had, for both financial
and security reasons refused to allow the migrants on board. And because
Malta, Italy nor Libya were under a clear obligation to allow the migrants to
disembark in one of its ports, the migrants were compelled to desperately
clung to the buoys of a tuna fishing net for three days before finally being
brought to the shore of the Italian island of Lampedusa.106 In another incident
in July 2006, the Maltese government had refused to allow the disembarkation
of fifty-one migrants rescued by the Spanish fishing trawler Francisco y Catalina
by affirming that it had been Libya’s responsibility to rescue them and, given
that a Spanish vessel ended up doing so, the migrants had become Spain’s
responsibility. After a standoff lasting eight days, it was agreed that Malta,
Libya, Italy, Spain and Andorra would all take in a share of the migrants.107
A similar exchange of arguments took place in April 2009, when Italy refused
a Turkish-owned vessel which had rescued 140 migrants entry into its terri-
torial waters, positing that, because they were found in the search and rescue
area of Malta, they had to be disembarked in Malta. Malta disagreed, arguing
that the migrants needed to be landed in Lampedusa, since that was the nearest
safe port. The row ended with the Italian government authorizing the migrants
to disembark at Lampedusa .108 A final peculiar example of how EU Member
States grapple with burdens posed by rescued migrants is the fate of the 27
mostly African passengers of a small boat which had ran into trouble in late
May 2005 and drifted off the coast of Sicily for eight days while other vessels
passed it by but refused to help. The Danish-registered container ship MV
Clementine Maersk eventually picked up the migrants and continued its
scheduled voyage to Felixtowe, Britain, prompting the British Daily Express
to bring the rescue operation on its front page with the headline: ‘MAD: Illegal
immigrants rescued in the Mediterranean and the ship’s captain brings them
2,000 miles... to Britain.’109 Guidelines for search and rescue situations and
for disembarkation in the context of sea border operations coordinated by the
Frontex Agency have now been laid down in the non-binding Part II of the
Annex of Council Decision 2010/252/EU.
In addressing the plight of migrants in distress at sea, legal studies often
focus on issues of effectiveness, compliance and enforceability of relevant
obligations under the Law of the Sea.110 Another and more general legal angle
106 The incident has been widely reported. For a summary: Migration Policy Group, Migration
News Sheet, Brussels, July 2007, p. 11.
107 Migration Policy Group, Migration News Sheet, Brussels, August 2006, p. 16-18.
108 Migration Policy Group, Migration News Sheet, Brussels, May 2009, p. 8
109 Daily Express 8 June 2005.
110 Pugash (1977); M. Davies, ‘Obligations and Implications for Ships Encountering Persons
in Need of Assistance at Sea’, 12 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal (2003), p. 109-141.
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is the extent to which migrant interdictions and sea border controls may
increase risks involved for migrants, attracting obligations not only under the
Law of the Sea but possibly also under human rights law.111 Although highly
important, the current study is not as such interested in the causes and
remedies for the migrant death toll at sea. It is concerned, rather, with the
smaller question of delineating the obligations of states for undertaking rescue
operations at sea and to subsequently identify the obligations relevant for
disembarkation. It is in this connection that international maritime obligations
on search and rescue are particularly relevant because they, firstly, lay down
a general duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea which distorts
the ordinary maritime regime defining the interdiction powers of states in the
various maritime zones. Secondly, the duty of search and rescue encompasses
the duty to bring rescued persons to a place of safety, touching upon the
crucial question of the appropriate place of disembarkation.
6.3.2.1 The duty of search and rescue
The duty to assist persons in distress at sea is an essential constitutional
element of the law of the sea and codified in a variety of treaties, most notably
in Article 98 UNCLOS, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue
(SAR).112 It is a duty incumbent on all shipmasters: both private and govern-
mental.113
The duty to render assistance applies anywhere at sea and to anybody in
distress.114 What exactly amounts to distress and how far a shipmaster’s
duties to provide assistance stretch is not always specified. The SAR Convention
defines a distress phase as ‘a situation wherein there is a reasonable certainty
that a person, a vessel or other craft is threatened by grave and imminent
danger and requires immediate assistance’.115 A ship need not be dashed
against the rocks before it can successfully invoke a claim of distress, nor is
the fact that the vessel may be able to come into port under its own power
111 T. Spijkerboer, ‘The Human Costs of Border Control’, 9 EJML (2007), p. 127-139.
112 International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea, 1 November 1974, 1184 UNTS 3;
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 27 April 1979, 1405 UNTS 23489.
The SOLAS and SAR Conventions provide for an expedient amendment procedure, see
Article VIII SOLAS and Article III SAR Convention. The SAR Convention was amended
by IMO Resolution MSC. 70(69), adopted May 1998 and IMO Resolution MSC.155(78),
adopted May 2004. The 1998 amendments put greater emphasis on regional cooperation
and co-ordination between maritime and aeronautical SAR operations. The 2004 amend-
ments aim to facilitate the disembarkation of rescued persons. References to the SAR and
SOLAS Conventions hereunder are made to the consolidated versions.
113 Art 98 (1) UNCLOS.
114 Art 98(1) UNCLOS; SAR, Annex, para. 2.1.10; SOLAS, Annex, Chapter V, Regulation 33 (1).
115 SAR, Annex, para. 1.3.13.
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conclusive evidence that a plea of distress is unjustifiable.116 Arguably,
passengers threatening to kill themselves or throw children overboard bring
themselves in distress, thereby triggering a legal duty of rescue and/or assist-
ance.117 It has been suggested that ‘preservation of life’ is the appropriate
criterion in determining whether a distress situation exists.118 EU Member
States do not interpret the term distress uniformly. Malta, for example, con-
siders a ship to be in distress only if a distress call has been issued and if there
is an immediate danger to the life and safety of those on board. Italy, on the
other hand, considers all unseaworthy ships to be in distress and is reported
to have commenced rescue operations also against the will of migrants on
board the concerned vessels.119 Council Decision 2010/252/EU stipulates that
the assessment of whether a distress situation exists should take account of
a range of factors, including the existence of a request for assistance, the
seaworthiness of the ship, the presence of qualified crew and safety equipment
and the weather and sea conditions.120
Apart from the duty to provide assistance to persons in distress, inter-
national maritime obligations imposed on states in connection to search and
rescue at sea comprise the duty to establish and maintain adequate and effect-
ive search and rescue services; and the duty to cooperate with neighbouring
states to ensure that assistance is rendered.121 The SOLAS and SAR Conventions
oblige states to ensure that necessary arrangements are made for coast watch-
ing.122 Detailed provisions on the establishment of rescue co-ordination
centres, the designation of rescue units and the equipment of rescue units are
laid down in Chapter 2 of the SAR Annex.123 The term ‘necessary’ indicates
that the establishment of rescue services must be commensurate with past ex-
periences relating to accidents at sea and the knowledge of navigational risks,
which is also apparent from the SOLAS Convention, which refers to ‘the density
of the seagoing traffic and the navigational dangers’.124 Given the rampant
incidents of migrants perishing in the seas between Africa and Europe, it may
116 General Claims Commission United States and Mexico, Opinion rendered 2 April 1929,
Kate A. Hoff v The United Mexican States, 4 UNRIAA 444, reprinted in 23 AJIL (1929), p. 860-
865.
117 On situations of self-inflicted distress, see D.J. Devine, ‘Ships in distress – a judicial contribu-
tion from the South Atlantic’, 20 Marine Policy (1996), p. 231-232, who emphasises that self-
inflicted distress must still be seen as distress.
118 Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 63; Barnes advances a wider definition of distress, which
does not necessarily require that the very existence of the person concerned is in jeopardy.
R. Barnes, ‘Refugee Law at Sea’, 53 ICLQ (2004), p. 59-60.
119 Rijpma (2009), p. 343.
120 Annex, Part II, para. 1.3.
121 The general duties of coastal States are summarized in Art 98 (2) UNCLOS.
122 SOLAS, Annex, Chapter V, Regulation 7(1). Also see SAR, Annex, para. 2.1.1.
123 See esp. SAR, Annex, paras. 2.2.-2.6.
124 SOLAS, Annex, Chapter V, Regulation 7(1).
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be questioned whether all involved states in the region take this duty sufficient-
ly serious.125
A key obstacle for identifying clear obligations on the side of coastal states
to respond to distress calls or to provide a place of safety for rescued persons
is a lack of clarity concerning the allocation of responsibility between states.
Addressing this issue, the SAR calls upon states to jointly agree upon the
establishment of national search and rescue regions (SRRs or SAR regions),
which are expressly not related to the delimitation of national boundaries
between states, within which each state has primary responsibility for overall
co-ordination of search and rescue operations.126 The division of the world’s
oceans in SAR regions was undertaken within the framework of the Inter-
national Maritime Organization and general agreement was reached on the
establishment of a SAR plan for the Mediterranean Sea in 1997.127 Apart from
having responsibility for overall co-ordination, the responsibility of states
within their SAR regions embodies the duty to use search and rescue units for
providing assistance to persons in distress within the specified area – an
obligation phrased in imperative and unconditional terms.128
Although the establishment of search and rescue regions has helped clarify
the state having primary responsibility for providing assistance, it does not
always appear to function effectively in the Mediteranean. Libya, although
a party to the SAR Convention, has repeatedly refused to answer distress calls
from within its SAR region.129 Malta, on the other hand, has on occasion
referred to the delimitation of the sea into SAR regions as a pretext to eschew
responsibility for undertaking rescue operations, by pointing out that the
troubled vessels were within another state’s search and rescue area.130 It must
be emphasised however, that the SAR regions do not establish mutually exclus-
ive areas of responsibility. A preponderant feature of the legal regime pertain-
ing to coastal state search and rescue obligations is the duty for coastal states
to cooperate in ensuring that assistance is provided to persons who are in
distress at sea. Article 98 (2) UNCLOS urges State Parties to conclude mutual
125 Note that the SOLAS and SAR Conventions also acknowledge that not all States may be
equally capable to arrange for search and rescue services, SOLAS, Annex, Chapter V,
Regulation 7(1) and SAR, annex, para. 2.1.1.
126 SAR, Annex, paras. 2.1.3-2.1.12.
127 Agreement adopted at IMO Mediterranean and Black Seas Conference on Maritime Search
and Rescue (SAR) and the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), Valencia
(Spain), 8 to 12 September 1997.
128 SAR, Annex, para. 2.1.9.
129 Rijpma (2009), p. 344.
130 Late May 2007, the Maltese government refused to provide assistance and to take in the
26 migrants rescued by the Spanish tug Monfalco, by arguing that ‘the incident took place
27 miles inside Libya’s search and rescue area and 17 miles outside Malta’s SAR zone, and
that Libya was therefore responsible for the peoples’ safety about 60 nautical miles from
the Libyan coast’; Migration Policy Group, Migration News Sheet , Brussels, July 2007, p. 11
and 15. Also see the incident concerning the Francisco y Catalina, n. 107 supra.
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regional arrangements to this effect and a range of provisions in the SAR
Convention call for the establishment of close cooperation between the rescue
services of states.131 Paragraph 3.1.7 of the SAR Convention explicitly stipu-
lates that each State Party must ensure that ‘its rescue coordination centres
provide, when requested, assistance to other rescue coordination centres,
including assistance in the form of vessels, aircraft, personnel or equipment’.
Further, any search and rescue unit being alerted of a distress incident must
take immediate action if in the position to assist.132 These provisions make
clear that states do not have mutually exclusive zones of responsibility for
undertaking rescue operations but rather the obligation to cooperate in en-
suring that assistance is provided.
6.3.2.2 Disembarkation and a ‘place of safety’
The definition of ‘rescue’ in the SAR Convention includes the duty to deliver
persons in distress to a place of safety.133 What is meant by a ‘place of safety’
is not explained in the SAR Convention. The safety of the people rescued, and
the safety of the rescuing vessel and crew, will primarily determine the most
appropriate course of action, including finding a ‘safe’ port for dis-
embarkation.134 One author notes that it is common maritime practice to
disembark rescued persons at the next port of call, but merely as a matter of
commercial expedience rather than as definite rule.135 On the basis of this
practice, UNHCR’s Executive Committee has in the past suggested that ‘persons
rescued at sea should normally be disembarked at the next port of call’.136
UNHCR has later explained that the next port of call can either mean the nearest
port of call, the next scheduled port of call, the port of embarkation, or even
the best equipped port of call.137 IMO has further observed that a place of
safety may also be an assisting vessel capable of safely accommodating the
survivors.138 Yet, given the paramount consideration of preserving life at
sea, detrimental circumstances on board a ship may well place limits on the
shipmaster’s freedom to choose an appropriate port of call. In this regard, it
131 See especially SAR, Annex, paras. 3.1.1-3.1.8.
132 SAR, Annex, para. 4.3.
133 SAR, Annex, para. 1.3.2.
134 According to the Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, adopted under
IMO Resolution MSC. 167(78), 20 May 2004, paras. 6.12-6.14, ‘a place of safety [in the
meaning of the SAR Convention] is a . . . place where the survivors’ safety of life is no
longer threatened and where their basic human needs (such as food, shelter and medical
needs) can be met. Further, it is a place from which transportation arrangements can be
made for the survivors’ next or final destination’.
135 Barnes (2004), p. 51-52.
136 UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion No.23 (XXXII), 1981, para. 3.
137 UNHCR, ‘Background note on the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees rescued at
sea’, Geneva, 18 March 2002, paras. 30-31.
138 IMO Resolution MSC. 167(78), 20 May 2004, para. 6.13.
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is not uncommon that a vessel coming to the rescue will find itself in distress
after a rescue operation.139 A lack of food and water or medical supplies,
or a lack of sufficient safety equipment for the amount of persons a vessel is
licensed to carry may severely limit the options a shipmaster has in choosing
a place of safety. Depending on the circumstances, a shipmaster may have
no other option than to deliver the rescued persons to the nearest port without
any delay.
UNHCR has underlined that legal obligations of states under international
refugee law must also inform the choice as to the port for disembarkation.140
Although disembarkation in a potentially unsafe country may certainly raise
issues under the prohibition of refoulement (see section 6.4.1 below), it can be
questioned whether one should incorporate the notion of safety under refugee
law (understood as being safe from proscribed ill-treatment or persecution)
into the concept of safety under the Law of the Sea. Within the latter body
of law, ‘safety’ refers to the preservation of life at sea and does not as such
deal with refugee considerations. Further, while the obligation to bring rescued
persons to a safe place is addressed to both governments and shipmasters
under the Law of the Sea, the prohibition of refoulement applies to governments
of Contracting States only.141 Rather than reading one obligation into another
one, the duties to bring rescued persons to a place where there basic and
medical needs are met and to respect the prohibition of refoulement are best
conceived as two distinct but complementary obligations. It is not
unimaginable that situations may arise in which states can find it difficult to
reconcile the different safety concepts.142
In more recent years, the question of disembarking rescued migrants
attracted renewed interest on both the international level and the level of the
European Union. Partly in response to Australia’s Tampa affair, the Inter-
national Maritime Organization proposed to identify existing inconsistencies
and ambiguities in internal maritime law instruments with a view to ensuring
139 A strong case has been made that the asylum-seekers taken on board the MV Tampa were
in distress. See Bostock (2002), p. 296. For a discussion, Barnes (2004), p. 59-61. For European
examples, one may refer to the adventures of the private rescue vessel Cap Anamur which
had picked up 37 migrants, of whom some suffered nervous breakdowns and wanted to
throw themselves overboard when the ship was refused entry in the port of Empodocle,
Sicily. Only when the ship issued an emergency call was permission given to enter port.
Migration Policy Group, Migration News Sheet, Brussels, August 2007, p. 12-13.
140 UNHCR, ‘Background note on the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees rescued at
sea’, Geneva, 18 March 2002, para. 31
141 See also, ibid, para. 22, where UNHCR explains that the private shipmaster of a rescuing
vessel ‘will not be aware of the nationality or status of the persons in distress and cannot
reasonably be expected to assume any responsibilities beyond rescue’ and that, therefore,
‘[t]he identification of asylum-seekers and the determination of their status is the responsib-
ility of State officials adequately trained for that task’.
142 One can think, for example, of situations where the state of health of the passengers requires
their immediate disembarkation but where refugee concerns oppose such disembarkation.
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that survivors of distress incidents are provided assistance, are delivered to
a place of safety and are treated in accordance with humanitarian maritime
traditions, while minimizing the inconvenience to assisting ships.143 As a
result, the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee adopted several amendments to
the SOLAS and SAR Conventions in May 2004, together with the Guidelines
on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea.144 Included in the amendments
is a prohibition imposed on the owner, the charterer or the company operating
a ship to prevent or restrict a shipmaster from engaging in a rescue under-
taking and the obligation of shipmasters to treat embarked persons in distress
at sea with humanity.145 Most pertinent is the amendment setting forth some
sort of procedural mechanism for ensuring that shipmasters who have pro-
vided assistance are released from their obligations and that disembarkation
is effectuated.146 This provision endows ‘primary responsibility’ for ensuring
cooperation between the parties involved in finding a place of disembarkation
upon the state in whose SAR region the persons have been rescued. In this
cooperation, the involved Parties are under a joint duty to arrange dis-
embarkation to be effected as soon as reasonably practicable. Even though
they do not designate by default the state where disembarkation should take
place, the 2004 SOLAS and SAR amendments were not accepted by Malta,
because it considered that persons rescued at sea should always be dis-
embarked at the nearest safe port – and because it would be ‘manifestly unfair
to expect a country of the size and population density of Malta to bear any
greater share of the burden of illegal immigration than it already does’.147
In the non-binding Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Dis-
143 IMO Resolution A.920(22), November 2001. Also see: ‘F.J. Kenney, Jr. and V. Tasikas, ‘The
Tampa Incident: IMO Perspectives and Responses on the Treatment of Persons Rescued
at Sea’, 12 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal (2003), p. 143-177.
144 IMO Resolutions MSC.153(78) , MSC. 155(78) and MSC.167(78), adopted 20 May 2004. The
amendments entered into force on 1 July 2006. Under the SAR and SOLAS Conventions,
an expedient ‘tacit acceptance’ amendment procedure applies, whereby amendments are
deemed accepted by a specified date unless a required number of Parties object.
145 SOLAS, Annex, Chapter V, Regulations 33(6) and 34-1.
146 SAR, Annex, para. 3.1.9.; and (under identical terms) SOLAS, Annex, Chapter V, Regulation
33 (1.1): ‘Parties shall co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that masters of ships providing
assistance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released from their obligations with
minimum further deviation from the ships´ intended voyage, provided that releasing the
master of the ship from these obligations does not further endanger the safety of life at
sea. The Party responsible for the search and rescue region in which such assistance is
rendered shall exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such co-ordination and co-
operation occurs, so that survivors assisted are disembarked from the assisting ship and
delivered to a place of safety, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case
and guidelines developed by the Organization. In these cases, the relevant Parties shall
arrange for such disembarkation to be effected as soon as reasonably practicable’
147 Letter of the Permanent Representative of Malta to the Permanent Representative of
Germany and COREPER Chair, 8 June 2007; Times of Malta 23 April 2009, ‘Editorial: An
unnecessary diplomatic stand-off’.
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embarking Persons Rescued at Sea issued by IMO’s Facilitation Committee in
January 2009, the responsibility of the government in whose SAR region the
persons have been rescued is taken further. These guidelines stipulate that,
if disembarkation cannot be arranged swiftly elsewhere, the government
responsible for the SAR area should accept the disembarkation of the rescued
persons.148
On the level of the European Union, Council Decision 2010/252/EU pro-
poses to address the question where the migrants should be disembarked
somewhat differently. The guidelines posit that ‘priority should be given to
disembarkation in the third country from where the ship carrying the persons
departed or through the territorial waters or search and rescue region of which
that ship transited and if this is not possible, priority should be given to
disembarkation in the host Member State unless it is necessary to act otherwise
to ensure the safety of these persons.’149 The term host state refers to the
Member State whose borders are the object of control of the Frontex
operation.150 The guidelines do note that this is ‘without prejudice to the
responsibility of the Rescue Coordination Centre’, probably referring to the
responsible SAR state.151 Because the guidelines are addressed at the Member
States participating in Frontex operations and not at third countries, the priority
of disembarking persons in a third country will necessarily depend on further
agreement with the third state concerned. The alternative allocation to the host
Member States may well be instrumental in averting ad hoc disagreements
between Member States on the issue of disembarkation, but it is also the most
controversial element of the Decision. Malta, likely to be a host of Frontex
operations, opposed the adoption of the Council Decision on the basis of
precisely this element. In the words of a spokesperson of the Maltese govern-
ment: “if we decide to host the Frontex mission, we will get funding to operate,
but that would mean that we would have to take in people rescued off the
sea from as far away as Crete.”152 Instead, Malta continues to favor a system
where rescued migrants are as a rule taken to the nearest port of call and has
threatened to refrain from future participation in Frontex operations.
On the one hand, rules or guidelines setting by default the state responsible
for allowing disembarkation appear imperative for the effective implementation
of duties of search and rescue. Clear guidelines may resolve the problem of
private shipmasters being reluctant to render assistance for a fear of not being
allowed entry into a port and may ensure that the needs of rescued migrants
148 IMO Facilitation Committee, 22 January 2009, FAL.3/Circ. 194, para. 2.3.
149 Annex, Part II, para. 2.1.
150 See recital 5.
151 Annex, Part II, para. 2.1
152 The Malta Independent Online 4 February 2010, ‘Malta and Frontex missions: ‘No chance
if the rules are changed’’; Times of Malta 1 February 2010, ‘Angry Malta protests over new
Frontex rules’.
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are attended to as soon as practicable. On the other hand, any default rule,
regardless of which state is appointed, is problematic in view of the fact that
each distress situation is different. IMO has underlined that, given the variety
of factors to be taken into account, selection of a place of safety must always
depend on the unique circumstances of each case – by referring to such matters
as medical needs and the situation on board the ship.153 Although one may
therefore criticize the Law of the Sea for not providing a crystal clear rule as
to the appropriate place of disembarkation, the nature of the duty to bring
persons to a safe place would seem to inherently require a certain level of
flexibility.
It can further be observed that past disputes between EU Member States
on the issue of disembarkation were not, in essence, grounded in a lack of
clarity of the scope of maritime obligations or the relevant interests to be taken
into account. References by governments to a perceived imprecision of the
Law of the Sea or even outright differences of interpretation have been used,
rather, as a pretext obscuring the much more fundamental discord on the
question of taking in the migrant burden. In other words, it is not the im-
precision – or flexibility – of the Law of the Sea which undermines compliance
with obligations of rescue and of bringing persons to a safe place, but the fact
that the person in distress is also a migrant which is the cardinal factor explain-
ing why states find it difficult to comply with relevant maritime obligations.
One may question, in this connection, whether the Law of the Sea constitutes
the appropriate framework to address this issue. The Law of the Sea has not
been designed to regulate questions of migrant burden sharing and these issues
are likely to be much more effectively resolved by regional arrangements, such
as in the context of the European Union. From this perspective, Council De-
cision 2010/252/EU, despite its shortcomings and controversial contents, may
be regarded as an example of how a regional instrument can contribute to
the proper implementation of obligations of search and rescue. Other examples
of burden-sharing arrangements which are perceived as having successfully
contributed to ensuring and speeding up the disembarkation of rescued people
are the Disembarkation Resettlement Offers (DISERO) and Rescue at Sea Resettle-
ment Offers (RASRO) schemes established by UNHCR in the 1980s in response
to the Indochinese refugees.154 These schemes created a special reserve of
153 IMO Resolution MSC.167(78), para. 6.15. This need for flexibility is well illustrated by the
choice of a Spanish patrol boat, taking part in Frontex operation Nautilus in the seas
between Italy and Libya, which had rescued 26 migrants among whom a woman and her
baby born only three days earlier, not to sail to the nearby island Lampedusa but to Malta
since both child and mother required urgent medical assistance which was not available
on Lampedusa. Migration Policy Group, Migration News Sheet, Brussels, August 2007, p. 13.
154 UNHCR, Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea, EC/SCP/18,
26 August 1981; UNHCR, Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-Seekers in Distress
at Sea, EC/SCP/30, 1 September 1983. Because the resettlement offers where perceived
as creating a ‘pull-factor’, the schemes were replaced by the Comprehensive Plan of Action
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resettlement guarantees to which – mainly developed – countries contributed
according to fixed criteria.
6.4 HUMAN RIGHTS AT SEA
The analysis above has explored the rights of states to interdict migrant vessels
under the Law of the Sea. The framework and conditions for asserting rights
of interdiction are properly exercisable vis-à-vis other states. In connecting
this regime of law to issues of migration enforcement at sea, one must be aware
that, in essence, the Law of the Sea protects the freedom of navigation of states,
and that this protection is made operational through a system under which
specific rights and freedoms are accorded to vessels flying under the flag of
one or the other state. Crucially, this system of protection and the waiving
of protection does not in itself regulate the powers a state may exercise vis-à-vis
the passengers of such vessels in the course of migration control. In other terms,
although the Law of the Sea sets the circumstances under which states may
take particular action over migrant vessels, it does not answer the question
of what action may subsequently be taken against the migrants themselves.
From positing that the Law of the Sea allows for the interdiction of migrant
vessels, it does not automatically follow that a state becomes competent to
arrest, detain or return the migrants found on board.
These are questions which instead depend on two complementary but
interlinked bodies of law. One is the general framework of the international
law on aliens, and in particular human rights law on the treatment of aliens.
The other is the domestic regime on immigration and border control (or, where
relevant, bilateral or regional arrangements), prescribing the extent to which
states consider it opportune to engage in migration enforcement at sea. One
prime reason why these two regimes cannot be assessed in isolation, is that
human rights law requires states not merely from refraining from activity
which is in violation of human rights, but also obliges states to put in place
a system of law which secures against human rights violations, which entails
safeguards against arbitrariness and which ensures the availability of remedies.
In the context of migrant interdiction at sea, the scope and contents of domestic
laws regulating interdictions are a particularly salient issue, precisely because
interdictions are often conducted outside the ordinary framework of the state’s
immigration policies.
It is not necessary to repeat what has been said about the extraterritorial
application of human rights and in particular the ‘right to asylum’ in chapters 2
for Indochinese Refugees, under which only those determined as refugees were eligible
for resettlement. For an appraisal, see W. Courtland Robinson, ‘The Comprehensive Plan
of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989–1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck’,
17 Journal of Refugee Studies (2004), p. 319-333.
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and 4 of this book. But it is helpful to start this section by noting that the
European Court of Human Rights has on various occasions considered the
European Convention on Human Rights to apply to interdictions at sea. In
the case of Medvedyev, concerning the visit and subsequent seizure and arrest
of a vessel and its crew at the high seas in the course of an anti-drug trafficking
operation, the Court considered the arrest and detention to come within the
ambit of Article 5 ECRH, protecting the right to liberty.155 On a general note,
the ECtHR pronounced that:
‘[T]he special nature of the maritime environment (…) cannot justify an area outside
the law where ships’ crews are covered by no legal system capable of affording
them enjoyment of the rights and guarantees protected by the Convention which
the States have undertaken to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction, any more
than it can provide offenders with a “safe haven”.’156
In the specific context of the interdiction of migrants and asylum-seekers, the
ECtHR has considered the guarantees of Article 2 ECRH, the right to life, to apply
to an incident where a boat carrying more than 50 migrants from Albania who
wished to enter Italy collided with an Italian warship and sunk in international
waters.157 The Committee against Torture, in the Marine I case, considered
that a rescue operation of the Spanish Civil Guard of 369 migrants whose boat
had gone adrift in international waters had brought the passengers within
the jurisdiction of Spain for the purposes of the complaints at issue, which
included alleged violations of Articles 1 and 3 CAT, on account of the treatment
of the passengers and their forcible repatriation to India after they had been
disembarked in Mauritania.158
It could nonetheless be questioned whether, in analogy with the Banković
requirement that a person must find himself within the effective control of
the state, all forms of sea interdictions must necessarily entertain the human
rights obligations of the interdicting state.159 It has been reported that not
all interdiction activities are accompanied with the boarding of migrant vessels,
but that states may also employ diversion tactics without making physical
contact with a migrant vessel.160 Examples which can be given are the escort-
155 ECtHR 10 July 2008, Medvedyev v France, no. 3394/03 (Chamber); ECtHR 29 March, Med-
vedyev v France, no. 3394/03 (2010 (Grand Chamber). Also see ECtHR 12 January 1999,
Rigopoulos v Spain, no. 37388/97 (adm. dec.).
156 Medvedyev v France (Grand Chamber), para. 81
157 ECtHR 11 January 2001, Xhavara a.o. v Italy and Albania, no. 39473/98 (adm. dec.).
158 UN Committee Against Torture 21 November 2008, J.H.A. v Spain (Marine I), no. 323/2007,
para. 8.2.
159 See extensively chapter 2.5.2.
160 See the accounts of various diversion tactics employed by States in the Mediterrrean in
Foundation Pro Asyl (2007); Human Rights Watch, ‘Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s
Forced Return of Boat Migrants and Asylum-seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants
and Asylum-seekers’ (report), September 2009.
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ing of a migrant vessel; the addressing of the captain or passengers by mega-
phone; the dissuasion of a vessel from further passage by making intimidating
maneuvers; or even the shooting of the engine of a vessel.161 But it is difficult
to see why such measures should preclude persons from being brought under
the personal scope of the acting state’s human rights obligations. As concluded
in chapter 2 of this book, it transpires from the evolving case law on the
extraterritorial application of human rights that the form or manner of state
activity is generally not considered decisive for enlivening the state’s extraterri-
torial obligations but rather the question whether there is a factual assertion
of state sovereignty which affects a person in such a way that he can be
considered a victim of an alleged infringement of a human rights obliga-
tion.162 This reasoning finds further support in the ECtHR judgment in Women
on Waves v Portugal, in which a prohibition to enter Portuguese territorial
waters imposed on a Dutch vessel and enforced by a warship of the Portuguese
Navy which took position near the Dutch vessel, was considered to contravene
the right of the Dutch crew to promote to the debate on reproductive rights
in Portugal.163
Migrant interdictions at sea not only attract obligations specific for asylum-
seekers, but may extend to the full panoply of rights laid down in the different
human rights conventions. The current section explores three human rights
which appear particular at issue when states subject migrants at sea to coercive
measures: the prohibition of refoulement, the right to leave and the right to
liberty. It will conclude that the manner in which several EU Member States
currently control their maritime sea borders raises serious issues under all
these rights.
6.4.1 Non-refoulement obligations arising out of interdiction at sea
In situations of land arrivals of refugees at a state’s border where the state
wishes to exclude the refugee, the state will have the alternatives of either to
send the refugee to his country of origin, possibly violating the prohibition
of refoulement, or to send him to a third country, which may also involve
either direct or indirect refoulement and further depends on the willingness
of the other country to admit the person. In respect of sea arrivals, there is
the alternative possibility of sending the refugee back to open sea.164
Although sea diversions not accompanied with forced returns to another
country are not necessarily at variance with the prohibition of refoulement,
they are problematic nonetheless. Ultimately, it may result in ‘refugees in orbit’,
161 Ibid.
162 See in particular the analysis in chapter 2.5.2.
163 ECtHR 3 February 2009, Women on Waves v Portugal, no. 31276/05.
164 Pugash (1977), p. 594.
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where no country is willing to allow entry into its ports.165 Because migrants
at sea often travel on unseaworthy or unsafe ships and will often have limited
food-, water- or fuel supplies, they cannot be expected to stay at sea
indefinitely. In practical terms, this means that diversions to the open sea may
result, firstly, in refugees seeing no other option than to return to the state
where their life or freedom is in danger or where there is a risk of chain
refoulement. This may well amount to either exposure to ill-treatment under
Article 3 ECRH or ‘return’ (or ‘refouler’) in the ordinary meaning of the term
under Article 33(1) Refugee Convention and must therefore be classified as
prohibited.166 Secondly, also in situations short of distress, to knowingly
accept the risk that a migrant vessel is forced to remain at sea for a prolonged
period may endanger the life and well-being of the passengers, thus attracting
the state’s human rights obligations under the right to life and/or the prohi-
bition of inhuman treatment.167
Increasingly, EU Member States seek not to merely divert vessels carrying
irregular migrants, but to conclude agreements with third countries allowing
for their immediate return. This practice has attracted considerable attention
of legal scholars and UNHCR and touches upon the two crucial issues of where
asylum-seekers should be disembarked and where and how their status should
be determined.
The most immediate question in connection to summary returns of refugees
who are interdicted at sea is how states should deal with asylum requests
lodged by intercepted migrants. At the land border, specific mechanisms will
normally regulate the lodging and processing of asylum requests. But domestic
laws often remain silent on asylum requests lodged at sea, rendering the
mechanism of processing asylum applications, and how to guarantee access
to fair and efficient asylum procedures, manifestly unclear.168 Because inter-
165 Mathew (2002), p. 666.
166 See chapter 4.3.
167 It is reported that, on occasion, EU Member States have attempted to divert migrant vessels,
also if in distress, rather than to bring them to a port. In August 2009, the five survivors
of a ship carrying over seventy migrants, who had embarked in Libya, told to the Italian
press that their ship had ran out of fuel and had remained adrift for twenty days, during
which time only one out of several vessels passing by had stopped to provide assistance.
Two days before being rescued, a patrol boat, allegedly belonging to Malta, had provided
them with fuel and directed them to the Italian island of Lampedusa, Migration News Sheet,
Migration Policy Group, Brussels, Sept. 2009, 12. On preventive duties under the right to
life and border controls, see Spijkerboer (2007), p. 137-139. Council Decision 2010/252/EU
expressly allows Member States participating in border operations coordinated by Frontex
to order a ship to modify its course towards a destination other than the territorial waters
or contiguous zone, but also obliges Member States to always respect fundamental rights
and to not put at risk the safety of the intercepted passengers, Annex, Part I, paras. 1.1,
2.4(e).
168 UNHCR, ‘Background note on the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees rescued at
sea’, Geneva, 18 March 2002, para. 21.
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dictions will normally bring asylum-seekers within the jurisdiction of the state
in human rights terms, a lack of guarantees of law safeguarding asylum-seekers
from being returned without their claim being assessed in itself raises serious
issues under the prohibition of refoulement. Under Article 3 ECRH, ‘a rigorous
scrutiny must necessarily be conducted of an individual’s claim that his or
her deportation to a third country will expose that individual to treatment
prohibited by Article 3’.169 This ordains the installment of certain procedural
safeguards, an obligation which likewise applies to the prohibition of refoule-
ment under other treaties.170 Therefore, although the question of whether
a particular return measure does indeed expose a person to ill-treatment or
persecution can ultimately only be answered on the basis of an assessment
of the circumstances of the individual and those prevailing in the receiving
country (including the possibility of onward removal), return practices not
allowing for some sort of screening procedure in effect amount to a blanket
determination that none of the returnees may have a valid asylum claim,
without the possibility of assailing that determination.171
Crucially therefore, any interdiction practice not providing for some form
of refugee screening runs counter to procedural duties which follow from the
prohibition of refoulement, regardless of whether it concerns countries which
are generally considered as unsafe, such as Libya,172 or whether it concerns
a safe country, as it is generally accepted that asylum-seekers must always
be allowed the possibility to rebut the supposed safety of the country con-
cerned.173 Hence, interdictions of EU Member States where no specific regard
is paid to refugee concerns, including the recent returns by Italy of migrants
intercepted at sea to Libya, but also the interdictions and summarily returns
carried out in the context of the Hera operations in the territorial waters of
Senegal, Mauritania and the Cape Verde – which have not been confirmed
to provide for access to an asylum procedure174 – are problematic.175 Out-
169 ECtHR 11 July 2000, Jabari v Turkey, no. 40035/98, para. 39. On the obligation to install
procedural safeguards under Articles 3 ECHR, 7 ICCPR and 3 CAT extensively K. Wouters,
International Legal Standards for the Protection from Refoulement, Antwerp: Intersentia (2009),
p. 330-331, 411-412, 513-515.
170 Ibid.
171 Cf. H.H. Koh, ‘The Human Face of the Haitian Interdiction Program’, 33 Virginia Journal
of International Law (1993), p. 486.
172 Human Rights Watch News Release 17 January 2008, ‘Libya: Summary deportations would
endanger migrants and asylum-seekers’; Human Rights Watch, ‘Libya: Stemming the F
low, Abuses Against Migrants, Asylum-seekers and Refugees’ (Report), Volume 18, No.
5(E), September 2006; S. Hamood, ‘EU–Libya Cooperation on Migration: A Raw Deal for
Refugees and Migrants?’ 21 Journal of Refugee Studies (2008) p. 19-42. Also see the country
information reproduced in ECtHR 20 July 2010, A. v the Netherlands, no. 4900/06.
173 J.C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge University Press
(2005), p. 326-333; K. Hailbronner, ‘The Concept of ‘Safe Country’ and Expeditious Asylum
Procedures: A Western European Perspective’, 5 IJRL (1993), pp.51, 53.
174 García Andrade (2010), p. 321-322.
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side the European context, interdiction practices which have been reported
not to entertain meaningful screening for refugees include the returns of
Haitians intercepted by the US Coast Guard to Haiti after President G.H.W.
Bush had issued the Kennebunkport Order in 1992176 and the return of
asylum-seekers interdicted by Australia to Indonesia in the most recent
decade.177
UNHCR has repeatedly underlined the necessity of identifying and sub-
sequent processing of asylum-seekers who are intercepted at sea. In view of
all sorts of practical constraints, UNHCR advises that status determination is
most appropriately carried out on dry land – where access to inter alia trans-
lators, appropriate counsel and appeal mechanisms can be ensured.178
Although not always unambiguous, UNHCR generally appears to refrain from
recommending that the processing must always be conducted within the
territory of the interdicting state.179
175 The CPT has explicitly submitted that Italy’s policy of pushing back migrants to Libya
violates the prohibition of non-refoulement, CPT Report on Italy (2010), para. 48.
176 Legomsky (2006), B. Frelick, ‘“Abundantly Clear”: Refoulement’, 19 Georgetown Immigration
Law Journal (2005), p. 245-275. The Kennebunkport Order (Executive Order 12807), named
after the vacation home of the President from where the order was issued, declared that
Article 33 Refugee Convention did not extend to persons located outside the territory of
the United States and that vessels found to be engaged in the irregular transportation of
persons could be returned to the country from which it came, provided that the Attorney
General, ‘in his unreviewable discretion’, decided that a person who is a refugee shall not
be returned. See, further chapter 7.2.1.
177 S. Kneebone, ‘The Pacific Plan: The Provision of ‘Effective Protection’, 18 IJRL (2006), p.
714; Mathew (2002), p. 671.
178 UNHCR, ‘Background note on the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees rescued at
sea’, Geneva, 18 March 2002, para. 23-24. UNHCR does not exclude the possibility of
onboard processing in limited circumstances. In a similar vein: IMO, ‘Principles Relating
to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons Rescued at Sea’, FAL.3/Circ.194,
22 January 2009, para. 2.2. Frelick has aptly described the inadequacies of on board identifi-
cation and screening of Haitian refugees in the context of the Haitian interdiction policy:
Frelick (2005), p. 245-247.
179 UNHCR Background note (2002), paras. 25-29. EXCOM had earlier recommended, in the
context of rescue operations, that asylum-seekers should normally be disembarked and
further processed in the country of the next port of call; EXCOM Conclusion No. 23 (XXXII),
1981, para. 3. In EXCOM Conclusion No. 15 (XXX), 1979 para. h iii, it was stated that
‘intentions of asylum-seeker as regards the country in which he wishes to request asylum
should as far as possible be taken into account’. More recently, and specifically responding
to rescue operations carried out by EU Member States, UNHCR recommended that ‘…
disembarkation of people rescued in the Search and Rescue (SAR) area of an EU Member
State should take place either on the territory of the intercepting/rescuing State or on the
territory of the State responsible for the SAR. This will ensure that any asylum-seekers
among those intercepted or rescued are able to have access to fair and effective asylum
procedures. The disembarkation of such persons in Libya does not provide such an assur-
ance’; UNHCR, Letter to His Excellency Mr. Martin Pecina, Minister of the Interior of the
Czech Republic, 28 May 2009, in: UNHCR, Submission by the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees in the Case of Hirsi and Others v. Italy (Application no.
27765/09), March 2010, para. 4.3.6.
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As noted above, the non-binding Part II of Council Decision 2010/252/EU
sets as a default rule that, by way of priority, intercepted or rescued persons
in Frontex operations should be disembarked in a third country.180 The
Decision does not provide specific guidelines or rules on how participating
Member States should deal with asylum claims lodged at sea, but it does
stipulate firstly, that no person shall be disembarked in or handed over to a
country in contravention of the prohibition of direct or indirect refoulement;
and secondly, that rescued or intercepted persons must be allowed the possibil-
ity to ‘express any reasons for believing that disembarkation in the proposed
place would be in breach of the principle of non-refoulement’.181 Further, Mem-
ber States must ensure that their participating border guards are trained with
regard to relevant provisions of human rights and refugee law.182 Although
this is the first legal instrument of the European Union codifying the extraterri-
torial applicability of the prohibition of refoulement, it does little to resolve the
fundamental question of how to make operational procedural duties for
deciding upon asylum claims lodged at sea. Theoretically, it leaves the Member
States confronted with asylum claims the three options of either to process
the asylum-seeker on the territory of one of the Member States (normally the
host Member State183), to process the claim in a third country, or to process
the claim at sea.
Because all three options may be problematic from either a legal, practical
or policy perspective, states have on occasion sought recourse to the further
possibility of entering into arrangements with a third country allowing for
the identification, status determination and subsequent repatriation or resettle-
ment in that country. In chapter 7 of this study, the merits of such external
processing schemes are more extensively reviewed. It transpires from that
review that although the processing of asylum claims of interdicted asylum-
seekers in a third country not necessarily raises issues under the prohibition
of refoulement, these schemes may raise a variety of other human rights issues,
especially in the sphere of procedural guarantees and the availability of safe-
guards against arbitrary detention.
6.4.2 The right to leave at sea
The right to leave can be invoked by any person, regardless of entitlements
to international protection. It was concluded in chapter 4 of this book that the
right to leave, laid down in Articles 2(2) Protocol No. 4 ECRH and 12(2) ICCPR
may constrain the freedom of states to employ extraterritorial measures of
180 Section 6.3.2.2.; Council Decision 2010/252/EU, Annex, Part II, para. 2.1.
181 Annex, Part I, para. 1.2.
182 Annex, Part I, para. 1.4.
183 Annex, Part II, para. 2.1.
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border control. It was derived from relevant case law of the ECtHR and HRC
that measures of immigration control enforced in the territorial waters of a
third country can constitute an interference with the right of a person to leave
that country, and that it is neither excluded that interdictions at the high seas
accompanied with summarily returns to the third country may also deprive
the right to leave of meaningful effect.184
Concluding that measures of border control effectuated in a foreign country
attract protection under the right to leave has substantial ramifications for the
manner in which those controls must be executed. Surely, states may have
very good reason to require persons to only cross international borders with
valid travel and identity documents. When states, to that purpose, conclude
international arrangements allowing them to deny persons from exiting another
country, such activity may well be brought within one of the justifiable aims
for restricting a person’s right to leave. The key point, however, is that any
interference with the right to leave requires compliance with all the elements
of the limitation clauses of Articles 2(3) Protocol No. 4 ECRH and 12(3) ICCPR.
Most pertinent, in view of current practices, is the requirement of in accordance
with law, ordaining that interferences may only take place under a procedure
prescribed by law, that this procedure must be accessible and foreseeable and
sufficiently precise to avoid all risk of arbitrary application.185
It is in this sphere that issues arise. This is so firstly, because interdiction
practices of European states at sea which involve the summarily return of
migrants to a third country are often conducted outside a clear procedural
framework. And, secondly, the same conclusion applies to joint operations
of border control within the territorial seas of third countries: these operations
often take place under obscure arrangements, which do not set the precise
conditions for refusing persons to exit a country, nor embody guarantees
against arbitrary application.
It is useful here to make an analogy with the case of Medvedyev v
France.186 Although concerning the right to liberty instead of the right to
leave, the judgments of both of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber of the
ECtHR in that case shed light on how the requirement of ‘lawfulness’ should
be interpreted in a situation concerning the interdiction of a vessel and the
taking of coercive measures against those on board in the context of a bilateral
arrangement with another country. The Court had regard to the applicable
French legislation, the international law instruments on the suppression of
drug trafficking and the ad hoc arrangements between France and Cambodia.
It concluded that universal treaty law on the suppression of drug trafficking
did provide for international cooperation in taking action against illicit drug
trafficking by sea but merely referred to the taking of ‘appropriate measures’
184 See, extensively, chapter 4.4.4.
185 Ibid.
186 Supra n. 155.
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with respect to persons on board, not specifically to depriving the crew of
the intercepted ship of their liberty.187 It considered French law on the
carrying out of checks at sea not to apply, because the law referred to inter-
national treaties to which Cambodia was not a party.188 Moreover, the Cham-
ber had found the French law to neither make specific provision for depriva-
tion of liberty of the type and duration of that to which the applicants were
subjected.189 And in respect of the diplomatic note concluded between France
and Cambodia, by which Cambodia had agreed to the interception of the
vessel, the Court found the agreement to solely refer to action taken against
the ship itself, not covering the fate of the crew.190 The Court concluded that
none of the relevant provisions referred specifically to depriving the crew of
the intercepted ship of their liberty, that they did not regulate the conditions
of deprivation of liberty on board the ship, that they did not provide for the
possibility for the persons concerned to contact a lawyer or a family member
and did not place the detention under the supervision of a judicial authority.
As obiter dictum, the Court considered that although international treaties do
afford the possibility of concluding regional or bilateral initiatives setting forth
a more clearly defined legal framework for undertaking coercive action,
international efforts to that effect had been lacking in substance.191
The right to liberty is accorded special protection under the European
Convention and not all its substantive and procedural guarantees necessarily
apply to the right to leave. Nonetheless, the ‘lawfulness’ requirement under
the right to leave does require the law to set the grounds and conditions under
which it is permitted to set restrictions on persons crossing borders. The
general issue which rises here is that even though several southern EU Member
States have made provision in their domestic laws for suppressing irregular
migration by sea, also on the high seas or in the territorial waters of third
countries if this is pursuant to agreement with the flag state or coastal state,
they do not appear to set forth on what specific grounds and under what
conditions action may be undertaken against migrants trying to leave another
country.192 Neither do the applicable bilateral arrangements between EU
Member States and third countries put in place a legal framework which sets
forth the specific procedures to be followed in preventing persons from exiting
187 Medvedyev v France (Chamber), paras. 60-61; Medvedyev v France (Grand Chamber), para. 95.
188 Medvedyev v France (Grand Chamber), paras. 90-92.
189 Medvedyev v France (Chamber), para 60.
190 Medvedyev v France (Grand Chamber), paras. 98-100.
191 Medvedyev v France (Grand Chamber), para. 101.
192 For an extensive appraisal of applicable Italian and Spanish legislation to interdiction at
sea, see Di Pascale (2010), p. 283-289 (Italy) and García Andrade (2010), p. 313-316 (Spain).
Also see Rijpma (2009), pp 339-340.
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a country.193 Especially problematic, in this respect, is that most of the bi-
lateral arrangements currently in force and which allow for joint operations
in the territorial waters of third countries are outside the public domain, raising
issues of accessibility and foreseeability. In sum, the legal frameworks currently
applicable to interceptions involving refusing individuals to leave another
country, seem of insufficient quality to meet the requirement that, when human
rights are at issue, the law must set limits to the discretionary power of
states.194
Problems also arise under the requirement of effective remedies. Articles 13 ECRH
and 2 (3) ICCPR require amongst other things that when there is an arguable
claim that a human right is violated, administrative mechanisms must be in
place ensuring that individuals have accessible and effective remedies to
vindicate their rights; that allegations of violations are investigated promptly,
thoroughly and effectively through independent and impartial bodies; and
that states Parties make reparation to individuals whose rights have been
violated.195 The ‘quality of law’ doctrine under the limitation clause of the
right to leave further requires the law to provide for an independent review
to allow alleged victims of human rights violations to vindicate their rights.196
It transpires from the few European cases involving sea interdiction of migrants
which have been brought before a court that domestic laws on effective
remedies do not always allow migrants to challenge their interception and/or
return before an independent authority or court. In the Marine I case, the
Spanish High Court had rejected claims under the Spanish human rights act
lodged by the migrants rescued at the high seas because the incidents com-
plained of were regarded as political acts which were exempted from judicial
prosecution.197 In the case of Hirsi v Italy, concerning the Italian push-back
policy, the migrants, after having been intercepted in international waters,
had been delivered to the Libyan authorities allegedly without having been
granted the opportunity to challenge their return.198 These examples indicate
that EU Member States do not always accept that procedural guarantees implied
in human rights govern their various interdiction policies. Given that certain
193 See, for example, the 2008 Spain-Cape Verde Treaty, n. 14 supra, which speaks only in
general terms of interceptions and visits and does not endow Spain with the explicit
competence to prohibit intercepted migrants from leaving the third country, see Articles 3
and 6.
194 ECtHR 24 April 2008, C.G. a.o. v Bulgaria, no. 1365/07, para. 39.
195 See, extensively, with references to case law, P. Boeles et al, European Migration Law, Ant-
werp: Intersentia (2009), p. 380-384.
196 See, extensively, chapter 4.4.5; and Boeles et al (2009), p. 382 (with references to case law).
197 J.H.A. v Spain (Marine I), para. 6.2. Note that this case concerned a rescue operation.
198 ECtHR 18 November 2009, Exposé des faits et Questions aux Parties, in the case of Hirsi
a.o. v Italy, no. 27765/09 (Communication).
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interdiction measures may very well deny migrants the possibility of leaving
a country, this deficiency is difficult to sustain.
Apart from the requirements of in accordance with law and effective
remedies, further issues under the right to leave may arise under the require-
ments of legitimate aim and necessity and proportionality. These are not further
discussed here.199
6.4.3 The right to liberty at sea
It is not unimaginable that coercive measures taken in respect of migrants at
sea may interfere with their liberty. Similar to the right to leave discussed
above, establishing that interdictions at sea may attract protection under the
right to liberty is particularly relevant in the light of guarantees of procedure
and good administration which must be respected when a state deprives a
person of his liberty. Under Articles 5 ECRH and 9 ICCPR, deprivations of liberty
must be in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, which must be
accessible and foreseeable and must afford legal protection to prevent arbitrary
interferences of the right to liberty. Safeguards relating to the right to liberty
include the informing of the persons who have been detained of their rights,
allowing them to contact a lawyer and to bring them before an appropriate
judicial authority within a reasonable time.200
Although restrictions on liberty may also fall within the ambit of Article
12 (1) ICCPR and Article 2 (1) Protocol No. 4 ECRH securing the right to freely
move within a country and to choose a residence, the references in these
provisions to ‘lawful’ presence within the territory of a state and movement
within ‘the State’s territory’ render it problematic to consider this more general
right to freedom of movement applicable to irregular migrants at sea who are
prevented from crossing borders.201 This section is concerned only with
restrictions on liberty which amount to a deprivation of liberty in the meaning
of Articles 5 ECRH and 9 ICCPR. It first addresses the circumstances under which
sea interdictions can be considered to come within the ambit of the right to
liberty. It next addresses several issues raised by current interdictions practices
under obligations of good administration and procedural guarantees.
With respect to assertions of criminal jurisdiction at sea, such as in the
course of anti-drug trafficking operations, it will normally be beyond dispute
that coercive activity amounting to arrest and detention of suspects on board
a vessel constitutes a deprivation of their liberty in the meaning of Articles 5
199 For some general remarks, see chapter 4.4.5.
200 Eg Medvedyev and Others v France (Grand Chamber), paras. 76-80.
201 On the distinction between restrictions on liberty of movement and deprivations of liberty
see eg ECtHR 6 November 1980, Guzzardi v Italy, no. 7367/76, paras. 92-93; and HRC 18
July 1994, Celepli v Sweden, no. 465/91, para. 6.1.
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ECRH and 9 ICCPR. This is less straightforward in sea interdictions which have
the purpose of preventing irregular migration. Normally, intercepted migrants
are not formally put under arrest, although they may be taken to a detention
facility after arrival in a port. What renders it particularly difficult to draw
a general picture on the relation between the right to liberty and the inter-
diction of migrants at sea is that interdictions take a variety of forms: some
interdictions amount to the mere diversion of migrant vessels without the
boarding of the vessel; some interdictions amount to the taking on board of
the migrants; and others amount to the towing of a vessel still having the
migrants on board. Further, while some interdictions result in the return of
the migrants to a third country against their desire, others may be expressly
welcomed by interdicted migrants, especially those involving an escort to a
EU Member State. Another relevant distinction may be between rescue
operations and operations expressly aimed at undertaking coercive activity
in respect of the vessel and the migrants on board.
The problem of classifying coercive action taken in respect of irregular
migrants at sea as deprivations of liberty is well illustrated by the Australian
MV Tampa case, involving the refusal of the Australian authorities to allow
a group of rescued asylum-seekers to disembark in its territory. After the
Australian trial judge had granted habeas corpus relief to the persons on board
the vessel on account of them having been held in custody on the vessel
contrary to the powers conferred by the Australian Migration Act,202 Austra-
lia’s Federal Court upheld the challenge of the Australian government that
the control asserted over the persons on board was incidental to the executive
power to prevent the entry of non-citizens and that there was no restraint
susceptible to habeas corpus: ‘the actions of the Commonwealth were properly
incidental to preventing the rescuees from landing in Australian territory where
they had no right to go. Their inability to go elsewhere derived from circum-
stances which did not come from any action on the part of the Commonwealth.
The presence of SAS troops on board the MV Tampa did not itself or in
combination with other factors constitute a detention. It was incidental to the
objective of preventing a landing and maintaining as well the security of the
ship. It also served the humanitarian purpose of providing medicine and food
to the rescuees.’203 The dissent maintained, on the other hand, that as a prac-
tical matter ‘the movements of those rescued on the ship were controlled by
officers of the Special Armed Services of the Australian Defence Force and
the rescued people were not allowed to leave the ship except to leave Austra-
lian territorial waters.’204 Accordingly, the dissent considered the asylum-
202 Federal Court of Australia 11 September 2001, Victorian Council for Civil Liberties Incorporated
v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, [2001] FCA 1297.
203 Federal Court of Australia 18 September 2001, Ruddock v Vadarlis, [2001] FCA 1329, para.
213.
204 Ibid, para. 80.
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seekers to have been held in custody unauthorised by law, and that they
therefore should be released on mainland Australia so that they could enjoy
their right to a remedy in an effective way.
It is rather unlikely that the European Court of Human Rights would
concur with the reasoning of Australia’s Federal Court. The gist of the Federal
Court’s argument – that the inability of the migrants to go elsewhere and that
hence the restraint on their liberty could not be attributed to the Common-
wealth – was repudiated by the ECtHR in the case of Amuur v France, on the
question whether the holding of asylum-seekers in the transit zone of an
international airport amounted to a deprivation of liberty.205 After having
posited that the right of Contracting States to control the entry of aliens must
be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, including
Article 5 ECRH, the Court dismissed the French government’s argument that
the transit zone was closed on the French side but not on the outside, so that
the applicants could have returned of their own accord to Syria. Instead, the
Court noted that there was only a theoretical possibility for the asylum-seekers
to leave the transit area and that the circumstances in which they were held
were equivalent in practice to a deprivation of liberty.206 The Court took
account of the considerable duration of their stay (twenty days) and the fact
that they were placed under strict and constant police supervision.207 In so
doing the Court affirmed that the right to control migration does not entail
an unfettered prerogative to subject migrants to coercive measures and that
Article 5 ECRH protects against factual deprivations of liberty irrespective of
whether persons have voluntarily brought themselves within the scope of a
state’s executive power in migration matters.
There is a wealth of case law, especially under Article 5 ECRH, on the material
scope of the deprivation of liberty. It transpires, as a general formula, that in
pronouncing upon a deprivation of liberty, account must be taken of a whole
range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementa-
tion of the measure in question.208 In cases not concerning placement in
prisons or other specialized detention facilities, such as house arrest or com-
pulsory hospitalization, particular relevant factors are the degree of super-
vision, the actual freedom of movement and the possibility to maintain contact
205 ECtHR 25 June 1996, Amuur v France, no. 19776/92.
206 Ibid, paras. 48-49.
207 This may be different however, in a situation where there is a genuine possibility of
traveling elsewhere, see: EComHR 5 April 1993, S.S., A.M. and Y.S.M. v Austria, no. 19066/
91; ECtHR 8 December 2005, Mahdid and Haddar v Austria, no. 74762/01 (both cases concern-
ing asylum-seekers in a transit area at an airport).
208 Eg Guzzardi v Italy, para. 92; Amuur v France, para 42.
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with the outside world.209 A further relevant factor is whether the constrain-
ing measure was taken with a view to protect the person concerned.210 This
latter factor may, in the context of the present chapter, also be of relevance
for rescue operations at sea. As regard the specific situation of placing re-
strictions on liberty of persons on board a ship – where the freedom to move
is necessarily confined to the physical boundaries of the ship and where they
may accordingly not be a particular need for additional constraining meas-
ures – the ECtHR in Medvedyev v France further considered the factor relevant
whether the ship’s course was imposed by the state’s authorities.211
These factors lend themselves for meaningful application in the context of
interdictions of migrants at sea. Especially interdictions which involve the
taking of control of the vessel and which are accompanied with strict police
supervision over the persons on board may well come within the ambit of
the right to liberty.
By way of further illustration of how these criteria are to be applied to
interdiction activity, it is useful to refer to the Marine I case.212 Although the
right to liberty was not expressly at issue in this case, the facts do shed light
on how, deliberately or not, rescue or interception activities may factually
result in migrants being severely restrained in their liberty. The case had
initiated as a rescue operation where a Spanish maritime rescue tug responded
to a distress call of a vessel carrying 369 migrants which had gone adrift in
international waters and which was subsequently towed into the territorial
waters of Mauritania. Instead of being allowed to disembark however, Spanish
Civil Guard personnel took control of the vessel, which remained anchored
off the Mauritanian coast for eight days. The complainant had submitted,
amongst other things, that during that period ‘the migrants were crammed
together below deck, receiving food by means of ropes, and that no medical
personnel was able to provide assistance or board the vessel to ascertain their
state of health.’213 Although the facts of the case do not precisely indicate
the degree of supervision over the migrants and the scope of their freedom
of movement while on board the vessel, the vessel had clearly ceased to be
a mere object of a rescue operation but instead became the object of an
operation of migration control. The presence of security forces on board the
vessel, the prolonged stay of the migrants, the restrictions on contacts with
209 ECtHR 28 November 2002, Lavents v Latvia, no. 58442/00, paras. 63; ECtHR 26 February
2002, H.M. v Switzerland, no. 39187/98, paras. 44-48; ECtHR 28 May 1985, Ashingdane v
United Kingdom, no. 8225/78, para. 42. See, in the context of the Article 9 ICCPR, and with
references to views of the HRC, S. Joseph et al, The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Cases, Commentary and Materials, Oxford University Press, 2nd Edition (2004) p. 307-
308.
210 H.M. v Switzerland, para. 44.
211 Medvedyev v France (Grand Chamber), para. 74.
212 J.H.A. v Spain (Marine I). Also see den Heijer and Wouters (2010).
213 Ibid, para. 5.2.
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NGO personnel and the taking of control over the vessel including the setting
of its course, support a conclusion that the situation on board did amount to
a deprivation of liberty; and that, as such, the confinement of the migrants
on board the vessel constituted a mere prelude to their placement in a re-
ception facility on the mainland of Mauritania, of which it was not disputed
that it amounted to a deprivation of liberty.214 In these circumstances, the
Spanish government’s argument that the operation had only amounted to a
humanitarian operation which did not attract human rights obligations is
difficult to maintain.215
The significance of concluding that migrant interdictions can amount to
a deprivation of liberty primarily lies with the concomitant rule that depriva-
tions of liberty must be accompanied with norms of good administration and
procedural guarantees. It is not necessary to repeat here the issues which were
noted in respect of the requirements of ‘in accordance with law’ and ‘effective
remedies’ under the right to leave in the section above. In the specific context
of the requirement of lawfulness under Article 5(1) ECRH, the ECtHR requires
the law to not only set forth the precise circumstances under which depriva-
tions of liberty are permitted, but also to set limits as regards the duration
of detention, to provide for legal and humanitarian assistance, and to allow
for judicial review.216 The general problem identified in respect of the require-
ment of ‘lawfulness’ under the right to leave which also raises under the right
to liberty is that the domestic laws of EU Member States and bilateral agree-
ments with third countries are often lacking in circumscribing the state’s power
to deprive migrants who are outside its territory of their liberty.217 Neither
do international conventions of a general nature expressly regulate the subject
of detention of migrants on the high seas. Although international maritime
law does allow for the boarding and search of vessels that are without national-
ity and/or engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea,218 it does not make
specific provisions for deprivation of liberty of improperly documented
migrants found on board such vessels.219 As noted in chapter 5, Council De-
cision 2010/252/EU has neither succeeded in supplementing powers of inter-
ception, seizure of the ship, apprehension of persons on board and the conduct-
ing of the ship or persons on board to another country with procedural guar-
antees, a right to judicial review or other norms of good administration.
214 Ibid, para. 4.3.
215 Ibid, paras. 4.3, 6.2.
216 Amuur v France, paras. 50, 53.
217 Supra n. 192 and accompanying text.
218 Article 110 UNCLOS; Article 8 Migrants Smuggling Protocol. Also see chapter 6.3.1.3-6.3.1.4.
219 Cf. Medvedyev v France (Grand Chamber), paras. 87-89, 101.
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6.5 ISSUES OF ATTRIBUTION AND ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
The previous sections examined in what manner sea interdictions may conflict
with obligations of states under human rights law. A preliminary condition
for establishing the international responsibility of states for wrongful conduct
is that the interdiction activity must be attributable to the state or on some
other account attract the state’s international responsibility.220 This require-
ment warrants special scrutiny in the context of joint operations of sea border
control, where multiple actors are involved in the interdiction of migrants,
in particular joint operations of EU Member States under the coordination of
Frontex and joint operations of EU Member States and third countries along
the shiprider model.
The Frontex / RABIT model
The Frontex Regulation, as amended by the RABIT Regulation, lays down
specific rules on civil and criminal liability for acts committed by guest
officers.221 These rules are only binding as between the Member States and
do not prejudice claims brought by a national of a third state.222 Moreover,
they only relate to claims for damages or criminal offences and do not touch
specifically upon human rights claims.
It follows that, outside the context of inter-Member State claims, attribution
of particular activity of a guest officer to either the host or the home Member
State depends on the general rules of attribution discussed in chapter 3 of this
book and in particular the rule on attributing conduct of a state organ to the
state at whose disposal it is placed.223 For such attribution it is necessary
not only that an organ or officer of a state acts on behalf of another state, but
it must also be placed within the command structure of the other state and
be subject to that state’s instructions. Especially Article 10 of the amended
Frontex Regulation, laying down the tasks and powers of guest officers is
instructive in this regard. Article 10 (3) specifies that ‘guest officers may only
perform tasks and exercise powers under instructions from and, as a general
rule, in the presence of border guards of the host Member State’. Article 10(10)
220 See, extensively, chapter 3.
221 Articles 10b and 10c Regulation 2007/2004. Article 10b appoints civil liability for damages
incurred by acts of guest officers to the host Member State; Article 10c lays down that guest
officers are treated the same way as officials of the host Member State with regard to
criminal offences committed by or against them. Guest officers are border guards of other
Member States than the Member States hosting the operation, Article 1a (6) Regulation
2007/2004. The rules on civil and criminal liability, together with the further specification
of tasks and powers of guest officers and division of competences between Member States
and Frontex, discussed hereunder, were introduced in the Frontex Regulation pursuant
to Article 12 of the RABIT Regulation (863/2007).
222 This follows from the pacta tertiis rule codified in Article 34 VCLT and is implicitly recog-
nized under Article 10b (3) and (5) Regulation 2007/2004.
223 See chapter 3.2.3.
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specifies further that refusals of entry in the meaning of the Schengen Borders
Code shall be taken only by border guards of the host Member State.224
Article 10(2) lays down that guest officers shall comply with Community law
and the national law of the host Member State. The only activities requiring
specific authorization of the home Member State are the carrying of weapons
and the use of force in the exercise of their powers.225 Although the Frontex
Agency is involved in the practical organization of joint operations and the
drawing up of operational plans,226 it has no specific power of instruction
as regards the manner in which interdictions are conducted.227
Presuming that Frontex operations comply with this model, i.e. that inter-
dictions are only carried out on instructions of the host Member State and
in compliance with the laws of the host Member State, it would seem in
accordance with the Law on State Responsibility to attribute possible wrong-
doings ensuing from activities of guest officers to the host Member State. This
does, however, not always mean that the home Member State is discharged
of its own obligations under human rights law. Home Member States have
the discretion to decide upon participation in Frontex operations and thus
wield ultimate influence over the deployment of their officers.228 They may
be presumed, further, to be well aware of activity undertaken by their officers.
On that account, and depending on the circumstances, home Member States
may be under a positive duty to make use of material opportunities to prevent
their officers from being engaged in possible wrongdoings, for example by
refusing or terminating their participation.229
The shiprider model
A notorious problem with pronouncing on the international responsibility for
possible international wrongs committed by EU Member States in the course
224 This raises the further question of whether this also applies to decisions as to the stopping,
boarding and searching of a vessel, the seizure of the vessel and apprehension of those
on board, and the return of the ship and persons on board to a third country as now laid
down in Council Decision 2010/252/EU, Annex, Part I, para. 2.4.; see the discussion in
chapter 5.3.2.1.
225 Articles 10(5)(6) Regulation 2007/2004.
226 See inter alia Articles 3, 8e Regulation 2007/2004.
227 With regard to Rapid Border Intervention Teams, the RABIT Regulation does foresee in
a closer involvement of the Frontex Agency, but it merely specifies that the host Member
State shall take the ‘views’ of the Frontex coordinating officers ‘into consideration’; Article
5(2) Regulation 863/2007. The proposal for recasting the Frontex Regulation foresees in
a similar provision for other Frontex operations, COM(2010) 61 final, Article 3(c)(2).
228 But see article 8d (8) ‘shall make border guards available’. Also see COM(2010) 61 final,
Article 3(b)(3).
229 For a general discussion on the circumstances giving rise to such duties, see chapters 3.2.2.4
(positive obligations). Note that the ‘jurisdiction’ requirement may render it problematic
to construe potential victims of human rights violations as being within the personal scope
of the home Member State’s (postive) human rights obligations, see chapter 2.5.3.
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of joint patrols with and pursuant to agreements with third countries is the
lack of accurate information on the relevant legal arrangements and their
manner of implementation. This section will, for reasons of expedience,
primarily refer to the terms of the Spain-Cape Verdean Treaty.230
That treaty foresees in joint maritime patrols, with Spain deploying air
and naval assets in Cape Verdean maritime areas. These assets remain under
Spanish command and Spain is competent to decide upon matters of flight
and navigation.231 At least one coast guard officer of the Cape Verde must
be present on board Spanish ships and aircraft.232 Interceptions, visits and
arrests can only be made by the Cape Verdean authorities or under their
direction.233 It appears that this model is also followed in the context of the
joint patrols Spain conducts with other third countries, notably Mauritania
and Senegal.234
One difference of potential crucial nature between this shiprider model
and the Frontex operations discussed above is that Spanish officers are not
placed within the command structure of the host state (Cape Verde), rendering
it difficult to consider them as having been put at the disposal of another
state.235 Rather, as long as host and guest officers function within their own
state machinery, acts committed by them are properly attributable to their
own state, or may in particular situations be labeled as ‘joint acts’, engaging
the responsibility of both states involved.236
The agreement between Spain and Cape Verde speaks of coercive measures
which are either carried out by Cape Verde or carried out by Spain but under
the direction of Cape Verde. As regards the situation of direction, both Spain
and Cape Verde will normally incur responsibility for ensuing conduct which
is unlawful. This situation is specifically governed by Article 17 of the ILC
Articles on State Responsibility, according to which the directing state incurs
responsibility on account of it having directed or controlled the wrongful act
in question. But this does not diminish the responsibility of the directed state
for having itself committed a wrongful act.237 The directed state would then
be under the obligation to decline to comply with the instruction.238
Alternatively, where officers of the host state are engaged in wrongful
activity, it will depend on the involvement of guest officers with the wrongful
conduct whether the guest state can incur either derived responsibility for
having facilitated the act in question or for having failed in discharging a
230 Supra n. 14.
231 Article 6 (4).
232 Articles 3(1)(b), 6(4).
233 Article 6(5).
234 Supra n. 16.
235 See chapter 3.2.3.
236 See chapter 3.2.4.1.
237 ILC Yearbook 2001-II, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 69 (at 9).
238 Ibid.
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positive duty to take measures within its power to prevent wrongdoings from
occurring.239 In general, for such responsibility to arise, it is required that
the facilitating state has knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful
act.240 This may be a potent threshold in the context of sea interdictions, as
it will often be uncertain to what exact treatment interdicted migrants will
be subjected. On the other hand, it is not impossible to imagine situations
where a EU Member State would facilitate the interdiction of migrants by the
authorities of a third country in the knowledge that those authorities commonly
place irregular migrants in detention facilities where maltreatment systematical-
ly occurs, where detention can be prolonged indefinitely and where refugee
claims are not examined. The problem with such a reasoning remains nonethe-
less, that it may be hard to identify a connection of sufficiently close nature
between the interdicted migrant and the facilitating state, raising issues under
both the victim-requirement and that of ‘jurisdiction’ under human rights
treaties.241
6.6 FINAL REMARKS
Few areas in migration law are so contested and legally complex as the inter-
diction of migrants at sea. From an international law perspective, the legality
of migrant interdiction at sea depends on an assessment of i) the competences
of states under the Law of the Sea to interdict migrant vessels and ii) the limits
set by human rights law to the treatment of the migrants found on the vessel.
The chapter has observed that in several respects, EU Member States have
tended to interpret competences under the Law of the Sea extensively, while
they have interpreted requirements of human rights law restrictively.
For sea interdictions to be carried out in conformity with human rights
standards, Member States will, either unilaterally, in the context of arrange-
ments with third countries or on the level of the European Union, have to
develop a meaningful human rights strategy which supplements and restrains
the policy of sea interdiction. The chapter has argued that this not only implies
the formulation of procedures to be followed in respect of asylum-seekers at
sea. Current European interdiction practices attract a wider range of human
rights concerns, and may also interfere with the right to liberty and the right
of persons to leave any country, including their own.
The development of such a human rights framework is controversial, as
it transgresses the very idea that pre-border controls and other extraterritorial
coercive measures take place outside the realm of refugee and other human
rights concerns. A key rationale underlying many of the current interdiction
239 Chapters 2.5.3, 3.2.2.4, 3.3.2.
240 Ibid.
241 Chapters 2.5.2-2.5.3.
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strategies is that they would prevent the migrants from making ‘contact’ with
the domestic jurisdictions of Member States and therewith the concomitant
domestic procedures and legal safeguards.
But this rationale constitutes an affront to the law on human rights. Inter-
dictions carried out at sea, and especially those involving the taking of coercive
activity, must in one way or the other be incorporated into the state’s domestic
immigration policy, by setting forth the grounds, conditions and safeguards
for undertaking interdiction measures. This may ultimately imply that parti-
cular interdiction strategies need to be fundamentally reconsidered. The key
argument of this chapter has however not been to posit that pre-border inter-
dictions are necessarily at variance with human rights or that they should be
abandoned altogether. The salient point, rather, is that European states cannot
simply pretend that their policies do not entertain human rights concerns; and
that, therefore, their policies must be embedded in a legal framework affording
migrants inter alia access to a proper and fair status determination procedure,
access to effective judicial oversight and adequate safeguards in relation to
detention. The alternative would be the coming into being of an area outside
the realm of the law, where migrants would enjoy no protection whatsoever,
and where states could go forth and seize persons to their utter discretion.
Although it is increasingly acknowledged on the level of the European
Union that procedural standards for maritime migrant interdictions need to
be agreed upon, attempts to incorporate Member State practices into the
Schengen regime on border crossings have as of yet not resulted in the laying
down of a framework of procedural guarantees safeguarding against human
rights violations and the provision of appropriate remedies. The recently
adopted Council Decision for maritime Frontex operations sets forth a large
variety of interception measures to be taken against vessels suspected of
intending to circumvent border checks, but, apart from a general reference
to fundamental rights and the prohibition of refoulement, does not lay down
the precise procedures to be followed or safeguards to be respected when
apprehending migrants, refusing them further passage or returning them to
a third country. Hence, the Decision not only departs from the ordinary
standards on border checks and refusals of entry laid down in the Schengen
Borders Code as concluded in chapter 5, it neither provides detailed guidance
on the appropriate respect for human rights. Further, the Decision arguably
overstretches the competences of states to undertake coercive action in respect




The relocation of asylum-seekers to an external processing facility for the
determination of their status can be regarded as the culminating idea of
external migration control. By locating protection and asylum processing
outside the state of refuge, policies of external reception represent a funda-
mental shift from the traditional paradigm that asylum is granted inside the
state’s territory. Instead, asylum-seekers are granted a temporary safe haven
in a foreign location, allowing for the determination of their status and the
arrangement of more durable solutions. Those found eligible for protection
may either be resettled into the state of refuge or are removed to a safe third
country. Others, it is assumed, ought to be repatriated to their country of
origin. The rationales for external processing may consist of discouraging abuse
of territorial protection regimes, of avoiding legal obligations pertaining to
those who present themselves at the state’s border, of the provision of a
temporary safe haven until the circumstances in the country of origin have
changed, or to reduce costs in the reception of asylum-seekers.1 External
processing is further perceived as the ultimate means of preserving the state’s
sovereign prerogative to control the entrance of aliens. Or, as Australian Prime
Minister Howard stated in support of Australia’s Pacific Strategy: ‘We will
decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come.’2
Within the refugee advocacy, the external processing and protection of
refugees has raised a multitude of concerns, especially as regards the use of
detention as a necessary auxiliary instrument and the lack of safeguards against
the onward removal to potentially unsafe countries.3 On a more fundamental
1 United Kingdom Home Office, ‘New International Approaches to Asylum Processing and
Protection’, reproduced in: House of Lords European Union Committee – Eleventh Report,
‘Handling EU asylum claims: new approaches examined’, 30 April 2004, Appendix 5
(hereafter ‘A New Vision for Refugees’); K.F. Afeef, ‘The Politics of Extraterritorial Process-
ing: Offshore Asylum Policies in Europe and the Pacific’, Oxford: Refugees Studies Centre
Working Paper No. 36, October 2006.
2 ABC Lateline 21 November 2001, ‘Liberals accused of trying to rewrite history’.
3 Amnesty International, ‘Australia/Pacific: The ‘Pacific Solution’ – Offending Human
Dignity’, 26 August 2002, AI Index: ASA 12/009/2002; Amnesty International, ‘Unlawful
and Unworkable: Extraterritorial Processing of Asylum Claims’, 17 June 2003, AI Index:
IOR 61/004/2003; Human Rights Watch, ‘An Unjust ‘Vision’ for Europe’s Refugees’ (Briefing
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note, it is feared that schemes of external protection may render refugees
‘beyond the domain of justice’ and create ‘rights-free zones’ where neither
domestic or international legal obligations apply.4 The danger of the coming
into being of a lawless area is seen to be augmented by the remote location
of external facilities, making the processing less visible, transparent and access-
ible to public scrutiny.5
But, scholars have also submitted that states are not as such barred under
international law from conceiving creative protection alternatives.6 And in
line with UNHCR’s strategy of enhancing protection capacities in regions of
origin, some academics have welcomed regional protection options as provid-
ing safe alternatives to unsafe routes of escape and as contributing to lasting
solutions for the overwhelming majority of refugees who are not able to flee
beyond their own region.7 A variation to this argument is that the establish-
ment of processing or reception centres in transit countries could provide a
viable alternative for the protection of refugees who are refused further travel
in the course of pre-border enforcement measures, including for those who
are subjected to checking procedures at foreign airports or those who are
interdicted at sea, as discussed in chapters 5 and 6.
External processing can take a variety of forms. In general, a distinction can
be made between protection in regions of origin (or regional protection pro-
grammes8) and the external processing of asylum-seekers in transit countries.
The former sees primarily to the enhancement of protection capacities in
regions of origin, by increasing the capacities of state actors, non-state actors
and international organiSations as the UNHCR; by contributing to resettlement;
Paper), 17 June 2003; Human Rights Watch, ‘Not For Export’: Why the International
Community should Reject Australia’s Refugee Policies’ (Briefing Paper), September 2002.
4 G. Noll, ‘Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit Process-
ing Centres and Protection Zones’, 5 EJML (2003), p. 338; H.H. Koh, ‘America’s Offshore
Refugee Camps’, 29 University of Richmond Law Review (1994), p. 141.
5 Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘2009 Immigration detention and offshore processing
on Christmas Island’ (Report), 2009, part C. introduction.
6 J.C. Hathaway, ‘The False Panacea of Offshore Deterrence’, 26 Forced Migration Review (2006),
p. 56-57; G.S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Extraterritorial Processing of Claims to Asylum or Pro-
tection: The Legal Responsibilities of States and International Organisations’, in: S. Blay,
J. Burn and P. Keyzer (eds), Offshore Processing of Asylum-seekers: The Search for Legitimate
Parameters, Broadway: Halstead Press (2008), p. 40. Also see UNHCR, ‘Migration Amend-
ment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill. Submission of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee’, 22 May 2006, para. 16.
7 Ibid; Also see N. El-Enany, ‘Who is the New European Refugee?’, LSE Legal Studies
Working Paper No. 19/2007, December 2007, p. 1-2.
8 See extensively chapter 5.2.3.
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and by contributing to prospects of local integration.9 It has also been sug-
gested that regional protection areas could be used for the return of failed
asylum-seekers.10 The external processing in transit countries is generally
proposed as an alternative to reception within the state of refuge; as a location
where temporary protection can be provided; where claims are processed; and
from where resettlement or repatriation can be arranged.
In view of the fact that protection programmes in regions of origin remain
scarcely developed and are often not proposed as entailing the direct involve-
ment of EU Member States nor the explicit restriction of rights of migrants in
the sphere of entry and residence,11 the current chapter deals only with
programmes of external processing involving the interception and transfer
of asylum-seekers and their subsequent status determination and resettlement
or repatriation. In the absence of presently functioning European policies of
external processing, the chapter will take as its background the two most
pertinent non-European experiences of external processing: the programmes
developed by the governments of Australia and the United States. These non-
European precedents are then transposed into the European legal framework,
by assessing to what extent those programmes correspond with the human
rights norms binding the EU Member States. From this assessment, conclusions
are drawn as to the legal feasibility of the possible future creation of pro-
grammes of external processing in the European context.
Although the idea of external processing has especially attracted attention
in refugee law discourse, the material focus of the chapter extends beyond
the typical rights associated with refugees. Indeed, programmes for the external
processing of asylum-seekers may or may not increase a risk of refoulement.
In itself, the very decision to institute a policy of external processing constitutes
a recognition, in law or as a matter of policy, that rights of refugees should
be respected and that, to that end, an assessment of the protection status of
claimants should be made before a decision on resettlement or repatriation
is taken. It would follow that external processing not necessarily constitutes
an affront to international refugee law. This conclusion is subscribed by several
authors who, commenting upon specific aspects of the past US and Australian
offshore policies, have observed that the operations paid due respect for the
prohibition of refoulement.12
9 A New Vision for Refugees, para. 1; European Commission Communication, ‘On the
Managed Entry in the EU of Persons in Need of International Protection and the Enhance-
ment of the Protection Capacity of the Regions of Origin: “Improving Access to Durable
Solutions”’, 4 June 2004, COM(2004)410 final.
10 A New Vision for Refugees, para. 1 (iv).
11 See, in the EU context, chapter 5.2.3.
12 C.M.J. Bostock, ‘The International Legal Obligations owed to the Asylum-seekers on the
MV Tampa’, 14 IJRL (2002), p. 288; E. Willheim, ‘MV Tampa: The Australian Response’,
15 IJRL (2003), p. 172-176.
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This does however not diminish the validity of concerns raised by others
on alleged non-conformity of the US and Australian offshore programmes with
the prohibition of refoulement.13 These concerns however, do not appear to
touch upon the concept of external processing as such, but rather originate
from a lack of guarantees accompanying the external process, rendering it
impossible, for example, to challenge decisions on the transfer to an offshore
facility, status determination, or eventual removal from the facility.
In taking the US and American policies as background, the present chapter
takes a more holistic perspective on the phenomenon of external processing.
It focuses not on the detailed execution of the policies and their conformity
with the wide variety of human rights which may indeed be at stake. Rather,
it examines the legal validity of the two arguably most intrinsic components
of external processing: that of both procedurally and physically containing a
specific group of migrants. Within this analysis, the question of possible
refoulement is taken as part of the broader issue of granting unauthorized
arrivals access to a system of substantive and procedural safeguards capable
of ensuring human rights and guaranteeing against the arbitrary exercise of
state power. Under the question of physical containment, the general issue arises
whether it is permissible to mandatorily and systematically detain a specific
category of migrants. This question not only involves the legality of external
detention as an instrument of migration policy, but also the cognate issues
of terminating detention and the provision of prospects for detained persons
in the sphere of entry, resettlement or repatriation.
The chapter submits that the physical and procedural ‘containment’ of asylum-
seekers raises a number of key human rights issues which have not been
satisfactorily addressed in the Australian and United States’ offshore processing
programmes. Apart from a system which does not secure essential require-
ments of the rule of law (especially obstacles in the sphere of judicial review
and an insufficient level of guarantees against arbitrary human rights inter-
ferences), the Achilles’ heel of previously employed external processing lies
in the absence of meaningful and lasting solutions for persons being processed
in an extraterritorial facility. The chapter will conclude that, in order to be
legally viable, and to provide meaningful prospects for refugees and failed
claimants alike, programmes of external processing should be embedded in
a broader framework addressing the crucial questions of entry, resettlement
or repatriation.
13 Eg A. Francis, ‘Bringing Protection Home: Healing the Schism Between International
Obligations and National Safeguards Created by Extraterritorial Processing’, 20 IJRL (2008),
p. 283-292; S. Legomsky, ‘The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Program’, 18 IJRL (2006),
p. 680 et seq; Australian Human Rights Commission (2009), para. 8.2.
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7.2 THE LOGIC OF EXTERNAL CONTAINMENT UNDER US AND AUSTRALIAN
PRACTICES
7.2.1 The US offshore programme
The United States Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, situated on a strip of
land leased from Cuba on a permanent basis, has been used at various points
to house migrants and refugees, predominantly Cubans and Haitians in the
1990s. The Naval Station remains in use today to accommodate small numbers
of migrants who have a possibly valid refugee claim and it is retained as a
contingency facility for future large scale migration crises.
The base was first opened for migrants in November 1991, when United
States Coast Guard cutters were becoming severely overcrowded by intercepted
Haitians who had fled their country after the ousting of President Aristide
in September that year.14 Reluctant to proceed with the standing policy of
forcibly returning Haitians boat migrants to their home country and failing
to secure options for their reception in third countries in the region, the US
administration opened a camp at the Naval Station, where the migrants were
pre-screened for possible asylum in the United States. Over the following
eighteen months, more than 36.000 Haitian refugees were processed in Guan-
tánamo Bay, with 10.000 screened in and allowed entry into the United States,
while the remainder were repatriated to Haiti. A smaller number of refugees
who were infected with the HIV virus were initially barred from entering the
United States, and only brought to US territory under the Clinton administra-
tion in June 1993, after a federal judge had ordered the closure of the facility.15
The policy of temporarily harboring Haitians in Guantánamo Bay had at that
time already been reversed as a consequence of the Kennebunktport Order
of May 1992, issued after a renewed surge of Haitian boat migrants threatened
to overburden the Guantanámo Bay facility, and according to which the US
Coast Guard was to immediately return all intercepted migrants to Haiti
without the conducting of refugee interviews.16
The migrant facility in Guantánamo Bay was reopened in July 1994, when
violence had broken out again in Haiti and when President Clinton bowed
to the pressure to abandon the no-screening return policy. The new offshore
programme entailed the bringing of all Haitians expressing a fear of per-
secution to a location in the region where they would be processed as potential
14 For an extensive historical account, eg R.E. Wasem, Congressional Research Service, ‘U.S.
Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants’, CRS Report for Congress, 31 March 2010; S.
Ignatius, ‘Haitian Asylum-Seekers: Their Treatment as a Measure of the INS Asylum Officer
Corps’, 7 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal (1993), p. 119-125; H.H. Koh, ‘America’s
Offshore Refugee Camps’, 29 University of Richmond Law Review (1994), p. 139-173.
15 H.H. Koh (1994), p. 143-151; N. White, ‘The Tragic Plight of HIV-Infected Haitian Refugees
at Guantánamo Bay’, 28 Liverpool Law Review (2007), p. 249-269.
16 See also chapter 6.4.1.
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refugees. Those found to be a refugee were not granted the opportunity of
obtaining asylum in the United States, but should instead be resettled in a
third country. To this end, the US entered into agreements allowing for the
opening of other reception centers across the Caribbean, including in Jamaica
and the Turks and Caicos Islands.17 The large majority of the Haitian migrants
held in Guantánamo could however, after the return of President Aristide in
October 1994, be gradually repatriated to Haiti under the consideration that
the country had become safe.
In August 1994, the US government had decided to use the Guantánamo
Bay facility also for a sudden surge of Cubans trying to migrate to the US by
boat, thereby reversing the three-decade long US policy of welcoming Cubans
fleeing from Fidel Castro’s regime. The decision constituted a response to the
announcement of Fidel Castro that he would no longer prevent Cubans from
leaving Cuba, prompting over 30.000 Cubans to exit their country in small
and often unseaworthy boats. As with the Haitians, those Cubans found to
be refugees were not allowed to apply for asylum in the United States but
ought to be resettled in third countries in the region.18 In total, 28.000 Cubans
were granted temporary refuge in Guantánamo Bay. A further 9.000 migrants
were brought to a US military facility in Panama.19
After signing an agreement with Cuba, on 2 May 1995, the Clinton admin-
istration reversed its previous position of not allowing the detained migrants
entry into US territory by announcing that most of the Cubans at Guantánamo
Bay would be transferred to the United States and that in the future, those
Cubans intercepted at sea would immediately be repatriated to Cuba. This
policy shift was partly instigated by the high costs incurred for operating the
migrant facility at Guantánamo Bay and by concerns voiced by government
officials over the unfavorable conditions within the facility.20 Further, the
promise of the Cuban government to not only take effective measures to
prevent future unsafe departures but also to allow the repatriation of Cubans
intercepted at sea removed the necessity of retaining the Guantánamo Bay
facility as a deterrent for future Cuban migrants. The new policy on Cuban
migrants, which remains in force until today, did provide Cubans the possibil-
ity of applying for asylum when intercepted at sea. After a preliminary refugee
screening at sea, possible Cuban refugees are subsequently transferred to
Guantánamo Bay, until a third country can be found for their resettlement.21
According to a congressional report, from May 1995 through July 2003, about
17 Koh (1994), p. 154; Wasem (2010), p. 5; Legomsky (2003), p. 681.
18 Koh (1994), p. 154-155; M.E. Sartori, ‘The Cuban Migration Dilemma: an Examination of
the United States’ Policy of Temporary Protection in Offshore Safe Havens’, 15 Georgetown
Immigration Law Journal (2001), p. 328-329.
19 Sartori (2001), p. 331.
20 Ibid, p. 349-350.
21 Ibid, p. 352.
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170 Cuban refugees were resettled in 11 different countries, including Spain,
Venezuela, Australia and Nicaragua.22
Since the large scale exoduses of Haitians and Cubans in the mid-1990s,
Guantánamo Bay has been in permanent use for the accommodation of smaller
groups of migrants interdicted in the Caribbean. In 2002, President G.W. Bush
issued a decree granting the Attorney General the power to maintain custody
over and to screen undocumented aliens interdicted in the Caribbean region
in the Guantánamo Naval Base or another appropriate facility.23 The decree
specified that aliens determined not to be persons in need of protection should
be held in custody until such a time as they are returned to a country of origin
or transit and that the US government shall execute a process for resettlement
in third countries of persons identified as in need of protection. Since 2003,
migrants are being held in the Migrants Operations Centre, operated by the
private company GEO Group, which has a capacity of 130 migrants but typically
keeps fewer than 30 people.24 It was used again for the temporary protection
of Haitian refugees from 2004 onwards, when violence had resurfaced in Haiti
and when President G.W. Bush decided to re-install the policy of summary
returns to Haiti, except for those migrants who had indicated a need for
protection and who passed a subsequent on board pre-screening refugee
interview.25 In 2005, only nine of 1.850 interdicted Haitians were transferred
to Guantánamo Bay and only one of those was found to be a refugee.26 The
center is further retained as a contingency facility for a future large scale
migration crisis. In 1999, the US government had considered the naval base
at Guantánamo Bay as a temporary safe haven for approximately 20.000
refugees from Kosovo, but eventually abandoned the idea.27 In the beginning
of 2010, the US government also initiated plans to use the Guantánamo Naval
Base in the event of a sudden outflow of Haitians in the aftermath of the Haiti
earthquake.28
22 R.E. Wasem, Congressional research Service, ‘Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy
and Trends’, CRS Report for Congress, 2 June 2009.
23 Executive Order 13276 of 15 November 2002, ‘Delegation of Responsibilities Concerning
Undocumented Aliens Interdicted or Intercepted in the Caribbean Region’.
24 GEO group, http://www.thegeogroupinc.com.
25 Legomsky (2006), p. 682, Wasem (2010), p. 5. Frelick has described the on-board refugee
screening process as involving a ‘shout test’ under which ‘only those who wave their hands,
jump up and down and shout the loudest are afforded a shipboard refugee pre-screening
interview’: B. Frelick, ‘“Abundantly Clear: Refoulement”’, 19 Georgetown Immigration Law
Journal (2004), p. 246.
26 Wasem (2010), p. 5.
27 The New York Times 6 April 1999, ‘Crisis in the Balkans: The Haven; U.S. Chooses Guan-
tánamo Bay Base in Cuba for Refugee Site’.
28 Fox News 15 January 2010, ‘U.S. Suspends Haitian Deportations as Florida Prepares for
Migration From Quake Zone’.
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7.2.2 Australia’s excised territories and offshore processing
Australia’s offshore programme for intercepted asylum-seekers, officially
known as the Pacific Strategy but colloquially known as the Pacific Solution,
was installed in the aftermath of the 2001 Tampa-incident, discussed in chapter
6, and constituted a validation and consolidation of the actions taken by the
Australian government in respect of the boat people found on the MV Tampa.
Although the offshore processing centre on the Pacific island state of Nauru
was closed in the beginning of 2008, the Australian government has continued
a policy of excluding boat arrivals from the ordinary terms of the Australian
Migration Act and to process them instead in a facility on Christmas Island,
one of Australia’s overseas territories.
Under the Pacific Solution, a legislative scheme was put in place allowing
for the transfer of unauthorized boat arrivals from September 2001 onwards
to Nauru and Manus Island, Papua New Guinea. In accordance with memo-
randa of understanding signed with Nauru and Papua New Guinea, offshore
processing facilities were established on the two islands on 19 September 2001
and 21 October 2001, providing for the accommodation of up to 1.200 persons
in Nauru and 1.000 in Papua New Guinea.29 In return, the governments of
Nauru and Papua New Guinea were offered financial arrangements.30 The
processing centre in Manus Island was in use for a relatively short period and
closed in July 2003, although it was retained as a contingency facility.31 The
facility in Nauru remained in use until 8 February 2008, when a final group
of 21 Sri Lankans, found to be refugees, were resettled in Australia as part
of the humanitarian resettlement program. In total, 1.637 persons were pro-
cessed in the Nauru and Manus facilities, of which the majority had the
nationality of Iraq or Afghanistan.32
Persons found to be a refugee in the offshore processing centers were not
legally entitled to enter Australia, but places in third countries were sought
for their resettlement. These efforts were only partly successful, with New
Zealand being the only country which was prepared to accept a substantial
number of refugees. Out of the 1.637 persons brought to Nauru and Manus,
1.153 were found to be refugees.33 New Zealand allowed for the resettlement
of 360 persons and smaller numbers were accepted by Canada, Sweden,
29 Parliament of Australia, Report of the Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime
Incident, 23 October 2002, paras. 10.33-10.38, 10.51-10.61.
30 Ibid.
31 S. Taylor, ‘Australia’s Pacific Solution Mark II: The Lessons to be Learned’, in: S. Blay, Burn
and Keyzer (2008), p. 107
32 Senator Chris Evans, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, ‘Last refugees leave Nauru’,
press release 8 February 2008; Parliament of Australia Background Note, ‘Boat arrivals in
Australia since 1976’, 25 June 2009, p. 13-16.
33 Ibid.
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Denmark and Norway.34 The remainder were eventually taken to Australia
on temporary visas.35
In December 2007, the new Rudd government made the decision to close the
detention facility on Nauru and to resettle the remaining detainees on mainland
Australia. The new government did not however fundamentally depart from
the system of excluding unauthorized boat arrivals from the ordinary migration
regime. The legislative arrangements pertaining to Australia’s excised territories
and the special status of offshore entry persons remained in place, but instead
of bringing these persons to centers in ‘declared countries’, the new arrange-
ment provided for the bringing of all unauthorized boat arrivals to a newly
built facility on Australia’s Christmas Island, opened in December 2008, where
they are held in immigration detention until they have been granted a visa
or are removed from Australia.36 Originally, the new centre had a capacity
to house 800, but this was rapidly increased to 2040 in early 2010.37 The
official capacity was nonetheless exceeded for the first time in April 2010.38
Refugee claims on Christmas Island are not tested within the framework
of Australia’s Migration Act, but directly against the Refugee Convention.
Those determined to be a refugee are not legally entitled to enter Australia,
although in practice, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship will ‘lift
the bar’ on making a valid visa application for all persons found to be a
refugee, enabling them to enter into mainland Australia.39 Those not found
to entertain Australia’s international protection obligations are subject to
removal from Australia in accordance with the ordinary provisions of the
Migration Act and removed as soon as practicable.
In July 2010, the new Australian Prime Minister Gillard announced plans
to create a regional processing centre in East Timor for the status determination
of persons intercepted en route by boat to Australia.40 These plans are not
further discussed here.
34 The Senate, Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Commonwealth of Australia,
‘Provisions of the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006’
(Report), June 2006, para. 3.90.
35 Ibid.
36 M. Grewcock, ‘Systems of Exclusion: The Rudd Government and the ‘End’ of the Pacific
Solution’, 19 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 2007-2008, p. 364. Australian Human Rights
Commission (2009), part C. introduction.
37 ABC News 7 March 2010, ‘Rudd shoots down detention centre report’.
38 The Australian 2 April 2010, ‘Capacity exceeded on Christmas Island with 138 new arrivals’.
39 Australian Human Rights Commission (2009), para. 7.
40 BBC News 6 July 2010, ‘Australian PM Gillard plans E Timor asylum centre’; The Age 6
July 2010, ‘Gillard Timor policy ‘responds to xenophobia’’.
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7.3 THE FEASIBILITY OF PROCEDURAL CONTAINMENT
The US and Australian policies of offshore processing are both premised on
a system whereby detained persons are barred from invoking domestic migra-
tion legislation and from accessing courts. This logic of procedurally containing
a specific group of migrants coincides with a substantial degree of executive
discretion over the status and detention of migrants held in an offshore facility.
In the context of the US offshore programme, the excluding of migrants
held at Guantánamo Bay from statutory protection was made possible by a
series of executive decisions and the confirmation of their legality by domestic
US courts. The Presidential Kennebunkport Order 0f 1992 held Article 33
Refugee Convention not to be applicable outside the territory of the United
States and authorized the Attorney General to exercise ‘unreviewable dis-
cretion’ in deciding upon the return of refugees.41 This unassailable executive
discretion was confirmed by the Executive Order of 2002, which explicitly
stated that the powers accorded to the Attorney General were not reviewable,
that the processing of interdicted migrants did not create rights or benefits
that are enforceable at law, and that the establishment of offshore arrangements
cannot be construed as to require any procedure to determine whether a person
is a refugee or otherwise in need of protection.42 A variety of policy guidelines
were adopted regulating the procedures for screening and pre-screening for
refugee status outside US territory, which provided for examinations under-
taken by US immigration officers outside the terms of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act, without the possibility of review or appeal and without
a right to legal representation.43
Although lower US Courts had been divided on the question of applicability
of immigration statutes and constitutional rights to the persons held in Guan-
tánamo Bay,44 the Supreme Court, in Sale, ultimately found the US Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act not to apply beyond the geographic borders of the
United States and held the programme of summarily returning interdicting
migrants at sea to be subjected to neither domestic nor international obliga-
tions.45 This ruling was followed up in two later cases concerning a series
of claims brought by Haitians and Cubans detained at Guantánamo Bay,
relating not only to their entitlements under the Refugee Convention and
domestic asylum legislation, but also to several rights guaranteed under the
US Constitution. The claims were rejected by the US Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, holding that domestic legislation could not be presumed to
41 Executive Order 12807 of 24 May 1992, ‘Interdiction of Illegal Aliens’.
42 Supra n. 23.
43 Ignatius (1993), p. 121-129; also see Canadian Council for Refugees, ‘Interdiction and Refugee
Protection: Bridging the Gap’, International Workshop, Proceedings, Ottowa, 29 May 2003,
p. 4.
44 See, extensively, Koh (1994) p. 143-148.
45 On the Sale decision extensively, chapter 4.3.1.1.
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apply beyond the borders of the US without express congressional authorization
and that the Haitians and Cubans held in Guantánamo Bay were ‘without
legal rights that are cognizable in the courts of the United States’.46 Instead,
the court found the US policy of providing these migrants a safe haven a
‘gratuitous humanitarian act which does not in any way create even the
putative liberty interest in securing asylum processing (…)’. Although recogniz-
ing the difficulties of their prolonged stay at the naval base, the court con-
sidered this a problem ‘to be addressed by the legislative and executive
branches of our government’.47 As noted below however, more recent US
litigation on the detention of terrorist suspects in Guantánamo Bay signifies
a shift towards the acceptance that US courts do enjoy jurisdiction in reviewing
the conformity of detention on Guantánomo Bay with the US Constitution.48
Under the Pacific Strategy, Australia’s government similarly opted for the
establishment of an offshore programme following a system of unreviewable
executive control. This system was grounded in a substantial revision of
Australia’s Migration Act, issued shortly after the Tampa-incident.49 The
revision pertained mainly to the legal status and procedural guarantees
accorded to irregular migrants arriving by boat. It removed particular overseas
Australian territories from the Australian migration zone (these were called
‘offshore excised places’), to the effect that persons arriving at such places
(‘offshore entry persons’) were barred from applying for a visa under Austra-
lia’s Migration Act.50 This included applications for a protection visa, the
ordinary document granted to persons who are recognized as refugees. Further,
the amendments allowed for the taking of offshore entry persons to a ‘declared
country’, which is a country declared by the minister as inter alia providing
access to effective status determination procedures; protection pending the
status determination; and protection for refugees pending their voluntary
repatriation or resettlement in another country.51 Apart from being prevented
from applying for a visa, the amended Migration Act also barred offshore entry
persons from instituting legal proceedings in Australian courts, including
proceedings relating to their entry, their status, the lawfulness of detention
and their transfer to a ‘declared country’.52 The system put in place ensured
that offshore entry persons fell outside the refugee status determination pro-
cedure regulated by the Migration Act, preventing them, perhaps most crucial-
46 Cuban American Bar Association (CABA) v Cristopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995). Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc. v Christopher, 43 F.3d 1431 (11th Cir. 1995).
47 Ibid.
48 Infra n. 64 and accompanying text.
49 For a detailed description of the legislative scheme putting in place the Pacific Solution,
see eg P. Mathew, 96 AJIL (2002), p. 663-5; Taylor (2008); Kerr, (2008).
50 Section 46A Migration Act invalidates visa applications of offshore entry persons.
51 Section 198A(3) Migration Act.
52 Section 494AA Migration Act.
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ly, from invoking a right of entry once they were found to be a refugee.
Instead, offshore refugee claims were considered by Australian immigration
officers under a non-statutory procedure, without granting claimants a right
to legal representation, without access to independent merits review, and with
no, or very limited, access to judicial review.53
The special legislative arrangements pertaining to excised territories and
offshore entry persons remained in force after the closure of the Nauru facility
and the formal dismantling of the Pacific Solution. The main difference with
the past policy is that, instead of being brought to a processing center in a
third, ‘declared’ country, offshore entry persons are since 2008 brought to
Christmas Island, which is properly situated within the territorial sovereignty
of Australia. Similar to the previously applicable scheme, refugee claims lodged
at Christmas Island are tested directly against the definitional terms of the
Refugee Convention, without a system of legally enforceable guarantees and
without an entitlement for persons determined to be a refugee to enter Austra-
lia.54 The new arrangement did provide for two procedural changes: the
introduction of access for offshore entry persons to Australia’s legal aid pro-
gramme and the installment of an Independent Reviewer competent to review
negative decisions on refugee claims and to issue a non-binding recommenda-
tion to the minister to reconsider lifting the bar to allow a person to apply
for a protection visa.55 A further difference of considerable practical import-
ance is that the Australian government no longer maintains a policy of granting
visas to refugees only as a last resort, i.e. if no other countries can be found
for their resettlement.56
Within the European context, both the inapplicability of the law and the
barriers to judicial review are inherently problematic from a human rights
perspective. Although it is, as such, possible for states to differentiate in their
domestic laws between various forms of entry or to consider particular laws
to only apply within certain parts of its territory57 (or, conversely, also to
53 Taylor (2008), p. 108; S. Kneebone, ‘The Pacific Plan: The Provision of ‘Effective Protection?’’,
18 IJRL (2006), p. 715. Although the non-statutory determination procedure does not make
provision for judicial review, failed claimants may possibly invoke a constitutional right
to seek a remedy in court; see, extensively: Kerr, (2008), p. 57-68.
54 For a summary of the procedure for determining refugee status on Christmas Island, see
Australian Human Rights Commission (2009), p. 14-17.
55 Ibid.
56 Supra n. 39.
57 Various authors have nonetheless submitted that the putting into place of a distinct process-
ing regime for unauthorized boat arrivals amounts to discriminatory treatment: Francis
(2008), p. 284; Legomsky (2006), p. 693; S. Kneebone, ‘Controlling Migration by Sea: The
Australian Case’, in: B. Ryan and V. Mitsilegas (eds), Extraterritorial Immigration Control.
Legal Challenges, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff (2010), p. 362. Although the singling out
of one specific category of migrants for the purpose of offshore processing, for example
on account of nationality, may amount to discrimination, these authors do not substantiate
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foreign territories), these arrangements must conform with international law.
Crucially, as extensively discussed in chapter 2 of this book, states cannot
simply excise particular territories from their human rights obligations, nor
are they absolved from respecting those obligations when undertaking activity
in a foreign territory.58 In so far as governmental activity interferes with
human rights, the law must set limits to the scope of executive power and
must provide guarantees against arbitrary interferences. This implies not only
that persons held in an offshore facility may invoke human rights, but also
that the state holding them in such a facility must ensure that legal regulations
are in place which guarantee against the abuse of discretionary state power.59
From the same rationale, migrants held in an offshore facility may invoke
the right of having access to a court or an effective remedy. In general terms,
Article 13 ECRH and Article 2 (3)(a) ICCPR oblige states to ensure the availability
of an effective remedy to vindicate the substantive rights and freedoms
guaranteed under both Conventions. Specific provisions on judicial review
apply to situations of detention (Articles 5 (4) ECRH and 9 (4) ICCPR).60 Further,
Article 16 Refugee Convention provides that ‘[a] refugee shall have free access
to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting States.’ This latter
provision, which, similar to Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, does not
require any specific attachment of the refugee with the state, has been inter-
preted as necessarily applying also to those refugees who have not yet been
formally declared to be a refugee.61
The programmes of offshore processing in Guantánamo Bay, Nauru and
Christmas Island reveal a paradoxical attitude towards the protection of human
rights. Notably, as a matter of policy, and with the exception of the United
States ‘no-screening policy’ in respect of Haitians in the period 1992-1994, the
Australian and US offshore programmes upheld a pledge to guarantee refugee
rights: the very purpose of offshore processing was to ensure that pre-border
migration controls paid respect to the special position of refugees, by granting
them a safe haven and by not returning those found to be a refugee to their
country of origin. The Australian government, in this connection, has explicitly
considered itself bound, at least so under the Christmas Island arrangement,
whether discrimination based on mode of arrival can be brought under one of the prohibited
discrimination grounds. A further question to be determined before one can speak of
prohibited discriminatory treatment is whether there is an objective and reasonable justifica-
tion for the difference in treatment.
58 See chapters 2 and, by analogy, 6.4.
59 Ibid, and especially the discussions in chapter 6.4.2.
60 The Human Rights Committee has considered the Australian restrictions on judicial review
of administrative detention to be in violation of Article 9 (4) ICCPR: HRC 30 April 1997,
A. v Australia, no. 560/1993, para. 9.5.; HRC 6 November 2003, Bakhtiyari v Australia, no.
1069/2002, para. 9.4; HRC 18 September 2003, Baban v Australia, no. 1014/2001, para. 7.2.
61 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge University Press (2005),
p. 645; Willheim (2003), p. 172.
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to the terms of the Refugee Convention.62 But this pledge to safeguard rights
of refugees was implemented within a system designed to prevent migrants
from invoking any right which may effectuate their entry into the state. This
system necessitated the abandonment of procedural rights and norms of good
administration as equally protected under human rights law, including the
right to a fair and effective determination of asylum claims, the right to an
independent review of the transfer to a processing centre located in a third
country, and the right to an independent review of decisions of repatriation
or resettlement from the processing center. Ultimately, this strategy of pro-
cedural containment leaves the upholding of refugee and other fundamental
rights to the exclusive discretion of the state, which is an unacceptable pro-
position under human rights law. As an American federal judge put it in a
judgment on the legal position of the HIV infected refugees whose stay at
Guantánamo Bay was prolonged: “[i]f the Due Process Clause does not apply
to the detainees at Guantánamo, [the US Government] would have discretion
deliberately to starve or beat them, to deprive them of medical attention, to
return them without process to their persecutors, or to discriminate among
them based on the color of their skin.”63 The implication of the recognition
that human rights do apply to programmes of offshore processing is not only
that they should pay special consideration to refugees. It also implies that
offshore processing is embedded in a framework of procedural guarantees
capable of ensuring the respect for those rights.
The more recent developments in US litigation on the detention of terrorist
suspects in Guantánamo Bay also tend towards the acceptance of this maxim.
The US Supreme Court considered that US courts are empowered to hear habeas
corpus challenges filed by detainees at Guantánamo Bay, and that the scope
of judicial review extends to provisions of the US Constitution.64 The Supreme
Court found reason to depart from its earlier case law that non-citizens
detained in foreign territories were never deemed to have rights under the
Constitution, in view of the exceptional duration of the detention and because
the detainees were held in a territory that, while technically not part of the
United States, is under the complete and total control of our Government’.65
62 According to the Australian government: ‘The retention of the excision zone does not
prevent Australia fulfilling its international obligations under the Refugees Convention
and under other relevant international instruments. Regardless of where, and how, unlawful
non-citizens arrive in Australia, those who claim asylum have their protection claims
assessed and are provided with protection in Australia if found to be owed protection.’
Australian Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship, ‘Fact Sheet 75 –
Processing Unlawful Boat Arrivals’, available at http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-
sheets/75processing-unlawful-boat-arrivals.htm (accessed 18 May 2010).
63 U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York 7 april 1992, Haitian Centers Council,
Inc v. Sale, 823 F.Sup. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). See extensively White (2007), p. 249-269.
64 U.S. Supreme Court 28 June 2004, Rasul v Bush [2004] 542 U.S. 466; U.S. Supreme Court
12 June 2008, Boumediene v Bush [2008] 553 U.S. 723.
65 Boumediene v Bush, note above.
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Although the reasoning of the Supreme Court may be relied upon also by
migrants in the context of legal challenges against detention, the terrorist cases
do not necessarily have ramifications in the context of challenges against
removal to a third country. Notably, a US Court of Appeals, in relying on the
2008 Supreme Court’s decision in Munaf v Geren on the transfer of detainees
in Iraq,66 concluded that detainees in Guantánamo, in obstructing their
removal to a third country, cannot invoke the Convention Against Torture,
because US law only allows judicial review under the CAT in respect of removal
proceedings taking place within US territory.67
7.4 THE FEASIBILITY OF PHYSICAL CONTAINMENT
A prominent feature of the processing schemes established in Nauru, Christmas
Island and Guantánamo Bay is the mandatory detention of migrants. The
physical containment of irregular boat arrivals ensures not only that they are
prevented from effectuating unauthorized entry and residence, but also serves
as a deterrent for future arrivals.68 The systematic detention of irregular
migrants in an offshore facility has attracted considerable criticism.69 Most
importantly, the setting up of a detention regime which is not subject to judicial
review, without maximum time limits and no guarantees as to resettlement
or repatriation, would potentially allow for migrants to be detained for an
indeterminate and excessive period of time. Further, contrary to the detention
of asylum-seekers inside the territory of the state of refuge, offshore detention
in a remote island facility by its nature restricts possibilities to engage in
meaningful activities such as work or education or to maintain contacts with
the outside world. In case of refugees, mandatory detention is generally seen
to contrast with the notion that, in view of the character and causes of their
flight, detention should only be used as a last resort and only upon an indi-
vidual assessment of the necessity of detention.
66 U.S. Supreme Court 12 June 2008, Munaf v Geren [2008] 553 U. S. ___
67 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 7 April 2009, Kiyemba v Obama,
561 F.3d 509. The case was subsequently brought to the Supreme Court. Also see N. Frenzen,
‘US Migrant Interdiction Practices in International and Territorial Waters’, in: Ryan and
Mitsilegas (2010), p. 393-395.
68 Francis (2008), p. 274; Parliament of Australia Background Note, ‘Boat arrivals in Australia
since 1976’, 25 June 2009, p. 13. In the UK’s New Vision for Refugees, it was considered
that ‘[t]his approach could act as a deterrent to abuse of the asylum system’, ‘New inter-
national approaches to asylum protection and processing’, para. 2.
69 Eg Australian Human Rights Commission (2009); Australian Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission, ‘Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee on the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006’,
22 May 2006; HRC, Concluding observations on Australia, 7 May 2009, CCPR/C/AUS/CO/
5, para. 23.
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The detention of asylum-seekers solely on account of unauthorized entry is
controversial but not necessarily prohibited.70 Under the right to liberty pro-
tected by Articles 5 ECRH and 9 ICCPR, detention which forms part of a process
to determine whether persons should be granted entry clearance or asylum
is not in itself prohibited, provided it cannot be branded as arbitrary. The
ECtHR, in Saadi v United Kingdom, concluded that states are permitted under
Article 5 (1)(f) to detain would-be immigrants who have applied for permission
to enter, whether by way of asylum or not, but that, to avoid being branded
as arbitrary, detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely
connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to
the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate; and
the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the
purpose pursued.71 The Court explicitly considered that immigration detention
does not require a more stringent proportionality test, i.e. applying detention
only as a measure of last resort or striking a balance between the interests
involved.72 Albeit less unambiguous, the Human Rights Committee has also
recognized that circumstances particular to the arrival of asylum-seekers and
other unauthorized migrants, such as the need for identification and the proper
assessment of claims of entry, may warrant their detention.73 The Human
Rights Committee has, in its various pronouncements on the detention of
asylum-seekers in Australia, never concluded that Australia’s policy of
mandatorily detaining all asylum-seekers, on the sole ground of them having
arrived in Australia without prior authorization, contravenes Article 9 ICCPR
– although it has repeatedly denounced the restrictions to judicial review and
70 See extensively Hathaway (2005), p. 413-439. UNHCR submits that there should be a
presumption against the detention of asylum-seekers and that detention should only take
place after a full consideration of all possible alternatives: UNHCR, ‘Revised Guidelines
On Applicable Criteria And Standards Relating To The Detention Of Asylum-seekers’,
February 1999, Guideline 3; Also see the dissenting opinion of judges Rozakis, Tulkens,
Kovler Hajiyev, Spielmann and Hirvelä in ECtHR 29 January 2008, Saadi v the United
Kingdom (Grand Chamber), no. 13229/03.
71 Saadi v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), paras. 70-74.
72 Ibid, paras. 70-73.
73 In A. v Australia, the Human Rights Committee considered that ‘the fact of illegal entry
may indicate a need for investigation and there may be other factors particular to the
individual, such as the likelihood of absconding and lack of cooperation, which may justify
detention for a period.’ HRC 30 April 1997, A. v Australia, no. 560/1993, para. 9.4. Also
see HRC 26 August 2004, Francesco Madafferi and Anna Maria Immacolata Madafferi v. Austra-
lia, no. 1011/2001, para. 9.2; HRC 6 November 2003, Ali Aqsar Bakhtiyari and Roqaiha Bakhti-
yari v. Australia, no. 1069/2002, para. 9.2. Contra, Cornelisse, who concludes that the HRC
would not accept general justifications for the detention of asylum-seekers. However, the
cases cited in support of that proposition concern violations of Article 9(1) ICCPR on account
of prolonged detention instead of the initial decision of detention, G. Cornelisse, Immigration
Detention and Human Rights. Rethinking Territorial Sovereignty, Leiden/Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff (2010), p. 254.
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the prolonged duration of detention.74 In Bakhtiyari v. Australia, the Committee
found the detention of an asylum-seeker having arrived by boat, in light of
the facts that his identity was in doubt and that he had lodged a claim for
protection, not to be arbitrary and in breach of Article 9(1) ICCPR.75 The ECtHR
and HRC have however underlined that the notion of arbitrariness may require
more vigilance in cases of persons with special needs, including unaccompan-
ied minors, families with minor children or persons with a serious illness.76
This rather broad discretion accorded to the state in deciding upon the
detention of potential immigrants is however circumscribed by the conditions
stemming from the prohibition of arbitrariness in respect of continued detention.
The detention of unauthorized arrivals, while initially warranted, may become
arbitrary if it is inter alia no longer connected to its purpose or if the duration
of detention exceeds that reasonably required for the purpose pursued.77
These considerations also apply to the detention of persons whose claims have
been refused and who are detained with a view to deportation. According
to the ECtHR ‘any deprivation of liberty under Article 5 (1)(f) will be justified
only for as long as deportation proceedings are in progress. If such proceedings
are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be permiss-
ible under Article 5 para. 1 (f)’.78 The HRC has applied a more fully fledged
proportionality assessment in respect of continued detention, which includes
consideration of whether less invasive means can achieve the same ends, for
example the imposition of reporting obligations.79 The conducting of a
proportionality test is also warranted under Article 31 (2) Refugee Convention,
which prohibits the imposition of restrictions on the free movement of refugees
on account of illegal entry ‘other than those are necessary’.80
74 Ibid.
75 Bakhtiyari v. Australia, para. 9.2. The Committee further considered relevant that the person
in question was granted a protection visa and released seven months after his arrival.
76 Ibid, para. 9.3; ECtHR 12 October 2006, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, no.
13178/03; ECtHR 19 January 2010, Muskhadzhiyeva a.o. v Belgium, no. 41442/07; Madafferi
v. Australia, para. 9.3. See, in general, P. Boeles et al, European Migration Law, Antwerp:
Intersentia (2009), p. 386-387.
77 Saadi v United Kingdom, paras. 74, 77. Also see A. v Australia, para 9.4; HRC 18 September
2003, Omar Sharif Baban v Australia, no. 1014/2001, para. 7.2.
78 Chahal, paras. 112-113: ECtHR 8 October 2009, Mikolenko v Estonia, no. 10664/05, paras.
59, 63.
79 HRC 28 October 2002, C. v Australia, no. 900/1999, para 8.2.; Bakhtiyari v Australia, para
9.3.; Baban v Australia, para. 7.2.
80 Goodwin-Gill, referring to the drafting history, has interpreted Article 31(2) Refugee
Convention as allowing for the initial detention of asylum-seekers for identification and
investigation purposes but as prohibiting prolonged detention unless other justifications
arise. G.S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees: non-penalization, detention, and protection’, in: E. Feller, V. Türk and F. Nicholson
(eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International
Protection, Cambridge University Press (2003), p. 195-196. Note that Article 31 Refugee
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Because we may assume that offshore detention also serves the goal of
preventing irregular migrants and asylum-seekers from effecting an unauthor-
ized entry, it would not seem that systems of offshore detention run in them-
selves counter to the right to liberty. However, unlike, for example, the fast-
track procedures for asylum-seekers coupled with mandatory detention for
specific categories of asylum-seekers as employed by several EU Member States,
the Australian and US offshore programmes not merely pertain to the swift
and efficient determination of identities and claims of entry. They serve the
further purpose of physically excluding migrants until resettlement or re-
patriation can be arranged, or when, as a last resort, authorization to enter
is granted. In general, to maintain detention until a solution as to removal
to a particular country can be arranged sits uncomfortably with safeguards
against unreasonable duration of detention. These safeguards imply, amongst
others, that the identification and verification of claims of entry must be
prosecuted without undue delay and that, as regards failed claimants, pro-
longed detention can only be maintained as long as there is a ‘reasonable
prospect of removal’ or as long as ‘action is being taken with a view to de-
portation’.81 As regards refugees, it has further been submitted that when
detention can no longer be connected to the administrative purposes of identifi-
cation, status determination or repatriation, it amounts to the imposition of
a penalty on account of illegal entry in contravention of Article 31 (1) Refugee
Convention.82
Especially problematic, in this respect, is that the past US and Australian
offshore programmes were established without an adjoining strategy as to
the eventual release – in the form of authorization of entry, resettlement or
repatriation – of the migrants after their claim had been determined. The
ultimate consequence of the decision of the Australian government to embark
upon a strategy of detaining and processing boat arrivals in the Nauru facility
without authorising their entry, and with neither having procured in advance
resettlement and repatriation guarantees from third countries, was that success-
ful and failed claimants alike were compelled to remain within the Nauru
facility for considerable periods of time. It has been reported that asylum-
seekers recognized as refugees remained on Nauru for four years before being
brought to Australia.83 Another example concerns the HIV-infected Haitian
Convention contains an explicit territorial restriction in that it only applies to refugees who
have ‘entered or are present’ in the Contracting State’s territory.
81 Supra n. 77. Also see HRC 26 March 2002, Jalloh v the Netherlands, no. 794/1998, para. 8.2.
82 Hathaway (2005), p. 422. Francis (2008), p. 284; J. von Doussa, ‘Human Rights and Offshore
Processing’, in: Blay, Burn and Keyzer (2008), p. 48-49; Australian Human Rights Commis-
sion (2009), para. 8.1. Note however the territorial restriction to the applicability of Article
31 Refugee Convention, see n. 80 supra.
83 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, ‘Submission to the Senate Legal and
Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee on the Migration Amendment (Designated
Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006’, para. 4.14; S. Taylor, ‘Australia’s Pacific Solution Mark II:
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refugees who were confined to a separate facility in Guantánamo Bay for
eighteen months before being allowed entry into the US for further medical
treatment and processing.84 In respect of the current detention of asylum-
seekers at Christmas Island, the Australian Human Rights Commission has
noted that the arrangements in place have not dispelled the risk that people
may be held for prolonged or indefinite periods.85
Accordingly, operations of external processing which follow a policy
presumption of prolonging detention until a definite solution on their removal
can be arranged is prone to conflict, in individual cases, with safeguards
against arbitrary detention. In view of the often unsuccessful efforts to secure
resettlement or repatriation, it would seem imperative – in order to comply
with requirements of periodic review of the justifications for detention and
the possibility of release – that offshore detention is complemented with a
meaningful ‘exit strategy’ in case a prospect of removal or resettlement to a
third country ceases to exist. Although the US and Australian governments
did allow, for humanitarian or practical reasons, the sporadic entry of certain
categories of migrants into their territory (or, in the case of Christmas Island:
‘community detention’86), these decisions were of ad hoc and discretionary
character and not based upon existing guarantees established in law.87
The Lessons to be Learned’, in: Blay, Burn and Keyzer (2008), p. 108; S. Kneebone, ‘Controll-
ing Migration by Sea: The Australian Case’, in: Ryan and Mitsilegas (2010), p. 362.
84 White (2007), p. 263
85 Australian Human Rights Commission (2009), para. 9.2.
86 Under the presently functioning Christmas Island scheme, the Australian government has
pledged to detain unauthorized arrivals only for the purpose of health, identity and security
checks and that, once checks have been successfully completed, continued detention is
unwarranted: C. Evans (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship), ‘New directions in
detention: restoring integrity to Australia’s immigration system’, Speech delivered 29 July
2008. Immigration detainees whose claim has not yet been resolved, are then eligible for
‘community detention’ on Christmas Island, allowing them to reside at a specified place
where they are generally free to come and go and are not subject to constant supervision.
The Australian Human Rights Commission has observed however that, due to the small
size of the community on Christmas Island and the significant number of detainees, the
option of community detention is only sporadically used; see Australian Human Rights
Commission (2009), para. 13.
87 In respect of the fist large influx of Cuban migrants in 1994 of which the majority were
brought to Guantánamo Bay, the U.S. government made frequent humanitarian exceptions
to its initial position that the Cubans would not gain entry into the U.S., and granted parole
to unaccompanied minors, families and persons suffering from medical emergencies; see
M.E. Sartori, ‘The Cuban Migration Dilemma: An Examination of the United States’ Policy
of Temporary Protection in Offshore Safe Havens’, 15 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal
(2001), p. 348-349. Under the presently functioning Christmas Island scheme, the Australian
government has commenced with the transfer of persons who have been denied refugee
status from Christmas Island to detention facilities on mainland Australia, although this
does not change their entitlements under Australia’s Migration Act; ABC News 29 March
2010, ‘Asylum-seeker transfer could spark test case’.
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The conclusion that programmes of offshore processing should be comple-
mented with meaningful exit guarantees in the sphere of entry, resettlement
or repatriation acquires specific gravity in respect of refugees, because the
Refugee Convention presupposes that refugees should not be isolated from
their host communities and that they should, congruent to their level of attach-
ment with the state, eventually be granted a variety of social, economic and
social rights.88 Even though the freedom of movement guaranteed under
Articles 31 (2) and 26 Refugee Convention accrues to refugees who are either
unlawfully or lawfully present in the state’s territory and can therefore not
literally be construed as applicable to refugees not yet having entered the state,
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and Human Rights
Committee indicates that the detention of asylum-seekers must take proper
account of their possible entitlements under international law.89 A system
designed to prolong detention in a remote facility beyond what is necessary
for status determination or for effectuating resettlement to a third country runs
counter to that notion. It fails to recognize the Refugee Convention’s underlying
premise of creating genuine prospects and possibilities of self-fulfillment for
refugees. True, the enjoyment of most of the substantive rights of the Refugee
Convention depends upon the prior acquisition of lawful presence or residence.
But a system which neither guarantees a right of lawful entry for refugees
nor ensures that lawful entry can be obtained into another state, leaves refugees
in a legal vacuum, in which the enjoyment of the substantive rights laid down
in the Refugee Convention (and in other human rights treaties) is potentially
subject to indefinite postponement.
7.5 ISSUES OF ATTRIBUTION AND THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
The aforegoing analysis presupposed that external processing engages the
international responsibility of the state, on account of the state having brought
the migrants under its jurisdiction (thereby enlivening its human rights obliga-
tions vis-à-vis the migrants) and on account of potentially wrongful conduct
being attributable to that state. A notable feature of external processing is
however that it can take place outside the territorial sovereignty of the state
and may involve multiple actors, giving rise to questions of jurisdiction,
attribution and the allocation of international responsibility.
As regards the offshore programmes initiated at Christmas Island and
Guantánamo, these questions are not particularly apparent. Both programmes
are of unilateral character, with an easily identifiable state actor, and take place
88 See extensively Hathaway (2005), p. 978-979.
89 See, in particular, ECtHR 25 June 1996, Amuur v France, no. 19776/92 para. 43 (‘States’
legitimate concern to foil the increasingly frequent attempts to circumvent immigration
restrictions must not deprive asylum-seekers of the protection afforded by these conven-
tions’). Also see Saadi v United Kingdom, para. 74; A. v Australia, para. 9.4.
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within the state’s territory (Christmas Island) or otherwise within a setting
where the state retains exclusive and ultimate control over the migrants,
including over detention matters, refugee status determination, resettlement
and repatriation (Guantánamo Bay). In the light of the framework on the
extraterritorial application of human rights and the allocation of responsibility
for wrongful conduct as established in chapters 2 and 3, it can be readily
assumed that decisions or activity in the course of external processing which
interfere with human rights would come within the scope of the acting state’s
human rights obligations.90
As to the Nauru scheme, a more complex division of labour between
different actors was agreed upon. Under the Memorandum of Understanding
concluded with the government of Nauru, Nauru agreed to accept ‘certain
persons’ on behalf of Australia, in return for Australia’s commitment that it
would ensure the departure of the individuals within a reasonable time and
that it would fully finance all activities in Nauru.91 Under a service agreement
with Australia, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) provided
reception and processing services, including management of accommodation
and the provision of staff.92 Security tasks were shared between Nauru and
Australian officers, with Australian security personnel providing ‘the more
active security within the centres’.93 The government of Nauru government
had issued special purpose visa to the asylum-seekers which formed the basis
for their temporary residence and confinement to the detention facility on its
territory.94 Although UNHCR had initially been involved in the status deter-
mination of the asylum-seekers, it later withdrew from that agreement, leaving
Australian immigration officers exclusively responsible for the determination
of claims.95
90 Cf. ECtHR 30 June 2009, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v United Kingdom, no. 61498/08 (adm. dec.),
paras. 87-89; CAT 21 November 2008, J.H.A. v. Spain (Marine I), no. 323/2007, para. 8.2.
See further chapters 2.5 and 3.
91 Parliament of Australia, Senate Select Committee Report (2002), paras. 10.33-10.36. For the
operational arrangements, see also High Court of Australia 31 August 2005, Ruhani v Director
of Police [No 2], [2005] HCA 43, para. 49-51; S. Taylor, ‘The Pacific Solution or a Pacific
Nightmare?: The Difference Between Burden Shifting and Responsibility Sharing’, 6 Asia
Pacific Law and Policy Journal (2005), p. 13-14.
92 Parliament of Australia, Senate Select Committee Report (2002), paras. 10.81-10.82.
93 Ibid, para. 10.83.
94 Ruhani v Director of Police [No 2], para. 8.
95 According to UNHCR, ‘While UNHCR does undertake refugee status determination under
its mandate, this is normally undertaken in situations where signatory States have no
resources or capacity to conduct the exercise, or where a State is not signatory to the 1951
Convention, thus requiring that UNHCR undertakes refugee status determination in order
to ensure the protection of refugees. In the context of extraterritorial processing by Australia,
given that Australia is a long-time signatory to the 1951 Convention and has in place its
own procedures, these procedures should be applied’; UNHCR, Migration Amendment
(Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill. Submission of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Commit-
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This division of responsibilities may certainly give rise to difficulties in
the allocation of responsibilities; or be used as a pretext to eschew responsibil-
ity. It indeed appears that both the Nauru and Australian governments denied
responsibility for the situation in which the asylum-seekers were held.96 Given
the plurality of actors involved and the complexity of the legal arrangements,
it will depend on the precise complaint at issue and the involvement of the
respective parties to which actor particular conduct should be attributed and
on what account individuals should be considered to fall within the jurisdiction
of Nauru or Australia for the purposes of human rights protection.97 In
general, it can however be observed that Australia exercised exclusive authority
over the procedure leading to a decision on resettlement or repatriation, that
it financed the operation, and that its officials were present and closely
involved in the management of the facility. Further, Australia was the party
initiating, organizing and eventually terminating the operation. This direct
and decisive involvement of Australia not only opens various avenues for
attributing conduct or for establishing derived forms of responsibility as
discussed in chapter 3, but is also instructive in the establishment of a suffi-
ciently close ‘jurisdictional link’ between the migrants and Australia as dis-
cussed in chapter 2, either under a reasoning that Australia maintained ‘effect-
ive control’ over the migrants, because the migrants were directly affected
by acts of Australian officials, or on account of Australia’s involvement in and
influence over activities undertaken by other actors, potentially enlivening
positive obligations.98 This does, on the other hand, not preclude the existence
of possible concurrent responsibility for wrongful conduct on the side of
Nauru.99
7.6 FINAL REMARKS
This chapter has identified some of the key human rights issues raised by the
United States and Australian policies of external processing. By focusing on
the two aspects of the procedural and physical exclusion of migrants, the
analysis is relevant also for possible future policies embracing the idea of
external processing launched by the European Union and/or its Member States.
tee, 22 May 2006, para. 24.
96 Taylor (2005), p. 14-15. Referring to the management of the centre by IOM, Australia’s
Immigration Minister Amanda Vanstone reportedly stated: ‘They are in charge. It’s not
in Australian territory, it’s on Nauru, and being run by other people. If someone doesn’t
want to be there, they can go home.’ Tahiti Presse 17 December 2003, ‘Australia: hunger-
striking asylum-seekers not our problem, says government’.
97 See, in general, chapter 3.2.3-3.3.
98 Cf. ECtHR 8 July 2004, Ilascu a.o. v Moldova and Russia, no. 48787/99, paras. 392-394. See
extensively, chapters 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 3.2.2.4.
99 See chapter 3.2.4.1.
External Processing 295
It follows from this chapter that, although not necessarily contravening
the international refugee law regime, the procedural and physical containment
of a specific group of migrants raises issues under more general doctrines of
human rights law. The summary conclusion is that the programmes of offshore
processing carried out in Nauru, Guantánamo Bay and Christmas Island failed
to deliver sufficient guarantees in the sphere of procedures and prospects: the
absence of a legal and procedural framework allowing for the vindication of
human rights and the absence of guarantees in the sphere of repatriation or
resettlement ultimately allowed for a system where refugees and other
migrants were left in a legal vacuum for potentially indefinite duration.
Although the US and Australian governments did provide for status determina-
tion and eventual removal from the offshore facility, these procedures were
not grounded in the law nor subject to independent (or, in the case of Christ-
mas Island: legally enforceable) review.
The conclusion that external processing must more firmly be embedded
in a framework of guarantees safeguarding against the arbitrary exercise of
state power is much in line with the previous chapter’s conclusions on inter-
dictions at sea. Similar to what was said in the context of sea border controls,
the key challenge for states wishing to employ policies of offshore processing
is to devise such policies in harmony with a meaningful human rights strategy.
It follows from this chapter that such a human rights strategy embodies more
than a policy of screening for refugees and a search for ad hoc solutions in
the event a person is found to be a refugee. Perhaps most crucially, all actions
taken in the course of external processing potentially interfering with human
rights must be based in the law and must allow for review; and detention may
not be maintained beyond what is necessary for status determination or for
effectuating a removal.
These requirements may have notable repercussions for the arrangement
of programmes of external processing. Especially guarantees of securing release
from detention in the absence of prospects of removal compel governments
engaged in offshore processing to ensure that alternative solutions for the
reception of migrants are put in place. Under the Christmas Island arrangement
and the UK New Vision proposal, it is foreseen that those found to be a refugee
should be resettled in Australia and the EU Member States respectively.100
But it may be much more difficult to devise similar guarantees of removal
in respect of failed claimants. In view of the often protracted nature of
readmission procedures, states may well be confronted with persons whose
repatriation to the country of origin cannot be arranged and for whom altern-
atives must be found. This challenge of putting into place an ‘exit strategy’
also questions the effectiveness of offshore processing as a temporary solution
for the reception of migrants. As the past US and Australian experiences of
100 A New Vision for Refugees, para. 2.
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external processing of asylum-seekers show, the securing of resettlement or
readmission into third countries was only partly successful, and a majority
of the migrants held in Nauru and all the Cuban migrants held in Guantánamo
Bay in the 1990s, were eventually brought to the mainland.
The conclusions of this chapter are premised on the finding that the Austra-
lian and US governments exercised de facto and de jure control over the process-
ing, detention and eventual removal from the facility and that the persons
held in the facilities could thus be brought within the personal scope of the
respective states’ human rights obligations. One may however also imagine
situations where external processing merely involves the transfer of persons
to such a facility and/or the financing of the facility, but without a further
or ‘decisive’ involvement of the state in the treatment and the determination
of protection claims.101 Examples of such arrangements are the border
cooperation agreements between Australia and Indonesia and Papua New
Guinea, where the authorities of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have
agreed to intercept irregular migrants thought to be intent on traveling toward
Australia and under which the Australian government funds the reception
and status determination carried out in those countries.102 Under these
arrangements, it is problematic to identify a clear ‘jurisdictional link’ between
the financing state and the migrants. As submitted in chapter 2, the existence
of this link will then depend on the relationship of the state with a particular
set of circumstances involving the individual being of such a special nature
that the state can be considered to be under a duty to use its influence, knowl-
edge, or other resources at its disposal to prevent the manifestation of human
rights violations, provided that the state is indeed legally and factually capable
to do so.103 It is highly unlikely however, that the mere financing of reception
and status determination, in the course of which human rights violation
incidentally occur, would give rise to the international responsibility of the
financing state.
101 The UK New Vision remained silent on the question whether EU Member State should
be directly involved in the operation of Transit Processing Centres. It merely proposed
that such centers should be managed by IOM and that screening should occur under the
‘approval’ of UNHCR; ibid, para. 2.
102 For an overview: S. Taylor and B.R. Rafferty-Brown, ‘Waiting for Life to Begin: the Plight
of Asylum Seekers Caught by Australia’s Indonesian Solution’, 22 IJRL (2010), p. 558-592.
103 See especially chapter 2.5.3. Also see chapter 3.2.2.4.
8 Conclusions
The late Professor Atle Grahl-Madsen, pioneer in the development of inter-
national refugee law, once explained why it is that states perceive their obliga-
tions towards refugees as being essentially territorial in character:
‘It must be remembered that the Refugee Convention to a certain extent is a result
of the pressure by humanitarian interested persons on Governments, and that public
opinion is apt to concern itself much more with the individual who has set foot
on the nation’s territory and thus is within the power of the national authorities,
than with people only seen as shadows or moving figures “at the other side of
the fence.” The latter have not materialized as human beings, and it is much easier
to shed responsibility for a mass of unknown people than for the individual whose
fate one has to decide.’1
This perception remains prevalent today. It underlies the United States’ ‘wet-
foot/dry-foot policy’ (under which only those Cuban migrants ‘touching’ US
soil become subject to US immigration legislation), it forms the justification
of the Italian push-backs as advanced by Prime Minister Berlusconi (‘to take
in only those citizens (…) who put their feet down on our soil, in the sense
also of entering into our territorial waters’) and constitutes the essential ratio-
nale behind the Australian offshore programme as voiced by Prime Minister
Howard (‘we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances
in which they come’). For individuals to successfully claim protection with
a state other than their own, they need first to enter that state. And as long
as they have not succeeded in doing so, the rationale goes, the approached
state is discharged of its protection obligations under international law.
The present study was born out of the conception that the proliferation
of practices of external migration control employed by major immigration
countries, including the Member States of the European Union, warrant a
reconsideration of this rationale. The Refugee Convention (and Grahl-Madsen’s
commentary) was drafted in a time when states were passive recipients of
refugees. Very few would derive from the Refugee Convention an obligation
on the part of states to venture out of their territory to actively seek refugees
and to offer them asylum – even though states are increasingly urged to do
so by contributing to resettlement efforts on a voluntary basis. But the question
1 See chapter 4.3.1.1. at n. 108.
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of the territorial scope of protection obligations towards persons seeking
asylum does become manifest when states actively seek to prevent migrants,
possibly including refugees, from arriving at their borders. Such activity would
potentially allow for the circumvention of protection duties states normally
incur in respect of asylum claimants presenting themselves at the state’s border.
The possible detrimental consequences in terms of obtaining access to pro-
tection gave rise to the study’s thesis that when European states endeavour
to control the movement of asylum-seekers outside their territories, they remain
responsible under international law for possible wrongdoings ensuing from
their sphere of activity. The general premise underlying this thesis is that the
territorial scope of the state’s obligations under international law, including
human rights law, is congruent with – and must necessarily follow – the locus
of state activity. To wit, this premise equals that of Grahl-Madsen noted above,
in so far as he indicates that the degree to which a state incurs responsibility
for protecting people should be commensurate with the degree to which people
are ‘within the power of the national authorities’.
This concluding chapter proceeds as follows. First, a number of final ob-
servations are made on the key thesis of the study mentioned above: in what
manner, through which avenues and under what circumstances does inter-
national law, and in particular human rights and refugee law, govern the
externalized migration practices of EU Member States. This includes an
appraisal of the limits inherent in international and human rights law in
responding to activity which takes place across legal orders and which may
involve a plurality of actors: in particular the duty to respect other state
sovereignties, limits inherent in substantive human rights norms, and the
general boundaries inherent in the Law on State Responsibility and the extra-
territorial application of human rights (section 8.1).
Second, some concluding observations are drawn as to the material and
procedural obligations of international human rights and refugee law informing
current and possible future practices of European states in the sphere of
external migration control. In setting forth the dynamics explaining why states
not always succeed in devising effective human rights strategies in their
external migration practices, this section makes a number of recommendations
for ensuring that fundamental rights are accorded higher priority in the
external dimension of asylum and migration (section 8.2).
Finally, some concluding remarks are made on the potential of the Euro-
pean Union, both as a source of law and as a political actor, to contribute to
appropriate norm-setting. This involves not only the manner in which EU law
may set limits to individual Member State activities, but also the broader
question of the capacity of the EU to address root causes for Member States’
reluctance to implement respect for fundamental rights in their external ac-
tivities (section 8.3).
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8.1 SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARDS A GENERAL
PROPOSITION
One of the reasons why only persons outside their country of origin are eligible
for refugee status is that the protection of internal refugees, now commonly
denoted as internally displaced persons, was seen as constituting an infringe-
ment of the territorial sovereignty of the country of origin.2 Internal refugees
were not deemed unworthy of protection, but the physical presence of the
refugee within his country of origin was seen as a practical impediment for
other states to effectively provide protection. Within human rights treaties of
general scope, the possibility of colliding state sovereignties also constituted
a decisive consideration for introducing restrictive clauses which made the
existence of a state’s human rights obligations dependent on a person being
within its jurisdiction and/or territory. The division of the world in mutually
exclusive state sovereignties was necessarily seen to implicate that the state
is legally and practically handicapped in ensuring respect for human rights
in another country.
The phenomenon of extraterritorial migration enforcement challenges this
paradigm. It shows that exercises of state power may transcend predefined
territorial demarcations. Although this re-opens the debate on the relationship
between human rights protection and state sovereignty, it also opens up an
area of legal indeterminacy. It should not be doubted that the process of
relocating migration management and of dispersing control tasks to other
actors severely hampers the identification of the applicable law and the actor
who can be held internationally responsible for potential wrongful conduct.
Typically this process of relocation and outsourcing is accompanied with the
establishment of extraordinary procedures which fall outside the ambit of
domestic migration statutes. Although this renders the identification of the
international legal framework governing these activities all the more important,
it presupposes an understanding and examination of doctrines of international
law which not only deal with the substance of refugee rights and human rights,
but also with some of the founding principles of human rights law and over-
arching regimes of international law. In essence, the questions raised in this
study form part of one of the arguably most topical challenges within con-
temporary international law: how to formulate responses to shifting and
colliding state sovereignties within an international legal order which is still
premised on the foundational ideas of sovereign equality and territorial de-
marcation.
The formulation of answers, in this study confined to issues relevant for
human rights and refugee protection, is by no means an easy task. The con-
clusions drawn in the first chapters of this study are attempts at putting some
2 See, extensively, J.C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, Toronto/Vancouver: Butterworths
(1991), p. 29-33; A.E. Shacknove, ‘Who Is a Refugee?’, 95 Ethics (1985), p. 282-283.
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of the most topical issues in context and of contributing to ongoing discourse,
but they leave ample room for debate and further questions. Undoubtedly,
many of the rules and principles discussed in this study will remain contested.
Not only because the legal complications are of magnitude, but also because
the political stakes are high. In the specific context of migration, perceived
gaps in international law are employed by states as a means to discharge
themselves of protection obligations. They may allow for shifting the migrant
burden and its concomitant administrative, social and financial implications.
It is no surprise therefore, that some governments continue to deny the exist-
ence of extraterritorial human rights obligations, that they posit that human-
itarian activity should not be conflated with human rights obligations, or that
they point to other entities as being primary responsible for protection or
controlling activities.
As this is a legal study which is not as such hampered by political ramifica-
tions, it is nonetheless possible to draw some general conclusions on the
manner in which international law in general, and human rights and refugee
law in particular, govern the external migration activities of states. One of the
foremost conclusions must be that international public law contains a potent
tool-box for holding states responsible for violations of international obligations
occurring in the context of extraterritorial and/or joint activity of states. Under
the general regime of international law, it is the conduct of the state,
constituting a violation of its international obligations, which forms the
essential source for arriving at the state’s international responsibility.3 This
basic rule is sufficiently wide to respond to the various atypical forms of state
activity discussed in this study. Firstly, as a matter of principle, international
obligations govern state conduct wherever it takes place, unless a particular
territorial restriction flows from the text of a treaty or particular obligation.4
Secondly, the study has indicated that there are multiple avenues for holding
states accountable for conduct which may have been committed by actors
which are not normally classified as agents of the state. The study has
extensively discussed how the legal constructs of attribution, derived
responsibility and positive obligations constitute three separate but conjunctive
instruments for identifying which conduct is attributable to the state or which
conduct should dependently on conduct of another entity lead to the state’s
responsibility. It follows that, subject to limitations, international law must
be considered as generally well-equipped to respond to the various forms
through which European states implement their agendas of external migration
control: including interceptions at sea, activities of private airlines which have
been delegated powers in relation to immigration control, activities of
immigration officers posted in a third country, joint operations of border
3 Chapter 2.1 and 3.1.
4 Chapters 2.6 and 4.3.
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control, or schemes of external processing. The doctrine of positive obligations,
or due diligence, is an especially potent jurisprudential tool for arriving at
the international responsibility of a state in situations where another actor is
the source of the violation complained of and where the state, on account of
its facilitating activity or because of unduly passive conduct, has abused or
failed to make use of material opportunities to ensure the upholding of human
rights.
The study has proposed, secondly, that a similar rationale – i.e. the locus
of obligations is commensurate with the locus of the exercise (or effects) of
power – should serve as guiding principle for deciding upon questions of
extraterritorial application of obligations under human rights treaties. The issue
of whether a particular human rights norm binds a state who takes action in
respect of an individual outside its territory involves both the debate on
possible restrictions of general nature (and the oft-cited delimiting role of the
notion of ‘jurisdiction’ in this respect) and the possible specific territorial
limitations flowing from the text of a particular human right at issue. In respect
of the second question, the foremost limits set to obligations of states to protect
refugees outside their borders flow from the territorially restricted refugee
definition in the Refugee Convention and the manner in which the prohibition
of refoulement, the key norm to be respected under refugee law, has found
expression in Article 33 Refugee Convention and Article 3 CAT. The literal
wording of these provisions renders it problematic to construe them as applic-
able also to activity undertaken in respect of persons who are within their
country of origin or within another territory from which the threat with
persecution or torture stems. This limitation is not present under the prohi-
bitions of refoulement established under the ICCPR and ECRH, which entail a
protective duty of more general nature.
As regards the general debate on the extraterritorial application of human
rights, the study has observed that the notion of jurisdiction under human
rights law has been employed by national and international courts and bodies
in divergent manner, making it difficult to make firm pronouncements on the
precise circumstances giving rise to extraterritorial human rights obligations.
The most contested issue in this respect appears to be whether any exercise
of authority of the state, in whatever form it takes place, constitutes an ‘exercise
of jurisdiction’ and can hence bring affected individuals within the personal
scope of the state’s human rights obligations; or that it is only in exceptional
cases that acts of the contracting states performed, or producing effects, outside
their territories can bring individuals within the acting states’ ‘jurisdiction’.
This latter approach appears to presume that there must be a pre-existing
relationship between the state and the individual, normally conceptualized
through the criterion of ‘effective control’, or, in the words of the European
Court of Human Rights, ‘other recognised instances of the extra-territorial
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exercise of jurisdiction’5 – a phrase relating to the competence of states to assert
jurisdiction in respect of matters which may also affect the sovereignties of
other states.
In respect of this issue, the study has proposed that both the reference to
the competence (or the right) of a state to act and the employment of the factual
criterion of ‘effective control’ as a basis for the establishment of a jurisdictional
link between the acting state and the affected individual are problematic as
delimiting concepts in defining the territorial scope of human rights obliga-
tions. Firstly, human rights bodies and the International Court of Justice have
accepted as a general rule that de facto exercises of power (or control), regardless
of whether the activity constitutes a legitimate exercise of the state’s authority
vis-à-vis another state, form the basis for enlivening the state’s obligations
under human rights treaties.6 Secondly, the criterion of ‘effective control’,
although of potential use in situations of control over a foreign territory, is
rather selectively used by human rights courts and supervisory bodies to
determine the extraterritorial application of particular human rights provisions
in respect of incidental exercises of power or authority over persons. There
are several judgments and decisions in which, for example, the mere exercise
of force, the refusal to issue a passport or visa to a person living abroad, or
decisions such as the termination of pension rights or the freezing of assets
in respect of persons living abroad, did attract the state’s human rights obliga-
tions – without any particular examination of whether the affected individuals
could be said to be within the state’s ‘effective control’.7 On a similar token,
refusing migrants further passage at sea, refusing persons to board an airplane
at a foreign airport or refusing to offer protection to persons who present
themselves to a diplomatic mission are all acts which can in themselves – but
see below – bring affected individuals within the purview of human rights
protection. In sum, de facto exercises of authority over persons, in whatever
form and wherever it takes place or where its effects are felt, should be con-
sidered sufficient for establishing a ‘jurisdictional link’ between the state and
the affected individual. The evolving case-law supports a proposition that
power or authority, rather than territory, engages the state’s obligations under
human rights treaties.
It follows that the thesis introduced in this study, i.e. European states
remain responsible under international law for possible wrongdoings ensuing
from their sphere of activity in pursuing their external migration policies, finds
affirmation in both the general regime of international law and the subset of
human rights. This having said, the thesis, which is formulated in rather broad
terms, has it limits. Although it may serve as a general rule or axiom for
deducing and inferring the scope and contents of a state’s obligations in a
5 ECtHR 12 December 2001, Bankovic v Belgium, no. 52207/99, para. 72.
6 Chapter 2.4, 2.5.2.
7 Chapter 2.5.2.
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particular case at hand, the exertion of power in and impacting upon other
states’ sovereignties may well give rise to further questions of demarcation.
Firstly, there is the potential of conflicting state sovereignties: how do the
sovereign interests of other states restrict the power of the state to ensure
human rights within the other state? A second limitation concerns the potential
of conflating state sovereignties: in which sovereign order (and concomitant
sphere of responsibility) should particular violations of the law be placed which
involve a causal chain of actions or multiple actors?
8.1.1 Conflicting sovereignties
To posit that international law recognizes for and follows exertions of state
sovereignty outside the state’s territory does not in itself resolve the question
of a potential conflict between human rights obligations and the duty not to
interfere within the sovereign order of another state. Although they may seem
hypothetical, there can be all sorts of situations where to guarantee human
rights to persons outside the state’s territory could come in conflict with the
(sovereign) interests of another state. A grant of diplomatic asylum by a
sending state in opposition to demands of the host state is a classic example,
but similar situations of norm conflict may arise when, for example, a border
guard official of a sending state is confronted with an asylum claim of a
fugitive national of the host state, or when a state interdicts a migrant vessel
flying a foreign flag and where the flag state demands the return of the
passengers. The study has identified several cases before British courts and
the ECtHR in which such precise issues arose but where the courts followed
different approaches in reconciling human rights obligations with the rule of
non-intervention.8 Somewhat simplified, approaches have been adhered to
under which human rights can simply not come into play when this would
conflict with sovereign decisions of the territorial state (Gentilhomme); under
which the protection of human rights can only be deemed compatible with
public international law if it constitutes a recognised humanitarian exception
to the principle of state sovereignty (B and others); or that in principle all acts
or omissions of the state require compliance with human rights, regardless
of whether the act or omission in question is a consequence of the necessity
to comply with international legal obligations, leaving room for an argument
that extraterritorial human rights obligations may trump the principle of
respect for the territorial sovereignty of the host state (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi).
Although one may tentatively infer from this case law a development under
which the notion of state sovereignty is no longer seen as necessarily dis-
charging the sending state of its own human rights obligations, it neither seems
8 Chapter 4.5.
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that international law is as of yet sufficiently developed to provide unequivocal
guidance for addressing this type of situations.
The absence of a set of guiding principles in this respect should not come
as a surprise. The relationship between human rights and state sovereignty
is such a central and contested topic in international law that it is arguably
too much to expect courts to develop a normative framework for reconciling
these two core notions in the context of rather isolated cases. Failing the
existence of this guiding framework, appropriate solutions could however be
sought, not (only) on the level of legal doctrine or progressive jurisprudential
developments, but also, by analogy to the conventions on diplomatic asylum
concluded in Latin-America, in arrangements of practical character between
host and sending states which address the human rights concerns of specific
extraterritorial practices. Hence, should states for example agree on the place-
ment of border guards of one party in that of the other, on the conducting
of joint border controls or on the setting up of centers for the reception of
migrants, states could avoid being confronted with situations of norm conflict
by agreeing upon conditions with the host state which pay regard to their
reciprocal interests. An apt illustration in this respect concerns the case of Al-
Saadoon and Mufdhi, where the ECtHR had faulted the United Kingdom for
having failed to make use of material opportunities to secure arrangements
with the Iraqi government which would both respect the proper treatment
of prisoners in custody of British forces in Iraq as well as the sovereign interest
of the Iraqi authorities to allow its justice system to have its course. The
challenge for states concluding arrangements providing for competences to
undertake particular enforcement activity in another state is thus to include
in those arrangements, where relevant, agreements on respect for human rights
as well.
8.1.2 Conflating sovereignties
A second topical problem which rises in the context of activities described
in this study concerns the identification of the degree of causality between
a state’s sphere of activity and the eventual violation of human rights. Not
all extraterritorial activity which in some way negatively impacts upon human
rights must necessarily attract the acting state’s responsibility. Perceiving the
term jurisdiction under human rights law in the manner as described above
– a term which first and foremost gives expression to merely an exercise of
state power – is only one element in establishing whether the state has acted
in contravention of its human rights obligations. A further question, which
is especially salient in the context of the present study, is whether exercises
of authority which only remotely or indirectly affect an individual in enjoying
fundamental rights should also attract the state’s responsibility. Here, the study
has tentatively drawn a distinction between, on the one hand, enforcement
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activity in which there is a direct or sufficiently close link between the state
and the alleged misconduct, such as joint operations of border control or
schemes of external processing involving a decisive amount of involvement
and influence of a state; and, on the other hand, programmes of aid or coopera-
tion of more general nature, such as development assistance targeted at root
causes of migration, the supply of surveillance equipment, the training of
border guards, or capacity building for the reception and treatment of
migrants.
In the latter type of situations, assistance is normally rendered without
specific knowledge or presumed awareness of the circumstances in which it
will be used. This renders it difficult to establish a sufficiently close causal
link between the state’s sphere of activity and the eventual misconduct com-
plained of. Although this may allow a critical observer to conclude that Euro-
pean states can simply shift all responsibilities for controlling the border to
other states – by funding, training and supplying equipment – this essential
limit of international law must generally be deemed as beneficial for the
promotion of international cooperation. Further, this does not as such deprive
states from being receptive to human rights concerns in deciding upon such
forms of cooperation, since there may be circumstances, especially in situations
of systematic violations, where the link between general programmes of aid
and human rights does become legally relevant.
A preliminary issue within human rights law complicating the identification
of the required causal link concerns the choice of the appropriate
jurisprudential tool. The study has identified several cases (Tugar, Hess, Ben
El Mahi) where the absence of a ‘direct’ link between the exercise of authority
and the alleged violation was addressed in the context of the jurisdiction-
requirement under human rights treaties, leading to the conclusion that the
relationship between the state and the alleged victim was ‘too remote’ (Tugar),
that there was simply no ‘jurisdictional link’ (Ben El Mahi) or that an exercise
of ‘joint’ authority cannot be divided into ‘separate jurisdictions’ (Hess).9 There
have however also been cases (Ilascu, Treska, Application of the CERD (Georgia
v Russia)) where, also in the absence of an act ‘directly’ targeted at an indi-
vidual, the notion of jurisdiction was not perceived as a prima facie barrier for
accepting that the relationship of a state with a particular set of circumstances
can be of such special nature, that the state’s (positive) human rights obliga-
tions may become engaged in respect of the individual.10
In respect of this issue, the study has questioned whether the requirement
of ‘jurisdiction’ is the appropriate tool for giving expression to the link which
must exist between the acting (or omitting) state and the eventual wrongful
conduct committed in respect of an individual. In particular, employing the
notion of jurisdiction in this vein may compete with, or potentially displace,
9 Chapters 2.5.2, 3.2.4.2, 3.3.2.
10 Chapters 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 3.2.2.4, 3.2.4.2, 3.3.2.
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other legal constructions which also bridge acts of the state with eventual
wrongful conduct: the concept of positive obligations, the doctrine of derived
responsibility (or ‘aid and assistance’), but also the ‘victim-requirement’ as
laid down in Article 34 ECRH, which requires the existence of a ‘sufficiently
direct link between the applicant and the damage allegedly sustained’.11 This
is not the place to repeat the differences in nature between these legal concepts
and the respective requirements to be met for holding a state to have violated
its human rights obligations. It suffices to emphasize that these other legal
concepts have been developed precisely to provide guidance as to the circum-
stances giving rise to international responsibility for violations of international
law in situations where the establishment of the link between the state and
the affected individual is not straightforward. The tendency, in particular
within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, to bring together
questions of extraterritorial applicability with those of causality under the
single denominator of ‘jurisdiction’ hence appears to conflate issues which
are conceptually distinct. Especially a narrow outlook on the ‘jurisdiction’-
requirement in this respect risks opening up an area within human rights law
where the state’s activity may be material or decisive in the eventual manifesta-
tion of human rights violations, but without a concomitant level of inter-
national responsibility.
8.2 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY: TOWARDS RECOM-
MENDATIONS
The main task undertaken by this study has been to clarify the applicable law
and to derive from that law the essential conditions for the extraterritorial
treatment of refugees and other persons entitled to international protection.
The key conclusion in this respect is not that extraterritorial migration enforce-
ment is against the law, but rather that is it is within the law: external migration
enforcement cannot be implemented in terms of unfettered discretion of states
to control migration, but takes place within the ambit of well-established
guarantees of international law on the treatment of aliens in general and
refugees in particular.
Current and past practices of external migration control employed by EU
Member States and other Western countries display notable discrepancies in
the level of human rights protection. Some policies have been accompanied
by strict procedural safeguards; others aim at respecting human rights but
without a system of procedural rights guaranteeing their effectiveness; and
some proceed from the assumption that states enjoy an unassailable discretion
in deciding upon the treatment of migrants.
11 See chapters 2.5.3, 3.2.2.4, 3.3.
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By way of good practice, mention can be made of the United Kingdom’s
scheme introduced in 1999 of enabling its immigration rules to be operated
extraterritorially rather than only at UK points of entry. Although this scheme
expressly aimed at stemming the flow of asylum-seekers coming from countries
not subject to the UK’s visa regime (through the posting of immigration officers
in foreign countries to conduct pre-clearances), the tasks and duties of the
immigration officers operating that scheme were expressly incorporated in
the UK immigration statute.12 In granting or refusing leave to enter the immi-
gration officers were bound by the ordinary grounds for refusing entry and
those refused leave to enter enjoyed the right to lodge an appeal. Although
the House of Lord held the relevant obligations not to include respect for the
prohibition of refoulement,13 the arrangement evidences that it is well possible
to export domestic legislation on entry and border controls to controlling
activity of state agents in a foreign country.
The schemes of migrant interdiction at sea and the subsequent processing
of asylum claims in an extraterritorial facility employed by the United States
and Australia, and arguably also the ad hoc agreement between Spain and
Mauritania on the passengers of the Marine I, are examples of arrangements
which do in themselves aim at respecting human rights, and in particular the
plight of refugees, by providing for a form of refugee screening and subsequent
status determination. These arrangements accordingly reflect a recognition
that human rights do matter and that refugees should not be put at risk of
being returned to persecution. However, this pledge to safeguard rights of
refugees was implemented within systems designed to prevent migrants from
invoking any right which could effectuate their entry into the state. Ultimately,
these arrangements made the upholding of refugee and other fundamental
rights subject to the exclusive discretion of the state. As observed in chapter
7, this is highly problematic from a human rights perspective, because human
rights by their nature require the existence of mechanisms allowing for their
enforcement.
There are, finally, arrangements which do not appear to recognize any
human rights considerations whatsoever. The most clear examples are di-
versions or ‘push-backs’ at sea which take place outside the realm of domestic
legislation and neither allow for surrogate forms of protection. These arrange-
ments have been widely criticized by legal commentators and international
supervisory bodies, including the European Committee for the Prevention of
12 The relevant UK legal framework is amongst others set out in: Court of Appeal (England
and Wales) 20 May 2003, R (European Roma Rights Center) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2003] EWCA Civ 666, paras. 7-15. See, on the right of appeal against entry
clearance decisions under UK law extensively: G. Clayton, ‘The UK and Extraterritorial
Immigration Control: Entry Clearance and Juxtaposed Control’, in: B. Ryan and V. Mitsilegas
(eds), Extraterritorial Immigration Control, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff (2010), p. 407-
411.
13 See extensively chapter 4.3.1.1.
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Torture and UNHCR. The key issue raised is that this form of interdiction strikes
at the heart of interests protected under refugee law, by not allowing for a
procedure capable of establishing whether among the migrants there are
persons in need of international protection. The governments operating these
diversions have nonetheless upheld their legitimacy by relying on assertions
derived from the contested extraterritorial application of human rights and
refugee law. Typical other forms of migration control where claims are upheld
that they do not engage duties under human rights law are those which
involve the sharing of shifting of specific tasks to other states or entities. These
include the joint maritime patrols of EU Member States and third countries,
the activities of immigration officers posted in third countries who are said
to only fulfill an advisory role, and schemes of external processing where
multiple states and other entities jointly arrange for the reception and treatment
of migrants. In these situations, states have employed the fiction of mutually
exclusive state sovereignties and concomitant spheres of responsibility to
renounce distinct obligations flowing from their own acts or omissions.
To observe that current European practices of externalised migration control
do not always pay due respect for human rights is a worrisome conclusion.
Although we could leave it at that – and hope for the better in the future –
it is appropriate at this concluding moment to move beyond the letter and
spirit of the law and to address the broader legal-political context of the
phenomenon of external migration controls. It is only within that broader
context where the reasons, and hence also suggestions for solutions, for the
states’ reluctance to devise effective human rights strategies can be found.
8.2.1 Clarifying the law
A first factor explaining why states do not always pay due account to human
rights in the course of external migration enforcement is the contested nature
of the law. As noted above, some of the most crucial issues discussed in this
study are burdened with a lack of consensus within legal doctrine, contrasting
opinions of courts and sometimes conflicting regimes of law. The resulting
legal ambiguity occasions states to legally justify their activities. The judgments,
for example, of the US Supreme Court in Sale and the House of Lords in Roma
Rights, endorse rather than restrict the liberty of states to take enforcement
action in respect of persons claiming protection in the course of sea operations
or pre-clearances at airports. On a more general note, the externalization of
migration enforcement can be depicted as a trend under which states uni-
laterally and broadly interpret the scope of their competencies and where the
law, including its institutionalised supervisory structures, encounters problems
in providing acute responses. This calls for the continuation of efforts to clarify
the relevant legal framework. The present study has taken up this challenge
and constitutes one attempt at contributing to ongoing discourse and at identi-
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fying the proper application of the law to a number of past and current
practices. Beyond academic legal discourse, which on the subject matter of
this study continues to produce a considerable collection of literature, there
are a range of other actors, stakeholders and supervisory bodies which play
a role in identifying and setting limits to the external migration policies of
states.
On the international level, which by its nature offers the best chances of
arriving at harmonious interpretations, the topic of this study also enjoys an
increasing amount of interest. Especially UNHCR has ever since the exodus of
Vietnamese boat people in the 1970s shown an unremitting effort in explaining
and emphasizing the rights of refugees who are subjected to extraterritorial
enforcement activity. In more recent years, other relevant international organ-
izations have followed suit. Amongst many other efforts, the International
Maritime Organization has pressed for and adopted amendments to maritime
treaty law and guidelines on the treatment of persons rescued at sea; the
European Union, whose role is more extensively discussed in section 8.3, has
called for studies and arrangements setting forth the applicable law in respect
of interdiction activities; the International Organisation for Migration has
regularly organized round tables and expert seminars on diverse issues of
external migration management and the European Committee of Torture has
published a highly critical report on the Italian push-back strategy. On a more
general level, international courts and supervisory bodies have issued a range
of pronouncements on the relevant framework governing extraterritorial
activity of states.
Although it is difficult to estimate the effect these norm-setting activities
have had on the actions of individual states, the continuous attention for the
extraterritorial treatment of migrants of international supervisory bodies is
a welcome development. Although they may not always offer uniform inter-
pretations nor receive unequivocal support, they allow for progressive
standard-setting and provide a forum for discussion and the exchange of good
practices. Perhaps more importantly, the sense of involvement displayed by
international organizations indicates that there exists a shared international
concern for persons who are at risk of not finding protection with any state
and that therefore collective responses should be formulated.
From the perspective of resolving legal ambiguities, one problem remains
that most of the adopted standards are of soft law character, such as is the
case with UNHCR conclusions and recommendations, IMO guidelines and the
EU guidelines for Frontex rescue operations at sea. Another factor which
explains the limited observance by states is the lack of effective individual
complaint mechanisms, as is the case under international maritime law treaties
and the Refugee Convention. More may be expected in this regard of obliga-
tions of European states under the European Convention of Human Rights
and the capacity of the European Court of Human Rights to issue binding
judgments in respect of individual claims. The pending case of Hirsi v Italy,
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on the Italian push back-policy, is the first case in which the European Court
is specifically asked to dwell upon the issue of migrant interdiction at sea and
could therefore set an important precedent.14
It may, in view of the abundant amount of literature and debate on the
topic, perhaps come as a surprise that the issue of legality of external migration
policies, and in particular enforcement activities such as pre-clearances and
interdictions, have not attracted a more robust collection of international
jurisprudence. An important explanation may lie in the fact that the out-
sourcing of control tasks engenders intrinsic obstacles in the sphere of
justiciability. On the one hand, we have seen that domestic courts, for example
in Spain (Marine I) and the United States (Sale and others) have considered
the activities of states to be exempt from judicial prosecution because they
fall under the ‘political question’-doctrine or because domestic courts simply
lack jurisdiction to apply domestic laws to foreign cases.15 On the other hand,
the physical distance of controls and the resulting difficulty of monitoring and
ensuring legal representation constitutes a potent barrier for individual
migrants to lodge complaints or appeals and to present themselves before a
court. And even in the exceptional situation that a migrant or a group of
migrants, often due to the unrelenting efforts of specialized NGOs or UNHCR,
succeed in bringing a complaint, the problem of keeping track of migrants
and of obtaining authentic authorization of attorney may pose a bar for the
complaint’s admissibility. Thus, in the case of Hussun a.o. v Italy, concerning
the expulsion of a group of 84 migrants who had landed in Lampedusa and
who had subsequently absconded or were expelled, the European Court of
Human Rights declared the complaints inadmissible on account of the re-
presentatives having lost all contact with the applicants and because the
powers of attorney of 34 of the applicants had in fact been written and signed
by one and the same person.16 The complaint in the Marine I case failed on
a similar ground, namely because the organization lodging the complaint could
not demonstrate that it was duly competent to represent the alleged victims.
In order to preclude repetition, and in the light of the high profile it has
accorded to the case, UNHCR has made special arrangements for keeping track
of the whereabouts of the complainants and for ensuring their proper represen-
tation in the pending case of Hirsi v Italy. But in the vast majority of cases
where persons are subjected to extraordinary controls or diversions, this service
will be unavailable, rendering the lodging of (successful) complaints a distant
likelihood. There is, in sum, no shortage of factors explaining why it is that
so little cases on the topic of this study have resulted in successful litigation:
admissibility thresholds of domestic and international courts; a lack of pro-
cedural safeguards and information about avenues for obtaining redress; the
14 See chapter 6.4.2.
15 Chapters 4.3.1.1, 6.4.2, 7.3.
16 ECtHR 19 January 2010, Hussun a.o. v Italy, nos. 10171/05, 10601/05, 11593/05 et 17165/05.
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ignorance and limited resources on the part of migrants to individually
vindicate their rights; and a lack of access to legal aid. This creates a trouble-
some dynamic in which the absence of institutionalized safeguards for protect-
ing human rights is able to sustain itself.
The identification of the legal framework governing external migration
practices of states involves not only relevant international norms but also the
application of domestic statutes. As indicated, the formulation or extrapolation
of domestic guarantees to foreign conduct of states is crucial in ensuring
respect for human rights. Procedural duties inherent in human rights protection
require domestic law to restrict the scope of discretion offered to competent
authorities and to protect against arbitrariness. This is a proposition states find
difficult to accept. The widening of the state’s competences to undertake
enforcement activity outside its ordinary legal order is only seldom ac-
companied with an extrapolation of individual guarantees. This has resulted
in constructions of enigmatic legal character, under which domestic immigra-
tion laws are selectively employed as a basis for undertaking enforcement
activities. Thus, whereas the US Supreme Court in Sale denied the extraterri-
torial application of US immigration statutes, the Presidential Order allowing
for the interdiction of aliens at sea derives a competence to return vessels from
a ‘reason to believe that an offense is being committed against the United States
immigration laws’. This begs the question how one can violate a law which
in the circumstances of the case does not apply. The alternative solution of
prospective nature created by the EU Council Decision on maritime Frontex
operations (‘reasonable grounds for suspecting that they carry persons intending
to circumvent the checks at border crossing points’), is semantically more
sound, but it neither complies with the essential rule that state competences
and individual rights are two sides of the same coin.
8.2.2 Clarifying reality
A second and related factor which helps understanding why the protection
of human rights in externalised migration controls often falters is the lack of
information and visibility of what goes on in practice. This study itself has
encountered the problem that very little is disseminated about the actual
manner of, for example, joint controls coordinated by Frontex or between EU
Member States and third countries or of the activities of immigration officers
posted at foreign airports. This is due not only to governments displaying
reluctance in making public the relevant arrangements, but also due to the
physical distance of the relevant activities. In the first place, both governmental
and non-governmental stakeholders such as human rights institutions, NGOs,
the media and legal advisers have no self-evident access to persons who are
subjected to external controls. The fact that activities are undertaken within
territories of regimes which are not always used to the same standards of
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public scrutiny is a further obstacle for these actors to fulfill their traditional
role of informing the public and of monitoring human rights compliance.
Secondly, the physical distance of the control activities may lead to the socio-
logical effect pointed to by Grahl-Madsen in this conclusion’s introduction,
namely that public opinion feels less concerned with people who remain
outside national borders and who are therefore not deemed to be of society’s
primary concern. These dynamics, which may be mutually reinforcing, explain
the lack of reliable and systematic information on what precise activity states
undertake outside their borders, which in turn renders it difficult to make firm
statements on whether such activity complies with the law or not. Although
this study has not refrained from taking a critical stance towards particular
state practices, this criticism was often couched in terms of ‘may’, ‘if’ and
‘probably’. This also points to the incentive of states to preserve the obscure
character of some of their external strategies. It allows not only for a maximiza-
tion of their discretionary powers, but also for rebutting allegations that human
rights are violated. To give an example, it is sheer impossible to verify Italy’s
claim that none of the persons intercepted in the course of its push-back policy
expressed an intention to apply for asylum, in which case they would allegedly
have been promptly brought to Italy.
Typically, states and other entities responsible for border controls invoke
the ground of public security or the preservation of international relations to
refuse the disclosure of specific information on the conducting of controls.
In requesting a copy of the Operation Plan of the Hera 2007 operation, the
present author was informed by the Frontex agency that disclosure of the
documents would undermine the course of external border controls and
therefore fell under the public security exception of the EC Regulation on public
access to documents. The CPT delegation which visited Italy in July 2009 to
verify whether the push-back policy complied with the prohibition of
refoulement, was denied access to inter alia the logbooks of the operations and
inventory lists of objects seized from the migrants on grounds of confidential-
ity, even though Italy could have requested the CPT not to make the informa-
tion public. Despite repeated requests of European Parliament, the biannual
report on the functioning of EU networks of immigration liaison officers
remains classified and although a proposal is now pending to better inform
the European Parliament on the activities of the network, the European Com-
mission has refused to include in this information specific data on how the
functioning of the network affects asylum-seekers.17 This is not the place to
extensively discuss whether all aspects of border controls, and in particular
information on procedures to be followed, the grounds for refusing further
passage and the numbers of affected persons must necessary fall under the
protected interests of public security or international relations. It suffices to
17 Chapter 5.2.2.3.
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observe that the veil of security interests obstructs transparency and public
understanding of practices which due to their physical distance and isolated
location are already highly invisible to the public.
NGOs and UNHCR have recognized the imperative of ensuring that more
information is disseminated on what goes at and beyond the EU’s external
borders. UNHCR is engaged in the screening of (returned) migrants for refugees
and on assembling data on the number of migrants who indicate a wish for
and who subsequently receive a form of international protection. Organizations
such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the European Council
on Refugees and Exiles and Pro-Asyl report on incidents occurring at sea and
collect stories and travel accounts of individual migrants in an effort to give
some impression of the consequences of externalized controls for individual
migrants. Other privately instigated activities concern those of ‘United for
Intercultural Action’ and ‘Fortress Europe’, internet-based action groups which
collect press accounts on migrant deaths and other incidents along the EU’s
external border and which compile data and publish yearly statistics on the
loss of immigrant life at sea or in African transit countries. Governmental
information, on the other hand, is normally restricted to persons who have
presented themselves at their borders. Although these data present reliable
accounts on, for example, the nationalities of the migrants and the ratio
between successful and unsuccessful asylum claimants, they do not shed clear
light on the plight of those who have not succeeded in arriving at their border.
8.2.3 Clarifying political aims
The essential political challenge underlying the subject of this study is that
of reconciling rights of refugees and other migrants with the goal of preventing
unsolicited migration. The idea of protection elsewhere and of outsourcing
and externalizing control mechanisms was born out of, as Lord Justice Simon
Brown of the England and Wales Court of Appeal put it, ‘the great public
concern’ on ‘asylum overload’ and illegal immigration.18 The ‘problem’ caused
by this phenomenon was initially sought to be controlled by imposing visa
regimes upon states from which most asylum-seekers or irregular migrants
come, coupled with a system of carrier’s liability to ensure that the requirement
for prior entry clearances would be effectively enforced. The very object of
these controls is ‘of course’ – again quoting Lord Justice Brown – to prevent
these persons from reaching our shores: ‘the very arrival of asylum-seekers
at the border entitles them to apply for asylum and thus defeats the visa
regime’. The conducting of pre-clearances by immigration officers at foreign
airports and the establishment of controls at the high seas or territorial waters
of third countries are additional instruments ensuring that only persons with
18 Supra n. 12, para. 1.
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prior admission arrive at the state’s border. The foremost rationale of all these
policies is to prevent unauthorized migrants from effectuating an unauthorized
entry – as this would automatically set in motion administrative and societal
burdens.
Yet, there is notable consensus among the major immigration countries,
including the Member States of the European Union, that refugees form a
particular vulnerable group and that external migration controls should, if
possible and manageable, pay account to their particular entitlements under
international law – or at the least their precarious humanitarian position. Thus,
even Justice Stevens, delivering the majority opinion in the contested judgment
of the US Supreme Court in Sale, acknowledged that ‘the gathering of fleeing
refugees and their return to the one country they had desperately sought to
escape’ may ‘violate the spirit of the Refugee Convention’. In order to take
heed of this spirit, governments have chosen to devise schemes of external
processing so as to preclude refugees from being sent back to countries of
persecution. It is for the same reason that many states, in implementing
schemes of carrier’s liability or border controls at sea, make reference to the
upholding refugee rights. It must therefore also be concluded that, even in
the absence of forthright acknowledgments that human rights and refugee
law constrain external migration activities, their underlying humanitarian
aspirations are generally embraced as a standard for the treatment of migrants.
This study has indicated that although the twin aims of preventing un-
authorized migration and respecting refugee rights may find reconciliation
in the context of policy documents, round table discussions or press releases
issued by responsible agencies, they are much more difficult to reconcile in
practice. Border guards may be trained in understanding refugee law, but if
the domestic procedures under which they operate do not allow for referring
claimants to a protection mechanism, the training remains an academic
exercise. The Dutch immigration service may have opened up a special phone
number for private carriers in case they are confronted with persons claiming
asylum, but in the absence of a duty on the part of carriers to entertain asylum
applications, it is no surprise that the phone never rings.19 Other questionable
attempts at reconciling human rights with control concerns are the ‘shout-test’
of the US Navy, under which persons are only given a credible fear interview
if they spontaneously show or state a fear of return20; and the more recent
Italian practice of only bringing to its shore those persons who, upon being
rescued or interdicted, declare immediately a wish to apply for asylum.
The essential challenge therefore, is not only to formulate political aims,
but also to make – and to account for – political choices. Despite increasing
discourse, especially within the European Union, on establishing ‘protection-
sensitive’ entry management systems, current practices do appear to sub-
19 Chapter 5.2.2.2 at n. 45.
20 Chapter 7.2.1 at n. 25.
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ordinate human rights to the goal of preventing illegal entries. States have
refrained from establishing (or have abolished) protected entry procedures;
from granting a general waiver for private carriers bringing persons claiming
asylum to their territories; from exporting asylum guarantees inherent in
border controls standards to pre-clearances; or from establishing external
processing arrangements capable of granting rights of entry for those who
are found to be a refugee. The underlying political choice is clear but rarely
ventilated by government officials: the advantage such arrangements may bring
in terms of human rights are outweighed by the risk that they may facilitate
irregular entries.
Proper understanding of the legal challenges raised by this study would
be much enhanced if states would more clearly acknowledge that it is inherent-
ly difficult to ensure respect for human rights in the course of external controls.
This study has, in fact, not been able to identify a single example of where
a system of procedural guarantees for the upholding of refugee and human
rights has been successfully implemented within a control mechanism which
ensures that persons without legal entitlements of entry are precluded from
arriving in the state. This is not due to a lack of creativity on the part of states,
but because the contents of procedural and material duties of human rights
impose a heavy burden on states, in particular in respect of claims for asylum.
It is well-nigh impossible to install status determination procedures of suffi-
ciently quality, coupled with access to legal assistance and effective remedies,
in the context of controlling procedures which aim at the swift and efficient
checking of persons outside the state’s territory and which may further be
of only temporary character. This is not necessarily the case in respect of more
durable arrangements of external processing of asylum applications, but, as
concluded in chapter 7, these schemes are in themselves resource-intensive
and can only be deemed a legal success if accompanied with guarantees on
timely repatriation and resettlement which may be difficult to procure.
The bleak prospect that emerges is that European and other immigration
countries will continue to employ and expand their arsenals of external migra-
tion instruments without them finding effective ways of ensuring that these
instruments do not jeopardize access to protection for refugees. Although the
further crystallisation of the law and efforts of procuring and disseminating
information on the human rights effects of certain state practices may con-
tribute to better human rights compliance or even force states to abandon some
of the most legally questionable practices, adherence to human rights is ulti-
mately premised on a requisite amount of societal and political support.
Because the deterrent effect of external migration controls is widely perceived
as crucial for preserving essential societal interests, it is likely that fundamental
rights will face continuous contestation and that therefore external migration
enforcement remains in a constant state of tension with both the letter and
spirit of human rights and refugee law.
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8.3 THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A PANACEA FOR UPHOLDING REFUGEE RIGHTS?
The European Union may, both as a source of law and as a collective platform
for action, be better placed than individual Member States to address some
of the challenges discussed above. The policy strategies of the EU in the sphere
of external migration and asylum display a firm commitment to the vulnerable
position of refugees. The EU’s programme of enhancing refugee protection
capacities in regions of origin and transit must be commended from the
perspective of ensuring that refugees have access to effective protection and
for contributing to global efforts to alleviate the needs of refugees. These
activities see in particular to promoting accession and adherence of third
countries to refugee instruments, to the creation of national protection systems
consistent with international rules on refugees and asylum, and to contributing
to the durable solutions of resettlement, local integration and voluntary return.
This commitment to refugees also features in respect of the strategy of
integrated border management, which includes the multi-layered system of
pre-entry control measures. The goal to make these measures more ‘protection-
sensitive’ has already produced some concrete results, such as in the sphere
of border guard training on asylum issues, a more firm embedding of funda-
mental rights in the recast of the Frontex Regulation and a recognition that
the compilation of data and incident reporting contributes to an understanding
of the nature and effects of particular forms of border control. The European
Asylum Support Office, established in May 2010, has an express mandate to
be involved in the external dimension of the Common European Asylum
System and to contribute to ensuring that the international protection needs
of refugees in the context of the external dimension are met.21
Further, in respect of clarifying the law, the study has forecasted a trend
under which EU law pertaining to border controls and fundamental rights may
compensate for the substantial amount of discretion the current EU policy on
external migration is perceived to accord to Member States. This prospect
concerns not only instances where Member States implement relevant EU
instruments on, for example, carrier’s liability, Frontex operations or the
deployment of immigration officers, but also involves the broader matter of
identifying which activities of Member States should be deemed as falling
within the remit of the EU’s common border crossings regime. The action
brought before the European Court of Justice for annulment of the Council
Decision on maritime Frontex operations is a very welcome and timely one,
since it deals with the essential issue of whether ordinary EU safeguards on
border checks must also apply to extraordinary checking procedures.
Yet, when it comes to those situations where control concerns may warrant
diametrically opposed solutions as respect for rights of refugees and other
irregular migrants, the EU has shown to be little more than the sum of its parts.
21 Articles 2(1) and 7 Regulation EU No. 439/2010.
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Although it is instrumental in exchanging good practices and in providing
support and technical assistance to Member States subject to particular migra-
tion pressures, the EU has not been able to agree upon more far-reaching
arrangements in the sphere of burden sharing of migrant arrivals among
Member States or the obligatory allocation of rescued or intercepted migrants.
Although these mechanisms may ultimately be much more effective in guar-
anteeing that Member States respect procedural and other rights of migrants,
they face the obstacle of the Member States’ sovereign prerogative of deciding
upon questions of entry and residence.
Council Decision 2010/252/EU on maritime Frontex operations is symptom-
atic of the EU’s limited capacities in this respect. Despite its aim to ensure
uniform application of relevant aspects of international maritime law and
international law on refugees and fundamental rights, the Decision has not
succeeded in creating a binding arrangement for the disembarkation of
migrants, it does not define what procedural duties flow from the prohibition
of refoulement in the course of interdictions at sea, and it has disconnected
external controls from the ordinary regime on border crossings instead of
bringing them within that framework. In sum, the decision epitomizes rather
than resolves the contested applicability of fundamental rights and EU law
to operations undertaken outside EU territory.

Samenvatting
EUROPA EN EXTRATERRITORIAAL ASIEL
Het voor u liggende boek betreft een juridisch promotieonderzoek naar de
hedendaagse trend waaronder Europese staten, in een poging de druk op de
binnenlandse beschermingscapaciteit te verlagen, in toenemende mate trachten
migratie- en asielstromen buiten het eigen grondgebied te reguleren. Deze
trend betreft het uitvoeren van migratiecontroles op personen die het grond-
gebied van de Europese Unie nog niet hebben bereikt, zoals op zee of lucht-
havens in niet-EU landen, het stellen en handhaven van toegangsvoorwaarden
nog voordat migranten de Europese buitengrenzen hebben bereikt, en het
creëren van bescherming- en opvangalternatieven voor vluchtelingen in landen
buiten de Europese Unie.
Deze ‘externalisering’ van het migratiebeleid heeft eerst en vooral tot doel
een rem te zetten op de binnenkomst van ongewenste migranten. Door in te
grijpen nog voordat een migrant zonder recht op toegang zich meldt aan de
grens, worden juridische en logistieke lasten die gepaard gaan met statusdeter-
minatie en eventuele uitzetting weggenomen. Er is evenwel ook kritiek op
de wijze waarop Europese landen uitvoering aan deze externe migratiestrategie
geven. Eén van de voornaamste bezwaren is dat ook vluchtelingen, die vaak
ongedocumenteerd zijn, beperkt worden in hun mogelijkheden bescherming
te vinden op het Europese grondgebied. Externe migratiecontroles zouden,
anders dan controles aan de grens zelf, onvoldoende acht slaan op de bijzon-
dere status van vluchtelingen. Ten aanzien van pogingen om alternatieve
vormen van opvang voor vluchtelingen in derde landen in te richten wordt
verder de kritiek geuit dat deze opvang de rechten van vluchtelingen onvol-
doende zeker stelt en niet kan gelden als volwaardig substituut voor asiel
binnen Europa.
Het promotieonderzoek bestudeert het spanningsveld tussen externe
controlemechanismen en de rechtspositie van vluchtelingen en andere asiel-
zoekers. De centrale stelling die wordt verdedigd is dat indien Europese landen
uitvoering aan dergelijk beleid geven, zij onder het internationale recht gehou-
den blijven de rechten van vluchtelingen en asielzoekers te respecteren.
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Het proefschrift bestaat uit drie delen van elk twee hoofdstukken. Het eerste
deel (hoofdstukken 2 en 3) verschaft het algemene internationaalrechtelijke
en mensenrechtelijke kader dat van toepassing is op atypische situaties van
statelijk optreden, in het bijzonder optreden van staten buiten het eigen grond-
gebied en optreden dat plaatsvindt in gemeenschappelijkheid met andere
actoren, zoals andere staten of private partijen als luchtvervoerders. Dit deel
van de studie is deels inventariserend van karakter, maar beschouwt ook
kritisch de heersende opvattingen in doctrine en jurisprudentie. Hoofdstuk
2 verkent de theorie, internationale jurisprudentie en doctrine omtrent de
extraterritoriale werking van mensenrechtenverdragen. Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt
de internationaalrechtelijke leerstukken omtrent de toedeling van verantwoor-
delijkheden voor gedeeld of gedelegeerd optreden van staten. Ten aanzien
van beide thema’s wordt geconcludeerd dat het internationale recht, inclusief
mensenrechtenverdragen, voldoende ontwikkeld en geëquipeerd is om rechts-
statelijke grenzen te stellen, waardoor ‘gaten’ in de internationale rechtsbescher-
ming kunnen worden voorkomen. De reikwijdte van de internationale aanspra-
kelijkheid van staten in dit verband wordt evenwel begrensd door 1) het
beginsel van staatssoevereiniteit, en in het bijzonder de verplichting om de
territoriale soevereiniteit van andere staten te respecteren en 2) de overdracht
van bevoegdheden aan andere actoren of het delen van bevoegdheden met
andere actoren. In algemene zin kan worden gesteld dat een vaststelling van
internationale aansprakelijkheid een duidelijk te identificeren band vereist
tussen statelijk optreden en een uiteindelijke schending van internationaal
recht.
Het tweede deel van het proefschrift (hoofdstukken 4 en 5) betreft een con-
ceptualisering van het begrip ‘extraterritoriaal asiel’ in het internationale
respectievelijk Europese recht. Hoofdstuk 4 bespreekt de relevante juridische
verschillen tussen situaties van ‘territoriaal asiel’ (asiel op het grondgebied
van de aangezochte staat) en ‘extraterritoriaal asiel’ (asiel gevraagd aan een
extraterritoriaal optredende staat). Centraal in dit hoofdstuk staat de drie-
hoeksverhouding tussen een extraterritoriaal operende staat, de territoriale
staat en het bescherming zoekende individu. Het hoofdstuk geeft een histo-
rische beschouwing van diplomatieke asielverlening in het internationale recht,
analyseert de extraterritoriale werking van de refoulementverboden en be-
spreekt de voorwaarden waaronder een individu het recht om asiel te zoeken
moet worden toegekend. De slotparagraaf bespreekt aan de hand van relevante
jurisprudentie de mogelijke spanning die kan bestaan tussen enerzijds een
mensenrechtelijke verplichting om bescherming aan een individu in een andere
staat te verlenen en de verplichting anderzijds om niet te treden in de terri-
toriale soevereiniteit van de andere staat.
Hoofdstuk 5 bespreekt de grenzen die het recht van de Europese Unie stelt
aan externe vormen van migratiecontrole. Het hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht
van de Europese rechtsinstrumenten die de externe dimensie van het Europese
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asiel- en migratiebeleid vormgeven. In het bijzonder wordt ingegaan op
visumverplichtingen, verplichtingen van luchtvervoerders (carrier sanctions),
de bevoegdheden van immigratieverbindingsofficieren, het mandaat en optre-
den van het buitengrensagentschap Frontex en instrumenten die specifiek zien
op het verbeteren van de bescherming van asielzoekers in derde landen. Ook
wordt de mogelijke toepasselijkheid van regels voortkomend uit het Schengen-
recht en gemeenschappelijke asielrecht op situaties van extraterritoriaal asiel
besproken. In dat kader komt ook Raadsbesluit 2010/252/EU aan de orde,
waarin regels zijn neergelegd voor maritieme grenscontroles die worden
gecoördineerd door het EU agentschap Frontex. Het Europees Parlement heeft
dit Raadsbesluit ter vernietiging voorgelegd aan het Hof van Justitie van de
EU vanwege een onjuist gevolgde besluitvormingsprocedure. De studie betrekt
de stelling dat het Raadsbesluit niet slechts vanwege procedurele redenen maar
ook op materiële gronden moet worden vernietigd: anders dan de Schengen
Grenscode verlangt, ontbreken in het Raadsbesluit essentiële waarborgen
omtrent de rechtsbescherming van op zee onderschepte migranten.
Het laatste deel van de studie (hoofdstukken 6 en 7) toetst in hoeverre huidige
Europese praktijken van extraterritoriale migratiecontroles plaatsvinden in
overeenstemming met het internationale recht, in het bijzonder vluchtelingen-
recht en mensenrechten. Hoofdstuk 6 geeft een uitputtende juridische analyse
van zeegrenscontroles. Het hoofdstuk bespreekt in hoeverre het internationale
maritieme recht een grondslag biedt voor de onderschepping van bootmigran-
ten, welke bescherming volgens het maritieme recht dient te worden geboden
aan migranten die in nood zijn op zee, en welke rechten onderschepte migran-
ten kunnen ontlenen aan mensenrechtenverdragen. In hoofdstuk 7 komt de
externe opvang van asielzoekers aan bod. Aan de hand van voormalig en
huidig beleid gevoerd door de regeringen van Australië en de Verenigde Staten
wordt bezien in hoeverre gelijksoortige Europese voorstellen om over te gaan
tot de externe opvang van asielzoekers juridisch haalbaar zijn. Ten aanzien
van zowel maritieme onderscheppingen als de externe opvang van asielzoekers
wordt geconcludeerd dat zij niet altijd in overeenstemming geschieden met
geldende internationale normen en dat zij het risico van gebrekkige individuele
rechtsbescherming met zich dragen.
In het concluderende hoofdstuk worden drie algemene aanbevelingen gedaan.
Eerstens wordt aangedrongen op een verdere verheldering van het toe-
passelijke rechtskader indien Europese staten besluiten personencontroles
buiten het eigen grondgebied uit te voeren. Dit betreft niet slechts de identifi-
catie van relevante internationale normstellingen, maar ook de vertaling van
deze normen in nationale en Europese wetgeving. In die vertaling zou het
in het bijzonder moeten gaan om de opstelling van procedurele garanties en
het waarborgen van rechterlijk toezicht.
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Ten tweede wordt aanbevolen tot het vergroten van de zichtbaarheid en
kennis van de praktische consequenties van externe vormen van migratiecon-
trole. Het onderzoek concludeert dat gouvernementele toezichthouders, non-
gouvernementele organisaties, rechtshulpverleners, de media en andere rele-
vante actoren nauwelijks zicht hebben op of toegang hebben tot extern optre-
den van staten, waardoor niet slechts de individuele rechtsbescherming, maar
ook de publieke informatieverstrekking en legitimering in gedrang komt.
Ten derde wordt aanbevolen tot een verduidelijking van de politieke
doelstellingen die aan externe migratiecontroles ten grondslag liggen. De twee
hoofddoelstellingen die op beleidsniveau doorgaans worden geformuleerd
zijn het tegengaan van illegale migratie enerzijds en het blijven bieden van
bescherming aan vluchtelingen en andere zwakke groepen migranten ander-
zijds. Het onderzoek signaleert dat in de praktijk het belang van het tegengaan
van illegale migratie vaak prevaleert boven de bescherming van vluchtelingen.
Het politieke uitgangspunt dat vluchtelingen beschermd dienen te worden
behoeft derhalve een betere implementatie in de praktijk. Het onderzoek
concludeert onder andere dat huidige pogingen om controlemechanismes in
te richten die recht doen aan beide doelstellingen onvoldoende succesvol zijn
en doet suggesties voor verbetering.
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